Tuesday, 2 December 2025

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning) (12:11):

I move:

[CONTENT TO BE INCORPORATED]

Motion agreed to.

 James NEWBURY (Brighton) (12:11): I seek a brief explanation of the bill.

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning) (12:11): The Justice Legislation Amendment (Community Safety) Bill 2025 will amend the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005, the Youth Justice Act 2024 and the Crimes Act 1958 to address increasing levels of crime in Victoria and respond to increasing community concern about serious violent offending, particularly by children.

Read first time.

Sonya KILKENNY: Under standing order 61(3)(b) I advise the house that the representatives of the other parties and independents have been provided with a copy of the bill and a briefing in accordance with the standing order. I therefore move that the bill be read a second time immediately

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning) (12:14): In accordance with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, I table a statement of compatibility in relation to the Justice Legislation Amendment (Community Safety) Bill 2025:

Opening paragraphs

In accordance with section 28 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Charter), I make this Statement of Compatibility with respect to the Justice Legislation Amendment (Community Safety) Bill 2025 (Bill).

In my opinion, the Bill, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is in part, incompatible with the human rights set out in the Charter. The measures in the Bill constitute significant limits on the fundamental rights of children who are by their nature a vulnerable cohort, which require a very high standard of justification in order to be compatible with rights. While it is my strong view that the Bill is necessary to address compelling and pressing community safety concerns brought about by unprecedented incidents of serious and violent offending by children, my acknowledgement of incompatibility accepts the inherent difficulty in meeting this high standard of justification. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview of the Bill

The purposes of the Bill are to:

a.   amend the Crimes Act 1958 (Crimes Act) to:

i. increase the maximum penalties for specified serious, high-harm offences. These proposed reforms seek to ensure that sentences for these offences adequately reflect the gravity of the offending, particularly in cases involving high levels of culpability;

ii. introduce a new knife crime offence, criminalising the use of a knife by a person in the commission of specified indictable offences;

iii. amend the existing offence of carjacking to include the presence of a child victim in the car as a standalone element of the offence; and

iv. make any other consequential amendments that are required;

(Crimes Act reforms)

b.   amend the matters the Children’s Court must have regard to under the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (CYF Act) when sentencing a child, to reflect certain sentencing principles in the Youth Justice Act 2024 (YJ Act) with modifications (before the full commencement of the YJ Act), including:

i. the sentencing principle in section 204 of the YJ Act – protection of the community from reoffending (‘community protection principle’); and

ii. the sentencing principle in section 207 of the YJ Act – impact on victims (‘victim principle’); and

c.   amend two sentencing principles in the YJ Act before they commence:

i. the ‘community protection principle’; and

ii. the sentencing principle in section 208 of the YJ Act – minimum intervention (‘minimum intervention principle’).

((b) and (c) together the sentencing principle reforms)

d.   amend the CYF Act and YJ Act so that the Children’s Court no longer has jurisdiction to hear and determine specified serious, high-harm offences for 15- to 17-year-olds and to require uplift for other age cohorts and offences unless exceptions apply (uplift reforms).

Human rights issues

The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to the Bill are:

•   the right to equality (section 8);

•   the right to life (section 9);

•   protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (section 10);

•   the right to the protection of families and children (section 17);

•   the right to liberty and security of the person (section 21);

•   the rights of children in the criminal process, including that children be brought to trial as quickly as possible (section 23);

•   rights in criminal proceedings, including that a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of that child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s rehabilitation (section 25);

•   the right not to be tried and punished more than once (section 26); and

•   retrospective criminal laws (section 27(2)).

For completeness, in addition to these primary rights affected by the Bill, it is acknowledged that the amendments in the Bill will cause more children to receive custodial sentences and longer sentences will be available than those currently imposed by the Children’s Court. A sentence of imprisonment necessarily involves the limitation of other rights, including freedom of movement (section 12), the right to privacy (section 13(a)), the rights to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19), freedom of expression (section 15(2)), right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16), the protection of families and children (section 17) and the right to property (section 20). This is the result of

the deprivation of liberty and the powers held by officers in charge of custodial facilities that are necessary to maintain good order and security of the facilities and the welfare of detained persons. The family unit will also be affected when a family member is made subject to an imprisonment order. As all these limitations are a lawful and necessary consequence of a sentence of imprisonment, I do not propose to discuss these secondary impacts in detail, beyond acknowledging the wide range of human rights that are limited by a sentence of imprisonment.

General importance of the Bill

As my below discussion on the human rights limits imposed by the Bill will largely draw on a common purpose, to avoid repetition, I will set out the importance of the Bill’s purpose first.

The Bill is aimed at addressing pressing and substantial concerns, which are of sufficient importance to justify limiting rights. The Bill seeks to address increasing levels of crime in Victoria and to respond to increasing threats to community safety from serious, violent offending, including by children. Following a rapid review into Victoria’s justice system settings announced by the Premier in February 2025, government has progressed reforms to increase community safety, including strengthening bail laws. Despite these reforms, Victoria continues to experience high crime rates. Victoria Police report that child crime (aged 12 to 17) remains at the highest levels since electronic records commenced. Children are overrepresented in serious and violent crimes such as home invasions and carjacking with approximately half of alleged offences incidents for these offences in the past year being linked to offenders under 18. In the last year, Victoria Police has arrested thousands of youth offenders as part of Operation Trinity (home burglaries and car thefts) and Operation Alliance (youth gangs).

