Wednesday, 12 August 2026

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning, Minister for Prevention of Family Violence) (11:19): Under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, I table a statement of compatibility:

Opening paragraphs

In accordance with section 28 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, (the Charter), I make this Statement of Compatibility with respect to the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Coercive Control, Good Character, Risk Assessment and Other Matters) Bill 2026 (the Bill).

In my opinion, the Bill, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is compatible with human rights as set out in the Charter. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview

The Bill contains a package of reforms designed to improve justice system responses to sexual and family violence, including strengthening accountability for perpetrators and improving court processes to minimise further harm to victim-survivors.

The Bill amends the:

• Crimes Act 1958 (Crimes Act) to introduce an offence of coercive control

• Sentencing Act 1991 (Sentencing Act) and Youth Justice Act 2024 (YJ Act) to abolish the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing

• Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (FVPA), Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (CPA) and Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (PSIOA) to:

•   enable a court to extend or vary a family violence intervention order (FVIO) on its own motion when sentencing an adult respondent for family violence offending

•   require police to indicate if there is an FVIO or recognised interstate domestic violence order in place when filing related family violence charges, and to indicate if an extension or variation application will be made

•   establish a default length of 12 months in addition to the total effective sentence when an FVIO is being extended if the respondent is serving a term of imprisonment for related family violence offending

•   provide considerations courts must take into account when determining an FVIO extension application

•   ensure earlier intervention and protection for vulnerable children and young people by enabling personal safety intervention orders (PSIOs) to be ordered against adults engaging in grooming behaviours

•   clarify that electronic signatures can be used for documents required to be signed in relation to FVIOs and PSIOs

•   clarify information-sharing obligations under the Family Violence Information Sharing Scheme (FVISS) and streamline reporting obligations under the Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management (MARAM) Framework

• Infringements Act 2006, Fines Reform Act 2014 and Road Safety Act 1986 to include court fines in the work and development permit (WDP) scheme and include speeding camera fines in the family violence scheme (FVS) where the victim-survivor was not the driver, and

• Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (EO Act) to insert a new attribute of ‘subjection to family violence’ that would prohibit discrimination in areas of public life against a person who has been or is being subjected to family violence.

Human Rights Issues

For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the Bill is compatible with the Charter and, to the extent that any rights are limited, those limitations are reasonable and justified.

Introducing an offence of coercive control

The Bill seeks to protect and promote the rights of victim-survivors of family violence by amending the Crimes Act to introduce a new offence of coercive control. The offence will apply where an accused person engages in a course of conduct towards a current or former intimate partner intending that course of conduct to coerce or control them in circumstances where the accused ought to have understood that the course of conduct will probably cause harm to the other person.

Right to life (section9), right to protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (section ‍10) and right to liberty and security of person (section21)

Section 9 of the Charter provides that every person has the right to life and the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life, which recognises that public authorities have a duty to safeguard lives. Section 10 of the Charter provides that a person must not be subjected to torture or treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, which recognises the duty of public authorities to take reasonable steps to prevent, protect against, and respond to abuse, including in the private sphere. Section 21(1) of the Charter provides that every person has the right to liberty and security, which recognises that public authorities must take reasonable steps to protect people from interference with their personal integrity.

Introducing an offence of coercive control promotes each of these rights. In circumstances of family violence, coercive control is a particularly serious form of offending and is often a precursor and risk factor for homicides in the context of intimate partner violence. The conduct captured by the offence includes physical, sexual, economic, emotional or psychological abuse and conduct that, in any other way, coerces or controls a victim, and which causes them to feel fear for their safety or wellbeing. This includes conduct that can be fatal or cause serious injuries and conduct that is not physical in nature but is nonetheless cruel, inhuman or degrading. The definition of ‘emotional and psychological abuse’ in the offence expressly includes conduct that torments or degrades a person.

While some of the conduct captured by the new offence is already criminalised, creating a new offence will criminally denounce coercive control conduct that is cumulatively harmful and dangerous. It will assist police, early intervention services and justice agencies to better identify, monitor and respond to instances of coercive control.

Right to freedom of movement (section12) and right to privacy (section13)

Section 12 of the Charter provides that a person is entitled to move freely within Victoria, to choose where to live in Victoria, and to freely enter and leave Victoria. Section 13(a) provides that a person has the right not have his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with.

The new coercive control offence promotes the right to freedom of movement and the right to privacy as the broad nature of prohibited conduct captured by the offence will ensure that the criminal law deters and punishes behaviour that interferes with a victim’s privacy, family, home or correspondence. For example, the offence captures unreasonably monitoring a person’s movements or activities, or use of social media, unreasonably disclosing certain personal information such as health information, and restricting or interfering with a person’s access to housing or other support services. This promotes victims’ privacy, individuality and identity as well as their ability to not have their actions or movements limited.

Protection of families and children (section17)

Section 17(1) of the Charter recognises the family as the fundamental group unit of society and entitles it to protection by society and the State. Section 17(2) recognises that every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is in their best interests and is needed by them by reason of being a child.

The coercive control offence promotes the protection of families and children by strengthening protections for intimate partners who are victims of family violence. By introducing a new coercive control offence, people will be able to report coercive and controlling behaviours to police which can result in an investigation and prosecution of an accused person, and if successful, a criminal conviction including an imprisonment order. It will also generally deter and denounce coercive control and strengthen perpetrator accountability by capturing forms of intimate partner violence which may otherwise go unchecked or unprosecuted, offering more protection for the family unit.

The Bill also promotes the best interests of the child by limiting the application of this offence to adult accused persons (18 years or older). Limiting the offence to adults recognises the complexities of children who use family violence. These children are often victims themselves and adopt the use of violence as a learned behaviour. This limitation protects children from being criminalised given their age, maturity and likelihood of being a victim of misidentification. It is also consistent with Victorian Youth Justice principles around age-appropriate responses, diversion and minimising unnecessary contact with the criminal justice system.

Right to a fair hearing (section24)

Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding has a right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing.

While the rights of an accused person under section 24(1) are engaged by the new offence, they are not limited as nothing in the new offence restricts an accused’s right to have the charge or proceeding heard by an impartial criminal court. The accused will also have a right to a fair hearing, encompassing fundamental principles of procedural fairness, such as the reasonable opportunity to be informed of the prosecution case, and to respond and present the defence case accordingly.

Consistent with other recent offence reform, the new offence also promotes the right to a fair hearing by setting out the offence using a clear structure and simple, modern language. This makes the offence easier to read and understand. All elements of the offence that must be proven are set out and a defence is also clearly stated. Terms and definitions are consistent with existing terms and definitions where possible, as is the structure of the offence. This approach improves access to the law by making it easier to understand how the law applies.

Rights in criminal proceedings (section25)

Section 25(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

This right is engaged, as the reasonableness defence available for the offence places an evidential burden of proof on the accused. To raise the defence, an accused person must point to evidence that the course of conduct was reasonable in the context of the relationship as a whole. The prosecution must then prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct was not reasonable. This defence does not limit the right to be presumed innocent as the legal burden remains on the prosecution.

Abolishing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing

The Bill amends the Sentencing Act and YJ Act to:

• abolish the concept of ‘good character’ (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing

• ensure that child offenders, as well as adults, may not rely on a lack of prior convictions to mitigate sentence when it facilitated their offending in child sexual offence cases (the ‘special rule’), and

• require those providing written references for an offender to be aware of the offence or offences for which the offender may be sentenced.

The reforms to abolish ‘good character’ at sentencing are intended to prevent offenders from benefitting from a concept that the New South Wales Sentencing Council found to be vague, speculative and subjective, and as such an inappropriate reason to reduce sentence. The reforms are intended to reduce harmful effects on victim-survivors, including the distress, re-traumatisation and harm minimisation they can experience when offenders’ good character is considered a mitigating factor at sentencing. The New South Wales Sentencing Council also heard concerns from some victim-survivors that the prospect of hearing an offender described as having ‘good character’ during sentencing may discourage offence disclosure.

