Tuesday, 22 September 2026

 Evan MULHOLLAND (Northern Metropolitan) (19:33): I rise to speak on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026. The Premier stood up on his first day in the job and told Victorians that integrity would not be optional. Yet when we actually look at this bill as currently drafted – when we look beyond the rhetoric and examine what it would allow IBAC to investigate and, importantly, what it would prevent IBAC from investigating – we see that integrity remains very much optional under this Labor government. This might be a new Premier, but this is the same Labor government. It is a continuation of the governments of Daniel Andrews and Jacinta Allan, with the same instinct to talk about integrity when it is politically convenient but resist genuine scrutiny when that scrutiny gets a little too close to home.

For years IBAC has been asking for stronger powers, integrity experts have been calling for stronger powers and the Liberals and Nationals have been calling for stronger powers, and frankly, Victorians who have watched scandal after scandal after scandal unfold deserve an anti-corruption commission with power to follow the money and get to the truth. I moved a similar IBAC amendment bill in this place this year, back in March, and every single Labor MP on that side of the chamber voted against it. Mr Batchelor even said:

Taking a couple of amendments here and there to try and do justice to the complexity of the adequacy of IBAC’s legislative framework I think is an approach and a response that is being driven by a political moment, rather than being driven by a desire to achieve workable, long-lasting and effective reform.

Mr Galea described my bill as:

… a half-baked affair focused on being seen to do something more than to achieve good reform through effective, considered legislation.

John Berger: Well, he got that right.

Evan MULHOLLAND: If it was considered legislation, the government would not be scrambling to consider amendments from the chamber at the last minute. I will just note that, for your reference, Mr Berger. And of course, Ms Ermacora referred to the ‘so-called follow-the-money power’ and said:

Entities like Victoria Police and the Labour Hire Authority are far better placed to investigate and deal with allegations of criminality and industry-specific misconduct.

That was not all. She even went on to say:

You do not reform something as complex as our integrity system with a change here and a change there and call it a day.

Forgive me if I do not believe this government for a second on integrity or rooting out corruption when this is what they had to say just a few months ago. Labor says it is giving IBAC new powers, but at the same time it is deliberately preventing those powers from being used to revisit matters that IBAC has previously dismissed, completed or referred elsewhere. You do not ask the people responsible for the crime scene to determine what can and cannot be investigated.

This bill introduces what are commonly described as follow-the-money powers. Those powers are important because they allow IBAC to pursue information held by third parties, something that has been a significant limitation in investigations involving contractors, subcontractors and other organisations dealing with government. The bill also broadens the relevant threshold so that IBAC’s investigative powers can extend beyond the commission of an offence to serious disciplinary matters. We support those changes because this is something that we have been calling for and indeed attempted to legislate earlier this year but was blocked by the Victorian Labor Party.

But here is the problem: after 12 long years of Labor government, after years of integrity scandals and serious allegations involving billions of dollars of taxpayer-funded infrastructure projects, Labor has drawn a line through the past. The government has specifically blocked retrospectivity for matters IBAC has already investigated, dismissed or referred to another body. This means that matters may have previously been dismissed because IBAC did not possess the very powers this bill now gives it, yet once those powers exist, IBAC will still be prohibited from using them. How can that possibly be justified? The government wants to stand up and say, ‘Look at us, we have strengthened IBAC’, but at the same time inserted provisions saying, ‘Just don’t look backwards.’

I mean, you had the former Premier – and I know they were all embarrassed by it, that is why they got rid of her. But you had the former Premier brandishing around to the media, briefing the media on a 2024 letter to IBAC, referring serious criminal allegations of corruption to IBAC, and she was briefing it and briefing it earlier this year to the media, getting them all to report on it, only for IBAC itself to take an unprecedented and extraordinary step of releasing the letter they sent back to Ms Allan, the Premier, about six weeks later. They advised the Premier that they did not have the follow-the-money powers to investigate those allegations of corruption and would very much like those follow-the-money powers so it could properly consider the matters referred to in the former Premier’s letter. How embarrassing for those opposite, who claim to be all about integrity now, to have sat there and watched the former Premier brandish about that letter only to be publicly refuted in an unprecedented way by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission.

This is the great contradiction at the heart of this bill. Clause 8 could hardly be clearer: proposed section 200(3) provides that nothing in the relevant provisions permits IBAC to reopen a complaint or notification that it dismissed or referred elsewhere before the commencement or an investigation that it completed before the commencement. Nothing permits IBAC to reopen them. That matters, because there is a very important distinction between IBAC deciding an allegation has no merit and IBAC being unable to investigate an allegation because the law did not give it the powers it required to do so at the time. Under Labor’s bill, both can effectively end up in the same basket. If IBAC received an allegation, determined it did not possess the necessary powers and referred that allegation elsewhere, it simply cannot come back once the Parliament finally gives it those powers and investigate the matter properly. That is not the comprehensive strengthening of IBAC Victorians were promised.

