Thursday, 10 September 2026

Clause 1 (10:13)

Jaclyn SYMES: I am very happy to take all questions in clause 1. I think it will facilitate the committee stage. If you just let me know which topic in terms of what you are asking, then I think I will be able to acquit it that way.

Georgie CROZIER: I have just got a couple of questions on behalf of my colleague Ms McLeish, who has done an enormous amount of work on this issue, as I previously have said during the second-reading debate. They relate to part 2, division 1, ‘Power of court to extend or vary order on own motion’. There have been concerns from a number of stakeholders, I have been led to believe, that courts may be required to make decisions about future risk using information from criminal proceedings that could be incomplete, outdated or focused on a single incident rather than a broader pattern of family violence. Can the minister explain what safeguards are in place to ensure courts are able to consider all relevant and current risk information?

Jaclyn SYMES: I thank Ms Crozier and by default Ms McLeish in relation to their interest in these reforms. The own-motion powers – at the outset I acknowledge that you are picking up on some of the stakeholder feedback. I certainly want to start with advising the house of the level of consultation in this bill. The department and the Attorney-General consulted widely on the reforms, including with the family violence sector and the legal assistance sector. The own-motion power was discussed and developed in detail with the legal assistance sector for a very long period of time. New South Wales and Queensland have comparable provisions for extending equivalent family violence orders in their criminal divisions. What we know is that victim-survivors have repeatedly told us of the trauma involved with having to return to court to seek an extension or variation of the family violence intervention order despite recent criminal proceedings involving clear and serious family violence being committed against them, and I think what is important for the purpose of this amendment is the acknowledgement that it has to be a family violence offence. The own-motion power is intended to benefit victim-survivors by reducing their need to return to court to seek that extension or variation, where the risk is clear.

In terms of other relevant factors, the court, in terms of other information they can consider and other information that would more appropriately go back to the civil jurisdiction and how that will interact, has the opportunity to be put on notice that there are other issues, like family law or child protection proceedings, through the course of its obligation to take the protected persons’ and respondents’ views into account. However, the court cannot receive independent evidence about those matters, because that would start to replicate a civil proceeding and cause delay and basically create two parallel processes. So if the protected person or respondent indicates to the court that there are other issues at play, it indicates to the court that it should not exercise its own-motion power but should instead leave those issues to be settled in the existing civil application process.

Georgie CROZIER: Just for some clarity – and I think you have explained it in the answer to my first question – if there were proceedings before a family law or other court, that would be taken into consideration through these own-motion proceedings?

Jaclyn SYMES: Sorry, could you just say it again?

Georgie CROZIER: If they have got proceedings in other courts, like the family law court or another court, for whatever reason, I think you answered it to say that they would take it into consideration and that it would have to go through a different court. Is that what you said? Could I get some clarity about that?

Jaclyn SYMES: They can be advised that they exist or that there is a matter afoot – say, a child protection proceeding, for example – but they cannot take evidence on it. It would have to go back to the civil jurisdiction. So it can be a relevant factor, but it cannot be considered in the determination of extending the family violence intervention order, other than as a relevant factor. It cannot determine the matter or give it any interrogation based on receival of evidence.

Katherine COPSEY: I also have some questions on own-motion powers. Minister, why does proposed section 125F restrict the court when exercising the own-motion power from considering material that was not already before it in the criminal proceeding when the court is being asked to assess future risk?

Jaclyn SYMES: This is probably useful for Ms Crozier’s question as well, so thank you for your question, Ms Copsey. The own-motion power is intended to be used in matters where the risk is clear based on the evidence in the criminal proceeding, without needing the parties to make a new application or provide new evidence. Allowing new evidence to be considered would require a process similar to a further civil proceeding to enable any additional evidence to be provided and tested. This could create challenges given the different standards of proof in criminal and civil matters, particularly as the prosecution is not generally a party to a family violence intervention order proceeding. This would result in significant delays, undermining the efficiency and intent of the reform, and would risk compromising the integrity of the criminal proceeding by requiring the court to consider material beyond the offending before it, including what was presented at sentencing.

Katherine COPSEY: What is the legal distinction in the government’s mind between a court inquiring about current circumstances and the court receiving new evidence that is prohibited by proposed section 125F?

Jaclyn SYMES: A court may inquire about certain circumstances, because the bill requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, the safety of each protected person and the views of each protected person. The court may need to make these inquiries when deciding how long an order should be extended for or what conditions should be changed. Ultimately, if the court makes inquiries and it becomes apparent that further information is needed – if matters are complex or contested in any way that would require a further, more comprehensive hearing with new evidence – then it should not exercise the own-motion power. In essence, the bill is drawing a distinction between a court asking questions that help it to determine what information is relevant and needed for it to exercise the own-motion power and a court then seeking to rely on new information obtained on a basis for a decision. This is a nuanced exercise, but necessary to achieve the purpose of the reform.