It is anticipated that the reforms may lead to minor increases in sentence lengths, but that any increase would be modest and within the existing penalty range of the offence at the time it was committed.

Expanding the special rule to apply to children who commit child sexual offences will ensure that the same restrictions apply to both adults and children. The amendment reflects that children can obtain positions of trust in the community because of a lack of prior convictions (for example, as sporting coaches or workplace supervisors) and then use those positions to facilitate committing child sexual offences. However, this expansion is likely to have limited practical application given the small cohort of children who commit child sexual offences, coupled with the requirement to prove that a lack of priors facilitated the offending.

Right to recognition and equality before the law (section8)

Section 8(3) of the Charter provides that every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination. The first limb of section 8(3) is directed to the enforcement and administration of laws. It requires that public authorities, courts and tribunals treat all people equally when applying the law, and do not apply the law in a discriminatory or arbitrary way, or in a manner that has no objective justification.

The Bill promotes this right by abolishing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing. Currently, relying on ‘good character’ at sentencing contributes to differential treatment in the sentencing process as the concept is vague and subjective, and courts assess ‘good character’ inconsistently. Further, relying on ‘good character’ at sentencing engages in a form of moral and social accounting which can entrench systems of privilege, as not all offenders have equal access to evidence that can support a finding of ‘good character’ at sentencing. Removing this vague, subjective consideration from the sentencing process will help to ensure that courts only consider evidence about an offender’s circumstances and characteristics when it is relevant to other sentencing considerations.

Protection of families and children (section17), rights of children in the criminal process (section23) and rights in criminal proceedings (section25)

Section 17(2) of the Charter provides that every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is in their best interests and is needed by them by reason of being a child. Section 23(3) of the Charter provides that a child who has been convicted of an offence must be treated in a way that is appropriate for their age. Section 25(3) of the Charter provides that a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of their age and the desirability of promoting the child’s rehabilitation.

By abolishing the concept of good character at sentencing, the Bill will remove a mitigatory factor in the sentencing process, including for children. Expanding the special rule to apply to children will also prevent a small number of children from relying on a lack of prior convictions as a mitigating factor, when that lack assisted them to commit a child sexual offence.

These changes may result in marginally increased sentence lengths for child offenders, engaging rights under sections 17(2), 23(3) and 25(3) of the Charter. However, courts will still be able to consider information or material about a child offender’s circumstances and background and evidence regarding a child’s individual characteristics, vulnerabilities and strengths where this information is relevant to other sentencing considerations, including where provided to courts in written references. The reforms will also not impact YJ Act sentencing principles, including specific sentencing principles for Aboriginal children, or the requirement to prioritise rehabilitation and the positive development of children. For these reasons, I consider that although the rights in sections 17(2), 23(3) and 25(3) are engaged by the good character reforms, they are not limited.

Right to protection from retrospective criminal laws (section27)

Section 27(2) of the Charter provides that a person must not have a penalty imposed on them that is greater than the penalty that applied to the offence when it was committed.

The Bill’s reforms to abolish the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing will apply to the sentencing of offenders who have been found guilty of an offence on or after commencement, regardless of when the offence being sentenced was committed, and may result in marginally increased sentence lengths. However, the reforms do not limit section 27(2) of the Charter, as the Bill does not change the maximum penalty that applies to any offence.

For the reasons set out above, I consider that the good character reforms in this Bill do not limit any Charter rights. However, to the extent that any limitation may be perceived, then I consider it would be reasonably and demonstrably justified, noting that:

• good character is not an appropriate reason to mitigate a sentence given it is based on a vague and subjective concept that cannot predict risks of re-offending or prospects of rehabilitation, and using and referring to good character in mitigation of sentence is harmful and may be re-traumatising for victims

• these concerns about the use of good character to mitigate a sentence apply equally to both adults and children, and

• courts will not be prevented from considering information about a person’s circumstances or characteristics if it applies to another relevant sentencing consideration.

Improvements to family violence intervention orders to better protect victim-survivors

Intervention orders are an important mechanism to protect victim-survivors and hold perpetrators of family violence to account. The primary purpose of the reforms to existing FVIO extension and variation processes in Parts 2–3 of the Bill is to enable courts to act more efficiently to reduce the risk of further harm, minimise the trauma caused to victim-survivors by having to attend multiple court proceedings, and promote more consistent and victim-survivor centred decision-making in respect of family violence risk.

Right to life (section9), protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (section10), protection of families and children (section17) and right to liberty and security of person (section21)

The amendments in Parts 2–3 of the Bill promote these rights by enabling courts to more swiftly respond to a clear risk of further family violence by strengthening or extending an FVIO on their own motion when sentencing a family violence offender; introducing a default extension length where a family violence offender receives a custodial sentence to ensure protections remain in place during the post-release period of heightened risk; and requiring courts to consider the views of victim-survivors, including their self-assessed risk, when determining an application to extend an FVIO. These reforms will ensure protections are more responsive to the risk posed to families and children by family violence and reduce the trauma associated with having to return to court to seek stronger conditions or longer orders.

Right to freedom of movement (section12) and association (section16), privacy (section13), property (section20), and liberty and security (section21)

The proposed reforms limit certain rights protected under the Charter insofar as they create new processes under which a court may extend the duration of an FVIO or strengthen its conditions to further restrict the respondent’s conduct to reduce the risk of further family violence.

In particular, the reforms engage the right to freedom of movement insofar as the conditions of an FVIO may restrict the respondent’s movement by prohibiting them from entering or residing in a certain property or from going within a specified distance of the protected person or their workplace. The conditions of an FVIO may also engage the right to freedom of association by restricting who the respondent can associate with and prohibiting contact with protected persons.

FVIO conditions can also restrict a respondent’s relationships with family members and ability to enter their home, which engages the right of a person to not have their privacy and the privacy of their family and home unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with, property rights and the right to liberty and security.

The limitation of these rights is necessary to achieve the purpose of protecting victim-survivors from an identified risk of harm, and proportionate insofar as these restrictions can only be imposed where a court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that they are necessary to protect a person’s safety. In particular, the exercise of the own motion power and the determination of an appropriate period by which to extend an FVIO ultimately remain at the court’s discretion. As such, any interferences with these rights are not unlawful or arbitrary insofar as they are authorised by legislation, subject to judicial oversight, and responsive to an identified risk of family violence.

Right to a fair hearing (section24)

The Bill may also engage the respondent’s right to a fair hearing by empowering a court to extend or vary an FVIO on its own motion when sentencing the respondent for related family violence offending. This right entitles a person facing criminal charges or a party to a civil proceeding to a reasonable opportunity to be heard in those proceedings, including a fair chance to call witnesses or present evidence.

The own motion power reform is designed to recognise the link between criminal offending and an escalation of family violence risk, and to enable courts to respond effectively without requiring victim-survivors to attend further hearings or provide additional evidence. Accordingly, the own motion power will be enlivened by a finding of guilt in a criminal proceeding, and can only be exercised on the basis of evidence admitted during the criminal hearing or for the purposes of sentencing, taking into account the views of an adult protected person or a child who is the victim or sole protected person on the FVIO. Unlike the hearing of an application to extend or vary an FVIO under the FVPA, parties will not have an opportunity to test evidence when the own motion power is exercised.

The information that courts can consider for the purposes of exercising the own motion power is purposefully limited to avoid creating delays in protections for victim-survivors and to mitigate any risk to the integrity of the criminal proceeding. However, in accordance with the principle of procedural fairness, the court will be required to have regard to all the circumstances of the case and provide the respondent with an opportunity to be heard in respect of any extension or variation being contemplated by the court. The limitation on the respondent’s ability to challenge evidence is not arbitrary or absolute insofar as the exercise of the own motion power will remain entirely at the court’s discretion. That is, the court need not exercise the power if it considers a substantive application hearing would be more appropriate. As such, any constraints on procedural rights are balanced against the need to promote the rights of families and children, and reasonably necessary to ensure courts can respond expediently to a clear risk of family violence.