We have seen precisely why that matters, with the allegations occurring around Labor’s Big Build. The former Premier referred allegations concerning corruption on major projects to IBAC, and IBAC subsequently advised it did not have the powers required to investigate. Under this legislation, matters dealt with in that way may now be prevented from being reopened by using IBAC’s newly expanded powers. The government points to the Royal Commission into the Integrity of Major Public and Civil Infrastructure Construction Projects in Victoria as though it resolves every single problem. It does not. The royal commission has terms of reference. There have been other matters referred to IBAC over the last 12 years that fall outside of those terms of reference – I think those opposite know that too – and those matters deserve proper scrutiny as well. I refer to the government’s budget lotto deal that went to IBAC. That matter does not simply become part of the construction royal commission just because the government has now established one. There are questions around other decisions, other contracts and other conduct that have been referred to our integrity agencies over the life of this government. Why would Parliament give IBAC stronger powers in 2026 but tell it that when it comes to matters raised in 2025, 2024, 2023 or earlier those powers cannot be used?

This is why the Liberals and Nationals will move amendments. And let me be clear from the outset: we support giving IBAC stronger powers. In March this year I introduced the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026 to this very chamber. That bill gave IBAC enhanced follow-the-money powers. It passed the chamber; it represented the will of this house. Yet when it reached the Assembly Labor would not even allow it for first reading. So we will not be lectured to by the Labor Party on strengthening IBAC. We sought to give IBAC these powers months ago.

What we will do now is seek to improve the government’s bill so that IBAC receives powers that are meaningful, powers that can actually be used and powers that give Victorians confidence that allegations of corruption can be pursued wherever the evidence leads. Our first amendment will make the legislation fully retrospective: if IBAC previously received the matter but could not investigate it because it lacked the appropriate powers, it should be able to reconsider that matter once Parliament gives it those powers. That is common sense. Victorians would find it extraordinary if Parliament passed legislation that acknowledged that IBAC’s previous powers were inadequate but simultaneously prohibited IBAC from revisiting cases where that inadequacy may have prevented a proper investigation. We should not be legislating blind spots into our anti-corruption framework. I note the government have been dragged kicking and screaming to possibly move their own amendment in this respect, after the Special Minister of State went out there and said that these are much rather matters for the royal commission. I think the will of this chamber has shown the government up and dragged them to a much more sensible position than what they really wanted in their heart of hearts, because what they really wanted was a media release and press statements about being seen to do something, but leaving a great big trail of ‘cover-up’ in their tracks so that IBAC would be hamstrung from investigating this government’s own record on corruption.

Our second amendment deals with the timely reporting of IBAC investigations. Victorians saw what occurred with Operation Richmond: that investigation commenced years before the final report was eventually tabled following prolonged proceedings and delays. There must of course remain proper procedural fairness; people affected by an IBAC report must retain their legal rights and courts must retain their jurisdiction to consider legitimate applications brought before them. Nobody is proposing otherwise. There also needs to be a clear statement from this Parliament that IBAC reports should be finalised and tabled fast and as promptly as the law reasonably allows. Do not think I have forgotten the government briefing by the Premier’s private office and others about our attempts to move a private member’s bill on this. Mr Davis moved a private member’s bill and debated a private member’s bill on this, and my colleague in the other place Mr Newbury attempted to move a private member’s bill on this. This government scoffed at it. This government cannot recognise a reasonable idea. In fact it is almost allergic to a reasonable idea until they suddenly come to the table and recognise there is a problem. An anti-corruption report cannot become trapped indefinitely in a procedural merry-go-round, and our amendment establishes that legislative expectation while preserving the proper role and independence of the courts. When judges consider a matter relating to the release of IBAC reports, Parliament’s intention should be clear: procedural fairness matters, legal rights matter, but unnecessary delay should not become a mechanism through which public accountability is frustrated. The government seems to have been dragged kicking and screaming into this, but as I said, I can recall the briefing they were doing about our bill on fast tabling.

Our third amendment relates to public examinations. The government’s approach is that examinations should be held in private; we do not support that presumption. There will obviously be circumstances where privacy is necessary to protect investigations, witnesses or other legitimate interests, but Parliament should not start from the proposition that secrecy is automatically preferable when our anti-corruption commission undertakes examinations. Public confidence in integrity institutions depends in part upon transparency.

When hearings can appropriately occur publicly, IBAC should have the capacity to conduct them publicly without the law placing an unnecessary thumb on the scales towards secrecy. Our amendment would repeal that provision, consistent with the approach we have taken in legislation before this Parliament previously – again, laws that were opposed by those opposite. The government seems to have been dragged kicking and screaming on this one. We will wait and see what happens in the committee stage. But it does show that, up until now – as the government is dragged on at least three out of four of our amendments – integrity has been kind of optional under this Premier. It does show that in how much they have resisted stronger laws to beef up IBAC and our integrity framework and institutions. It does show that integrity has been optional under this government.

Our fourth amendment deals with public interest immunity and in my view addresses another significant weakness in the present system. Under the current framework a minister or former minister may claim public interest immunity in relation to certain material sought by IBAC. In practical terms, IBAC may come asking for a document and be told that the document attracts public interest immunity because it involves cabinet material. There are legitimate reasons why sensitive government information receives legal protection, and nobody disputes that matters involving national security, law enforcement operations and genuinely sensitive information require appropriate safeguards. But a blanket ability to prevent an integrity agency from accessing material simply because a minister, former minister or former Premier invokes public interest immunity creates an obvious problem. If IBAC is investigating serious allegations involving government decision-making, there needs to be an appropriate mechanism through which claims of immunity can be examined rather than simply operating as the end of the matter. That is what our amendment seeks to address.

