Thursday, 24 September 2026

 Ingrid STITT (Western Metropolitan – Minister for Health, Minister for Mental Health, Minister for Ambulance Services, Special Minister of State) (15:43): I would like to begin by acknowledging the broad support for these reforms in the chamber and the constructive way that we have been able to engage with many of you on these reforms. As we heard in the second-reading debate, the bill does two key things. Firstly, it gives IBAC follow-the-money powers so they can investigate suspected corrupt conduct by third-party and private subcontractors where there is a connection between alleged corrupt conduct and the performance of a public function funded by government. It does this by providing IBAC with powers comparable to those of the Victorian Auditor-General. Secondly, it amends the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ to capture a broader range of criminal conduct and other integrity-compromising behaviours by enabling IBAC to consider any offence or a serious disciplinary matter or a serious breach of a relevant code of conduct, including the ministerial code of conduct. These changes are in line with recommendations made in the Integrity and Oversight Committee (IOC) report into the adequacy of the legislative framework for the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission.

I do want to acknowledge the chair of that committee the late Dr Tim Read and pay my deep respects to him, his family and the Greens community, who are grieving such a heavy loss. His work alongside the committee’s has been instrumental in shaping the reforms in front of us today, and I would like to place on the public record the government’s appreciation for his work and dedication to integrity reform.

This reform delivers on the Carroll Labor government’s commitment that integrity is not negotiable. It must be said that this is a fast-tracked reform. It does not replace the broader reforms that this government is undertaking in relation to strengthening the powers of IBAC and considering the IOC report as a whole.

I will go into a bit more detail about the specifics of the bill now. Under the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 conduct must meet certain requirements to constitute corrupt conduct, such as conduct that adversely affects the honest performance by a public officer or public body of their functions, the misuse of information or material acquired in the course of their performance or conduct that involves recklessly breaching public trust. Currently conduct must also constitute a relevant offence before IBAC can commence an investigation. ‘Relevant offence’ is defined narrowly in the IBAC act as an indictable offence or any of the common-law offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice, bribery of a public official, perverting the course of justice or misconduct in public office.

The current definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ limits IBAC from investigating other integrity-compromising behaviours that may not meet the threshold of a criminal offence. To address this issue and give full effect to the government’s commitment, the bill amends the IBAC act to provide that ‘corrupt conduct’ means conduct that would constitute any offence or a serious disciplinary matter. ‘Serious disciplinary matter’ is defined as serious misconduct or any other matter that constitutes or may constitute grounds for termination of employment, appointment or engagement or a significant employment, appointment or contractual penalty or a serious contravention of the code of conduct set out in part 3 of the Members of Parliament (Standards) Act 1978 or the Model Councillor Code of Conduct within the meaning of the Local Government Act 2020 or a code of conduct that applies to a responsible minister of the Crown or a parliamentary secretary.

The bill also gives IBAC follow-the-money powers. These changes provide IBAC with powers comparable to those of the Victorian Auditor-General in order to investigate corrupt conduct by third-party and private subcontractors where there is a connection between the alleged corrupt conduct and the performance of public functions funded by government. To do this the bill will amend the definitions of ‘public body’ and ‘public officer’ in the IBAC act to include reference to associated entities, drawing on the definitions in the Audit Act 1994. This is in line with the IOC report recommendation. The bill seeks to ensure that IBAC’s jurisdiction is enlivened where there is conduct by an associated entity in the performance of a public function on behalf of a state public officer or body with a nexus or connection between the suspected corrupt conduct and the expenditure or use of those public funds or the publicly funded project function or undertaking.

Alongside the broad support for this bill, we have also heard about a number of concerns, which I am sure we will go into detail about in the committee stage, but there has been a breadth of comments as well. I want to touch on Mr Limbrick’s concerns that these reforms could make IBAC into a default HR manager. That is not the intent of this reform. It is vital that IBAC maintains its focus on serious or systemic corruption. It is this provision at section 15A of the principal act that ensures that IBAC must have regard to matters that warrant their attention rather than matters that may be dealt with by a relevant employer or workplace standards committee.

Regarding issues of police misconduct – I am sure that we will also discuss this in committee – our government is committed to ensuring that our police oversight system is robust, accountable and meets the needs of the community. I do acknowledge that that has not always been the case. While this bill does not deal with those issues, we continue to work through recommendations related to police oversight in line with the government’s response to the IOC report on IBAC’s legislative framework that was tabled in Parliament earlier this year.

There are a number of other issues that have been raised that the government is responding to through three house amendments, which I will be moving, and I ask that those house amendments in my name be now circulated. Firstly, in respect to public hearings, we will be moving an amendment to remove the extraordinary circumstances test for IBAC to hold public examinations. Further, the amendment will provide that a decision to hold a public examination under section 117(1) must be made by both the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. While IBAC will still be required to satisfy several other requirements in making their decision to hold public hearings, this will ensure that there is a better balance in IBAC’s decision-making when it comes to public hearings. This responds directly to amendments moved by the opposition and the Greens, and the government believes that this strikes the right balance for accountability and transparency.

Secondly, in respect of the timeliness measures for reporting, we are moving amendments to introduce statutory timeline measures to facilitate timely reporting of IBAC investigations. Section 162 of the IBAC act sets out the legal requirements IBAC must follow before transmitting a special report to Parliament for tabling. A proposed new clause will amend section 162 to provide that a person or body has 20 business days to respond to adverse material. The person or body may, within 14 business days of receiving the material or notification from IBAC, request an extension. It is intended that IBAC will have discretion to grant any such extension and be able to determine the length of the extension, having regard to the individual circumstances of each matter. This provision responds to the concerns of many in this chamber and indeed many in the Victorian community.