This Bill is a response to these significant incidents of youth crime, which are of deep concern to the government and the Victorian community. The Bill contains reforms targeting specific offending which, whether or not it is committed by children, has significant and harmful impacts on victims. Offending involving serious violence causes a wide range of serious harms. These harms affect not only the immediate victim but also the child, their family, and the wider community. The harms caused by violent offending tend to be deeper and more long-lasting than those associated with non-violent youth crime.

Home invasions and carjacking, particularly when aggravated, are some of the most serious offences because of the gravity of harm they cause, which can be wide-ranging and enduring. This includes physical harms as a result of violence in the commission of this offending, psychological and emotional harms arising from the loss of security of home and the impact on families (including young victims). There are also social harms from the resulting fear that in turn erodes community trust, increases collective anxiety and reduces social cohesion. There is also strain on emergency services and resulting costs to the economy relating to the destruction of property and the provision of increased security measures. This offending is high profile and ultimately contributes to a loss of public confidence in safety.

The Bill seeks to reduce the instances of this offending by increasing deterrence, accountability, punishment and statutory denunciation of such offending. This is done by ensuring that people who commit such offences are subject to higher penalties and liable to being sentenced to adult sentences, irrespective of them being children. This sends a strong message to offenders and the community that those who commit these offences will face severe consequences. The Bill prioritises community safety and recognises the impact of serious, violent offending on victims, including on the enjoyment of their human rights under the Charter.

Increasing criminal penalties

Promotion of various human rights

Clauses 3 to 7 of the Bill increase the maximum penalties for, respectively, causing serious injury intentionally in circumstances of gross violence, causing serious injury recklessly in circumstances of gross violence, aggravated home invasion, and aggravated carjacking. As these offences involve a victim being seriously injured, or having their home or property interfered with, increasing the maximum penalties that apply for these offences increases the deterrence, denunciation and punishment for such offending, in order to protect the community. This in turn safeguards and protects various human rights of members of the public, including their rights to life (section 9), security of person (section 21), privacy of home (section 13), and where victims may be families or children, protection of families and children (section 17). It provides courts with scope to sentence serious offenders to a period of imprisonment that is proportionate to the gravity of their offending, facilitating community safety from further unlawful and dangerous behavior.

Clause 7 sets a higher maximum penalty for recruiting a child to engage in criminal activity, which promotes the right in section 17(2) of the Charter. This right provides that every child has the right to such protection as is in their best interests and is needed by them by reason of being a child. Clause 7 recognises that children are particularly vulnerable and provides courts with scope to impose higher sentences for adults who recruit children to engage in criminal activity. This sends a strong message to the community that adults who recruit children to engage in criminal activity will face tougher penalties.

New offence of using knives in the commission of certain indictable offences and broader offence of carjacking

Clause 9 inserts into the Crimes Act the offence of using knives in the commission of certain indictable offences. Clause 10 amends the offence of carjacking in section 79(1) of the Crimes Act to insert a new element of the offence in relation to the presence of a child victim in the car.

Promotion of various human rights

The rights to life and security of person have been interpreted internationally to impose positive obligations on a state to take reasonable measures to safeguard life and protect

against personal violence, including by ensuring its criminal law framework provides adequate and effective accountability for the commission of acts of violence. Similarly, the Charter imposes obligations on the State to ensure the protection of children and families (section 17).

Knife crimes can be fatal or cause serious, long-term injury. Criminalising the use of a knife by a person in the commission of the following indictable offences (see new section 195X(2), inserted by clause 9) recognises the serious impact knife crime has on victims and community safety:

•   causing serious injury or injury intentionally or recklessly (sections 16–18 of the Crimes Act);

•   assault (section 31(1)(a) Crimes Act);

•   affray (section 195H Crimes Act); and

•   violent disorder (section 195I Crimes Act).

Similarly, the presence of a child victim during the commission of a carjacking or aggravated carjacking offence can cause significant harm to the child. Amending the offence of carjacking to include the presence of a child victim in the vehicle as a standalone element of the offence protects the life of those victims while sending a strong message to the community that such conduct will not be tolerated.

In recent times, young children have been the victims of carjackings where offenders have stolen a parked car with a child in the back seat. Disregard for children’s safety is an aggravating feature of this offending, which will now be appropriately captured by clause 10. This in turn promotes the protection of Victorian children and their families.

Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty (section 25)

Clause 10(2) inserts an element of strict liability in the amended carjacking offence so that it is immaterial whether or not the accused knew that there was a child in the vehicle at the time of stealing it. This also impacts the offence of aggravated carjacking because committing carjacking is one element of that offence. The imposition of a strict liability element engages section 25(1) of the Charter, particularly when that offence is liable to a penalty of imprisonment. The right is considered a fundamental one, which requires a legitimate and sufficiently important purpose to justify any limit.

To the extent that the imposition of a strict liability element to an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment constitutes a limit on the presumption of innocence, in my view it is reasonably justified. The purpose of this amendment is sufficiently pressing and important and is directed at safeguarding the child victim from the inherently traumatic experience of being present during such an offence. A child passenger who is present during a carjacking is not simply a bystander but is a direct victim. The experience exposes them to a uniquely severe set of harms due to prospect of direct physical danger, acute psychological trauma, and developmentally specific vulnerabilities. These harms can be both

immediate and long-term, including social, developmental, and family harms. Introducing a strict liability element is an appropriate response to the impact of carjacking on child victims, who in many circumstances have no capacity to protect themselves. This vulnerability to severe harm remains present regardless of whether the offender intended to commit the carjacking involving the child, or had any prior knowledge of the child’s presence. In this way, the need for strict liability element mirrors that which is commonly accepted in a regulatory context where there is a need to protect the safety of vulnerable persons who are entirely dependent on the care and compliance with the law of other people. Finally, I note that the remaining elements of the offence of carjacking must still be proven by the prosecution, including the fault elements relating to the act of stealing the vehicle.