The sticking point, I think, is our calls to stop Daniel Andrews and Jacinta Allan from using privilege as a way not to cooperate with IBAC or a royal commission. Ben Carroll wants to leave the former premiers with the power not to cooperate. If Mr Carroll refuses to remove the immunity, he would be ensuring that Ms Allan and Mr Andrews had a cover-up power to not provide information. His utterances in his first press conference that he is not Daniel Andrews and that he is not Jacinta Allan would be just words. He would be, if he refuses our amendment, running a protection racket for Daniel Andrews and Jacinta Allan. That is what he would be doing if he does not agree to our amendment. This is a sensible amendment that we think is in the public interest and in Victoria’s interest. I reckon if you asked Victorians – and those opposite might want to do it on the weekend when they are knocking on doors – whether they think Daniel Andrews or Jacinta Allan deserve public interest immunity at IBAC or a royal commission, I do not think they would agree with you.

Lee Tarlamis: On a point of order, Acting President, Mr Davis is continually interjecting when he is out of his place. He has been here long enough to know that that is not within the standing orders, and I ask you to ask him to refrain from doing that.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (Gaelle Broad): I ask Mr Davis, if he wishes to interject, to be seated in his place.

David Davis: I am only standing, Acting President, because I have an injured leg.

Lee Tarlamis: Further to that, Acting President, if he is not in his place, he can refrain from interjecting, which is disorderly and not within the standing orders anyway.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (Gaelle Broad): I ask Mr Mulholland to continue.

Evan MULHOLLAND: If Victoria establishes a royal commission specifically to investigate alleged corruption, criminality and misconduct associated with major public infrastructure, that commission should be able to obtain the information required to establish what has occurred. That applies regardless of whether the person holding the information is a current minister, a former minister or a former Premier. No individual should be above proper scrutiny simply because of the office that they once held. The purpose of our integrity system is to allow independent bodies to follow evidence where it leads. That should apply equally to the current government, former governments, ministers, former ministers, public servants, contractors, unions, companies and anyone else whose conduct properly falls within the jurisdiction of our integrity agencies.

Over recent years allegations have emerged of concerning conduct on major Victorian infrastructure projects, including allegations involving ghost shifts, false sign-offs, improper payments, labour hire arrangements and other misconduct. Other misconduct was referred to previously by Dr Heath in regard to workplace health and safety reps, who as we saw through the thorough investigative journalism of Nick McKenzie were being used as a proxy to house bikies, to house people that had just come out of prison in Queensland and to house domestic abusers. These are the people who were the workplace health and safety reps on construction sites under this government. These are the kinds of things that should be investigated. But under the current government’s set of laws, you could have all sorts of improper conduct on the North East Link exposed in a quarterly report or a report to Treasury, but if that goes to cabinet for noting, that entire swath of evidence about the government’s knowledge of allegations on the North East Link would be protected from a royal commission. We do not know what has gone to cabinet, but we would suspect that some of this has gone to cabinet, just like the government’s shameful secret public transport tax went to cabinet for noting. The Premier and most of the other ministers had never read it –

Members interjecting.

Ryan Batchelor: On a point of order –

Evan MULHOLLAND: I was making a comparison.

Ryan Batchelor: Acting President, Mr Davis appears to be continuing to defy your ruling for him to remain silent if he is going to be standing in the chamber.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (Gaelle Broad): I ask Mr Mulholland to continue unassisted.

Evan MULHOLLAND: As I was saying, the secret public transport tax went to cabinet. I know none of them obviously read their cabinet papers or are well briefed on them, but it is quite clear that many other matters could have gone to cabinet and are not going to be able to be investigated by IBAC. These allegations should be properly investigated on their merits by the appropriate independent bodies.

Politicians write laws that prevent independent agencies from properly examining them. A number of matters have already been referred to IBAC. The question therefore becomes very simple: once IBAC receives stronger powers will it actually be allowed to use them in relation to those matters? Under the bill as drafted there are circumstances where the answer is no. That is the issue for Parliament to fix. The government says the royal commission will deal with construction matters, but the royal commission will not answer every integrity question raised over the last 12 years of this Labor government.

It does not encompass every referral to IBAC. It does not encompass every government contract. It does not encompass every decision involving taxpayer money. It does not encompass every allegation concerning the conduct of ministers, departments, agencies or government-owned entities. Of course we saw lots of briefing that the director-general at Victorian Infrastructure Delivery Authority and other public servants were warning the former Premier and ministers about allegations of corruption on taxpayer-funded projects. There were allegations of corruption on the Hurstbridge line upgrade, where we saw some pretty awful instances of both corruption and allegations of abuse and violence. There were awful allegations of abuse on the North East Link and on the Footscray Hospital build – terrifying incidents of abuse and corruption we have seen on construction sites across our state.