Katherine COPSEY: If a protected person tells the court about a new family law order, a child protection order or a changed living arrangement, can the court rely on that information in deciding whether to extend or vary the family violence intervention order (FVIO), even though that information may not have been in evidence in the criminal proceeding?

Jaclyn SYMES: Similar to the answer that I gave to Ms Crozier, a protected person may tell the court this information as it may be directly relevant to the safety of the victim-survivor. A court can use the information about the existence of a family law order or child protection order, but it could not seek to obtain and rely on details included in those orders, unless that information was otherwise presented as part of the criminal proceedings.

Katherine COPSEY: Can the court consider a current family violence multi-agency risk assessment and management framework (MARAM) or other family violence risk assessment? I am aware there has been correspondence between the Attorney-General and the community legal centre family violence working group, but I do not think that situation is covered by the letter.

Jaclyn SYMES: Yes, I have got a copy of the letter here, but just to answer your question directly, the own-motion power is not intended to replace civil processes. We have covered that. Prosecuting agencies will need to advise courts if there is a current MARAM or other risk assessment that could not be put before the court. This is relevant to the court’s decision on whether or not it is appropriate to exercise their own-motion power.

Katherine COPSEY: Can the court consider new family violence threats or escalation that has occurred after the offending that is the subject of the criminal proceeding?

Jaclyn SYMES: If this information is included in materials forming part of the criminal proceedings, then yes, it can be considered – for example, if it was considered as part of the assessment process for a community correction order. Otherwise, prosecuting agencies will need to advise the court if there are matters that are relevant to risk that the court is unable to consider – for example, any new criminal charges.

Katherine COPSEY: If those matters do require a separate civil application, who is expected, in the government’s understanding of these reforms, to initiate that separate civil process and how does that square with the government’s stated intent of avoiding another court proceeding for the victim-survivor?

Jaclyn SYMES: Civil applications will be initiated in the usual way by a protected person or applicant, most likely a police applicant.

Katherine COPSEY: Still on the own-motion powers but just turning to the concerns that are held around potential for misidentification and the interaction of this with systems abuse behaviour, what safeguards has the government put in place to ensure that the own-motion power does not compound victim-survivor misidentification or facilitate systems abuse where the broader family violence context of a particular case was not before the criminal court?

Jaclyn SYMES: It is a really important issue, something that I know you and I have probably had conversations about in the past, and certainly the Attorney has spent a lot of time on issues of misidentification in the development of this bill. There are a range of views, and everyone is alive to systems abuse and the harm that it can cause. The own-motion power is discretionary. If a court considers that broader contextual information is needed to properly assess family violence risk or determine the nature of the relationship between the parties, it should not exercise the power. In circumstances where there is no information before the court, either from the parties or in the materials in the proceeding, a court is still required to consider all the circumstances of the case. A court may seek advice from a prosecuting agency as to whether there may be reasons as to why the own-motion power should not be exercised.

Katherine COPSEY: In a circumstance where a misidentification occurs and the offence for which a victim-survivor was convicted arose from self-defence, resistance or conduct occurring within a broader pattern of coercive control that may not have been fully explored in the criminal proceeding, how is the court to inform itself about that context?

Jaclyn SYMES: As you have identified, that is a common feature of misidentification instances, and so where there are issues about the nature of criminal offending and its context, these should be explored within the criminal proceeding. The respondent must also be given an opportunity to be heard before the own-motion power can be exercised, which is when issues regarding misidentification, coercive control and the general dynamics of the relationship may be raised before the court. The court may then decide not to exercise the own-motion power if it considers the civil process would be more appropriate.

Katherine COPSEY: What monitoring will the government be undertaking to identify with this new power whether the own-motion power is disproportionately being activated, involving particular vulnerable cohorts – women, Aboriginal people or other groups – who are at higher risk of misidentification?

Jaclyn SYMES: We know this is a known risk. It is something that is discussed regularly with relevant stakeholders, particularly the Aboriginal Justice Forum and the like. It will for that reason be closely monitored, and a lot of feedback will be sought and encouraged as part of the work that will also feed into cross-agency forums focused on addressing the risk of misidentification in family violence matters more broadly. It goes without saying when you know that this is a possibility and in fact a known risk that it is something that will be very closely monitored, and as I said, feedback will be encouraged.