Finally, we are proposing to amend the bill’s transitional provisions to clarify the government’s intended operation of the transitional provisions. There has been a lot of commentary about what these transitional provisions do or do not do. Whilst it is our government’s strong belief that these provisions, which we have fast-tracked to deliver in a number of weeks, would effectively enable IBAC to undertake the investigations many in this chamber are referring to, the whole point of this reform is to improve accountability and integrity. As such, we have worked collaboratively with many in this chamber to clarify our intent so that Victorians can have confidence in these important reforms.

The government’s house amendments will mean that the IBAC act, as amended by the bill, will apply to and in respect of any and all conduct which occurred before, on or after the commencement day. This means the changes to the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ and the inclusion of associated entities will apply to future complaints and notifications regarding conduct that occurred solely or partly before the commencement day, complaints and notifications IBAC has already received, IBAC investigations on foot and matters that were previously the subject of a complaint or notification that IBAC had dismissed, referred or investigated. The previously proposed new section 200(2) will be removed by the house amendments as it is no longer needed. The transitional provisions will more clearly apply to past conduct, irrespective of how IBAC has previously dealt with it, so there is no need to make reference to the course of conduct, and the past conduct is taken to have occurred after the commencement day. IBAC will be able to determine to investigate any complaint or notification before the commencement day that it had dismissed, referred to a person or body other than the Ombudsman, or referred to the Ombudsman where the Ombudsman had dismissed it or had determined not to investigate it. Similar to proposed new section 200(3), the government’s house amendment will still provide clarification that the transitional provisions do not of themselves require IBAC to reopen a complaint or notification IBAC had previously dismissed or referred to an investigation or to investigate a further complaint or notification to the IBAC about conduct that is the same or substantially similar to conduct that was the subject of a previous complaint, notification or completed investigation.

These provisions are not to be read in isolation. The existing settings in the IBAC act will continue to apply. They provide that IBAC must be certain of established criteria before determining to conduct an investigation into conduct that occurred entirely before the bill commenced. For example, IBAC must not conduct an investigation in relation to conduct which occurred entirely between the commencement of the Integrity and Accountability Legislation Amendment (A Stronger System) Act 2016 and the commencement of this bill if the complaint or notification lacks substance or credibility, the conduct occurred at too remote a time to justify investigation or the complaint or notification was not made genuinely or was made primarily for a mischievous purpose.

The government also recognises that there have been concerns raised about the provision of cabinet in confidence within the IBAC act. While we acknowledge that there are legitimate concerns about this, the government believes that this reform cannot be rushed. It is why the government will establish an expert panel by the end of October made up of organisations including the Centre for Public Integrity. The expert panel will be tasked with considering and consulting on options compatible with the IBAC act framework for providing IBAC with access to cabinet-in-confidence information relevant to its investigations, subject to safeguards, including consideration of relevant provisions in the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022. This is in addition to our commitment to deliver broader reform to the IBAC act and progress the outstanding recommendations of the Integrity and Oversight Committee’s report into the adequacy of IBAC’s legislation following further consideration by the expert reference group. This will include amending the IBAC act to empower IBAC to make findings of corrupt conduct and associated reforms and changes to their investigatory powers. This panel will work side by side with the ERG to deliver its recommendations no later than May 2027, which will be made public. I understand that a number of these matters will be raised in the committee stage, so I will leave my remarks there, but I do commend the bill to the house.

Motion agreed to.

Read second time.

 The ACTING PRESIDENT (Michael Galea) (15:56): The President has considered the amendments on sheet IS54C circulated by Minister Stitt. In his view, amendment 1 is not within the scope of the bill. In addition, amendments 1 to 4 and 6 on sheet EM87C circulated by Mr Mulholland and amendments 3 to 6 on sheet SMA101C circulated by Dr Mansfield are also not in scope. Therefore introduction motions pursuant to standing order 14.11 are required.

 Ingrid STITT (Western Metropolitan – Minister for Health, Minister for Mental Health, Minister for Ambulance Services, Special Minister of State) (15:57): I move:

That it be an instruction to the committee that they have the power to consider new clauses to amend the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 in relation to the holding of public examinations and timely reporting.

Motion agreed to.

 Evan MULHOLLAND (Northern Metropolitan) (15:57): I move:

That it be an instruction to the committee that they have the power to consider new clauses to amend the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 in relation to privilege, the holding of public examinations and timely reporting.

Motion agreed to.

 Sarah MANSFIELD (Western Victoria) (15:58): I move:

That it be an instruction to the committee that they have the power to consider new clauses to amend the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 in relation to appointments, the holding of public examinations, reporting and the IBAC’s annual plan.

Motion agreed to.

Committed.

Clause 1 (15:59)

Evan MULHOLLAND: Minister, what government advice has changed since March this year when the government voted down a bill that sought to give IBAC similar follow-the-money powers?

Ingrid STITT: Clearly, Mr Mulholland, the government has been carefully considering these matters. The Premier has made it clear that as well as calling a royal commission in response to the allegations that have been publicly aired about the construction industry, we have also been considering carefully the work of the Integrity and Oversight Committee (IOC) of Parliament, and we had already been working on the reforms through the expert reference group, but we have determined, through the normal policy determination processes of cabinet, to bring forward a number of the important elements of that work.