So if Parliament accepts that IBAC needs stronger laws and powers today, we must confront the obvious question about what happens to allegations that could not properly be investigated yesterday because IBAC did not possess those powers. The government could have introduced legislation straight away giving IBAC comprehensive follow-the-money powers, ensuring those powers apply to past matters, strengthening transparency around examinations and reporting and removing unnecessary barriers to preventing the commission from obtaining relevant information. Instead Labor has brought forward a bill containing worthwhile powers but surrounded them with restrictions that diminish their effectiveness.

We will support the strengthening of IBAC’s powers. We will also seek to amend this legislation, because simply giving IBAC more powers on paper is not enough. Those powers need to work in practice. They need to apply where allegations have previously fallen through gaps in IBAC’s legislation. They need to allow our anti-corruption commission to look backwards as well as forwards. They need to ensure reports are not unnecessarily trapped for years before Victorians can see them. They need to preserve IBAC’s capacity to conduct public examinations where appropriate, and they need to ensure claims of public interest immunity cannot operate as an automatic barrier. That is the integrity framework Victorians deserve. And after 12 years of Labor, which has faced one integrity controversy after another, this bill is certainly needed and should be supported.

 Ryan BATCHELOR (Southern Metropolitan) (20:03): I am very pleased to rise to speak on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026, which makes two incredibly important changes to IBAC’s legislative framework. Firstly, it expands the definitions of ‘public officer’ and ‘public body’ and inserts definitions of ‘associated entity’ and ‘third-party contractor’ to effectively expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to allow it to follow the money and allow it to investigate circumstances where there are allegations of alleged corrupt conduct in the performance of a public function undertaken by a third party but funded by government. Secondly, it amends the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ to replace the requirement that that conduct constitute a relevant offence, and at a lower threshold that the conduct constitute any offence, and at the lower threshold that the conduct constitute a serious disciplinary matter, to allow IBAC to investigate a broader range of integrity-related matters and to insert some transitional provisions in the bill.

The bill implements two critical recommendations – one being arguably the most important – from the Integrity and Oversight Committee’s report into the adequacy of the legislative framework for the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission that was tabled in December of last year, which the government responded to in June indicating its support for a range of recommendations.

The new Premier, upon coming to office, made it a priority of his, along with a range of other integrity-related matters, to not only establish a royal commission into the construction sector here in Victoria but do a range of other things, including this bill, which is to introduce follow-the-dollar powers sooner than was previously articulated as government policy, but also bring forward the changes to amend the definition of corrupt conduct and then the bill, which we will debate later, to create the Office of the Special Prosecutor – all components of this government’s integrity agenda under the Premier, Ben Carroll, setting a new direction for integrity here in Victoria. They have been very important steps that have, frankly, left the opposition floundering to understand what they can possibly say. But I will get a bit more into what the opposition’s contribution is. I want to go to the substance of these matters and why they are important.

As a member of the Integrity and Oversight Committee for the last four years and someone who worked very closely with many across the chamber – including the late Dr Tim Read, who was the chair of the committee – to formulate the recommendations in this report that this bill implements some of, I know we did extensive investigations and we heard detailed submissions and lots of evidence, and I think it was very clear that the framework that IBAC had been operating under since it was established by the former Liberal government in 2012 and operationally commenced in 2013 did constrain its ability to effectively function. This government, the Labor government, made a couple of tranches of changes to try and fix some of those issues, particularly the introduction of the amendments relating to misconduct in public office that were implemented in 2019. The committee recommended a series of amendments to improve IBAC’s operations. The follow-the-money powers, as they are colloquially termed, are amendments to definitions of ‘public officer’ and ‘public body’ that, importantly, will allow IBAC’s jurisdiction to go beyond those circumstances where a public officer or public body is involved in the conduct – so either the conduct of that public body or the conduct of a third party towards a public body or towards a public officer. It has been that nexus which has acted as a limitation on the jurisdiction of IBAC. There are many circumstances – yes, in the construction sector – where head contractors contract with government and then implement a series of subcontracting arrangements, but it is not exclusively the construction sector where these new provisions will have effect.

It, for example, could also be the conduct of those in the broader community and social care sector who are engaged by the government to deliver services on behalf of the Victorian people. Their conduct will now be able to be investigated by IBAC, but also those who are involved, say, in the professional services sector – a consulting firm, for example, undertaking work on behalf of the government – will have their conduct be able to be scrutinised by IBAC as a result of the changes that this bill brings about. Yes, it will, importantly, apply to the way that contracting and subcontracting work in the construction sector, but it will also go much broader than just that, across a whole range of government services. I think those matters should, in the course of this debate, be mentioned. They are not the focus, but they are the consequences of the amendments, particularly on follow the money, that we have got here today.

The second, but I think the most critical, amendment is the definition of corrupt conduct that this bill provides and its removal of the requirement for the conduct to constitute a relevant offence, which was a big curtailment of IBAC’s capacity to make findings of corrupt conduct to properly and thoroughly investigate a range of matters on which, in other jurisdictions, similar bodies are not so constrained. It does, I think, make the most significant change to Victoria’s corruption powers since the establishment of IBAC, its commencement as a body in 2012 and the commencement of its investigative functions in 2013. It means that conduct that is not a crime but which is a serious breach of a relevant code of conduct – whether that be the public sector code of conduct, the ministerial code of conduct or the members of Parliament code of conduct in the standards that we have – will be now capable of being scrutinised by IBAC, and the range of very significant powers that IBAC has, its significant coercive powers as an investigatory body, will be able to be brought to bear on those instances of misconduct. That is a real paradigm shift for corruption investigation in Victoria, and it is one that the Integrity and Oversight Committee, in its December report, recommended. As a member of that committee, I supported that report, I supported those recommendations, and I support the bill before us today.