The parties may appeal under the FVPA a decision made by the Magistrates’ Court but cannot appeal any appellate decision or a decision of the County Court or Supreme Court to extend or vary an FVIO on its own motion. While there is no general right to an appeal, alternative avenues of review, including judicial review, remain available, and the Bill does not limit appeals from the County Court or Supreme Court on the basis of jurisdictional error. The Bill also does not provide an appellate court, when hearing an appeal against the related criminal offending or sentence, with any power in relation to an FVIO. This may result in circumstances where a respondent is acquitted of the related family violence offence that enabled the sentencing court to exercise the own motion power under new section 125E but the FVIO, as varied or extended, remains in place.

Both parties may apply to vary or revoke an FVIO that has been extended or varied on the court’s own motion under the existing civil framework in the FVPA. When making such an application, parties are not required to demonstrate a change in circumstances if the County Court or Supreme Court exercised the own motion power in the first instance. The respondent must seek leave from the court to apply for an FVIO to be varied or revoked to protect victim-survivors from vexatious applications which may be used to perpetrate systems abuse. However, the Bill removes this requirement in circumstances where the FVIO was extended or varied under new section 125E but the related criminal conviction or sentence was changed on appeal, given the appellate court will not be able to make any further changes to the FVIO.

Any limitation on the right to a fair hearing is balanced with the importance of protecting families and children from repeated exposure to the stress and trauma of a protracted appeals process and multiple court proceedings.

In my view, to the extent that any right is limited by the changes to FVIO extension and variation processes, the limitation is reasonable and justified under section 7(2) of the Charter.

Better protecting children and families from ‘grooming’ behaviours

The amendments to the PSIOA in Part 7 of the Bill will provide greater safety for children under the age of 16 by including grooming as a ‘prohibited behaviour’ under that Act, enabling courts to disrupt predatory behaviour before it escalates to sexual offending and better hold perpetrators to account.

Protection of families and children (section17) and right to liberty and security of person (section21)

Perpetrators of sexual offences against children may purposely establish relationships with children, parents, carers or other family members to create situations in which abuse can take place. The Bill recognises the importance of protecting children and their families from this exploitative and harmful conduct by defining grooming as a ‘prohibited behaviour’ alongside similarly serious behaviours, such as assault and harassment. This empowers courts to make a PSIO before a sexual offence is committed, thereby promoting the rights of the child and the family unit to protection and the right to liberty and security of person.

Rights to freedom of movement (section12), privacy (section13), freedom of association (section16) and property (section20)

Expanding the circumstances in which a court can impose a PSIO will limit certain rights protected under the Charter. As discussed above, the conditions of an intervention order may engage the rights to freedom of movement, privacy, freedom of association and property by restricting who the respondent can contact or associate with, and where they can reside or travel.

Any limitations on these rights imposed by the Bill are reasonable and justified insofar as they are balanced against the importance of protecting families and children, and necessary to achieve the purpose of effectively responding to and disrupting grooming behaviour. The imposition of a PSIO with conditions that restrict these rights can only occur where a court is satisfied that they are necessary to protect a person from grooming, subject to judicial discretion and in accordance with established legal rules and procedures.

Recognising the validity of electronic signatures

Part 4 of the Bill amends the FVPA and PSIOA to make it clear that if a signature is required by or under one of these Acts, that signature can be done by electronic means.

Right to recognition and equality before the law (section8)

Section 8 of the Charter provides that every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination.

The electronic signature reforms will promote this right by ensuring that Victorians living in regional or remote communities, and those limited by mobility challenges, have equal access to legal services and participation in legal proceedings. The reforms also help to make FVIO and PSIO proceedings less disruptive to the lives of victims by allowing them to sign documents without attending court or a police station.

The reforms will also promote the right to equal protection of the law by making clear that the consent of any other party is not required, preventing perpetrators from using a consent requirement to frustrate proceedings.

In circumstances where an electronic signature is not preferred by the person signing, the existing means of physically signing a printed document remains available.

Clarifying the responsibilities of ‘information sharing entities’ under the FVISS

Right to privacy and reputation (section13)

The Bill includes amendments to the FVISS in Part 5A of the FVPA. The scheme provides that prescribed ‘information sharing entities’ are enabled or required to share information about persons believed to be either at risk of perpetrating, or being subjected to, family violence and those linked to such persons.

The scheme deliberately prioritises the safety of people experiencing family violence over the privacy of people using family violence. The Statement of Compatibility for Part 5A noted that appropriate safeguards are provided and that information sharing under the scheme is neither unlawful nor arbitrary.

The amendments in the Bill will clarify the operation of existing provisions but will not alter the scope of the scheme as it currently operates. Accordingly, I am satisfied that these amendments do not impose any further limitation on the right to privacy and reputation.

Right to protection of families and children (section17)

The MARAM Framework and FVISS exist to protect the safety of families and children and to identify and manage risks to that safety. By providing further clarity on the operation of the scheme, the Bill promotes the rights outlined in section 17 of the Charter.

Expanding the family violence scheme to include fines issued for excessive speed infringements detected by camera where the victim-survivor was not the driver

Right to protection of families and children (section17)

The amendments to expand the family violence scheme for infringements fines to include excessive speed infringements where the family violence victim-survivor was not the driver promotes the right to protection of families in section 17(1) of the Charter. The change means that family violence victim-survivors can access the scheme to ensure they are not held liable for excessive speed infringements where family violence has substantially contributed to them being unable to nominate the offender or reject a nomination. Limiting the expansion to excessive speed infringements where the family violence victim-survivor was not the driver of the vehicle ensures that road safety is not compromised.

Prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a person’s subjection to family violence

Recognition and equality before the law (section8), protection of families and children (section17), taking part in public life (section18), and rights in criminal proceedings (section25)

The inclusion of subjection to family violence as an attribute in the EO Act will promote the rights in sections ‍8, 17, 18 and 25 of the Charter, specifically for Victorians that have been or are being subjected to family violence.

The amendments will promote the right of recognition and equality before the law, as outlined in section 8 of the Charter. This right is central to anti-discrimination reforms. Under section 8(2), every person has the right to enjoy their human rights without discrimination. The amendments will prohibit discrimination on the basis of a person’s subjection to family violence in areas of public life, including employment, education, provision of goods and services, disposal of land, accommodation, clubs, sport and local government, which directly links to a person’s right to take part in public life, as enshrined in section 18 of the Charter.

Similarly, the reforms will promote equality before the law and a person’s entitlement to equal protection of the law without discrimination, and equal and effective protection against discrimination, as set out in section ‍8(3) of the Charter. The amendments will add subjection to family violence as an additional attribute protected from discrimination under the EO Act and will provide victims of family violence with equivalent protections to persons that are discriminated against on the basis of other attributes, such as age, disability, race, religious belief or activity, or sex.

I note that the amendments will also promote substantive equality for family violence victim-survivors through the operation of section 8(4) of the Charter, which enables targeted measures and initiatives to support them without those measures constituting discrimination.

The Charter defines ‘discrimination’ by reference to the definition in the EO Act where the discrimination is on the basis of an attribute set out in section 6 of that Act. The Bill amends section 6 of the EO Act to include subjection to family violence as an attribute, which has the effect of expanding the application of the definition of discrimination under the Charter. This will also impact non-discrimination provisions in sections 17(2), 18, and 25(2) of the Charter.

Section 17(2) of the Charter provides that every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is in their best interests and is needed by them by reason of being a child. This right recognises the vulnerability of children. The amendments include a definition of ‘family violence’, which has the same meaning as defined in section 5 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008. For the purposes of the new attribute, this would include a child that hears or witnesses, or is otherwise exposed to the effects of family violence. The reforms will therefore directly strengthen protections against discrimination for children.