Evan MULHOLLAND: Why are former premiers Daniel Andrews and Jacinta Allan, as well as former ministers, allowed to not cooperate with IBAC via public interest immunity?

Ingrid STITT: I do not accept the characterisation contained in your question. There are house amendments in respect to these matters, which we will no doubt deal with in due course in the committee stage today and into tonight. But I have been clear in my second-reading summing-up on the basis for the government bringing those amendments.

Evan MULHOLLAND: I just want to get to the sort of advice and thresholds on IBAC reopening an investigation, given amendments. If new and credible evidence were to emerge after IBAC had dismissed or referred a matter, why should IBAC be legally prevented from reconsidering that matter in the future?

Ingrid STITT: I have gone through the elements of the house amendment and transitional provisions, but the short answer is: they will not.

Clause agreed to; clauses 2 and 3 agreed to.

Clause 4 (16:03)

Sarah MANSFIELD: I move:

1.   Clause 4, line 11, before “In” insert “(1)”.

2.   Clause 4, page 4, after line 20 insert –

‘(2) After section 3(4) of the Principal Act insert –

“(5)   The Minister must ensure that a copy of a code of conduct referred to in paragraph (c)(iii) of the definition of serious disciplinary matter in subsection (1) is published on an appropriate government Internet site.”.’.

This is a straightforward amendment regarding the ministerial code of conduct. As we are all aware, the bill proposes to expand the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ to include any conduct in breach of codes of conduct applicable to ministers and parliamentary secretaries. This amendment strengthens the ability of members of the public to make a complaint to IBAC around alleged breaches of the ministerial code under the new definition by making sure a copy of the code is publicly available. It is only relatively recently that Victoria’s ministerial code of conduct has been made public, and there is no guarantee a future government will continue to do this. The amendment is also consistent with several IBAC recommendations and findings, including Operation Richmond and Operation Watts.

Ingrid STITT: The government will be supporting Dr Mansfield’s amendment, which will require that the government publish a copy of the ministerial code of conduct online. And I thank the Greens and the other members of the crossbench for the collaborative way that they have engaged with us on this bill. These amendments merely codify a practice that was started by our Labor government, and we are certainly happy to support this to ensure that any future government remains equally as transparent with the Victorian community.

Evan MULHOLLAND: The Liberals and Nationals will not oppose this particular amendment, but I want to ask Dr Mansfield about the purpose of this amendment, given the ministerial code of conduct is widely available online already.

Sarah MANSFIELD: As I explained, it has been published, I suppose, by convention. This is to codify that, to make sure that all future governments continue to make that publicly available. There currently is not a legislative requirement for them to do so. They have chosen to do so. We think it is important that that is a requirement.

Amendments agreed to; amended clause agreed to.

New clause 4A (16:05)

Evan MULHOLLAND: I move:

1.   Insert the following New Clause to follow clause 4 –

“4A Cabinet confidentiality

Sections 98(5) and 143(5) of the Principal Act are repealed.”.

I wanted to move an amendment on cabinet confidentiality. This will enable IBAC, if it so chooses, to be in possession of or deal with cabinet documents as part of its ongoing investigations should they be of interest to IBAC.

Ingrid STITT: The government will not be supporting Mr Mulholland’s amendment. As I indicated in my second-reading summing-up, I do recognise the concerns that this amendment is seeking to address, despite some of the motives. However, the government does not support the hasty making of policy in regard to this, because it could have significant and unintended consequences. It is why we will be taking a considered, measured approach to the issue. It is why the government will establish an expert panel by the end of October made up of organisations including the Centre for Public Integrity. The expert panel will be tasked with considering and consulting on options compatible with the IBAC act framework for providing IBAC access to cabinet-in-confidence information relevant to its investigations, subject to safeguards, including consideration of relevant provisions of the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022. We will not be supporting this amendment.

Sarah MANSFIELD: I would like to thank Mr Mulholland for introducing this amendment in the chamber and Mr Newbury in the other place for highlighting this really important issue. By the same token, I hope Mr Mulholland appreciates that our office did a lot of work with Mr Newbury and the Liberals, including hosting an expert policy round table, to take an earlier attempt at this amendment that Mr Newbury introduced in the other place and strengthen it and improve it, which resulted in this updated Liberal amendment. There has been a lot of talk this week in honour of Tim Read and about how much politicians from all sides work together in good faith behind the scenes to try and deliver outcomes for the good of Victorians. I think we would all acknowledge that Tim was the master at this, but I think we did him proud this week by trying to work together. We do not always see that, but there was a genuine attempt to work together behind the scenes here to put Victorians’ interests above our own.

There is no doubt that the Westminster convention of cabinet in confidence has significant benefits for democracy and public policy decision-making. We want our public servants to give frank and fearless advice to the executive. We want the executive to frankly and fearlessly examine all options at the cabinet table. You only have to look at the Commonwealth Games fiasco or the process of developing the Suburban Rail Loop to see what happens when frank and fearless advice and robust cabinet discussion are bypassed or ignored. But the Greens also strongly believe that cabinet in confidence, public interest immunity and executive privilege have been grossly abused by all governments to shield themselves from proper scrutiny and oversight, especially this state Labor government. Reform in this area is vital.

