Tuesday, 8 September 2026

 Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Premier) (12:05): I move:

That I introduce a bill for an act to amend the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act ‍2011 to broaden the concept of corrupt conduct and enhance the IBAC’s ability to follow the money, to make consequential amendments to the Public Interest Disclosures Act 2012 and for other purposes.

Motion agreed to.

 James NEWBURY (Brighton) (12:05): I seek a brief explanation of the bill.

 Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Premier) (12:06): The bill makes amendments to the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 to expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to enable it to investigate suspected corrupt conduct by third-party and private subcontractors where there is a connection between the alleged corrupt conduct and the performance of a public function funded by government. It will also broaden the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ to replace the requirement that corrupt conduct constitute a relevant offence with the requirement that the conduct constitute any offence and lower the threshold of conduct constituting a serious disciplinary matter to allow IBAC to investigate a broader range of integrity-compromising behaviours and make other necessary consequential and technical amendments.

Read first time.

Ben CARROLL: Under standing order 61(3)(b), I advise the house that representatives of the other parties and independents have been provided with a copy of the bill and a briefing in accordance with the standing order. I will therefore move the second reading immediately.

 Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Premier) (12:08): Under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, I table a statement of compatibility:

In accordance with section 28 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Charter), I make this Statement of Compatibility with response to the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026 (Bill).

In my opinion, the Bill, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is compatible with human rights as set out in the Charter. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview

The Bill introduces amendments to the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (IBAC Act) to expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to examine and investigate corruption.

The purpose of the Bill is to:

• Broaden the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ to enable IBAC to investigate conduct that would constitute a ‘serious disciplinary matter’ or any offence, and

• Expand the definitions of ‘public body’ and ‘public officer’ to enable IBAC to investigate suspected corrupt conduct of persons performing public functions on behalf of the State, when the conduct is linked to the expenditure or use of public funds.

Human Rights Issues

The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to the Bill include:

• Right to freedom of movement (section 12)

• Right to privacy and reputation (section 13)

• Right to freedom of expression (section 15(2))

• Property rights (section 20)

• Right to a fair hearing (section 24(1))

• Right to protection against self-incrimination (section 25(2)(k)).

Currently the IBAC Act empowers IBAC to identify, investigate and expose ‘corrupt conduct’, but only if the conduct constitutes a ‘relevant offence’ (being an indictable offence against an Act or certain common law offences such as misconduct in public office and bribery of a public official). Clause 5(2) of the Bill removes the relevant offence requirement and expands IBAC’s jurisdiction to include conduct that would constitute a ‘serious disciplinary matter’ (as defined under clause 4(a)) or ‘any offence’. These changes will enable IBAC to investigate a wider range of unethical or integrity-comprising behaviours, common law offences, and summary offences which don’t meet the current threshold for a relevant offence.

Clause 6 of the Bill enhances IBAC’s capacity to examine corrupt conduct in the exercise or performance of public functions, including where those functions extend to private contractors if there is a connection between the alleged conduct and government funding. Pursuant to the amendments, IBAC will be empowered to investigate corrupt conduct of ‘associated entities’ as defined in clause 4(a), which will be included under the existing definitions of public body and public officer in section 6(1) of the IBAC Act. This will address corruption risks which are increasingly arising where public functions are delivered, or public funds are administered, beyond traditional government structures. This includes, for example, where there is misuse of public funds or lack of transparency of those funds, by a broader range of persons or entities who now deliver public functions, such as through public/private partnerships, or other complex contracting arrangements.

Clause 8(1) of the Bill provides transitional provisions to account for:

• active investigations underway before the commencement day or where IBAC has made a determination to investigate the complaint but taken no action,

• complaints or notifications already received by IBAC but not yet determined,

• complaints or notifications received after the commencement day and

• own motion investigations after the commencement day.

Investigations that have been finalised will not be subject to the reforms.

Clause 8(2) of the Bill provides a transitional provision to delay compliance with section 57 of the IBAC Act for a period of six months for any associated entity that will now be captured by IBAC’s jurisdiction. This seeks to provide IBAC additional time in which to update its policies and procedures and implement communications regarding the new obligations, so that any associated entities that do not already fall within IBAC’s jurisdiction can be made aware of their new obligations.

There is a strong public interest in ensuring that public funds are utilised appropriately and in line with their intended purpose. The reforms promote transparency and seek to build public confidence in both IBAC and the public sector, by allowing Victorians to trust that IBAC is equipped to investigate and expose corruption. As Victoria’s premier anti-corruption body, it is integral that IBAC is afforded necessary functions to examine and investigate the conduct of third parties who utilise public funds.