Katherine COPSEY: That might be a good moment to shift similarly onto the risks of misidentification and systems abuse, but now in relation to the new offence of coercive control. What safeguards could you outline for us, please, that will operate before charge to minimise the risk of victim-survivor misidentification in relation to coercive control? If I could ask: what changes are going to be made to the Victoria Police policy supervision, training and risk assessment processes before commencement? How will the government identify cases where a victim-survivor has been wrongly charged or prosecuted? Similarly to monitoring, what data is going to be collected on investigations, charges and prosecutions, including – hopefully – data categorised by gender and Aboriginality? What early oversight mechanisms will identify if there are troubling patterns and unintended consequences emerging to enable intervention before that statutory three-year review period?

Jaclyn SYMES: I thank Ms Copsey for raising a series of issues in relation to misidentification and system abuse in the context of the establishment of the standalone coercive control offence. You have picked up on issues that are longstanding and have been considered for many years in relation to whether to proceed with this offence as a standalone offence in its own right. In that respect I can give you a lot of confidence that these issues are acknowledged, and it is why it has taken some time to be confident that the system has matured to a point where we can have a standalone offence. With respect to safeguards, the offence protects against criminalising reasonable or innocent actions, including where the accused has been misidentified by its elements and the reasonableness defence. This includes the requirement that the accused engaged in specified conduct that makes up a course of conduct, the requirement for a continuity of purpose in relation to the course of conduct and the requirement that both the intentional and objective fault elements be satisfied. The bill includes a defence: the course of conduct was reasonable in the context of a relationship as a whole. You asked about Victoria Police. They have been closely consulted during the development of this new offence, and this engagement will continue during the implementation period. Issues that you have raised will form part of that discussion.

In terms of the ability for government to identify cases of victim-survivors wrongly charged – basically misidentification in individual cases – it will be a matter for prosecution agencies. However, the government is committed to supporting complementary policy and system reform to minimise the risks of this occurring. Similar to what we were talking about in relation to closely monitoring the impacts of the changes in the court system, both of the changes will be highly important, and a commitment is given to that. Data will form part of monitoring, in a sense, because we will continue to closely monitor the impact and implementation. There are some forums, particularly the victim-survivor justice advisory group. Once the offence commences that group will work to monitor impacts including misidentification, which can consider a range of data, but particularly the Crime Statistics Agency will be relevant once the offence commences.

In relation to the statutory three-year review it should be noted that the offence has a long commencement time to enable critical system-wide reforms to mitigate the unintended consequences or get in front of what we know are the risks, and a statutory review will be required three years from commencement. As always, the government will ensure its laws are implemented safely and effectively. This is an area of law reform where a statutory review is important, but we know that ongoing monitoring from day one will also be vital.

Katherine COPSEY: This is my last question on the bill. You just spoke, Minister, about the extra work that is going to result from the implementation of this reform. What additional funding and resources will be provided to police, courts, the judicial college, legal assistance services and specialist family violence services to implement the coercive control offence and the new own-motion powers? If you could touch on specifically: what training will be provided to judicial officers hearing criminal matters who may now exercise family violence powers? What training will be provided to police and prosecutors on coercive control, predominant aggressor identification, systems abuse and victim-survivor resistance or self-protection? What additional funding will legal assistance and specialist family violence services receive to meet the presumably increased demand? What role will specialist family violence organisations, Aboriginal community controlled organisations and people with lived experience have in designing that training? And how will competency be assessed?

Jaclyn SYMES: Thank you, Ms Copsey, for your question. I think it contains a lot of suggestions. The additional funding and resources for relevant agencies will be subject to budget outcomes. As always, it is the government’s intention to ensure its laws are implemented safely and effectively. I think we have similar concerns on misidentification. Some of the questions that you have asked have also been in the bill briefing process for me as well and are things that I have asked about. This is something that is acknowledged by Victoria Police; it has been, even in my time as Attorney-General, and a lot has happened since I was in the portfolio. It has been a commitment across agencies to make sure that we are doing better in this regard. It is an acknowledgement that it exists, and there is no hiding of that, so that is a great foundation for training and ongoing improvement.

I do not have a breakdown of the training modules et cetera. I know the courts’ continual improvement is also – misidentifications come up time and again across agencies in relation to making sure everyone continues to talk about it and do better. I do not know what the training models look like, but I can give you confidence that that is something that is acknowledged, and therefore it is the government’s expectation that these things would be addressed. Because there is a long lead time for this law reform, we want to get it right. We want to make sure everyone is ready to avoid any of those risks as much as possible. I think that engagement with the Attorney’s office would be the best way forward to remain updated in some of those processes, but a lot of the forums that involve lived experience and agencies that come together will continue to have these conversations and identify any gaps.

Katherine COPSEY: Thank you for engaging with the answer. Can I just confirm, though – going and looking at the bill in its totality again, there are significant reforms here. Has the government committed some budget to assist the frontline services in particular, who are going to be out there and hopefully helping to achieve the government’s broad intent? Is there any funding or resourcing to support them in that endeavour?