Ultimately, in regard to IBAC, we need to find a balance where the commission has effective oversight of the executive, including access to all cabinet-in-confidence materials but where frank and fearless advice can continue to be given and debated. There are various models where this already occurs – the NACC federally and ICAC in New South Wales are notable examples. Victoria’s IBAC needs to adopt a similar model – we agree with that – and I know the Ombudsman is keen for something similar too. But despite the huge amount of work that my office and others have put into helping the Liberals develop and improve these complex amendments, ultimately I think we just ran out of time to come up with something that was equivalent to the other jurisdictions. The Greens will continue to push all governments to work and will work around the clock with all sides of politics, as we have been trying to this week, to enact these provisions. We genuinely support the intent of this but we cannot support this amendment in good faith the way it has currently been drafted as we believe it will not achieve either better public policy or better executive accountability in its current form.

David LIMBRICK: I actually have similar feelings to Dr Mansfield on this. I do think that there is reform needed in this area, and I think that this is a very complex area. I am concerned – and I thank Mr Mulholland for bringing this amendment and this issue up – but I feel that the way that this is drafted could have serious consequences. I think we do need to look at other models like the NACC or other models throughout other jurisdictions. I just feel that this is too rushed, and I do not feel that this is actually going to achieve what we hope it will achieve. Therefore, with some reluctance, I will not be supporting this either.

Council divided on new clause:

New clause 6A (16:18)

Evan MULHOLLAND: I move:

2.   Insert the following New Clause to follow clause 6 –

‘6A Determination of claim

(1) After section 59N(6) of the Principal Act insert –

“(7)   It is the intention of the Parliament that an application under section 59M be determined with as much speed as the requirements of this Act and the proper consideration of the application permit.”.

(2) After section 101(6) of the Principal Act insert –

“(7)   It is the intention of the Parliament that an application under section 100 be determined with as much speed as the requirements of this Act and the proper consideration of the application permit.”.

(3) After section 148(8) of the Principal Act insert –

“(9)   It is the intention of the Parliament that an application under section 147 be determined with as much speed as the requirements of this Act and the proper consideration of the application permit.”.’.

This is one on the timely determination of privilege applications, as discussed at great length in this chamber, including in a private members bill moved by my colleague –

David Davis interjected.

Evan MULHOLLAND: Two private members bills moved by my colleague Mr Davis. This is to insert a timely reporting requirement for reports to stop an Operation Richmond–style delay, as per Mr Davis’s two private members bills, including one moved as recently as June, which were opposed by the Labor Party.

Ingrid STITT: The government does not support Mr Mulholland’s amendment. It is a matter for the Supreme Court to determine when to schedule and hear individual matters. It is not appropriate for them to be directed by Parliament.

Sarah MANSFIELD: The Greens will not be supporting this amendment. We feel that this does not add anything to some of the provisions that are included in some of the other amendments. We think they deal with this issue adequately. Additionally, we have had advice from the Centre for Public Integrity that this would not necessarily do anything additional and there could be some questions about constitutionality.

David Davis interjected.

Sarah MANSFIELD: Yes, we supported this previously in the context of a private members bill. There are other amendments that have been put forward, including the house amendments, that I think address the issue that is being attempted to be covered by this amendment.

Council divided on new clause:

New clauses 6A and 6B (16:24)

Sarah MANSFIELD: I move:

3.   Insert the following New Clauses to follow clause 6 –

‘6A Appointment of Commissioner

After section 20(3) of the Principal Act insert –

“(4)   Before making a recommendation under this section, the Minister must –

(a)   ensure that the role was publicly advertised; and

(b)   be satisfied that the person recommended for appointment has been assessed as suitable for appointment by a panel established under subsection (5).

(5)   If it is necessary to appoint a person to the office of Commissioner, the Minister must establish a panel to consider the suitability of persons for appointment.

(6)   The regulations may prescribe any matters necessary or convenient for the establishment and operation of panels, including –

(a)   the composition of panels; and

(b)   the procedure of panels; and

(c)   the methodology to be used by panels assessing persons for appointment; and

(d)   the provision of assistance by the Minister’s Department to panels, including secretariat services and clerical assistance.”.

6B   Deputy Commissioner

For section 23(3) of the Principal Act substitute –

“(3)   Before making a recommendation under this section, the Minister must –

(a)   ensure that the role was publicly advertised; and

(b)   obtain the concurrence of the Commissioner.”.’.

This amendment is strengthening the appointment process of the Commissioner. There are essentially three main ways that a government can restrict an anti-corruption commission’s ability to fight corruption. Firstly, it can restrict its jurisdictional powers, and I spoke in my substantive contribution about how both major parties have done this to IBAC for decades. Secondly, it can restrict its funding, and I will talk about this in my next amendment. And finally, it can choose to appoint commissioners and leaders to the commission who are partisan or who do not have sufficient experience or authority to effectively investigate corruption.

I want to stress the point that I do not believe that any Victorian government, Liberal or Labor, has to date appointed commissioners to IBAC that fit any of the above criteria. I have enormous respect for all IBAC commissioners and their work past and present. The amendment requires that vacant positions of Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner are open and publicly advertised, something that I believe this government has done in practice, but a future government may not. It also provides that with the appointment of the Commissioner of IBAC the minister must establish a selection committee to consider the suitability of the appointment. Given the extraordinary powers that the IBAC Commissioner has, including over a government and executive that may have appointed them, we believe that the process for appointing the Commissioner needs to be strengthened. These amendments are in line with the Commonwealth’s Administrative Review Tribunal appointments, which were strengthened a few years ago and are, once again, strongly supported by the Centre for Public Integrity.