To the extent that the amended carjacking offence limits the right in section 25, it is a reasonable and justified limitation.

Right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 26)

Section 26 of the Charter protects a person’s right not to be tried or punished more than once for an offence in respect of which that person has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with law.

The maximum penalty for the new knife crime offence will be 3 years imprisonment, which is on top of the maximum penalty for the specified indictable offence.

Currently, knife-related offences focus on the possession, use or carrying of a particular weapon (for example, sections 5AA and 6 of the Control of Weapons Act 1990). There are also general offences, which capture the possession of an offensive weapon during the commission of the offence (e.g. aggravated burglary and armed robbery). In those matters, the use of a particular weapon such as a knife is considered during sentencing and the type of weapon is considered an aggravating factor. If the court determines that the use of a knife increases the seriousness of the offending, it may reflect this in the sentence imposed. However, consideration of whether such conduct aggravates a person’s offending is not required by statute and accordingly occurs to varying extents.

I consider that providing for this new offence will not limit the protection against double punishment. Once the new knife offence is introduced, it is possible that elements of this offence could also establish other offences or be considered an aggravating factor in sentencing. Nevertheless, the new knife crime does not displace the common law rule against double jeopardy nor the rule against duplicity, which protect an accused from being the subject of multiple prosecutions or convictions arising out of the same set of facts. As such, an accused will still be protected from the court imposing ‘double punishment’ for the use of a knife in the commission of an offence.

Mandatory uplift reforms

The mandatory uplift reforms in Part 4 of the Bill will amend the CYF Act and the YJ Act so that children aged 15–17 at the time of the alleged commission of, and who are charged with, any of the following designated offences:

•   aggravated home invasion (section 77B Crimes Act);

•   aggravated carjacking (section 79A Crimes Act);

•   home invasion (section 77A Crimes Act);

•   intentionally causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence (section 15A Crimes Act); or

•   recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence (section 15B Crimes Act) –

are removed from the jurisdiction of the Children’s Court and (if the child is committed to stand trial) dealt with by the County Court, where they can be sentenced according to the Sentencing Act 1991 (Sentencing Act), if they are found guilty (noting the Supreme Court and County Court also have access to sentencing options under the CYF Act and later the YJ Act in appropriate circumstances – see CYF Act section 586(1) and YJ Act section 241(1)).

Protection of children (section 17(2)) and criminal process rights of children (sections 23 and 25(3))

Section 17(2) of the Charter provides that every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is in their best interests and is needed by them by reason of being a child. This provision is modelled on article 24(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its scope is informed by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other relevant United Nations materials. The right protects important values, including bodily integrity, mental health, dignity and self-worth.

What is in a child’s best interests will depend on the specific circumstances of the child or group of children and the particular decision being made or action being taken. The level of protection required will ordinarily differ depending on the age of the child, in recognition of the progressively developing capacities of the children. The scope of section 17(2) in the youth justice context may be informed by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Justice (‘Beijing Rules’), which require youth justice systems to emphasise children’s wellbeing and ensure that responses to children and young persons within the youth justice system are proportionate. The Supreme Court has indicated that the right requires the state to ensure the survival and development of the child to the maximum extent possible.

In the context of youth justice and sentencing, the right is given effect to by a youth justice framework that emphasises rehabilitation and diversion from the criminal justice system, and where the court is empowered to impose a sentence that is connected to the provision

of relevant supports to address the drivers of a child’s offending. The right also emphasises child sentencing principles that promote minimal intervention and mandate that a custodial sentence is only to be imposed as a last resort and for the minimum appropriate period.

Sections 23 and 25(3) of the Charter protect the rights of children in the criminal process. In this Statement, the rights in sections 23 and 25(3) are referred to collectively as ‘rights of children in the criminal process’.

Section 23(3) provides that a child who has been convicted of an offence must be treated in a way that is appropriate for their age. Age-appropriate treatment may incorporate matters such as minimising stigma, preservation of family relationships, primacy given to rehabilitation when sentencing children, and the modification of the criminal process to promote the positive development of the child and protect their particular vulnerability. It also extends to requiring separate facilities for children deprived of their liberty, including distinct, child-centered staff, personnel, policies and practices.

Under section 23(2), an accused child must be brought to trial as quickly as possible. This right has been interpreted as imposing an obligation to take positive steps to proceed as expeditiously as possible within what the circumstances will allow.

Section 25(3) provides that a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation. This right is directed at ensuring that children can effectively participate in the legal process. It may require procedures that are targeted to child defendants (such as ensuring the provision of age-appropriate explanations) and that assist them to effectively participate in the proceeding. The right in section 25(3) may also require courts to take steps to ensure that the trial process does not expose a child defendant to avoidable intimidation, humiliation and distress, and may require alternative measures to criminal proceedings to be adopted where appropriate.

The Bill is relevant to these rights because the mandatory uplift reforms will remove the Children’s Court jurisdiction to hear and determine certain offences committed by 15- to 17- year-old children. This will affect children’s substantive and procedural rights as follows:

•   The higher courts can impose longer sentences on those children for the uplifted offences under the Sentencing Act, which were previously only available to adult offenders (other than in the limited existing circumstances of uplift). This affects a child’s entitlement under the section 17(2) right to a sentencing framework that emphasises rehabilitation and minimum intervention.