There are a range of transitional provisions in the bill that seek to ensure that the application of these new provisions and the expansion of IBAC’s jurisdiction are able to be applied to conduct that occurred prior to its commencement – in fact right back to the commencement of IBAC itself. There has been, unfortunately – and I do not know whether it was wilful or accidental – some misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the effect of those transitional provisions and an attempt to muddy the water a little bit about what their effect was, but the government’s intention has been very, very clear.

In quoting from the amendment bill in and of itself, members would be well served by reading the principal act in conjunction with the amendment bill to understand the totality of IBAC’s powers with respect to its own decision-making that it has to undertake. If you look particularly at the operation of section 60 of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011, you need to actually read the bill and the act together to get a holistic understanding of what IBAC’s powers and decision-making framework and matrix really will be to make the determinations that it has to make about investigations that it launches and the overarching determination about its decision-making in launching investigations that ultimately should be in the public interest. There has been, I think, some confusion about those issues. The government is certainly working to ensure that its intent is clarified and that it is very, very clear about what it is that we are seeking to do.

I think members will be well served by reading the bill and the act together to actually understand how the law might operate. As I say, those matters are being worked through, and the government is not going to allow misinterpretation to derail what is a very clear intention with respect to the ability of this bill to cast back and look at conduct that may have occurred as far back as 2013. There may well be members of this Parliament who have an interest in understanding what IBAC’s powers are to investigate improper conduct that occurred as far back as 2013 and 2014. There may well be a series of matters and decisions that were undertaken in 2013 and 2014, for example, in relation to the settling of legal action in the Ventnor matter, a matter in which the previous planning minister, the member for Bulleen – when he was the planning minister in 2011 – made some dubious planning decisions and then in 2013 had to go and settle through a court case.

The motivation for that settlement was borne out in some material that was tabled in 2018 that seemed to suggest that his motivation in seeking that settlement was one that was driven by politics and not by law. There may be other matters as far back as 2013 that need to be examined, and I am pleased that this bill will enable that to occur should IBAC determine that it should be the case.

There are a couple of other things I will say. We are not going to take lectures from Mr Mulholland about the application of legislative detail on this bill or others. Mr Mulholland could not answer some pretty simple questions I in particular asked him when he moved a private members bill in this place a couple of months ago. When I asked him when the operative provisions would commence, he could not give me an answer. He stuttered, he stammered, he could not actually give me an answer. I am not particularly convinced that he is across the detail here, so I am not going to be taking lectures from him about how these provisions might operate.

There are a couple of other things I just want to say more broadly and genuinely in the spirit of what I think is an exceptionally complex area of public law that needs to be addressed seriously. Following these amendments, there is going to be unresolved and unfinished business with respect to IBAC’s police oversight jurisdiction that is going to need ongoing monitoring and attention. The expansion of IBAC’s public sector jurisdiction should not have an impact on its police oversight functions, and we need to make sure that it does not. I put that firmly on the public record.

The other thing is that I think we need to be very clear and clarify the application of this bill, particularly with respect to the privileges of the Parliament. There was some interesting commentary in Operation Richmond from IBAC itself about how IBAC, as an arm of the executive, an instrument of executive government, treats and deals with the privileges of the Parliament and parliamentarians. Given the expansion of ‘corrupt conduct’ to include serious disciplinary matters and potential breaches of our standards of conduct as members of Parliament, I think we should give further consideration and thought to how those two matters intersect, because there may well be things that occur in this chamber – in the negotiation of legislation, for example – that members want to think about in terms of how IBAC and its new powers and expanded jurisdiction might operate. They are complex, but they need further discussion. They are two matters, I think, that we need to think further about and have further consideration of, probably in the next Parliament. This is a very important bill. I support it, and I commend it to the house.

 Jacinta ERMACORA (Western Victoria) (20:18): I am very pleased to speak on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026. The main aims of this bill are to empower IBAC to follow the money and to amend the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’, both of which have been so ably covered by my colleague Mr Batchelor. The Carroll Labor government has made a commitment to enable IBAC to follow the money. This legislation will do just that. It will do so by enabling IBAC to investigate suspected corrupt conduct by third-party and private subcontractors where there is a connection between that conduct and the performance of a public function funded by government. The bill also acts on the commitment to broaden the definition of corrupt conduct. In doing so, it will enable IBAC to deal with a broader range of criminal conduct and other behaviours that may compromise integrity.

These reforms work in parallel with other integrity-strengthening reforms. Together with the measures we are taking in relation to the royal commission and special prosecutor, this represents a holistic and comprehensive response to allegations of misconduct on government-funded construction sites.

If we just take a moment to have a look at the follow-the-money provisions, this bill focuses firstly on our commitment to enabling IBAC to follow the money. The prevention of corruption on our building sites does not just stop at the front gate – I know that is farming language, but there are gates behind the front gate. We need to apply the same scrutiny to subcontractors, labour hire firms and procurement chains. We need IBAC to have the tools to follow that trail, so this bill enables IBAC to investigate corrupt conduct down the chain of contractors and third parties.