Ingrid STITT: The government will be supporting Dr Mansfield’s amendment. Similarly, this is important. It is a previous amendment, but it codifies an existing practice of our government. We have always publicly advertised and established a panel for the recruitment of Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners and have no plans to change that process. On that basis, we are very happy to support Dr Mansfield’s amendment to codify this.

Evan MULHOLLAND: Dr Mansfield, are you suggesting that any past Commissioner has been chosen due to political biases or lack of intellect or capacity to hold the role or investigate corruption?

Sarah MANSFIELD: As I said, no, we do not believe that has been the case at all; this is about safeguarding future appointments from any government that may make, for example, a partisan appointment or be perceived to have made a partisan appointment. This is about ensuring some faith and trust in the process for the public but also for all sides and all parties in this place.

Evan MULHOLLAND: I do not see this amendment as necessary at all. I do not believe any future government would commit any of the allegations you are putting about political appointments or lack of capacity in any Commissioner that may be selected by a future government. I think we are getting into the weeds of establishing a star chamber for standard government appointments. We will not be supporting this amendment, but we will not be dividing.

New clauses agreed to.

New clause 6A (16:28)

The DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Ms Payne, I invite you to move your amendment 1, which inserts new clause 6A.

Rachel PAYNE: I have also got a few questions that I would like to ask the minister. I wanted to let the chamber know, because I might take 5 or 10 minutes, if that is okay. I wanted to ask about unintended consequences of increasing IBAC’s anti-corruption remit and leaving section 15(1A) unchanged or unrepealed. In increasing IBAC’s anti-corruption powers and statutory remit in line with the parliamentary Integrity and Oversight Committee’s recommendations without making changes to other definitions and provisions in line with the PIOC’s other recommendations, including changes to section 15(1A) and the definitions relevant to police oversight, it is my understanding that there could well be unintended adverse consequences. What does the government intend to do to mitigate these inevitable adverse consequences and ensure that IBAC can, within its budgetary constraints, investigate police criminality, serious misconduct and systemic failures?

Ingrid STITT: As you know, the IOC, which you are on, made eight recommendations solely related to IBAC’s police misconduct jurisdiction. Two of those were directed to IBAC and the rest to the government. These recommendations have been placed under review and referred to the expert reference group for advice on the feasibility of their implementation. The government remains committed to ensuring that Victoria’s police oversight system is robust and accountable and meets the needs of the community, but we also understand that there is strong community interest in an effective police oversight system, as evidenced by the submissions and recommendations from recent inquiries, reviews and commissions into the police oversight system. The government has committed to undertaking further consultation on these reforms, and I am committed to ensuring the views of complainants and victims of police misconduct are heard in that process. The expert reference group is reporting back with their advice to government by May 2027 in relation to these matters, after which the government will seek to introduce a second tranche of reforms to the Parliament.

Rachel PAYNE: Thank you, Minister, for that very detailed response; I appreciate that. Just in regard to statutory NDAs, in evidence that we heard in the IOC last year victim-survivors and also Integrity Oversight Victoria (IOV) noted that the patchwork of secrecy notices issued by IBAC under the IBAC act and the Public Interest Disclosures Act 2012 causes confusion even to legal practitioners, with victim-survivors describing them as statutory NDAs silencing them from telling their stories and causing fear of prosecutions if they speak out about their stories but in practice not protecting them from information leaks within Victoria Police. Given the review of information simplifications and those amendments themselves as recommended by the IOC are in effect low-hanging fruit and easy to achieve, is there any reason why the government is not implementing the IOC recommendations now?

Ingrid STITT: As you know, the main intent of this bill was to do two key things: provide IBAC with follow-the-money powers and broaden their jurisdiction. In the timeframe available since we took this position forward as legislation it has just not been possible to respond to every recommendation contained in the IOC report. However, as I mentioned, we do remain committed to this important work and expect the advice back from the expert reference group for the second tranche of reform in May next year.

Rachel PAYNE: Just in regard to police oversight and most recently as part of the Yoorrook Justice Commission’s recommendations about standalone, independent police oversight or a police oversight body, when will the IOC recommendations and those of Yoorrook be adopted? Is this part of what is going to be considered in that May 2027 tranche?

Ingrid STITT: As I indicated, there are a number of reviews that go to these matters, including indeed the Yoorrook Justice Commission’s report. Also, a number of the IOC recommendations are under review as part of that process. So there are a number of different reports from a number of different bodies that need to be considered in totality when it comes to coming up with the best advice about the future police oversight regime.

Rachel PAYNE: I want to talk about IBAC leaks. People involved in IBAC investigations and reviews as targets or as witnesses – there have been accusations made that IBAC or its staff or ex-staffers have leaked information to the press and elsewhere. With IBAC’s anti-corruption remit and powers being extended, will Integrity Oversight Victoria also receive extended powers or funding to ensure confidence in IBAC and that allegations of leaked information are followed through?

Ingrid STITT: We do know obviously that there is an interconnected oversight system here in Victoria, and we know that there can be flow-on implications from one agency to the next, including IOV. But IOV have got a very important oversight role. I just want to clarify whether your question was in relation to whether this bill will change anything in respect to their responsibilities.