Section 18 of the Charter protects the right to take part in public life without discrimination, including the right to vote, be elected at State and local government elections, and to have access, on general terms of equality, to the Victorian public service and public office. The amendments are likely to promote these rights by protecting family violence victim-survivors from discrimination and supporting their equal participation in the areas of public life under Part 4 of the EO Act.

Section 25(2) of the Charter sets out the minimum guarantees to which a person charged with a criminal offence is entitled, without discrimination. As noted above, the Charter defines ‘discrimination’ by reference to the meaning in the EO Act. The reforms will add a new attribute, which in effect expands the scope of the protections against discrimination in both the EO Act and the Charter. This would, in practice, extend the minimum guarantees for a person charged with a criminal offence to include protection against discrimination on the basis of their subjection to family violence.

The EO Act contains exceptions and exemptions to discrimination prohibited under the Act, including exceptions generally and specific to different areas of public life. The Bill does not amend the exception and exemption provisions in the EO Act, however it does have the effect of expanding the scope of exceptions that already apply to all attributes. This would permit discrimination on the basis of a person’s subjection to family violence in some circumstances, for example, employment in relation to domestic or personal services in the employer’s home under section 24 of the EO Act.

The Charter limitations of the exception and exemption provisions are addressed in the Statement of Compatibility to the EO Act. In my view, for the same reasons therein, any further limitations arising from adding a new attribute are reasonable and justified under section 7(2) of the Charter.

For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the Bill is compatible with the Charter.

Sonya Kilkenny

Attorney General

Minister for Planning

Minister for Prevention of Family Violence

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning, Minister for Prevention of Family Violence) (11:19): Under the Statewide Treaty Act 2025, I table a statement of treaty compatibility:

1.   In my opinion, the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Coercive Control, Good Character, Risk Assessment and Other Matters) Bill 2026 (the Bill) is compatible with the matters set out in section 66(3)(d) of the Statewide Treaty Act 2025 (Treaty Act). I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview of the Bill

2.   The Bill introduces a package of legislative reforms that are intended to improve legal and justice system responses to family and sexual violence and prioritise the safety of victim-survivors. In particular, the Bill will:

2.1 amend the Crimes Act 1958 to introduce an offence of coercive control

2.2 amend the Sentencing Act 1991 and Youth Justice Act 2024 (YJ Act) to abolish the concept of ‘good character’ at sentencing (including its use as a mitigating factor) for all offences, and all offenders

2.3 amend the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (FVPA) to:

a. introduce an own motion power for sentencing courts hearing criminal proceedings to extend or vary a family violence intervention order (FVIO)

b. introduce a police application process that requires police to indicate whether there is a current FVIO on the charge sheet and if an extension or variation application will be made

c. provide considerations for the court when it is determining an application to extend an FVIO and introduce a default length of extension when the respondent is serving a term of imprisonment

d. clarify that electronic signatures are permissible for documents required to be signed under the FVPA

e. promote timely responses to information sharing requests under the Family Violence Information Sharing Scheme (FVISS), to more effectively manage family violence risk, and to clarify the purposes for which information can be shared

f. introduce a new approach to Family Violence Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management (MARAM) Framework annual reporting processes focused on more efficient, meaningful and transparent reporting

2.4 amend the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (PSIOA) to expand the definition of ‘prohibited behaviour’ to include grooming, and to clarify that electronic signatures are permissible for documents required to be signed under the PSIOA

2.5 amend the Infringements Act 2006, Fines Reform Act 2014, and Road Safety Act 1986 to:

a. expand work and development permit scheme (WDPS) to include court fines, and

b. expand the family violence scheme (FVS) to include fines issued for excessive speed infringements detected by camera where the victim-survivor was not the driver, and

2.6 amend the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (EO Act) to insert a new attribute of ‘subjection to family violence’ that would prohibit discrimination against a person in areas of public life on the basis of that person having been or being subjected to family violence.

Consultation with the First Peoples’ Assembly of Gellung Warl

3.   The First Peoples’ Assembly of Gellung Warl (Assembly) was provided with information regarding the Bill and an opportunity to advise on the Bill in June 2026. In July 2026, the Assembly accepted a briefing on the Bill in which information was provided on the Bill and its impacts on First Peoples. I note that, respecting Cabinet processes, the Bill itself was not provided during this briefing. Following this briefing the Assembly provided a representation as follows:

3.1 The First Peoples’ Assembly was not provided with a copy of the Bill. The Assembly understands that extensive feedback was provided by First Peoples experts and organisations to the State and that several substantive concerns have not been addressed. The Assembly expects ongoing engagement with First Peoples experts and organisations throughout the implementation of the reforms, including consideration of any further legislative or policy changes and appropriate safeguarding mechanisms.

4.   I note that the Assembly was notified of the EO Act reforms separately and provided with information on the Bill in July 2026.

5.   I note that, as highlighted through engagement with First Peoples experts and organisations, the Bill may have a disproportionate impact on First Peoples. As detailed in the compatibility assessment below, these concerns have been considered and the Bill has been adapted to include some measures and safeguards in response to these concerns. However, I acknowledge that not all aspects of the Bill align with the concerns raised regarding its potential impacts on First Peoples. I note that the State will continue to work with First Peoples in the implementation of these reforms, and any related policy changes.

Compatibility of the Bill with each of the objects in section 66(3)(d) of the Statewide Treaty Act 2025

6.   I have considered whether the Bill is compatible with the objects at section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act:

6.1. advancing the inherent rights and self‑determination of First Peoples

6.2. addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation, and

6.3. ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

Introduction of an offence of coercive control

7.   I note that the coercive control offence introduced by this Bill does not apply specifically to First Peoples, as it creates an offence that applies equally to any adult. However, it may, in its practical effects, engage the objects at section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act in light of the significant overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

8.   I acknowledge that the exercise of the right to self-determination will necessarily be limited by the criminal justice system, given the loss of liberty inherent in aspects of policing, court processes and the conditions of custody. However, particular consideration has been given to whether this offence further affects the right to self-determination.

9.   While the government seeks to enable self-determination rights in the justice system where possible, for example through the operation of Koori Courts and by supporting Aboriginal programs and access to culture in prisons settings, the nature of criminal offences (when individuals are charged, prosecuted and sentenced) and broader policing, judicial and custodial systems are not self-determined. As the Bill only introduces an additional offence within these broader system settings, these amendments do not affect the self-determination of First Peoples.

10.   To the extent that the offence introduced by this Bill may lead to increased overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system and in custody, this may affect some inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in the United Nations Declaration into the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

11.   The offence of coercive control introduced by this Bill may indirectly limit the right to culture (article 11) noting the significant disruption that imprisonment presents to access to Country (see also articles 25 and 26) and places of spiritual significance, cultural practices and cultural connections, including kinship networks. Increased contact with the criminal justice system and/or a term of imprisonment may also limit the right to improvement of economic and social conditions (article 5) and the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 24).

12.   However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion the introduction of the offence of coercive control is nevertheless compatible with the object of advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples due to the importance of preventing this offending conduct and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples

13.   To the extent that the offence of coercive control introduced by this Bill may lead to increased contact with the justice system and incarceration of First Peoples, it may compound the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation.

14.   The Yoorrook Justice Commission’s Yoorrook for Justice report notes the significant overrepresentation of First Peoples in the justice system and the subsequent impacts on First Peoples including:

14.1. the disproportionate rate at which Aboriginal women are victim-survivors of family violence

14.2. the frequent misidentification of Aboriginal women as the predominant aggressor by police, which places them at greater risk of further violence and criminalisation, while leading to a profound sense of distrust in the police and legal system, and

14.3. the significant disruptions to family and the community when people face increased contact with the criminal justice system and/or are imprisoned.

15.   Misidentification can occur in a range of circumstances, including where the victim-survivor’s presentation and characteristics are misinterpreted, or they use retaliatory force to protect themselves or another person from family violence. Certain groups of people are more at risk of being misidentified, including First Peoples, and particularly women.