Jaclyn SYMES: As I indicated, additional funding resources will be subject to budget outcomes. This is not an area of justice response that is new as an issue. These changes will result in making sure that those discussions translate into policy changes. If there are funding requirements, then government will consider those appropriately.

David LIMBRICK: I have a couple of questions around different areas. I will start with the area around coercive control. Proposed section 34AQ(1)(c) speaks about non-sexual intimate personal relationships. What type of relationship is this actually? Could the minister give some examples of what type of relationship we are actually talking about here?

Jaclyn SYMES: There has been a lot of discussion and consultation in relation to the relationships where the offence will apply. There were discussions around parent–child, elder abuse and where it all can be relevant. It is a complex offence. It is the first time a pattern of behaviour and a relationship dynamic is at the core of a criminal offence here. We know that coercive control occurs in many different types of relationships, and we are not pretending that it does not. We have listened to the sector very much. This is informed by the consultations that we have had to limit the scope to begin with, recognising that intimate partner relationships are the relationships where coercive control presents the greatest risks. In terms of intimate partner relationships, that is where we are starting. The statutory review could assess if we want to apply it more broadly in the future. Does that cover your question?

David LIMBRICK: Actually, the type of relationship that I would like clarification on is parent–‍child relationships. Is this intended to cover that or is that not –

Jaclyn SYMES: No.

David LIMBRICK: No. Definitely not. Okay, good.

Jaclyn SYMES: It is just intimate partner relationships. In terms of the description, that is sometimes obvious, I suppose, but not always. It does not necessarily have to involve a sexual relationship, particularly in terms of people that might be waiting until marriage, that kind of thing. But that is the relationship that we are talking about, not parent–child and not elder abuse, acknowledging that there is coercive conduct in those relationships as well.

David LIMBRICK: I thank the minister for that clarification because, yes, I can see the problem with applying it to parent–child relationships. If you want to discipline a child, the difference between discipline and coercive control might be very difficult. Another type of what could be classified as a non-sexual intimate personal relationship is potentially someone and their carer. Is that not intended to be covered under this either?

Jaclyn SYMES: Not by virtue of them just being a carer in its own right. But if they are an intimate partner as well as a carer, then that would be covered.

David LIMBRICK: Okay, I think I understand. So what we are trying to capture here is what people would consider couples, I guess, regardless of their sexual relationship. That is basically what we are trying to cover here. Would that be a good summary?

Jaclyn SYMES: That is a good summary, Mr Limbrick.

David LIMBRICK: To another section on the abolition of good character: the NSW Sentencing Council report and the royal commission were limited in scope to sexual offending and institutional offending. The proposed new section 5AAA relies on these findings to justify it, but it applies to every offence. Why is this new prohibition on good character references applicable to all classes, not just those mentioned in the materials relied on?

Jaclyn SYMES: Because good character is a vague, uncertain and subjective concept that cannot predict the risk of offending or prospects of rehabilitation. We know it is exploited mostly in sexual offending, but as it is irrelevant and uncertain as a concept in general, we are getting rid of it for all offending.

David LIMBRICK: A couple of questions regarding clause 8, about the own-motion FVIO: in proposed sections 125S to 125U why is a merits appeal from a County Court or Supreme Court own-motion order ousted rather than leaving the existing Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (FVPA) appeal path in place?

Jaclyn SYMES: I might need you to re-ask that, sorry.

David LIMBRICK: Why is a merits appeal from the County Court or Supreme Court own-motion order ousted rather than leaving the existing FVPA appeal path in place?

Jaclyn SYMES: I will just get some advice on that.

Mr Limbrick, we are picking up the existing process in the Family Violence Protection Act and the offences and applying them to this process. It is replicating an existing process for the new process.

David LIMBRICK: I thank the minister for that clarification. When a court uses the proposed section 125E, the respondent cannot test the criminal brief the way they could on a civil variation. Is that intended?

Jaclyn SYMES: Yes, it is intended. This change is not wanting an outcome where the things that are best dealt with in the civil system move to the criminal system. You would not use an own-motion power when it is more appropriate to stay in the civil jurisdiction – different evidentiary requirements, different tests. Where it is appropriate to stay in civil, it is not brought in.

David LIMBRICK: I thank the minister for that clarification. If the conviction or sentence that triggered the own-motion order is later set aside or cut, the FVIO is varied or extended and stays up unless someone starts a fresh civil application. Is that intentional?