Rachel PAYNE: For clarification purposes, I think specifically what I am asking is: will Integrity Oversight Victoria receive any extension of powers in consideration of the extension of powers that we are legislating today?

Ingrid STITT: Not an extension of powers per se, but obviously if the remit of IBAC is being broadened, then that in itself means that it is potentially the case that there will be impacts on IOV’s resourcing. They are a member of the expert reference group, so they are involved in this work. I am very mindful that all our integrity agencies are fiercely budget independent, so they do not deal with their line minister when it comes to budget processes – they deal directly with the Department of Treasury and Finance and the Treasurer. I have got no announcements to make today in the chamber, but there is obviously an important role that IOV plays in ensuring our integrity agencies are accountable. That is absolutely vital, particularly as we are so significantly widening the jurisdiction of IBAC.

Rachel PAYNE: I have got one last question, and then I will move my amendment and speak to that. Several stakeholders that I have worked with, in particular around police oversight, have expressed concern around police being on the expert reference group. Obviously the government established the expert reference group to respond to the IOC report, and from my understanding the expert group includes IBAC, the Victorian Ombudsman, Integrity Oversight Victoria and Victoria Police. There is concern there if police are investigating police. But there is a push to establish a framework for independent oversight if police are part of that conversation. What measures will be put in place to prevent conflicts of interests and ensure that stakeholder voices are consulted on equal footing, including community legal centres and Aboriginal organisations?

Ingrid STITT: Yes, you are right. The expert reference group is made up of the heads of our integrity agencies – IBAC, the IOV, the Victorian Ombudsman – and also Victoria Police. As part of our government’s response, particularly in relation to matters of police oversight, the government has committed to undertaking further consultation on these reforms, and I am committed to ensuring the views of complainants and victims of police misconduct are heard in that process.

Rachel PAYNE: I move:

1.   Insert the following New Clause to follow clause 6 –

“6A Objects of Act and functions of the IBAC

Sections 8(aa) and 15(1A) and (1B) of the Principal Act are repealed.”.

I will just briefly speak to this. My amendment seeks to repeal sections 8(aa) and 15(1A) and (1B) of the IBAC act. Section 15(1A) requires IBAC to prioritise anti-corruption matters above all else. The intent of this amendment is that by removing this provision it is necessary to address the unintended consequences and restore the Commissioner’s discretion and ensure that IBAC can properly prioritise serious police misconduct and fulfil its independent oversight responsibilities. This is something that was raised in the IOC. It is something that was recommended there. I do note the government have indicated that there is further work being done in this space, but I would still like to move the amendment.

Ingrid STITT: While the government will not be supporting Ms Payne’s amendment, I do want to place some comments on the record. I do understand the intent of this amendment is to make improvements to the way that IBAC performs its police oversight functions, and I want to acknowledge Ms Payne’s advocacy for the needs of complainants and victims of police misconduct. I note that this amendment differs slightly from the recommendation of the IOC report, which Ms Payne was involved in, and while the government acknowledges the importance of boosting the police oversight function of IBAC, the government does not support the amendment in this form.

At a time when we are so significantly expanding the breadth and matters that IBAC will have the power to investigate, it is vital that we retain their focus on serious or systemic matters. I do want to say that there is a breadth of work already underway as the government responds to the IOC report into the adequacy of IBAC’s legislative framework, including, as we have been discussing, the establishment of the expert reference group made up of our integrity agency heads, who are considering the issues and the government’s response to this work. There are a number of important recommendations relating to police oversight, and I note many of these are not just limited to this particular report, as we have been discussing.

As we consider further reforms to IBAC’s legislative framework as part of the second tranche of reform for mid next year, we will continue to review the recommendations related to IBAC’s police oversight functions and how we can better meet the needs of complainants and victims of police misconduct. The government acknowledges that further consultation is required in relation to these recommendations, noting the differing views of many stakeholders, including concerns noted by Aboriginal Victorians and marginalised and vulnerable groups, and this work will also be considered by the expert reference group. I look forward to further engagement as part of this work.

Evan MULHOLLAND: The Liberals and Nationals will not be supporting this amendment. We believe that corruption matters are important for IBAC’s remit and prioritisation.

Sarah MANSFIELD: The Greens support the intent of this amendment that goes to the heart of one of the major issues with IBAC: its dual role between investigating police misconduct and public misconduct. The Greens strongly believe that we need an independent, well-resourced, dedicated police ombudsman to solve this issue. We have some concerns that the way this amendment is drafted may lessen the effectiveness of the anti-corruption commission to combat both serious and systemic corrupt conduct and serious and systemic police misconduct. But we support the intent of this amendment, and so we will be supporting it today.

New clause negatived; clause 7 agreed to.

New clauses 7A and 7B (16:44)

Ingrid STITT: I move:

1.   Insert the following New Clauses to follow clause 7 –

‘7A Examinations generally to be held in private

(1) In section 32 of the Principal Act –

(a)   in subsection (1), after “any other Act” insert “, other than the power to decide to hold an examination in public”;

(b)   in subsection (2) omit “117(1),”.

(2) Section 117(1)(a) of the Principal Act is repealed.

(3) After section 117(3) of the Principal Act insert –

“(3AA)   Despite anything to the contrary in this Act, the IBAC is to be constituted for the purpose of making a decision to hold an examination in public by –

(a)   the Commissioner and at least one Deputy Commissioner; or

(b)   the Commissioner, if there are no Deputy Commissioners.