16.   The Yoorrook Justice Commission’s Truth be Told report noted that Aboriginal women are more likely to experience family violence than non-Aboriginal women and yet, Aboriginal women in Victoria are also the fastest growing prison demographic. The report noted that First Peoples are over-policed as people who use violence, but simultaneously under-supported by police as affected family members in need of protection.

17.   Regarding the overrepresentation of First Peoples in prison, Yoorrook for Justice also notes that ‘removing them from their community can have devastating effects on their personal and social wellbeing, with many families experiencing ongoing trauma and grief as a result’. Disproportionate rates of imprisonment compound the unacceptable disadvantage of First Peoples which can have profound, far-reaching and intergenerational impacts.

18.   The report also found that the overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system was in part driven by a ‘pattern of systemically racist policing’ noting that while this ‘does not characterise the whole of policing in Victoria, it is widespread and ingrained’. In this context, I note that the introduction of this offence creates a further risk of over policing and criminalisation of First Peoples, both as a result of misidentification of the primary aggressor, as well as in the general application of the offence. In particular, given the complexity and long-term nature of investigating and demonstrating behaviours regarding this offence, I note that there is a risk of First Peoples being subject to sustained contact with police as victim-survivors, broader family members and those accused of the offence. I acknowledge that even where this does not result in conviction, this contact with the criminal justice system can result in harmful social, economic and health effects.

19.   I note that the proposed maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment for the new coercive control offence, may lead to more custodial sentences both generally and specifically for First Peoples due to their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. While courts will continue to have the full range of options for sentencing offenders, including non-custodial options, I acknowledge that this Bill does not address, and may compound, the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation given the profound impacts of overrepresentation of First Peoples in the justice system and imprisonment.

20.   However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion the Bill is nevertheless compatible with the object of addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation due to the importance of preventing this offending conduct and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

21.   While the Bill applies to any adult who engages in coercive control of an intimate partner, I acknowledge that the Bill may, in its practical effects, limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of First Peoples. I consider that the Bill may engage human rights, including the rights to liberty (section 21, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Charter)), freedom of movement (section 12), right to privacy (section 13(a)), the rights to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19), freedom of expression (section 15(2)), right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16) the protection of families and children (section 16) and the right to property (section 20). As noted above, the Bill may also engage First Peoples’ inherent rights, particularly the rights to culture, country, improvement of economic and social conditions and enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

22.   To the extent that First Peoples are overrepresented in the criminal justice system and may therefore be overrepresented in those charged with the new offence of coercive control, First Peoples’ equal enjoyment of these rights may be limited. These limitations may occur as a result of increased contact with police, being remanded and/or a possible sentence of imprisonment, which requires the deprivation of liberty and the exercise of powers held by officers in charge of custodial facilities. The family unit may also be affected when an intimate partner is investigated for this offence and/or made subject to an imprisonment order. This is a particularly acute and sensitive issue in the context of this offence, where the imprisonment is a result of family violence. In circumstances where First Peoples are subject to disproportionate criminalisation and detention, this may limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

23.   However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion the Bill is nevertheless compatible with the object of ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples due to the importance of preventing this offending conduct and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Proportionality assessment

24.   While the new offence may limit the achievement of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act as outlined above, in my opinion it is not incompatible with them having regard to the following matters:

24.1. the new offence applies to any adult who engages in coercive control of an intimate partner, not specifically or only First Peoples

24.2. the new offence denounces and criminally recognises behaviours that extend to a pattern of ongoing, continuous abuse used by a person to control and coerce an intimate partner, which can have a significant impact on victim-survivors and the community, including First Peoples women and children. Whilst the offence may lead to more custodial sentences, the maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment is appropriate given the insidious and damaging impact of coercive control

24.3. the scope of the new offence is limited to the extent that it only applies to adults, who must intend to coerce or control an intimate partner by engaging in the conduct, and does not apply to other relationships. This limits the risk of misidentification of the primary aggressor, which disproportionately impacts First Peoples victim-survivors, and limits the risk of increased criminalisation and incarceration of First Peoples more broadly, while addressing the key context in which coercive control occurs – in intimate partner relationships. Further, the courts will retain discretion to sentence offenders according to their relevant culpability, including imposing non-custodial sentences if appropriate

24.4. to the extent that misidentification of the primary aggressor is disproportionately experienced by First Peoples women, the Bill includes important safeguards to minimise the risks of misidentification, including a defence that the course of conduct alleged to constitute coercive control was reasonable in the context of the relationship as a whole. This defence can be raised by the misidentified person where relevant and allows for consideration of the broader context in which the alleged offending occurred

24.5. the elements of the offence also incorporate protections against misidentification including the requirements that an accused engaged in relevant conduct, that this conduct must be part of a course of conduct (that is, conduct that is protracted or occurs on more than one occasion), the course of conduct must show a continuity of purpose towards the victim and both intentional fault and objective fault elements – that the accused intends to coerce or control the victim by engaging in the course of conduct and ought to understand, in the particular circumstances, that the course of conduct will probably cause harm, and

24.6. noting the complexity of this offence and the need for carefully considered implementation and monitoring, the offence will be supported by a statutory review requirement and longer commencement timeframes for implementation, which will allow for training for key workforces, broad-based awareness building and targeted education campaigns, and structured and resourced pathways to support services, including culturally appropriate support services for First Peoples.

25.   For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the introduction of the offence of coercive control is compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

Abolishing the concept of ‘good character’ (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing for all offences and introducing procedural requirements for written references

26.   I note that the ‘good character’ reforms in the Bill do not in their terms include any provisions that apply specifically to First Peoples, as they abolish the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing for all adults and children.

27.   However, these reforms may, in their practical effects, engage with the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i)–‍(iii) of the Treaty Act in light of the overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system. For example, I note that First Peoples represent less than 2 per cent of the Victorian population but in 2025 made up 14 per cent of alleged offenders proceeded against by police via arrest or summons as a result of alleged offender incidents.

28.   The reforms abolish the concept of good character at sentencing for all offences, so that it can no longer be relied on as a reason that may reduce a sentence. There is therefore a risk the reform could lead to increased rates and/or lengths of custodial sentences for both children and adults, which has a risk of further increasing First Peoples’ overrepresentation in custody.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

29.   I acknowledge that the exercise of the right to self-determination will necessarily be limited by the criminal justice system, for the same reasons detailed above regarding the introduction of the offence of coercive control. However, the good character reforms do not, in their terms or in their practical effects, further affect First Peoples’ self-determination.

30.   To the extent that abolishing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing may lead to increased overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system and in custody, this may impact some inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in UNDRIP.

31.   The good character reforms may, in practice, limit the right to culture (article 11) noting the significant disruption that imprisonment presents to access to Country (see also articles 25 and 26) and places of spiritual significance, cultural practices and cultural connections, including kinship networks. A term of imprisonment may also limit the right to improvement of economic and social conditions (article 5) and the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 24).

32.   However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples due to the importance of removing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating sentencing factor) at sentencing and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples and ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

33.   To the extent that abolishing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing may lead to increased custodial sentences for First Peoples, the reforms may also compound the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation and limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of First Peoples.

34.   The Charter rights likely to be engaged include the rights to liberty (section 21), freedom of movement (section 12), right to privacy (section 13(a)), the rights to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19), freedom of expression (section 15(2)), right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16), right to protection of families and children (section 17) and the right to property (section 20). These rights may be limited due to a possible increase in custodial sentences, which requires the deprivation of liberty.

35.   The Yoorrook for Justice report considered the significant impact of First Peoples’ over-representation in the justice system, including the disruptions to family and the community when people are imprisoned. The report notes that ‘[r]emoving them from their community can have devastating effects on their personal and social wellbeing, with many families experiencing ongoing trauma and grief as a result’.