•   It will require children committed to trial for those offences to instead stand trial in the higher courts, which are not a specialist jurisdiction dealing exclusively with children. This affects a child’s entitlement to an age-appropriate process that is best provided by the Children’s Court.

•   It will increase the scope for children to receive terms of imprisonment that will be served in adult custodial facilities, where the conditions of detention are more burdensome than those which would apply in a youth justice facility and not designed for the developmental needs of young people.

Accordingly, I consider that these reforms limit the rights protected by sections 17(2) and 23(3) of the Charter. Under the Charter, these rights may be subject only to reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking account the relevant factors in section 7(2), which are considered below.

Nature of the rights

I have discussed the scope of the relevant children’s rights, above. These rights are ultimately directed towards protecting the vulnerability of children and as a result, are given particular weight above the rights of other members of the community. These rights require pressing and significant countervailing interests in order for any limitation to be justified.

Importance of the purpose of the limitation

As I said out above, the purpose of these uplift reforms is to protect the community from the threat of serious and violent offending by children aged 15 to 17 years by ensuring that they are sentenced in the higher courts, which are well equipped to deal with such offending and which have the capacity to apply the sentencing options that are appropriate to address the nature of the offending. The uplift reforms are intended to send a strong message to offenders and the community that these offences will not be tolerated and will be subject to severe consequences. These purposes embrace punishment, denunciation and deterrence. In this regard, the interests of the individual child are balanced with the interests of the community, including safety and maintaining confidence in the criminal justice system and the rights of the community to liberty and security (section 21) and their right to life (section 9).

Nature and extent of the limitation

The nature and extent of the limitation on these human rights will be as follows.

Adult sentences

The maximum length of a custodial sentence that can be imposed in the Children’s Court is 3 years for any offence. As a result of the mandatory uplift reforms, children aged 15 years and over charged with any of the mandatorily uplifted offences will now face sentences as follows:

•   aggravated home invasion and aggravated carjacking – up to 25 years (to be increased to a maximum life sentence under clauses 5 and 6 respectively);

•   intentionally causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence – up to 20 years (to be increased to a maximum of 25 years under clause 3);

•   recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence – up to 15 years (to be increased to a maximum of 20 years under clause 4); and

•   home invasion – up to 25 years (maximum penalty not amended by the Bill).

The framework of the Sentencing Act has a much stronger focus on punishment and deterrence, as compared with the strong focus on diversion, rehabilitation and minimum intervention in the CYF Act and YJ Act. As a result, it is expected that the mandatory uplift reforms will lead to more children receiving custodial sentences than in the Children’s Court, these sentences being longer than those imposed by the Children’s Court, and more sentences of imprisonment being imposed (which the Children’s Court does not have available as a sentencing option).

However, I note that the CYF Act already provides for certain serious offences to be outside of the jurisdiction of the Children’s Court, and these matters are currently heard and determined in the higher courts.¹ This existing uplift scheme in the CYF Act is reproduced in the YJ Act but has not yet commenced. It was considered compatible with Charter rights in the statement of compatibility when the Youth Justice Bill 2024 was introduced. The Bill seeks to expand the range of offences for which the Children’s Court does not have jurisdiction to include other serious offences that I consider cause similar grave harm to the community.

Aggravated home invasion and aggravated carjacking offences are currently known as ‘Category A serious youth offences’ under the CYF Act. Where these crimes are committed by children 16 years and over, they are currently subject to a requirement that they will be heard and determined by the higher courts unless exceptions apply. This is in recognition of the gravity of these offences and the grave impacts of this kind of offending on victims. In many cases children charged with these offences are already subject to the jurisdiction of the higher courts and may only be sentenced to a youth justice centre order or youth residential centre order in exceptional circumstances. Home invasion, intentionally causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence and recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances are currently known as ‘Category B serious youth offences’. This means that the Children’s Court must consider uplifting the offence to the higher courts.

Currently under the CYF Act the tests for uplift of Category A and B serious youth offences operate only in respect of offenders aged 16 years and over. In making 15-year-olds subject to the mandatory uplift, the Bill represents a significant limitation of the rights of those children under the Charter because of their vulnerability.

Being subject to adult sentences under the Sentencing Act (meaning likely longer sentences and sentences in an adult prison) is a significant limitation on the right to protection of children, given that detention can be particularly criminogenic for children, and on the right of children convicted of an offence to appropriate treatment for their age.

However, as noted above, the Supreme Court and County Court have an existing power to sentence under the CYF Act (or YJ Act, when it commences) in appropriate circumstances. This will have the effect of ensuring that limitations on the right to the protection of children’s best interests and the right of children to appropriate treatment, are in some cases justifiable and proportionate.

Limitations on procedural rights

The uplift reforms will have implications for a child’s procedural rights, including that:

•   preparation for trial before the higher courts may result in a comparatively longer period of time elapsing before the matter is heard than if it was determined summarily in the Children’s Court; and

•   the higher courts are not a specialist jurisdiction dealing exclusively with children, and do not provide the same standard modifications (both procedurally and in terms of the physical characteristics of the court) that are a primary focus of the Children’s Court, which is focused on giving the best effect to a child’s participation and prospects of rehabilitation.