(3AAB)   A Deputy Commissioner referred to in subsection (3AA) must be an Australian lawyer unless there are no Deputy Commissioners who are Australian lawyers.”.

7B Special reports

For section 162(2) and (3) of the Principal Act substitute –

“(2)   If the IBAC intends to include in a report under this section adverse findings about a public body –

(a)   the IBAC must give the relevant principal officer of the public body an opportunity to respond to the adverse material within 20 business days or the extended period determined by the IBAC under subsection (3A); and

(b)   if the relevant principal officer responds within the period referred to in paragraph (a), the IBAC must fairly set out each element of the response in its report.

(3)   If the IBAC intends to include in a report under this section a comment or opinion which is adverse to any person –

(a)   the IBAC must give the person an opportunity to respond to the adverse material within 20 business days or the extended period determined by the IBAC under subsection (3A); and

(b)   if the person responds within the period referred to in paragraph (a), the IBAC must fairly set out each element of the response in its report.

(3A)   If a relevant principal officer or a person makes a written request to the IBAC within 14 business days after the day on which the IBAC first gives the relevant principal officer or person the opportunity to respond to adverse material under subsection (2) or (3), the IBAC may extend the period for the relevant principal officer or person to respond to the adverse material for a period determined by the IBAC.”.’.

This amendment removes the extraordinary circumstances test for IBAC to hold public examinations. The amendment will provide that a decision to hold a public examination must be made by both the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. It is the intention of the government that IBAC must satisfy the requirements for a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner who is an Australian lawyer to make this decision with only exceptional circumstances. That would mean this decision is held by the Commissioner alone. IBAC will still be required to satisfy several other requirements in making their decision to hold public hearings, and this change will ensure that there is a better balance in IBAC’s decision-making when it comes to public hearings. This responds directly to amendments moved by the opposition and the Greens, and we believe this strikes the right balance for accountability and transparency. There is also a timely tabling of amendments, which will also introduce statutory timeliness measures to facilitate timely reporting of IBAC investigations. It will provide that a person or body has 20 business days to respond to adverse material. They may, within 14 days of receiving the material or notification from IBAC, request an extension. IBAC will have discretion to grant such an extension having regard to the individual circumstances of each matter. This provision responds to the concerns of many in the community and in this chamber. In moving this amendment I want to put on the record that it is the intention of this provision to avoid unreasonable delays for IBAC to table special reports. However, we note there is complexity in trying to legislate for procedural fairness, and the time an individual should be given to respond will ultimately depend on the circumstances.

Evan MULHOLLAND: The Liberals and Nationals will be supporting this amendment as it is very similar to the opposition’s amendment. I want to acknowledge the work of the government in coming up with this amendment and also the work of the Shadow Attorney-General Mr Newbury on coming up with an amendment but also working with the government and the Greens. I would like to acknowledge the work of the Greens on this. As I have not had an opportunity, I want to acknowledge the work of the late Tim Read and all the work that he did in the integrity space. I think he went a long way to formulating the Greens’ policy positions in this space. I look to the approach of a federal Greens member Max Chandler-Mather. I remember him lining up with union bosses at a particular protest and seeing how that worked out for him. I am thankful for the work of Tim Read. The Greens in this state honestly have taken a very, very sensible approach to integrity issues. It has been quite a productive and I would say a positive experience working with both the Greens and the government in this space to actually get some outcomes and force some change that has been needed in this state for some time.

Sarah MANSFIELD: The Greens will of course be supporting this amendment. I just want to acknowledge the collaborative work across all parties. I think we have all got amendments that address this. I will note that historically there has been opposition to public hearings from both major parties. The Liberals did change their mind earlier this year on it. They had previously voted against removing the exceptional circumstances in the IOC report. But I think it shows that sometimes these sorts of changes take time and banging on about the same thing again and again – maybe it is just political circumstances. I am not sure what has brought on the changes, but we are here now, which is good. It looks like it is set to pass. I also appreciate that the government in its house amendment has chosen to adopt the Greens’ additional clause requiring two IBAC commissioners to approve a public hearing. We think this is really important. It is an extra safeguard. Again, it is about building some confidence in that system. It is in line with the New South Wales ICAC and is strongly supported by the Centre for Public Integrity. Also, we will be supporting the timely reporting aspects of this amendment. I give credit to the opposition, who advocated for this IBAC reform in their previous bill. We have always supported this change to IBAC’s reporting regime, so we will be supporting all aspects of this house amendment that has been put forward today. I think it is an excellent example of how we can work together to get a decent outcome.

New clauses agreed to.

New clause 7D (16:51)

Sarah MANSFIELD: I move:

6.   Insert the following New Clause before clause 8 –

‘7D Annual plan

(1) In section 168(1)(a) of the Principal Act, after “that financial year” insert “and including a request for funding for that financial year”.

(2) For section 168(4) of the Principal Act substitute –

“(4)   In the annual plan for a financial year, the IBAC must –

(a)   indicate the nature of any changes suggested by the Parliamentary Committee under subsection (2)(b) that the IBAC has not adopted; and

(b)   include an explanation for any difference between the funding requested in the draft annual plan and the actual funding provided to the IBAC in the annual appropriation Acts for that financial year.”.’.