36.   The Yoorrook for Justice report also notes that First Peoples are estimated to be at least two to five times more likely to experience violence than non-Aboriginal people. As outlined above, good character is not an appropriate reason to mitigate a sentence given it is based on a vague and subjective concept that cannot predict risks of re-offending or prospects of rehabilitation, and using and referring to good character in mitigation of sentence is harmful and may be re-traumatising for victim-survivors.

37.   However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the objects of addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation and ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples due to the importance of removing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating sentencing factor) at sentencing and the nature of the impacts on these Treaty objects, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Proportionality assessment

38.   For the reasons set out above, these reforms may limit the achievement of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act. However, in my opinion, the reforms are a proportionate means of achieving the policy purposes of helping ensure fairer sentencing outcomes and improving victims’ experience of the justice system, and are therefore compatible with those objects, noting:

38.1. the good character reforms universally apply to any person who is sentenced for an offence, not specifically or only to First Peoples

38.2. good character is not an appropriate reason to mitigate a sentence given it is based on a vague and subjective concept that cannot predict risks of re-offending or prospects of rehabilitation. It may perpetuate inequality and systemic disadvantage as there is unequal access to the benefits of good character as a mitigating factor given it can be more readily available to certain groups (who have social status and means) than others, including First Peoples. In addition, using and referring to good character in mitigation of sentence is harmful and may be re-traumatising for victims, particularly as First Peoples are disproportionately represented as victim-survivors

38.3. courts will not be prevented from considering an individual’s lack of prior convictions and information about their circumstances and characteristics if it relates to another sentencing consideration. For example, this could include information relating to an individual’s connection to community, culture or Country where such information helps a court assess prospects of rehabilitation or risk of reoffending. When sentencing children, this includes the YJ Act sentencing principles and the requirement to prioritise the rehabilitation and positive development of children, as well as the specific sentencing principles for Aboriginal children

38.4. the reforms will also introduce procedural requirements for written references to ensure that courts receive appropriate information about an offender that is relevant to a sentencing consideration, and

38.5. delayed commencement of the reforms will allow stakeholders to conduct training and update practice guides as appropriate to implement the reforms effectively and without unintended impacts on First Peoples, victim-survivors, offenders, the judiciary and legal practitioners.

39.   For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the good character reforms in the Bill are compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

Family violence and personal safety reforms

40.   I note that the family violence and personal safety reforms introduced by this Bill do not in their terms include any provisions that apply specifically to First Peoples, nor is it expected that most aspects of these reforms will, in practice, affect the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

41.   However, it is expected that the new power for criminal courts hearing a criminal proceeding to extend or vary an FVIO on their own motion, without requiring an application to be filed or requiring a separate proceeding (own motion power), may engage with the objects in sections 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act, as detailed below.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

42.   To the extent that the own motion power may have an impact on First Peoples right to autonomy and self-government, this may impact some inherent rights, including the right to self-determination, as outlined in the UNDRIP.

43.   The Bill may, in practice, limit the right to decision-making and consent (articles 18 and 19), noting the own motion power allows a court hearing a criminal proceeding to extend or vary an FVIO on their own motion. This may also have a limiting effect on the right to improvement of social conditions (article 21) and the right to culture (article 11), given that matters relating to family and intimate relationships involving First Peoples may be more appropriately addressed through First Peoples laws, customs and community-led responses.

44.   However, I note that the own motion power can only be exercised with consent of the protected person and may also be exercised by Koori Courts hearing a related family violence offence, which may offer a more culturally sensitive way for FVIO extensions or variations to be considered.

45.   With regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples due to the importance of preventing family violence and protecting victim-survivors, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples

46.   To the extent that the own motion power reform may exacerbate the risk of First Peoples being misidentified as the predominant aggressor in family violence cases, there is a risk that this may compound the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation. Accordingly, the risks of misidentification discussed above in the section on the introduction of the coercive control offence are also relevant to these reforms.

47.   For First Peoples who have been misidentified, the own motion power could further reinforce and prolong the consequences of that misidentification, which can disrupt family and community connections and create barriers to employment, housing and cultural participation.

48.   However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation due to the importance of preventing and protecting against family violence and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

49.   While the Bill applies to all those experiencing family violence, I acknowledge that the Bill may limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of First Peoples, due to the risks associated with misidentification described above and how this may lead to criminalisation. I consider that the Bill may, in its practical effects, engage human rights, including Charter rights to a fair hearing (section 24) and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (section 25). As noted above, the Bill may also engage First Peoples’ inherent rights, particularly the rights to decision-making and consent.

50.   These rights may be limited because First Peoples who have been misidentified as the predominant aggressor may experience increased police involvement and criminal charges for alleged FVIO breaches, all in circumstances where the original allegations of family violence have not been properly examined. This can weaken the practical effect of being presumed innocent and undermine the right to a fair hearing. It may also be a contributing factor to the overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system, both due to misidentification and due to the overall effects of extensions and variations of FVIOs through the own motion power.

51.   In addition, if the own motion power is exercised with First Peoples respondents, this may also have a direct impact on Charter rights such as freedom of movement (section 12) and freedom of association (section 16). For example, the own motion power could vary the FVIO to include conditions that restrict a respondent from contacting or being within a certain distance of the protected person. These restrictions would directly impact the respondents’ ability to move freely around the State and associate with certain people.

52.   However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples due to the importance of preventing and protecting against family violence, including First Peoples victim-survivors, and and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Proportionality assessment

53.   While the own motion power may limit the achievement of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act as outlined above, in my opinion the limitations are proportionate and therefore compatible with these objects. In particular, I note that:

53.1. the Bill universally applies to those experiencing family violence where the own motion power may be available

53.2. there is a significant public interest in preventing family violence and protecting victim-survivors from further family violence, particularly noting the disproportionate rates of family violence experienced by First Peoples victim-survivors

53.3. the Bill complements the reforms in the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Stalking and Other Matters) Act 2026, which will commence no later than 10 November 2026, and will require police and courts to consider misidentification factors when considering whether to issue a family violence safety notice, or when making an interim or final FVIO. Although misidentification that pre-dates these reforms may persist, the reforms will reduce the risk of misidentification in the making of new orders, thereby reducing the risk of misidentification in the own motion power context

53.4. the Bill includes important safeguards such as requiring a court to hear the views of a protected person before exercising the own motion power, which is intended to minimise any potential negative impacts on victim-survivors

53.5. the Bill similarly requires that the respondent has had the opportunity to be heard in respect of an extension or variation. This may provide an opportunity for the court to assess whether misidentification is a relevant issue and whether it may be inappropriate to exercise the own motion power, and

53.6. the Bill does not replace the existing civil application pathways to extend, vary or revoke an FVIO available to parties under the FVPA.

54.   For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the own motion power under the family violence and personal safety reforms, and the reforms more broadly, are compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act.

Family Violence Information Sharing Scheme (FVISS) and Family Violence Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management (MARAM) Framework reforms

55.   I note that the amendments to the FVPA seek to clarify the existing responsibilities of prescribed organisations to share information and streamline reporting requirements. Amendments seeking to promote timely response to information sharing requests allow sufficient flexibility to ensure that Family Violence Specialist Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, which may receive a higher volume of such requests, can define ‘timely’ in a way which best promotes the needs of their service users and organisations.

56.   In light of the above, in my opinion, the MARAM and FVISS reforms in this Bill do not in their terms deal with First Peoples, nor is it expected that any aspects of the Bill will, in practice, have a differential effect on First Peoples.

57.   Accordingly, in my opinion, the MARAM and FVISS reforms in this Bill do not affect the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act and are therefore compatible with each of those objects.

Fines and infringements reforms

58.   I note that the reforms to the fines systems outlined in the Bill do not in their terms include any provisions which apply specifically to First Peoples. However, in their practical effects, in my opinion the reforms are likely to promote the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

59.   In considering the compatibility of these reforms with section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act, I have considered the effects of the fines system on First Peoples. Although data specific to Victoria is not available, in its 2018 report Pathways to Justice, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) found that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were over-represented as fine recipients, less likely to pay a fine on time and, as a result, more likely to be subject to enforcement measures (ALRC Report 133, 2018), 387.