Jaclyn SYMES: If a person has successfully appealed their criminal conviction or sentence after the exercise of the own-motion power, the family violence intervention order will remain in force as extended or varied. This is because the outcome of a criminal appeal and the related criminal conduct is not the main determination of family violence risk. A criminal conviction may be overturned for a range of reasons, but the protected person may still be at significant risk of harm. To ensure procedural fairness for respondents who have successfully appealed a criminal conviction or sentence, the bill removes existing legislative barriers for respondents to apply to vary or revoke the family violence intervention order in the Magistrates’ Court. If the respondent wishes to have the order changed, they can apply without having to seek leave or demonstrate a change in circumstances. Hearing an application to vary or revoke in the Magistrates’ Court instead as part of the criminal appeal allows for a more fulsome consideration of evidence and more established processes for obtaining victim-survivors views about that order.

Georgie CROZIER: I have just got a clarification, if I may, Minister, regarding the question Mr Limbrick asked on good character. I understand that, according to the explanatory memorandum, the amendments draw on the majority view of the NSW Sentencing Council’s report into good character on sentencing, the Good Character at Sentencing report, which I think you referenced. It appears that this amendment goes much broader than New South Wales, which I think you confirmed to Mr Limbrick.

Jaclyn SYMES: It is for all offences, not just sexual offences.

Georgie CROZIER: Yes. What advice did you get and what feedback from stakeholders? Where that advice came from to go broader than what is being applied in New South Wales is really what I am trying to understand.

Jaclyn SYMES: Just to clarify, New South Wales does apply to all offences as well. I think we were all going down a bit of a different pathway there. In New South Wales it applies to all offences. Our proposed laws will apply to all offences. It is mostly exploited in sexual offending, and that is where the main community campaign has been focused. But when we have looked at the reason for the laws, it made sense that when good character is so vague and so subjective, as has been demonstrated, and does not predict risk of offending or prospects of rehabilitation, it was determined through a range of consultation measures and a range of feedback from victims and other stakeholders that it was appropriate to apply to all offences. It was considered that it be confined just to sexual offences. So that policy debate has been discussed with a range of people, and we have landed on all offences.

Georgie CROZIER: For my understanding and confirmation, it does align fairly closely with what New South Wales has done? Minister, is that what you are saying?

Jaclyn SYMES: Yes. Applying the reforms to all Victorian offences responds directly to the recommendations of the majority of the NSW Sentencing Council, an expert independent body that prepared a detailed report on the issue following extensive public and expert consultation. The concerns regarding good character at sentencing can apply to all offences. These include, as I said before, that it can be based on a vague and subjective concept, cannot predict the risk of offending or prospect of rehabilitation and can cause further harm and trauma to victims. Only applying the reforms to certain offences would be unfair to those victims who would not be protected. A consistent approach across all offences minimises complexity in sentencing and inconsistency in sentencing practices and outcomes. So this is very much driven by the impact on victim-survivors, and there are strong policy grounds that it should be afforded to all offences, because all victims have a similar experience when hearing that the offender who did them harm is okay in someone else’s eyes.

Georgie CROZIER: Thank you, Minister, for that clarification. Just one final question. You have mentioned the victim-survivors, and the campaign, I think you said, came into a lot of the decision-making. What was the feedback from the legal fraternity in relation to some of the proposed changes that this bill seeks to do?

Jaclyn SYMES: The advice that I have here in front of me is obviously that we did not need to replicate the sentencing council’scomprehensive review in New South Wales because it was a similar topic. It was a big process because it was a law reform type process, so everyone was able to feed into that. In relation to feedback from specific stakeholders, I will have to get the Attorney-General’s office to follow up with you on any of that. If you have had any representations yourself that you want to put on record, then I would be happy to do so, but this has gone through consultation. I will see if the box has got anything else to add.

Just having checked with the box, there has not been an extensive concern raised by any particular stakeholders. The reforms, as I said, have drawn on New South Wales. That was extensive public and expert consultation. Since the government’s commitment in February to deliver this there has been an opportunity to consult with key legal and justice stakeholders. There have been mixed reviews but not a strong opposition to the change.

Georgie CROZIER: I understand that, but if that could be provided by the Attorney’s office, that would be helpful, I think.

Rachel PAYNE: I move:

1.   Clause 1, page 3, line 29, omit “violence.” and insert “violence; and”.

2.   Clause 1, page 3, after line 29 insert –

“(i) to amend the Summary Offences Act 1966 to repeal the offence of begging or gathering alms.”.

I am just noting that the house agreed to an instruction motion on this amendment. This amendment seeks to amend the Summary Offences Act 1966 to repeal the offence of begging or gathering alms. I note that since 2005 an average of 141 people have been charged with begging every year. Other states and territories such as New South Wales, Western Australia and Tasmania have all decriminalised begging, and I just want to note that when this government decriminalised public intoxication in November 2023 it recognised that doing so would allow people to access safe and appropriate care. The same is true for begging. People who are experiencing homelessness, long-term unemployment, mental illness, drug and alcohol dependence and violence are for various reasons much more likely to beg. I just also want to note in regard to this amendment the tragic murder of Jessica Geddes. The state coroner’s report from John Cain as coroner noted regarding Jessica’s death that it was recommended that the Victorian government work with Victoria Police to develop a welfare-oriented response to people who beg rather than a criminal one.