As I have said previously, even where IBAC is given strong jurisdictional powers and has strong and experienced leadership, the government of the day can still effectively restrain the commission’s ability to fight corruption by cutting its funding. For this reason, the Greens have a very strong position that our integrity agency should have a means of funding that is determined independently of the government – as, for example, the salaries of MPs are. Earlier this year IBAC, the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office and the Ombudsman put forward a compromise to fully independent funding in a paper entitled Advancing Budget Transparency for Victoria’s Core Integrity Agencies.This amendment seeks to implement one of the recommendations from that report in regard to IBAC. Currently IBAC shares with the Integrity and Oversight Committee a draft of its annual plan laying out its operational strategy and goals for the next 12 months, but it cannot share with the committee its budget submissions or funding requests, which are considered cabinet in confidence. It is vitally important that Parliament has some oversight of whether or not the funding that IBAC has received in the state budget meets what it considers it needs to achieve its strategic goals. If its funding is insufficient, we should know what functions or goals IBAC have had to cut due to insufficient funding. The Greens amendment provides this parliamentary oversight and public transparency in terms of IBAC’s funding in that IBAC will be required to share its funding requests with government and the IOC prior to the state budget and it will be able to provide comment if the actual funding it receives falls short of this amount.

Ingrid STITT: I thank Dr Mansfield for bringing this amendment. The government will be supporting it. We do note that there are a number of budgetary measures currently being considered by the government in response to the IOC report into the budget adequacy of our integrity agencies. However, the government believes that this is an important transparency and accountability measure for both IBAC and the government of the day, and we will be supporting Dr Mansfield’s amendment.

Evan MULHOLLAND: I thank Dr Mansfield for bringing this amendment to the chamber. The Liberals and Nationals will not be opposing this amendment. This is something that we have spoken to for some time. I do think that the joint report that was put together by our integrity agencies is well worth a read. It is clearly something that they have been quite frustrated with over a long period of time.

New clause agreed to.

Clause 8 (16:55)

The DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Dr Mansfield, are you withdrawing your amendment 7?

Sarah MANSFIELD: Yes. As with the public hearings one, the government has a house amendment that effectively mirrors the Greens amendment. We thank the government for their constructive collaboration on this, and we will withdraw ours given the house amendment is effectively the same.

Ingrid STITT: I move:

2.   Clause 8, lines 10 to 35 and page 8, lines 1 to 18, omit all words and expressions on these lines and insert –

“(b)   conduct all or part of which occurred before the commencement day if the conduct –

(i)   is the conduct of, or in relation to, a person or body (whether or not still in existence) who or which would have been a public officer or public body within the meaning of this Act as amended by the amending Act had the amending Act been in force at the time the conduct occurred; and

(ii)   would have been corrupt conduct within the meaning of this Act as amended by the amending Act had the amending Act been in force at the time the conduct occurred.

(2) The IBAC may determine to investigate any complaint or notification to the IBAC that the IBAC has before the commencement day –

(a)   dismissed under section 58(a); or

(b)   referred to a person or body (other than the Ombudsman) under section 73; or

(c)   referred to the Ombudsman under section 73 and the Ombudsman has dismissed it or has determined not to investigate it.

(3) Nothing in subsection (1) or (2) requires the IBAC –

(a)   to reopen –

(i)   a complaint or notification to the IBAC that it had dismissed or referred to another body before the commencement day; or

(ii)   an investigation, whether of a complaint or notification or an own motion investigation, that it had completed before the commencement day; or

(b)   to investigate a further complaint or notification to the IBAC about conduct that is the same as, or substantially similar to, conduct that was the subject of –

(i)   a complaint or notification to the IBAC that it had dismissed or referred to another body before the commencement day; or

(ii)   an investigation, whether of a complaint or notification or an own motion investigation, that it had completed before the commencement day.”.

This is in relation to transitional provisions. The house amendment proposes to amend the bill’s transitional provisions to clarify the government’s intended operation of these provisions. I did go to this in some detail in my summing-up. For completeness, there has been a lot of commentary about these transitional provisions and what they do or do not do. It is our government’s belief that these provisions, which we, as I have indicated, have fast-tracked to deliver in a number of weeks, will effectively enable IBAC to undertake the investigations many in this chamber have been referring to. The whole point of this reform is to improve accountability and integrity.

I do want to take the opportunity to thank members of the chamber who have worked very collaboratively with the government to clarify our intent so that Victorians can have confidence in these important reforms. The government’s house amendments mean that IBAC will be able to determine to investigate any complaint or notification that it had dismissed, referred to a person or body other than the Ombudsman or referred to the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman had dismissed it or had determined not to investigate it. These provisions are not to be read in isolation. As I indicated previously, the existing settings in the IBAC act will continue to apply. They provide that IBAC must be certain of established criteria before determining to conduct an investigation into conduct that occurred entirely before the bill commenced. It is important, from the government’s perspective, that people are satisfied that these transitional provisions do as intended.

Amendment agreed to; amended clause agreed to; clauses 9 and 10 agreed to.

Reported to house with amendments.

 Ingrid STITT (Western Metropolitan – Minister for Health, Minister for Mental Health, Minister for Ambulance Services, Special Minister of State) (16:58): I move:

That the report be now adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

 Ingrid STITT (Western Metropolitan – Minister for Health, Minister for Mental Health, Minister for Ambulance Services, Special Minister of State) (16:58): I move:

That the bill be now read a third time.

Motion agreed to.

Read third time.

The DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Pursuant to standing order 14.28, the bill will be returned to the Assembly with a message informing them that the Council have agreed to the bill with amendments.