60.   There is a lack of data to quantify the unequal impact of the Victorian fines system on First Peoples, but it is known that the system has the potential to impact adversely on people experiencing vulnerability and disadvantage. This is particularly relevant to First Peoples, noting the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples due to the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that the fines system may have a disproportionate impact on First Peoples.

61.   To address the potential disproportionate effects of the fines system on First Peoples in progressing any fines-related reforms, the government has regard to the importance of appropriate remedial and social justice mechanisms within the fines system. This requires a continuing focus on protecting and enhancing these measures to ensure the fines system is fair and flexible, so that people who cannot or should not pay due to a specified kind of vulnerability or disadvantage, are effectively diverted away from the criminal justice system or have options other than payment to expiate their fines.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

62.   The reforms do not expressly advance the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples, as the Bill applies to all people who are fine recipients. However, the Bill is likely to support this object by broadening access to the Work and Development Permit Scheme (WDPS), which provides eligible individuals with a non-financial way to address their fine debt thereby reducing the risk of non-payment and enforcement measures.

63.   There are 27 Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations delivering culturally appropriate activities to First Peoples who are fine recipients under the WDPS. This supports the inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in the UNDRIP, particularly rights to self-determination (article 3), allowing Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations to deliver the WDPS in ways that are tailored to local First Peoples’ communities and needs, and rights to culture (articles 11 and 12) and Country (articles 25 and 26), where WDPS activities include relevant cultural and on Country activities.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples and ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

64.   I note that the reforms to expand the family violence scheme (FVS) for infringement fines to include some excessive speed infringements, and the amendments to expand the WDPS to include court fines are likely to promote the objects in section 66(3)(d)(ii) and (iii) of the Treaty Act to the extent that First Peoples may be more likely to access these schemes as a result of historic wrongs and ongoing injustice and are therefore more likely to benefit from the broadening of access to the schemes.

65.   The following Charter rights may also be enlivened and supported by these reforms:

65.1. rights to freedom of movement (section 12) and to liberty and security of person (section 21(1)) – the broadening of access to the WDPS and FVS is likely to reduce the non-payment of fines by recipients who will now be eligible for the schemes, thereby reducing the risk of enforcement actions for unpaid fines, including the seizure of assets, and driver licence and vehicle registration sanctions, and

65.2. right to protection of families and children (section 17(1)) – expanding the FVS may reduce the impact of family violence on families who are victim-survivors, and support their capacity to subsist, as fines not previously eligible for the scheme may be withdrawn, and demerit points reversed under the expanded provisions.

66.   The amendment to clarify that the Director, Fines Victoria’s power to deregister infringement fines does not apply to infringement offences that take effect as a deemed conviction will not (directly or indirectly) engage any of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act because: the amendment is minor in nature in the context of the legislative scheme for fines; it is a clarification only to reflect that the deregistration power has never been used for deemed conviction infringements because the use of the power is problematic in the context of offences that take effect as a deemed conviction; and there are other pathways available for people experiencing vulnerability and disadvantage (including First Peoples) to deal with their fines.

67.   Accordingly, in my opinion, the fines-related reforms in this Bill are compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

Adding family violence as protected attribute under the EO Act

68.   I note that the reforms to the EO Act introduced by this Bill do not in their terms include any provisions that apply specifically to First Peoples. However, in their practical effects, in my opinion the reforms are likely to promote the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act, noting the disproportionate impact of family violence on First Peoples. For example, I note that First Peoples represent less than two per cent of the Victorian population but in 2024–25 made up over six per cent of victim-survivors with Family Violence Intervention Orders. I further note that 60 per cent of First Peoples women in Australia have experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner since age 15.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

69.   I note that the reforms may indirectly affect the object at section 66(3)(d)(i) of the Treaty Act by advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples. Providing protection from discrimination for people subjected to family violence is expected to support the inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in the UNDRIP, particularly the right to equality and freedom from discrimination (article 2) and subsequently the rights to the improvement of economic and social conditions (article 21), education (article 14) and the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 24) by providing protection from discrimination based on family violence impacting employment, access to education and healthcare and economic opportunities.

70.   Therefore, in my opinion, these reforms are compatible with advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples

71.   I note that the reforms may affect the object at section 66(3)(d)(ii) of the Treaty Act by addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation.

72.   The amendments to the EO Act would prohibit discrimination based on a person’s subjection to family violence, providing protections and avenues for redress for First Peoples who, as noted above, are disproportionately impacted by family violence. Noting that addressing discrimination can support First Peoples’ employment, economic, health and education opportunities and work to counter the historic and ongoing disadvantage inflicted by colonisation.

73.   Therefore, in my view, the reforms to the EO Act are compatible with the object in section 66(3)(d)(ii) of the Treaty Act.

Ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

74.   Noting that family violence has a disproportionate impact on vulnerable communities, particularly First Peoples women, in my view, the reforms are likely, in their practical effect, to have a positive effect on First Peoples and support their equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The reforms will prohibit discrimination on the basis that a person, including First Peoples, has been or is being subjected to family violence in an area of public life, such as employment, education or housing.

75.   In addition to the UNDRIP rights detailed above this may promote First Peoples’ human rights, including Victorian Charter rights to the protection of families and children (section 17), taking part in public life (section 18) and peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16). As these reforms will provide a beneficial legal protection, against discrimination experienced by First Peoples in these areas of public life, they are expected to promote their enjoyment of these rights by preventing a form of discrimination that arises against First Peoples because of their disproportionate experience of family violence.

76.   I note that the EO Act contains exceptions and exemptions that permit discrimination on the basis of an attribute protected under the Act, in some circumstances. This would also apply to the new attribute in the Bill. Provisions of the EO Act that would permit discrimination on the basis of a person’s subjection to family violence may disproportionately impact First Peoples, given their overrepresentation as victims of family violence.

77.   However, without the Bill, victims of family violence are not protected from discrimination under the EO Act. The limited relevant exceptions and exemptions apply to all attributes protected under the EO Act and were considered by reference to Charter rights when the EO Act was passed in 2010.

78.   Some exceptions may also operate to protect and provide tailored services to specific groups. For example, one exception under the EO Act would allow providers to deliver targeted family violence welfare services, such as emergency accommodation for women and/or First Peoples, and limit eligibility of that service to support the welfare and special needs of specific people or groups that are protected under the EO Act. The Bill would extend these recognised attributes to include victims of family violence.

79.   Noting that the Bill overall increases protections for victims of family violence, including overrepresented First Peoples, in my opinion it is compatible with the object of ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

Conclusion

80.   For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the Bill is compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Statewide Treaty Act 2025.

Sonya Kilkenny

Attorney General

Minister for Planning

Minister for Prevention of Family Violence

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning, Minister for Prevention of Family Violence) (11:20): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I would like to acknowledge all of the women and children whose lives have been taken by family violence.

I would like to also recognise that nobody bears the brunt of this epidemic at the same rate or intensity as First Nations women and children.

Across Victoria and indeed Australia, family violence is the number one law and order issue that is destroying lives, harming children across generations and destabilising homes, communities and our broader society.

This government has done more than any other government in history to better protect women and children and hold perpetrators to account.

But the work is never done.

Today, we take a further step.

This bill is about listening and responding to the voices of victim-survivors.

It contains a number of significant reforms to prioritise victim-survivor safety, improve the efficiency of justice processes and ensure perpetrators of all forms of interpersonal violence can be held to account.

Before I get into further detail about the bill, I would like to highlight the advocacy of those whose lives have been impacted by family and sexual violence and whose voices have contributed to the reforms in this bill.

Some of you are here today.

It is an incredible thing to go through the trauma you have been through and transform that experience into advocacy and change.

I am honoured to be standing here today on your behalf – because make no mistake, this bill would not be possible without you.