Georgie CROZIER: Ms Payne, I know that you have been a strong advocate in this area, but the Liberals and Nationals do not believe that this is the right bill for these amendments to be put into place, and so we will not be supporting your position at this time.

Jaclyn SYMES: I thank Ms Payne for her amendment. Whilst there is an argument that this is not the right bill, there has been an instruction motion that allows the chamber to consider it. People know my long-term view that we should use private members bills and substantive bills, but in acknowledgement that there are not a lot of opportunities to do that and that this is a piece of law reform that the Attorney-General is on record as being very interested in progressing, we are going to take the opportunity to support Ms Payne’s amendment.

A criminal response to begging disproportionately punishes the most vulnerable people in our community. It is inconsistent with the government’s commitment to early prevention, health-based reform and harm reduction. I know, Ms Payne, that you have had a lot of interaction with Jessica Geddes’s family. I want to acknowledge the coronial findings into her death, the Yoorrook Justice Commission and the longstanding advocacy from community groups and welfare-based organisations in response to begging. Victoria Police of course will still be able to rely on existing powers and alternative offences, and in that respect we do not believe that a repeal is going to cause a significant increase in demand or concern in that regard. The existing powers that police have to address antisocial or concerning behaviour include move-on powers if a person is endangering the safety of any other person or is a risk to public safety. Other offences are available for more serious conduct of course, such as assault or threatening another person, so we believe the current statute books would adequately address any concerns about antisocial behaviour. The simple act of begging, we know, is at its heart due to a vulnerability of an individual, and the criminalising of vulnerability is something that I am happy to support exiting the statute book. Thank you for your amendment. I acknowledge it is unconventional in this respect, but given that there are only 3½ more sitting days, Ms Payne, the government will support your amendment.

David LIMBRICK: The Libertarian Party will also be supporting this amendment. I see begging all the time in the city, and it does not seem to be something that is policed very heavily in any case. As the minister has pointed out, if people are acting in antisocial ways or committing other crimes, there are other powers that police have to deal with that, so I do not feel that this is a necessary thing to have as an offence.

Katherine COPSEY: The Greens will be supporting this amendment today. It is fantastic to finally see a very overdue reform. As has been noted, decriminalisation of begging has happened in many other states prior. I think in practice it has long been the preference to respond to people who are in a dire situation with care, not by criminalising them. However, this threat has hung over people’s heads for far too long. We must not kick people when they are down, when they are in desperate straits. The Greens have been pushing for this change for many years. I want to acknowledge the work of my predecessor in this place Sue Pennicuik, for whom this has been a vital area of reform, and also of course my dear colleague Dr Tim Read, the previous Greens Victorian justice spokesperson, who have both been passionate about this topic. We are very pleased to support the amendment today.

The DEPUTY PRESIDENT: We are dealing with Ms Payne’s amendments 1 and 2 on her sheet RP25C, which deal with the repeal of begging or gathering alms. They test all of the remaining amendments on her sheet RP25C.

Council divided on amendments:

Rachel PAYNE: Just to be clear, with the amendments on sheet RP26C, I will be moving amendments 1, 2 and 4, and I will not be proceeding with amendments 3 and 5. I will be speaking to them, though. I move:

1.   Clause 1, page 3, after line 26 insert –

“(iii) to void certain warrants to imprison made in respect of a person in default; and”.

In regard to amendments 1, 2 and 4, this is an amendment in relation to imprisonment for unpaid fines. Imprisonment for unpaid fines is unjust, particularly for Victorians who are vulnerable. It punishes people for poverty, not wrongdoing. Imprisonment itself and threats of imprisonment cause severe, avoidable harm for individuals, families, communities and especially First Peoples. Up to 83 per cent of fines involved in enforcement warrant cases are toll fines or private fines, according to Magistrates’ Court data. While there are existing safeguards designed to prevent the imprisonment of vulnerable Victorians in the Fines Reform Act 2014, there are failings in practice, resulting in outcomes that disproportionately affect marginalised Victorians. It should be noted that threatening to imprison people as well as imprisoning people for unpaid fines ignores the extensive national evidence about the harm that is caused by the discriminatory impact of this practice, especially to First Peoples. The amendment that I seek in relation to amendments 1, 2 and 4 is for the government to remove historic imprisonment warrants made under repealed laws, which came into effect on 31 December 2017. I will be calling a vote on that one, which is new division 3A. New subsection 171AAA is intended to remove historical unexecuted warrants to imprison, making them null and void. This provision draws a line under an outdated and unfair system. It makes historical unexecuted warrants for imprisoning people over unpaid infringement fines null and void. The reason behind moving this amendment is that no-one should face imprisonment today because of an old warrant issued under laws that have since been replaced.