Expanding IBAC’s jurisdiction in accordance with the Bill does not, of itself, engage any human rights. However, the expanded jurisdiction will mean that more individuals and a broader range of conduct will be subject to IBAC’s scrutiny and investigative powers, consistently with the purposes of the Bill.

In my opinion, IBAC’s expanded jurisdiction, as provided in the Bill, does not alter the way in which its existing investigative powers affect human rights protected by the Charter or remove the legitimate objectives of those powers.

I note that the human rights outlined in this statement may already have been affected or limited by the IBAC Act as it exists now. Previous statements of compatibility have concluded even where rights are limited any such limitation are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in accordance with section 7(2) of the Charter. The Bill does not affect those previous assessments. Moreover, even if it is considered that the Bill does affect or limit a human right, any such limitation would also be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable based on those previous assessments and the existing safeguards and limitations on certain IBAC powers in the IBAC Act. For example, any interference with the right to privacy in section 13 of the Charter arising from IBAC’s exercise of its powers will still be lawful and not arbitrary. This is because IBAC would not be properly equipped to perform its statutory functions of identifying, exposing and investigating corrupt conduct without its investigative powers, including the power to hold public examinations.

Further, although the Bill lowers IBAC’s investigation threshold, it does not remove any of the safeguards that apply to the exercise of the IBAC’s powers. Therefore, for any new persons or bodies that may be subject to IBAC’s powers, as a result of the amendments, the existing safeguards afforded to public bodies or public officers as currently defined in the IBAC Act will apply.

Existing safeguards under current sections 60(4) and 60(5) will also apply in relation to the transitional provisions. This will ensure that IBAC does not investigate conduct which occurred prior to commencement if, for example, it considers the conduct is trivial or is not satisfied that it is in the public interest to investigate the conduct.

Conclusion

I am satisfied that the Bill is compatible with the Charter and does not limit any rights in the Charter, for the reasons set out above.

The Hon. Anthony Carbines

Minister for Artificial Intelligence and the Digital Economy

Minister for Major Events

Minister for Medical Research

Minister for Racing

Minister for Economic Development

 Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Premier) (12:08): Under the Statewide Treaty Act 2025, I table a statement of treaty compatibility:

1.   In accordance with section 66 of the Statewide Treaty Act 2025 (Vic) (Statewide Treaty Act), I table a statement of Treaty compatibility for the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026 (the Bill).

2.   In my opinion, the Bill is compatible with the matters set out in section 66(3)(d) of the Statewide Treaty Act. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview of the Bill

3.   The Bill introduces amendments to the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) (IBAC Act) to expand the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission’s (IBAC) jurisdiction to examine and investigate corruption.

4.   The purpose of the Bill is to:

a. Broaden the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ to enable IBAC to investigate conduct that would constitute a ‘serious disciplinary matter’ or any criminal offence, and

b. Expand the definitions of ‘public body’ and ‘public officer’ to enable IBAC to investigate suspected corrupt conduct of persons performing public functions on behalf of the State, when the conduct is linked to the expenditure or use of public funds.

Consultation with the First Peoples’ Assembly of Gellung Warl

5.   The First Peoples’ Assembly of Gellung Warl (Assembly) was provided with information regarding the Bill and an opportunity to advise on the Bill in August 2026. Following receipt of this information, the Assembly provided a response as follows:

a. Gellung Warl does not seek formal engagement on the proposed legislation at this time and supports the work of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission.

Compatibility of the Bill with each of the objects in section66(3)(d) of the Statewide Treaty Act2025

6.   I have considered whether the Bill is compatible with the objects at section 66(3)(d) of the Statewide Treaty Act:

a. advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

b. addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation, and

c. ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

7.   I note that the conduct of private First Peoples-led business and Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander Community Controlled Organisations (ACCOs) that may contract with government to deliver government services and provide a public function on behalf of the State may already be subject to IBAC’s jurisdiction.

8.   However, the amendments in the Bill are not directed at First Peoples, nor is it expected that any aspect of the Bill will, in practice, have a differential impact on First Peoples. The amendments apply uniformly to all bodies and officers within the IBAC’s jurisdiction. There is a strong public interest in ensuring that public funds are utilised appropriately and in line with their intended purpose. As Victoria’s premier anti-corruption body, it is integral that IBAC is afforded the necessary functions and powers to examine and investigate the conduct of third parties who utilise public funds.