That said, these rights are still afforded a level of protection in the higher courts, which will go some way to reducing the extent of these limitations. The higher courts may still give effect to children’s procedural and fair hearing rights under section 6(2)(b) of the Charter. This includes that the trial be conducted in accordance with established criminal procedures directed at safeguarding a fair hearing, and ensuring a criminal charge is determined without unreasonable delay.

A higher court will also still be obliged to modify its procedures to ensure the effective participation of a child accused, such as ensuring the provision of age-appropriate explanations and that the trial process does not expose a child defendant to avoidable intimidation, humiliation and distress.

However, I recognise that, in practice, a non-specialist court will not have the same capacity to give effect to a child’s procedural entitlements to the same standard as the Children’s Court, and that, despite the higher courts being obliged to give effect to these rights, in practice, it is more likely a child accused will experience a reduced standard of enjoyment in relation to their procedural rights in circumstances that may constitute a limit on the right.

Consequential limitations relating to accommodation in adult prisons

The expansion of the uplift provisions enlivens a broader range of circumstances for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, which will expose a child to the prospect of being imprisoned in an adult prison.

While a sentenced child does not have an express right under the Charter to be segregated from all detained adults, they do have a right to be treated in a way that is appropriate for their age, as well as their general right to protection as is in their best interests, having regard to their developmental needs.

The legislative framework and conditions of detention in adult facilities will be more burdensome than those which would apply in a youth justice facility and will constitute an interference with these rights. Adult prisons do not provide the same level of access to youth-specific, specialised rehabilitative interventions available to a child in a youth justice custodial facility. Further, there is greater prospect for isolation in prison, particularly on protective grounds where a child may be separated from other prisoners to ensure their safety, which can involve necessarily restrictive conditions to effect that protective separation, including time confined in a cell, reduced use of common facilities and limited communication with other prisoners. The conditions in adult facilities are such that they may result in a limitation of children’s rights, as well as other rights associated with detention, to a greater extent than a child would experience in a youth justice facility.

However, for completeness, the reforms do not alter the discretions of the Adult Parole Board that exist in CYF Act and the YJ Act to transfer a child from prison to an available youth justice custodial centre where it is appropriate and suitable to do so, and where that child can reasonably be safely and appropriately accommodated there. Accordingly, the legislation will still provide for the child to be accommodated in an age-appropriate way, where the statutory criteria for doing so are satisfied.

Relationship between limitation and its purpose

I consider the expansion of the mandatory uplift is directly related to the overall purpose of punishing, deterring and denunciating this offending, and ultimately ensuring greater community protection.

However, I recognise that the interplay between criminal punishment and child offending is complex, and that there are contrary authoritative views as to whether such measures are capable of significantly reducing youth offending. These views go to the multiple interacting causes of youth crime, the developmental characteristics of children, and whether longer sentences more likely to be served in prison, standing trial in a higher court and potentially being subject to more burdensome conditions of detention, are as effective a deterrent for children as for adults.

Less restrictive means

In my view, and noting the multitude of interacting causes for this offending, I consider there to be no less restrictive means reasonably available. These reforms to mandatory uplift expand on an existing scheme, which do not appear to have struck the necessary balance to respond to serious, violent youth offending.

Conclusion

In my view, the reforms serve a pressing and important purpose, where there is no less restrictive means available. They expand the existing mandatory uplift scheme to new offences that are considered to be of the requisite seriousness to warrant elevation to this category.

However, on balance I acknowledge that the reforms interfere with fundamental protective and criminal process rights of children to a significant extent, in circumstances where other jurisdictions and international bodies have deemed such an approach to be incompatible with children’s rights. I also recognise the body of evidence that questions whether harsher punishment is an effective deterrent for children. For these reasons, I accept that this expansion of the mandatory uplift scheme is likely to be incompatible with the Charter.

While the existing uplift scheme was considered compatible with Charter rights when the Youth Justice Bill 2024 was introduced, these reforms, as noted above, represent an expansion of the scheme. In particular, these reforms, in applying to children aged 15 to 17 years, are likely to affect a larger cohort of children, who by virtue of their age may be more vulnerable than those captured by the existing uplift scheme. Further, the scheme will apply to a broader range of offences, resulting in significant limitations on children’s rights. I take very seriously the need to engage in the analysis contemplated by the Charter in introducing these measures. However, the Victorian Government considers these reforms are an important part of addressing serious, violent youth crime in Victoria.

Requirement of uplift for specified offences unless exceptions apply

The Bill also requires charges for the offences listed above to be uplifted from the Children’s Court to the County Court when committed by children aged 14 years (at the time of the alleged offending) unless exceptions apply. Consequently, children aged 14 who commit relevant offences will be able to stand trial in the Children’s Court only where one of the legislative exceptions applies.

Further, charges against 14- to 17-year-olds for carjacking (section 79 of the Crimes Act) will also be subject to the same requirement of uplift to the County Court unless one of the same exceptions apply.

The amendments provide that the Children’s Court must not hear and determine these specified charges for children in these age groups unless: the child or prosecution requests the charge be heard and determined summarily, and the Court is satisfied that the sentencing options available to it are adequate, and any of the following apply:

•   it is in the interests of the victim or victims that the charge be heard and determined summarily, or

•   the accused is particularly vulnerable because of cognitive impairment or mental illness, or

•   there is a substantial and compelling reason why the charge should be heard and determined summarily.

Protection of children (section 17(2)) and criminal process rights of children (sections 23 and 25(3))

As previously stated, the vulnerability and special status of children is recognised under several provisions of the Charter including when they are involved in the criminal justice system: sections 17(2) (best interests), 23(2) (brought to trial as quickly as possible), 25(3) (procedures that take into account age and rehabilitation) and 23(3) (treated in an age- appropriate way following conviction).