Jaclyn SYMES: Can you confirm what you are proceeding with and not proceeding with?

Rachel PAYNE: Just in relation to new sections 90A to 90F in amendments 3 and 5 on sheet RP26C, I will not be proceeding with this amendment, but I will speak to them. For division 4A, ‘Person in default and imprisonment’, these clauses remove a number of the Magistrates’ Court’s powers under the Fines Reform Act 2014, particularly powers connected with imprisonment and enforcement of unpaid fines. The justification for me speaking to this is that these provisions ensure that a fine should be a financial penalty, not a pathway into prison for someone who cannot afford to pay it. In conversation with government over this and with the department, I am satisfied that the department is looking into this issue more broadly.

Georgie CROZIER: You said ‘In conversation with government’ around these amendments. When did the conversation start?

Rachel PAYNE: When I moved these amendments initially. I moved amendments that looked at the pre-fine period and the post-fine period. In my conversations with government and advice that was then provided in response to those amendments from the department, I was satisfied that the department had suggested that they would be looking at this issue more broadly. There were questions around constitutionality and the like, so I felt it best that I leave that to the department to further investigate. It was outside the scope of this bill more broadly, and more time would have been required.

Jaclyn SYMES: Thank you, Ms Payne, for clarifying what you are proceeding with and what you are not. The ones that you are not proceeding with we were not going to support, but I do not need to speak to that; you have done that yourself. In relation to voiding imprisonment warrants made under now repealed legislation, the government will support this amendment. We understand the intention is to void all historical imprisonment warrants arising from orders made under now repealed provisions of the Infringements Act 2006. The amendment put forward by Ms Payne will void imprisonment warrants for infringement fine defaults that were first issued before 2018, even if they have since been reissued. However, these amendments as drafted will not fully capture all the imprisonment warrants for fine default arising from orders made before 2018. Cohorts left out include imprisonment warrants relating to court fine default – imprisonment warrants that were made in or after 2018 based on a court order made before 2018. This means further legislative work may be required to realise the intention of the amendment in full.

Katherine COPSEY: The Greens will be very happy to support this amendment. We have been on the record similarly about the unjust outcomes that placing people at risk of imprisonment for unpaid fines produces. It compounds vulnerability, drives people further into poverty and increases stigma, rather than approaching these issues through a lens of assisting people to get back on their feet. No-one should be jailed simply because they cannot afford to pay a fine, and it is plainly unjust in the case of the historic warrants for people to remain exposed to imprisonment warrants that were issued under an outdated enforcement regime. Cancelling the historical warrants is an important step that the Greens will support. For the record, had Ms Payne proceeded with her prospective set of amendments, removing imprisonment as an enforcement option for unpaid fines altogether, the Greens would have been supportive of this as well.

Criminalising poverty is not what Victoria is about. We need to work towards a fairer fines system, and I am again very proud to build on the work that my predecessor Sue Pennicuik put in in this place. We should not be imprisoning people for fines, and we encourage all parties to support these amendments because they are a proportionate and humane justice response consistent with people’s rights and the outcomes that we actually seek from our justice system, rather than driving people further into the dirt.

David LIMBRICK: The Libertarian Party will be supporting this amendment. In the case of historical fines it is obviously unjust that a warrant is still outstanding for a law that is now outdated and obsolete, but I do note the minister’s response that this is not a complete solution and will require further work and I urge the government to do that work.

On fines more generally, I still get people contacting my office about outstanding fines from the COVID period. There were enormous fines during that period. I have urged the government many times to forgive those fines. Some other states have done similar things to that. I still think that the government should forgive those fines. Many of these fines are of a magnitude that these people just cannot pay. Compounding the injustice even more is that many of these people were fined for protesting after they lost their jobs. This is an awful thing to do to people, and the idea of going to jail for that is wrong. Therefore, in general, I do not think that imprisoning people over fines is a very good solution for anything. We need our prisons for people that hurt other people, not for people that cannot afford to pay a government fine.

Georgie CROZIER: Whilst we understand the approach Ms Payne has provided to the house, again we think these amendments should not be put into this bill. This bill is the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Coercive Control, Good Character, Risk Assessment and Other Matters) Bill 2026, and we do not believe that these amendments should be in this.

Jaclyn SYMES: They are not part of the instruction motion. These are in scope.