Conclusion

9.   In my opinion, the Bill does not affect the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Statewide Treaty Act and is therefore compatible with each of those objects.

The Hon. Anthony Carbines

Minister for Artificial Intelligence and the Digital Economy

Minister for Major Events

Minister for Medical Research

Minister for Racing

Minister for Economic Development

 Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Premier) (12:08): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I ask that my second-reading speech be incorporated into Hansard.

Incorporated speech as follows:

I am pleased to introduce the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026 (Bill). The Bill amends the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (IBAC Act) to implement recommendations of the Integrity and Oversight Committee’s (IOC) report into the adequacy of the legislative framework for IBAC to broaden the definition of corrupt conduct and give IBAC the ability to follow the money.

The government has made clear that integrity is not optional. The Bill makes important and immediate amendments to IBAC’s jurisdiction to respond to strong public interest in ensuring public money is spent appropriately. However, the government acknowledges the amendments in the Bill alone will not address all the barriers identified with IBAC’s legislation and the integrity system more broadly.

Victoria’s integrity agencies form part of an interconnected system, and the legislative frameworks that establish their powers, duties and functions interact with one another in various interconnected ways. As such, a change to one agency’s powers and jurisdiction is likely to have for flow-on impacts across the entire integrity system.

That is why the Expert Reference Group, established by the government in response to the IOC’s report, will continue to provide advice on implementing the outstanding recommendations supported by government. The Expert Reference Group will provide this advice to government by May 2027, to inform a second tranche of reforms for introduction in Parliament by the end of 2027.

The government is committed to continuing to work with Victoria’s integrity agencies to ensure their legislation enables them to perform their important accountability and oversight functions.

I will now turn to the substance of the Bill.

Broadening the definition of corrupt conduct

The Bill brings forward implementation of the IOC’s recommendation to lower the threshold of behaviour that meets the definition of corrupt conduct under the IBAC Act, to address the broader limitations with IBAC’s jurisdiction identified by IBAC and the IOC and ensure the Bill gives full effect to the government’s commitment to empower IBAC to consider the unlawful and unethical use of public funds on major infrastructure projects.

Currently under the IBAC Act, conduct must constitute a relevant offence before IBAC can commence an investigation. Relevant offence is currently defined in the IBAC Act as:

• an indictable offence against an Act; or

• any of the common law offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice, bribery of a public official, perverting the course of justice, or misconduct in public office.

Both IBAC and the IOC highlighted that this definition limits IBAC from investigating other integrity-comprising behaviours that do not involve a relevant offence – for example, IBAC cannot investigate serious misconduct in isolation, nor can it examine broader governance or systemic failures unless the conduct meets the threshold for a relevant offence.

To address this issue, the Bill makes amendments to lower the threshold of behaviour that can be considered corrupt conduct, to capture a broader range of criminal conduct and other integrity-compromising behaviour.

The Bill provides that the conduct at subsections 4(1)(a)–(e) amounts to corrupt conduct if it would constitute an offence, or a serious disciplinary matter.

To address feedback that the current definition of relevant offence limits IBAC from considering potential criminal conduct if the conduct does not constitute a statutory indictable offence nor one of the specified common law offences, the Bill removes the requirement that the conduct constitute a relevant offence and replaces this with any criminal offence. This ensures IBAC can consider a broader range of potential criminal conduct, including conduct by associated entities performing public functions.

The new second limb of the definition, ‘serious disciplinary matter’, is defined in the Bill as:

• any serious misconduct; or

• any other matter that constitutes or may constitute grounds for –

•   termination of employment, appointment or engagement (whether under contract or otherwise); or

•   a significant employment, appointment or contractual penalty or sanction; or

• a serious contravention of various codes of conduct applying to Members of Parliament (MPs), Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and local government councillors.

The inclusion of serious disciplinary matters will broaden IBAC’s jurisdiction to cover a wider range of unethical or integrity-compromising behaviours, even where they do not involve suspected criminal conduct. The new limb also includes specific coverage for serious breaches of certain codes of conduct to ensure elected officials who are not subject to a traditional employment, contractual or appointment relationship are held to the same standard as other public officers.

Importantly, while the amendments will result in a considerable expansion of the nature of conduct that IBAC can consider, the conduct will still need to satisfy the other requirements in section 4 to constitute corrupt conduct. Further, the Bill does not otherwise change the legislative requirement for IBAC to prioritise serious or systemic corrupt conduct – rather, it allows IBAC to consider a broader range of circumstances that may give rise to serious and systemic corrupt conduct.