These reforms allow for any connection between the alleged corrupt conduct and the performance of a public function funded by a government to be investigated. That connection matters. It protects against overreach while ensuring that IBAC can more deeply pursue any real concerns affecting government projects. To do this, the bill will amend the definitions of ‘public body’ and ‘public officer’ in the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 to include reference to ‘associated entities’, drawing on the definition in the Audit Act 1994. These changes provide IBAC with powers comparable to the Victorian Auditor-General, in line with the recommendation of the Integrity and Oversight Committee.

If we have a look at the definition now of ‘corrupt conduct’, this bill also broadens that definition. The IBAC Commissioner has publicly stated that this definition should be amended, and we are acting on that advice. Currently the conduct must constitute a ‘relevant offence’ – and I say that in inverted commas – before IBAC can commence an investigation. The definition of a ‘relevant offence’ in the IBAC act is:

(a) An indictable offence…

…

(i) attempt to pervert the course of justice;

(ii) bribery of a public official;

(iii) perverting the course of justice;

(iv) misconduct in public office.

This limits IBAC from investigating other behaviours that may compromise integrity but are not a criminal offence. So corrupt conduct will now mean conduct that would constitute either a criminal offence or a serious disciplinary matter. A ‘serious disciplinary matter’ is defined as:

(a) serious misconduct;

(b) any other matter that may constitute grounds for –

(i) termination of employment, appointment or engagement … –

so whatever the legal language is for the role that you are in –

(ii) a significant employment appointment or contractual penalty …

(c) a serious contravention of –

(i) the Codes of Conduct …

that apply to members of Parliament or local government councillors.

When we introduce the notion of ‘follow the money’ and we redefine and broaden the definition of ‘corruption’, we have a much stronger capability to follow the trail of money further down the line. How effective will this be? The provisions in this bill are backed by Victoria’s integrity agencies. IBAC and Integrity Oversight Victoria, IOV, have been consulted on the bill and are broadly supportive of these reforms. IBAC is currently working through implementation planning, as the reforms are proposed to commence on the day after royal assent. These reforms implement the key recommendations of the Integrity and Oversight Committee.

I just want to take a moment to express appreciation for the work of the Integrity and Oversight Committee, which has a range of members from across parties who have worked very hard during this term on a range of things, not least of which was the establishment of the PIC, the parliamentary integrity commission. The committees that work in this place play a really important role for Victorians. Sometimes in this chamber here at 8:30 at night it is really hard to imagine that these changes – even as my colleague Harriet Shing mentioned in her valedictory – with the full stops, the commas and the details actually have an effect, but they do. This committee has done a power of work in this four-year term, and I want to express my appreciation but also the appreciation of everybody here for the work that that group has done.

The IOC, the Integrity and Oversight Committee, made 31 recommendations with respect to IBAC’s legislative framework. As someone that has worked on committees, 31 recommendations – that is a lot of work to come to that point. Mr Limbrick knows that. Mr Welch knows that. Everybody here who has been on a committee knows how much work that involves. The government response supports 21 of those recommendations in principle and places eight of them under review. Central to the government’s response is the creation of a time-limited expert reference group. This will be chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Community Safety, with members including IBAC, the Victorian Ombudsman, Integrity Oversight Victoria and Victoria Police. I think this committee will be very valuable. It is extremely important not to have overlap and extremely important not to have politicisation, and this group of experts, with each of them coming from a different perspective – a perspective from each of the integrity entities – will provide a powerful contribution and accountability for each other. This expert reference group will continue to work on implementation of the remaining recommendations, ensuring that Victoria’s integrity framework operates cohesively and without unintended consequences. How logical is that? Who would have thunk that talking to each other might actually strengthen what is being done?

Our reforms to IBAC will work alongside the royal commission and the special prosecutor. The terms of reference of the royal commission are broad and expansive. Nothing is off limits. It is wrong to say this royal commission has limits; it has none. By its very nature, the royal commission will be able to look forward, look back and look at the present. The royal commission can look into the conduct of the CFMEU, construction companies, labour hire firms, consortia and criminal actors on Victoria’s major projects, and it can examine the role of government, the executive, government departments and delivery agencies in overseeing the projects. Crucially, the terms of reference make it a matter for the commissioner to decide whose actions and whose knowledge are relevant to the matters under investigation – not government, not the Premier and certainly not the opposition.

It is concerning, what we have heard from the opposition, wanting to predetermine who gets called by the commissioner. That is called politicisation of an independent process. The commissioner should decide based on the terms of reference. The commissioner will choose who to call as a witness. It is important that the royal commissioner is not hobbled by a political agenda from any political party, anybody in government or anybody in opposition.

This bill ensures that if the royal commission uncovers misconduct, IBAC has the powers to pursue it. We are not waiting for the commission to finish and then asking, ‘What do we do now?’ We are acting now. These powers will be operational within weeks, not years. These reforms give IBAC the powers that it needs immediately. But we know there is more to do. We know we will continue working on a second tranche of reform, in line with our response to the independent oversight committee and in close consultation with the expert reference group.