These amendments also engage these rights. As noted above, uplift to the County Court will affect the sentencing of affected children, and will likely mean that more children will receive custodial sentences that are longer than those imposed by the Children’s Court.

For applicable circumstances, offences will be uplifted unless a number of specified criteria are made out. These may include that the accused is particularly vulnerable or there is a compelling reason why the charge should be heard summarily (in the Children’s Court).

While the test for uplift of 14-year-old children is in parts, protective of children’s rights, given it remains open to the Children’s Court to consider these matters involving a 14-year- old accused in those circumstances (as opposed to the mandatory nature of the uplift reforms discussed above applying to 15- to 17-year-olds), I accept that the burden of satisfying the legislative criteria will lie with the accused, and this will likely constitute a limit.

Further, I recognise that the uplift test for carjacking will operate to treat children more harshly than adults, as an adult defendant can have a carjacking charge tried summarily in the Magistrates’ Court without needing to satisfy legislative exceptions from uplift. This will also limit the right to equality (section 8) by directly treating a child unfavourably on the basis of a protected attribute, being their age.

Accordingly, for the same reasons as my discussion concerning the mandatory uplift, I also accept that the tests for uplift of 14-year-old children and 14- to 17-year-old children for carjacking are likely to be incompatible with the human rights in sections 17(2), 23 and 25(3) of the Charter, notwithstanding that the extent of the limit is more confined than the mandatory uplift provisions. While it is my strong view that these reforms serve a legitimate purpose to safeguard community safety and increase deterrence, denunciation and punishment for such offending, I accept these reforms do so in a way that significantly limits fundamental rights of children in circumstances that other jurisdictions and authorities have

considered to be incompatible with these rights, and where contrary views exist as to the efficacy of longer custodial sentences for child offenders in terms of achieving the deterrent aims of the Bill.

Sentencing principles

Part 3 of the Bill relates to the sentencing principle reforms. Division 2 of Part 3 amends sentencing principles in the YJ Act. Clause 12 amends the community protection sentencing principle in section 204 of the YJ Act and clause 13 amends the minimum intervention principle set out in section 208 in the YJ Act. Clause 12 removes the reference to ‘noting that efforts to support rehabilitation and positive development of the child are the most effective ways to reduce reoffending’ from the community protection sentencing principle in section 204 of the YJ Act. Clause 13 removes the reference to ‘with a custodial sentence imposed as a last resort and for minimum period appropriate and necessary’ from the minimum intervention principle in section 208. Since the YJ Act was developed and passed, the context of serious, violent offending by children and young people in Victoria has changed. The amendments seek to address concerns about the effectiveness of sentences to protect the community from further offending by a child and the need to protect victims of youth offending. While these provision of the YJ Act have not yet commenced, I consider these amendments are relevant to rights under the Charter.

Clause 11 in Division 1 of Part 3 amends section 362 of the CYF Act to amend some of the matters to be taken into account when deciding which sentence to impose on a child. This clause amends section 362(1)(g) to provide for consideration of the need to protect the community from ‘any further reoffending by the child’, rather than ‘violent or other wrongful acts’. Clause 11 also adds the requirement to consider the need for the sentence to: recognise the impact of the child’s offending on any victim, provide opportunities for the child to restore any harm caused by the offending and take into account any steps the child has taken to restore such harm, to the extent the child has the capacity to do so.

Human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to the sentencing principle reforms are:

•   the protection of families and children, including the right to such protection as is in the child’s best interests (section 17(2));

•   the right to liberty (section 21);

•   children in the criminal process, including that a child convicted of an offence must be treated in a way that is appropriate for that child’s age (section 23(3)); and

•   rights in criminal proceedings, including that a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of that child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s rehabilitation (section 25(3)).

The scope of the rights protected by sections 17(2), 23 and 25(3) are discussed above.

Section 21 of the Charter provides that every person has the right to liberty and security, including the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention. This right is concerned with the physical detention of the individual, not mere restrictions on freedom of movement. A person’s liberty may legitimately be constrained only in circumstances where the relevant arrest or detention is lawful, in the sense that it is specifically authorised and sufficiently circumscribed by law, and not arbitrary, in that it must not be disproportionate or unjust.

Protection of children (section 17(2)), criminal process rights (sections 23(3) and 25(3)) and the right to liberty (section 21)

As noted above, the sections previously added to the YJ Act that will be amended by this Bill promoted children’s rights in the Charter and, while these provisions have not yet commenced, the amendments to them made by the Bill remain relevant to the rights under sections 17(2) and 21 of the Charter.

The CYF Act amendment broadens the scope of the prioritisation of the protection of the community from violent and wrongful acts to protection of the community from any reoffending. These changes to sentencing principles and matters to be taken into account when imposing a sentence may increase the possibility that a court would impose a custodial sentence and consequently may limit rights under sections 17(2) and 21. Further, the amendments may limit the rights of children in the criminal process, namely the right in section 23(3), which provides that a child convicted of an offence must be treated in a way that is appropriate for that child’s age and section 25(3) that a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes into account that child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s rehabilitation.

Under the Charter, these rights may be subject only to reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account the relevant factors in section 7(2), which are considered below.

Nature of the rights

As noted above, the rights in sections 17(2), 23 and 25(3) are ultimately directed towards protecting the vulnerability of children and, as a result, are given particular weight against the rights of other members of the community. These rights require pressing and significant countervailing interests in order to be justifiably limited.