Empowering IBAC to follow the money

The Bill will also clarify and expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to enable it to investigate allegations of corrupt conduct linked to the use of public funds and publicly funded projects, regardless of whether the funds are expended through public or private entities, where there is a connection between the alleged conduct and government funding.

Currently, corrupt conduct is defined in the IBAC Act with reference to certain types of conduct engaged in by, or affecting, a ‘public officer’ or ‘public body’. The definitions of public officer and public body already encompass any persons or bodies that are performing a public function on behalf of the State or a public officer or public body, including those under contract. However, there is some legislative complexity regarding what constitutes a public function. While the IBAC Act provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be considered when determining what is a public function, the fact that one or more of these factors are present does not necessarily result in a function being a public function.

IBAC and other stakeholders have raised challenges posed by bodies that deliver both public and non-public functions, noting that determining the extent to which it can investigate alleged conduct involving such a body or its officers, particularly where the allegations relate to both its public and non-public functions, can be difficult in practice.

To give effect to the government’s commitment to empower IBAC to follow the money, the Bill will amend the definitions of public body and public officer in the IBAC Act to include reference to ‘associated entities’, drawing on the definitions in the Audit Act 1994. This will expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to allow IBAC to investigate third party and private contractors where there is a link between the alleged conduct and government funding and give effect to the IOC’s recommendation by adapting VAGO’s information-gathering powers to support IBAC’s investigative role and functions.

Importantly, the amendments in the Bill will not allow IBAC to investigate the mere use of public funds or other substandard, illegal, or unlawful conduct that is unrelated to the performance of public functions.

Consequential minor and technical amendments

The Bill also addresses a secondary issue identified by IBAC in relation to the definition of ‘relevant principal officer’. IBAC identified that the IBAC Act contains a gap as not every ‘public body’ has a corresponding ‘relevant principal officer’. To address this issue, the Bill makes consequential amendments to the definition of relevant principal officer to include the head of an organisation that qualifies as a ‘public body’.

The Bill also makes consequential amendments to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (PID Act) to provide that amendments to include associated entities in the definitions of public officer and public body in the IBAC Act do not apply to the PID Act. This approach is intended to avoid potential flow-on impacts to the PID scheme resulting from the inclusion of associated entity within the definitions of public officer and public body in the IBAC Act (which are adopted in the PID Act), noting the Expert Reference Group will consider broader reform to the PID scheme as part of its report to government.

Transitional provisions

Consistent with the government’s commitment, the reforms will allow IBAC to look at certain conduct that occurred prior to the commencement of the Bill, subject to appropriate limitations.

The Bill includes transitional provisions that will allow IBAC to apply the reforms to conduct that:

• is the subject of a complaint or notification that IBAC received but has not determined to dismiss, investigate or refer before to the commencement of the Bill;

• is the subject of a complaint or notification that IBAC had determined to investigate but had not completed investigating before the commencement of the Bill;

• is the subject of an own motion investigation that IBAC had commenced but had not completed before the commencement of the Bill;

• was not the subject of a complaint or notification to the IBAC that the IBAC had dismissed, referred to another person or body or completed investigating before the commencement of the Bill, or was not the subject of an own motion investigation that IBAC had completed before the Bill’s commencement.

Importantly, the Bill does not enable IBAC to use the reforms to reopen or redetermine matters that it has already considered. The Bill makes minor amendments to ensure the additional criteria and safeguards for IBAC to be able to conduct investigations in relation to conduct which occurred entirely before the Bill commenced. This approach will ensure IBAC is empowered to use its resources effectively and adheres to the legal principle of finality.

Commencement

To ensure IBAC can utilise these important amendments immediately, the Bill provides for commencement on the day after Royal Assent.

However, as IBAC’s jurisdiction will now extend to a wider range of conduct within a broader range of organisations, the Bill delays commencement of mandatory corrupt conduct reporting obligations under section 57 of the IBAC Act for associated entities that come under IBAC’s jurisdiction as result of the Bill for a period of six months from the date of commencement of the Bill.

This approach has been requested by IBAC to provide it time to work with impacted agencies to raise awareness of their new obligations, while ensuring the reforms can otherwise commence in a timely manner.

I am proud to deliver these important reforms the operation of IBAC to strengthen the integrity and accountability of our institutions and the proper use of public funds.

I commend the Bill to the house.

 James NEWBURY (Brighton) (12:09): I move:

That the debate be adjourned.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

Ordered that debate be adjourned until later this day.