The bill before us delivers on the commitments made by Ben Carroll, our Premier. It empowers IBAC to follow the money and it broadens the definition of corrupt conduct. These reforms complement the work of the royal commission and special prosecutor. They provide a holistic and comprehensive response to allegations of misconduct on government-funded construction projects. Victorians deserve integrity in their construction industry. They deserve to know that corruption will be pursued wherever it leads. This bill gives IBAC the tools to make that a reality, and I commend the bill to the house.

 David LIMBRICK (South-Eastern Metropolitan) (20:33): I also would like to say a few words on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026. The Libertarian Party went to the last election with one of our policies being – I think the slogan for it was ‘Give IBAC more teeth’. This bill does actually do that, so I am hardly in a position to oppose it. But I will temper that statement by providing a bit of context around that. During the last term of Parliament my main concerns around IBAC were actually around its police oversight function. We had lots of people come to us during the pandemic who complained that they put in a complaint to IBAC and then IBAC had come back to them and said that they had referred the matter on to the police and the police had investigated themselves. It seemed very inadequate, let us put it that way.

If this bill today was setting up a dedicated police oversight function separate from IBAC, I would be very supportive of it. But that is actually not what we are talking about today. What we are talking about today is less about the police oversight function and more about IBAC’s ability to investigate corruption. I would say that despite my enthusiasm for IBAC in the last term of Parliament, I am sort of less enthused now. However, this bill does address two issues around IBAC and its capabilities. Despite my scepticism, and I have concerns about these powers, I do feel that they will give an ability to IBAC to investigate and follow corruption that it does not currently have. The main thing that this bill does is around adding what they call follow-the-money powers. Effectively one of the problems with IBAC at the moment is its jurisdiction ends at the interface between government and the private sector, so it basically ends at the procurement phase. Much of the activity that we have seen with corruption in this state certainly extends to things in the private sector through contracting agencies, through third-party private sector companies, through unions and many other organisations that would be beyond the jurisdiction of IBAC at the moment. Certainly I think it is a big problem that it cannot go beyond that interface of procurement, and this bill does address that.

So that is a good thing I think, although I do have concerns that many of IBAC’s powers are, let us say, far less than what would be considered normal due process powers. I note that many people are concerned about some of the powers that IBAC has that essentially bypass due process in many cases. Some of their coercive powers are very extreme, and I hope that they are used sensibly and effectively. Nevertheless I am still sceptical and concerned about these powers that they have already, and I am concerned about those powers being extended beyond the jurisdiction that they already have. Nevertheless it is certainly the case that I do not feel they can investigate and get to the bottom of much of this corruption without this type of power. If they cannot go beyond the public sector, then they really cannot get to the bottom of this. We have seen cases where companies themselves have rorted Big Build construction contracts. I know a lot of the talk has been about unions, but it is not exclusively unions that are doing this. There was at least one case of a Swedish company that got into trouble for overcharging things, and Lord knows how many other things have gone unnoticed, which is a concern.

Of course we know about union corruption, at least within the CFMEU, and potentially other unions, although we do not yet know; we will have to wait and see what the royal commission comes back with. But I am also concerned that these job sites are mostly controlled by private sector companies. I think that if corruption is happening on these sites, it should not just be about the unions. I know lots of people in the Labor Party seem to think that many of us on the other side have an obsession with unions – I certainly do not. I am not anti union at all; in fact I think unions are an essential part of a free society. But I am concerned that these unions were operating in a corrupt manner, and we are meant to believe that these multinational companies – some of them were public companies that had to report to various stock markets and had boards of directors – somehow had no processes or controls to notice any of this stuff, and they just did not see or notice any of it. I think that is something that has not been investigated properly, the role of these contracting companies and what they have or have not seen or noticed. If they have not noticed things, then they obviously have not been looking with their eyes open.

The other thing that this bill does is expand the definition of corrupt conduct. I have a few more concerns about this than the follow-the-money powers. Expanding the definition to include workplace misconduct, councillor code breaches or ministerial code breaches – I am concerned about this. I will remain open-minded. It is not enough of a concern for me to oppose it, but I am concerned that IBAC could end up as the de facto HR manager here. When we are talking about workplace misconduct, could we end up in a situation where normal workplace disputes end up getting escalated to IBAC? I am concerned about how that may play out in the field. Nevertheless, there are a number of scenarios that probably could and should have been investigated by IBAC, but they could not because they did not meet the definition of corrupt conduct. Maybe they should have been investigated. So on balance, I will give that some leeway. But I still have concerns about trivial things being escalated to IBAC. I know IBAC has to deal with many trivial reports that are given to it all the time; it has to triage them and figure out what is actually worth investigating and what it has the resources to investigate and that sort of thing. I am sure it is a big job already. I am concerned that this will make it a far, far bigger job. Every time someone in the workplace does something that someone else does not like, they might get reported to IBAC, which sort of concerns me. But nevertheless, there are many things that probably should have been investigated that IBAC were unable to investigate because they did not have the powers to do that. After this bill is passed, they will have the power to do that.