In respect of the right to liberty and security of person (section 21 of the Charter), it is accepted that the right does not grant complete freedom from arrest and detention. Rather, the right in section 21 relevantly protects against arbitrary detention, and contains a number of procedural safeguards for the deprivation of liberty.

Importance of the purpose of the limitation

The purpose of the sentencing principle reforms is to ensure the YJ Act and the CYF Act better reflect that sentences imposed on children must consider community safety and impact on victims, while retaining the need for sentencing to promote whole-of-system responses and engage multiple service systems for rehabilitation outcomes to be achieved. The amendments seek to balance the interests of the individual young person with the interests of the community, including safety and maintaining confidence in the criminal justice system and the rights of the community and victims to liberty and security (section 21) and their right to life (section 9).

Nature and extent of the limitation

The nature and extent of the limitation on the rights protected by sections 17(2), 21, 23(3) and 25(3) of the Charter will depend on the relevant circumstances of the child being sentenced in accordance with the amended principles. In isolation, the sentencing reforms directly limit these rights by removing the reference to rehabilitation and positive development of the child from the community protection principle in section 204 of the YJ Act, and removing the reference to custodial sentences being imposed as a last resort and for the minimum period appropriate and necessary from the minimum intervention principle in section 208 of the YJ Act. I recognise that the principles being removed incorporate elements of international standards that some authorities regard as constituting the minimum standards for protecting human rights of children, or to which there is positive obligation to promote. Accordingly, this enlivens a question as to their compatibility, in terms of whether the removal of the statutory promotion of such principles is capable of being justified under any circumstances.

I do consider that any limitation of relevant rights affected by this amendment will be mitigated by the fact that the YJ Act will continue to explicitly provide that common law sentencing principles and rules applicable to the sentencing of children continue to apply, except to the extent of any inconsistency (section 202).

Furthermore, other YJ Act sentencing principles have not been amended by the Bill, such as considering the individual characteristics and vulnerabilities of the individual (section 206 of the YJ Act), rehabilitation and positive development of the child (section 203), and the specific sentencing principles that must be taken into account when the Court is sentencing an Aboriginal child (section 365). Accordingly, I consider the YJ Act framework still contains many appropriate safeguards in sentencing.

Relationship between limitation and its purpose

I recognise that there may be questions about whether the important purpose of community protection is rationally connected with the sentencing principle reforms. These principles have been reconsidered having regard to the changed context of serious, violent offending by children and young people in Victoria and are an important measure to address that offending and protect the community.

Less restrictive means

I recognise that less restrictive means, such as the fact that the YJ Act reforms had yet to commence, may be said to be available to achieve the purposes of the Bill and the sentencing principle reforms. As noted above, however, the context of serious, violent offending by children in Victoria has changed since the sentencing principles in the YJ Act were developed and passed by the Parliament. The more restrictive means proposed by the sentencing principle reforms seek to address concerns about the effectiveness of sentences to protect the community.

Conclusion

While these reforms will not interfere with common law protections and residual safeguards in the YJ Act that will continue to apply, I accept that the amendments to these statutory principles are likely to be out of step with the above human rights in how they have been universally interpreted, in a manner that may not be capable of being justified. This is particularly with regard to the removal of principles that promoted fundamental aspects of the children’s rights. However, the government intends to proceed with these reforms notwithstanding the conclusion that they are incompatible with the Charter.

Retrospective effect of sentencing principle reforms

Section 27(2) of the Charter provides that a penalty must not be imposed on any person for a criminal offence that is greater than the penalty applied to the offence when it was committed.

The sentencing principle reforms will apply to the sentencing of an offender on or after commencement, regardless of whether the offence was committed before the commencement of the reforms. In practice, I consider the right against retrospectivity is only engaged with respect to the amendment of sentencing considerations under the CYF Act. Given it is anticipated the Bill will commence before the YJ Act, amendments to the YJ Act sentencing principles will not have scope to operate retrospectively.

The retrospective application of amendments to the sentencing considerations under the CYF Act will limit section 27(2), as the practical effect of these reforms is that a child who has committed a relevant offence prior to the commencement of these reforms may have imposed on them a greater penalty than they may have received for the offence when it was committed. This may include imposing a sentence of detention rather than a community disposition, or imposing a longer sentence of detention than would previously have been imposed.

I consider these amendments rebalance the sentencing considerations to be applied under the CYF Act, which may influence the sentence that a court imposes. However, the amendments do not of themselves lift the maximum penalty that can be imposed, and do not otherwise affect a court’s discretion to impose an appropriate sentence in the circumstances.

That said, I recognise that these transitional provisions operate on sentencing principle reforms in this Bill that I have already considered to be incompatible with Charter rights. I consider that retrospectively applying these reforms to offences that have already been committed is likely to exacerbate this incompatibility. Accordingly, I conclude that the retrospective effect of these reforms is, on balance, likely to also be incompatible with s 27(2) of the Charter.

The Hon. Sonya Kilkenny

MP Attorney-General

¹ These offences are murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, child homicide, homicide by firearm, arson causing death, and culpable driving causing death: CYF Act s 516(1); YJ Act s 156(1)(a).

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning) (12:14): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I ask that my second-reading speech be incorporated into Hansard.

Incorporated speech as follows:

The Justice Legislation Amendment (Community Safety) Bill 2025 (Bill) will implement the Government’s Adult Time for Violent Crime policy, delivering serious consequences for children who commit violent crimes that hurt victims and the community.