So thank you.

Now to the bill and its reforms.

Coercive control

Coercive control is an insidious form of abuse used, usually by a man, to intimidate, humiliate, surveil, gaslight or isolate another person, usually a female intimate partner, and strip them of their sense of autonomy and self-worth so as to have control over them.

We know the devastating impacts this can have – increasing the risk of victims becoming homeless, suicidal, having poor health outcomes, sliding into poverty and committing offences themselves.

And, heartbreakingly, in some cases, it can be fatal.

While I acknowledge this is a complex area for law, it is unthinkable today that this kind of harm is not criminal.

Currently, there is no criminal justice response available for victim-survivors of coercive control unless there is a family violence intervention order (FVIO) in place or a physical criminal offence has taken place, like assault or a sexual offence.

Victim-survivors deserve to feel seen and heard and to know that the system can work to make them feel safe and protected.

Considerable work has gone into developing this offence, and I want to acknowledge the many complexities raised by stakeholders throughout the process. Thank you for your collaboration to ensure we do this well.

While it has not been possible to reconcile all views, the offence balances and addresses concerns where possible.

We will continue to work with stakeholders to ensure family violence services, police, courts and the legal profession are adequately supported to implement the offence and are engaged in the implementation process.

While the bill focuses on coercive control within intimate partner relationships, we know that coercive and controlling behaviours happen in other relationships too and this should be taken seriously.

Relationships and behaviour that fall outside the scope of this offence may continue to be dealt with by existing civil and criminal interventions, including FVIOs, breaches of those orders and other criminal offences.

The new offence will increase awareness of the harms caused by coercive control in all relationships. Importantly, the statutory review will specifically consider whether the scope of the offence should be expanded to capture coercive control in other relationships.

I know that misidentification of the predominant aggressor in family violence offending is a significant issue and has been a concern for stakeholders during the development of this offence.

The offence has been carefully crafted to minimise this risk, but for this offence to work, it is critical that justice agencies, from police to the courts, are provided training and support to fully understand the dynamics of coercive control.

The delayed commencement of approximately 18 months will allow for education and training for these workforces, to minimise the risks of misidentification.

The statutory review of the offence will also provide an opportunity to ensure the offence is operating as intended and to consider whether changes are required to further reduce the risk of misidentification.

Good character

Now, to ‘good character’ reform.

The bill will abolish the concept of good character, including its use as a mitigating factor, at sentencing for all offences.

Currently, victim-survivors are having to sit in court and hear that the person who harmed them is a person of ‘good character’. This can compound the trauma and diminish their experience.

The concept of ‘good character’, on its own, is generally only about someone’s reputation, community standing or their past ‘good deeds’.  This is not an accurate way to predict an offender’s prospects of rehabilitation or risk of reoffending.

These reforms seek to enable courts to continue to take into account relevant information at sentencing, while ensuring they no longer receive or consider vague, subjective opinions about an offender’s supposed moral worth as a person of ‘good character’.

Courts will still be able to consider information about an offender’s circumstances and characteristics, such as social background and employment history, including in written references, where that information is relevant to the remaining sentencing considerations, such as prospects of rehabilitation and risk of reoffending.

Equal Opportunity Act reform

This bill is amending the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 to add a new attribute of ‘subjection to family violence’.

This will make it unlawful to discriminate against someone because they have experienced, or are experiencing, family violence.

This new protection will apply to areas of public life, including employment, education, the provision of goods and services, disposal of land, accommodation, clubs, sport and local government.

No victim-survivor should lose a promotion, be performance managed or be denied a rental because they needed to attend court, relocate for safety or access support.

Victim-survivors will be able to challenge discrimination based on this new attribute by dispute resolution at the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission or by applying to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for civil redress, including compensation.

There will also be a positive duty on organisations, such as employers and accommodation and service providers, to take proactive, reasonable and proportionate steps to eliminate discrimination based on the new attribute. The commission has powers to investigate contraventions of this duty.

Family violence and personal safety reforms

The bill also contains a number of reforms to deliver more victim-centric processes for extending or varying an FVIO and better protect children and families from predatory behaviour under the personal safety intervention order (PSIO) system.

Currently, victim-survivors are often required to attend court multiple times to seek protection from their perpetrator, forcing them to relive their experiences of violence and subjecting them to further trauma, even when there is proven criminal family violence offending.

Victims should not have to feel like they have to fight so hard for protection.

Reforms in this bill will allow a criminal court, on its ‘own motion’ and with the consent of the victim-survivor, to extend or vary an FVIO when sentencing a perpetrator for relevant family violence offences.

To encourage earlier consideration of whether stronger protections are needed, the bill will require police to indicate if there is an FVIO in place and if an application to extend or vary that order will be made when filing a charge sheet for a related family violence offence.

The bill will also ensure courts more consistently prioritise consideration of victim-survivor views when extending an FVIO and encourage longer extensions when a perpetrator is serving a term of imprisonment for a related family violence offence, to avoid victim-survivors needing to return to court multiple times.

Fines and infringements reforms

This bill will strengthen supports for fine recipients experiencing vulnerability and disadvantage.

The family violence scheme will be expanded to include excessive speeding fines so that victim-survivors can access relief in these circumstances.

The work and development permit scheme will be also expanded to apply to court fines, where it is currently only available to infringement fines.

Electronic signatures

The bill clarifies that electronic signatures can be used for FVIO and personal safety intervention order documents.

This change will help to make proceedings less disruptive to the lives of victims by confirming they can sign documents without having to attend court or a police station.

Grooming

The bill will strengthen protections for children and families by enabling PSIOs to be made against adults engaging in ‘grooming’ behaviours.

Grooming is a predatory behaviour undertaken to facilitate child sexual abuse. It is insidious, deeply traumatic and deserves to be captured by the PSIO framework.

This will enable the conduct to be disrupted before it escalates to sexual offending.

Multi-agency risk assessment and management framework (MARAM)

Finally, the MARAM framework and the family violence information-sharing scheme are flagship reforms implemented by this government following the Royal Commission into Family Violence.

This bill includes reforms to support more effective, sustainable, and fit-for-purpose risk management and information sharing.

Together, these amendments will support prescribed organisations to better meet their legislative obligations and strengthen how professionals assess, manage and share information about family violence risk to keep victim-survivors safe and hold people who use violence accountable.

Section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975

It is my intention to make a statement under section 85(5) of the Constitution Act 1975 setting out the reasons for altering or varying that section. It is the intention of clause 8 of the bill to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act.

Clause 8 inserts new sections 125S, 125T and 125U into the Family Violence Protection Act 2008. New section 125S provides there is no appeal against an own-motion order made by the County Court or the Supreme Court. New section 125T provides that an appeal against an own-motion order made by the Magistrates’ Court must not be started or continued if the final order was extended or varied since the Magistrates’ Court made the order that is subject of the appeal.

New section 125U provides there is no appeal against a decision of the County Court following an appeal against an own-motion order made by the Magistrates’ Court. These new sections will limit the Supreme Court’s ability to hear an appeal in certain circumstances and therefore engage section 85 of the Constitution Act. Clause 10 inserts new subsection (3) after section 208(2) of the Family Violence Protection Act to make clear that it is the intention of new sections 125S, 125T and 125U to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act.

The right to appeal an own-motion power variation or extension is limited to ensure that victim-survivors are prevented from having to attend court on numerous occasions. This risks further traumatising the protected person, which would undermine the purpose of promoting and protecting the safety of victims of family violence. These limitations are also consistent with existing limitations in sections 114 and 120 of the Family Violence Protection Act. Parties can still seek to vary, extend or revoke an FVIO under existing provisions in the Family Violence Protection Act, if they so choose.

I commend the bill to the house.

 Cindy McLEISH (Eildon) (11:33): I move:

That the debate be now adjourned.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

Ordered that debate be adjourned for two weeks. Debate adjourned until Wednesday 26 August.