I think that the Integrity and Oversight Committee will play a crucial role in monitoring how this bill actually plays out in the field, because, as I said, I think there are many concerns here about how this may work in reality. The Integrity and Oversight Committee will need to be on their game to watch that we do not get IBAC flooded with trivial complaints or we do not get IBAC running down rabbit holes that are not going to lead anywhere, because Victorians, especially Victorian taxpayers, are very concerned about what they are seeing. They are very concerned about the money that has been wasted. They do not know how much – there have been numbers thrown around of $15 billion. I do not know whether that is the right number or not. I do know that corruption exists in Victoria. I do know that organised crime is very, very powerful and a formidable opponent.

I do not envy the government actually having to go up against organised crime in this state. Organised crime is very nimble, very able. One of the things that Premier Carroll was talking about was his new tobacco licensing thing and how they have shut down a few stores and stuff, but organised crime moved to a home delivery model months ago. I have spoken many times in here about how you could walk just a few hundred metres from Parliament and you could buy illegal products wherever you wanted. You cannot buy them anymore because they are all home delivery now. Organised crime has decided that they are going to shift to a different model. So anyone that you bust from this point on clearly is not part of whoever the dominant organised crime network is at the moment.

For some reason, organised crime seems to be able to advertise at will on social media. I get tobacco and vapes advertisements all the time in my social media feed, probably because I search for these things. But nevertheless, they are obviously spending large amounts of money on social media to advertise these illegal products. I have noticed a number of other illegal products being sold, not just tobacco and not just vapes. I have also seen illegal black market cannabis, which the government could have solved by legalising cannabis, but they refuse to do that. The question is not whether there is a cannabis market. The question is whether it is a regulated, legal market or whether it is controlled by organised crime. For some reason, the government thinks that organised crime controlling this market is a better thing. I disagree. The opposition seems to think that as well. Despite their big chest-thumping about organised crime, they do not seem to want to undermine any of their markets, when they could with the stroke of a pen.

In fact if the opposition today said that their policy was to legalise cannabis and undermine a billion-dollar market for organised crime in Victoria, it would flip. It would be legalised within minutes because the government could not oppose it at that point, and I am sure maybe even the Liberal Party would become more popular. Maybe there are a few cannabis consumers that are partial to the Liberal Party, apart from their position on cannabis – who knows?

I have also noticed a number of other illegal products that they are selling at the moment. There seem to be a lot of these weird injectable peptides and stuff, and Lord knows what is going to happen with that down the track. It is probably not a good thing, I imagine, having unregulated injectable drugs that do God knows what being sold to people, but they seem to be selling them with impunity as well, and the government seems to have no control.

As I said before, organised crime is so sophisticated that they have actually anticipated how the government might deal with tobacco regulation by setting up distribution centres. If you try and order illegal tobacco or vapes in Victoria online, they come from Brisbane, because Victoria Police has no jurisdiction in Queensland, and if you order them in Queensland, guess what, they come from Victoria. That is sort of how it works at the moment, and that will work for a while until Victoria and Queensland police come to some sort of agreement to investigate each other’s jurisdictions. For the moment it will buy them some time until they move to whatever model is next. They seem to be at least one step – probably two steps – ahead of the government.

As I have said many times, the only way that the government is going to deal with these things is not through enforcement but through undermining the incentives that deal with these things. This is another problem with this bill: it totally ignores the incentives that the government has set up in the construction sector, which I have spoken about many times in this place. It ignores the fact that organised crime has used the government’s own diversity policies as a vector for infiltration and corruption. The government says with its social procurement policies that you need to have a gender equality action plan and you need to have all these things about how you are going to employ Aboriginal people. Of course organised crime is only too happy to oblige and provide this workforce diversity for you, and that is exactly what it does. I do not think that anyone that supported the gender equality bill in the last term of Parliament, including me, thought that this was going to be the outcome of it, but actually that is sort of what has happened. It has turned into a nightmare. We need to rethink the procurement policies from scratch. I hope that the opposition will maybe say something about procurement policies and what they are going to do with them if they are lucky enough to become the government, because ultimately many of the vectors for infiltration that we have seen in the construction sector are a direct result of government procurement policies, and many of these vectors could be undermined by better procurement policies.

What IBAC are doing is mopping up the after-effects; they are mopping up the criminality that is a result of government policy. What we need to be looking at is the government policy that incentivises it, not the mopping up. If we are focused on this forever, we will never, ever fix organised crime in this state. Organised crime is a huge problem. Corruption is a huge problem. Anyone that denies it is denying reality. It is everywhere, and we will not fix it through enforcement alone. We will only fix this through facing the reality that the incentives that we have created – that the government has created and that Parliament has created – have actually backfired and caused a lot of this corruption, or at least allowed it. We need to soberly ask ourselves: did these things that we have done – the social procurement policies, for example – actually achieve the goals that we wanted, or have they done something else entirely? I think the answer is obvious.

Clearly the royal commission will be looking at this. I will probably be looking at making a submission myself to the royal commission. We will see where they end up. I hope that they do get to the bottom of this, but I really hope that the royal commission do look at the role of government policy in incentivising organised crime, because if we do not look at that, we will always be just doing a clean-up and will never, ever fix the problem.

 Lee TARLAMIS (South-Eastern Metropolitan) (20:50): I move:

That debate be adjourned until later this day.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned until later this day.