Georgie CROZIER: I am just saying, in terms of the overall amendments that Ms Payne has moved, whether it is the previous one or this one, we will not be supporting them based on the government’s response to all of these matters. They have had years to do this. Again, Ms McLeish brought this issue to the Parliament and the government voted against it some 12 months ago, so we will not be supporting Ms Payne’s amendment.

Jaclyn SYMES: Just to respond, Ms Crozier, obviously I am not the responsible minister, I just have custody of the bill today. Just to clarify your argument that these are not appropriate amendments for this bill, the advice from the clerks is that these are in scope and therefore not part of the instruction motion. Just to be very clear, we are supporting the voiding of imprisonment warrants made under now-repealed legislation. We have confined our support to that amendment. We would not have been in a position to support removing imprisonment as a last resort to act as a deterrent for unpaid fines. We have made that clear. As you have heard, Ms Payne has withdrawn that amendment. Perhaps I should not speak for Ms Payne, but if you have had amendments that are similar to hers and you were upset that they did not get voted up, it is kind of illogical that you are going to oppose the same amendments because they are put by someone else.

Georgie CROZIER: Minister, what I was referring to was the previous amendment. As with the instruction motion, I was saying that, similarly to that amendment, the Liberal and Nationals will not be supporting this amendment. That is what I was referring to. That is our opposition.

The DEPUTY PRESIDENT: We are now dealing with Ms Payne’s sheet RP26C and her amendment 1, which is in relation to the voiding of warrants to imprison. It tests all her remaining amendments on that sheet.

Council divided on amendment:

Clause 2 (11:24)

Rachel PAYNE: I move:

2.   Clause 2, line 31, omit “3” and insert “3, 3A”.

Georgie CROZIER: Again, the Liberals and Nationals will not be supporting Ms Payne’s amendment.

Amendment agreed to; amended clause agreed to; clauses 3 to 88 agreed to.

New clause 88A (11:25)

Rachel PAYNE: I move:

4.   Insert the following New Division to follow Division 3 of Part 9 –

‘Division 3A – Warrants to imprison

88A New section 171AAA inserted

After section 171 of the Fines Reform Act 2014 insert –

“171AAA   Historical unexecuted warrants to imprison are null and void

Any warrant to imprison a person in default of payment of any outstanding infringement fine (however described) issued by the Magistrates’ Court before the commencement of this Act under any of the following provisions, including any warrant to imprison re-issued under section 58(3) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 after the commencement of this Act in respect of the same outstanding infringement fine, that has not been cancelled, executed or recalled before the commencement of this section is null and void –

(a)   Schedule 7 to the Magistrates’ Court 1989 as in force immediately before its repeal;

(b)   section 68 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 in respect of an order of the Magistrates’ Court, under Part 12 of the Infringements Act 2006 as in force immediately before 31 December 2017, for imprisonment in default of payment of any outstanding fine.

Note

This Act came into operation on 31 December 2017.”.’.

Just while I have a moment, I would just like to thank the infringement notices working group for all of their support and advocacy in helping me with these amendments and the Federation of Community Legal Centres and community legal centres more broadly.

New clause agreed to; clauses 89 to 93 agreed to.

New clause 93A (11:26)

Rachel PAYNE: I move:

4.   Insert the following New Part after Part 10 –

‘Part 10A – Repeal of offence of begging or gathering alms

93A Section 49A amended

(1) For the heading to section 49A of the Summary Offences Act 1966 substitute –

“Offence to cause, procure or encourage child to beg or gather alms”.

(2) Section 49A(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1966 is repealed.’.

New clause agreed to; clauses 94 and 95 agreed to.

Long title (11:27)

Rachel PAYNE: I move:

5.   Long title, after “the Sentencing Act 1991” insert “, the Summary Offences Act 1966”.

Amendment agreed to; amended long title agreed to.

Reported to house with amendments, including amended long title.

 Jaclyn SYMES (Northern Victoria – Minister for Energy and Resources, Minister for Environment, Minister for Climate Action, Minister for the State Electricity Commission) (11:28): I move:

That the report be now adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

 Jaclyn SYMES (Northern Victoria – Minister for Energy and Resources, Minister for Environment, Minister for Climate Action, Minister for the State Electricity Commission) (11:28): I move:

That the bill be now read a third time.

The PRESIDENT: I am of the belief that this bill needs an absolute majority, so I ask the Clerk to ring the bells.

Bells rung.

Members having assembled in chamber:

The PRESIDENT: We need to determine if there is an absolute majority to pass this bill, so I ask members who are voting for the third reading to now stand in their place.

Required number of members having risen:

Motion agreed to by absolute majority.

Read third time.

The PRESIDENT: Pursuant to standing order 14.28, the bill will be returned to the Assembly with a message informing them that the Council have agreed to the bill with amendments.