The Bill builds on significant reforms passed by Parliament this year to protect the community, including bail reform, strengthening victim safety and perpetrator accountability measures relating to family violence and creating a new ‘post and boast’ offence targeting those who publish material that seeks to glorify criminal behaviour.

Equally, the Bill lays the foundations to support the broader elements of the Government’s Serious Consequences, Early Interventions plan to reduce youth crime and crime committed by children in Victoria.

Specifically, the Bill delivers on the Government’s commitments to:

•   ensure children aged 14 and above who commit specified violent crimes face the prospect of adult sentences in adult courts

•   increase maximum penalties for the violent crimes of most concern to the Victorian community

•   create a new knife crime offence, and expand the existing offence of carjacking

•   change the sentencing principles that Courts must apply in relation to all children, to reflect the importance of, and give greater priority to, community safety and the impact of offending of victims, and to remove the statutory requirement that jail is a ‘last resort’ for children.

Children accused of high violence offending will be dealt with by an adult court and face the prospect of adult sentences if found guilty

Currently, few children face trial in an adult court with a jury. Under Adult Time for Violent Crime, we will change the status quo and deliver serious consequences for children who commit brazen, violent crimes that devastate victims and the community.

The offences of home invasion, aggravated home invasion, aggravated carjacking, and intentionally or recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence will have to be heard in the County Court if the accused child is 15 to 17 years old – without exception. If the child is 14, the matter will be heard in the County Court unless certain circumstances apply. These circumstances include the accused child’s cognitive impairment or mental illness, substantial and compelling reasons why the matter should be heard by the Children’s Court, or when it is in the victim’s best interests for the matter to proceed in the Children’s Court. The trial and sentencing of children aged 14 to 17 years old for carjacking will also be heard in the County Court unless these circumstances apply.

We know that there is a core group of young offenders engaged in serious and repeated aggravated burglaries and armed robberies – and the community has had enough. That is why the Bill provides legislative guidance that the Children’s Court considers repeat and serious aggravated burglaries and armed robberies as relevant when it is deciding whether exceptional circumstances exist that will move the matter to the County Court.

Any related indictable offending that occurs alongside uplifted serious and violent conduct must also be heard in the County Court, unless certain circumstances apply. The Bill provides that a related offence means an indictable offence founded on the same facts as the uplifted offence, or that together forms part of a series of offences of the same or similar character (where, for example, the Court will weigh up things like how close together in time the offences were, as well as where the offences occurred, and their similarity to each other, in deciding whether they are related and uplift is warranted).

Longer maximum sentences, including life imprisonment, for violent offences

There is growing community concern that serious offenders are not being held accountable for their criminal behaviour.

To deter and denounce incidents of serious violent and confrontational offending, this Bill will introduce higher maximum penalties for certain offences that cause a high level of fear or harm to victims and which erode the community’s sense of safety and security.

The Bill amends the Crimes Act 1958 to increase the maximum penalties for:

•   Aggravated home invasion, from 25 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment

•   Aggravated carjacking, from 25 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment

•   Intentionally causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence, from 20 years’ imprisonment to 25 years’ imprisonment.

•   Recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence, from 15 years’ imprisonment to 20 years’ imprisonment

•   Recruiting a child to engage in criminal activity, from 10 years’ imprisonment to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Maximum penalties provide guidance to courts about the Parliament’s view of the gravity of a particular offence and are a mandatory consideration for courts determining appropriate sentences. Higher maximum penalties will give courts broader scope to impose more severe sentences for the most serious cases, better reflecting the community’s expectations. These offences target objectively serious conduct. Increasing the maximum penalties denounces this conduct in the strongest terms and helps ensure that people who commit these offences will face appropriately strong consequences.

The Bill will also add recruiting a child to engage in criminal activity to a list of indictable offences that can be heard summarily, ensuring that the offence can continue to be heard in the Magistrates’ Court where appropriate after the maximum penalty is increased.

Principles for sentencing children will emphasise community safety, recognise impact on victims and remove reference to ‘custody as a last resort’

The Bill makes changes that will prioritise the consideration of community protection and impact on victims when young people are sentenced. Right now, judges are guided by legislative principles that are often out-of-step with the community’s expectations and don’t always recognise what victims have been through.

The Bill addresses this by changing the sentencing considerations that apply in the Children’s Court under the current Children, Youth and Families Act and the principles that will apply when the Youth Justice Act commences in full. The amended decision-making principles in the Children’s Court will reflect those used for adults. That means that:

•   judges will be required to emphasise community safety in sentencing decisions

•   judges will have to consider the impact of a child’s offending on the victim, and provide opportunities for the child to try to restore the harm they caused

•   ‘custody as a last resort’ will be removed from sentencing principles.

Together, these changes will guide judges to appropriately focus on protecting the community from reoffending and holding offenders to account.

New and amended offences will better respond to community concerns about knife crime and carjacking that puts children at risk

The prevalence of knife crime has had a significant impact both on community safety and the community’s perception of safety – using knives to commit serious and violent offences increase the level of harm caused by crime, exacerbating community concerns and fear. To specifically target and denounce the use of a knife in this way, the Bill introduces a new offence into the Crimes Act that recognises the additional criminality associated with using a knife in the commission of certain serious offences.

While existing laws can capture the underlying conduct (such as causing serious injury) or carrying or possessing a weapon generally, they do not specifically criminalise the use of a knife in committing certain serious offences. The new offence provides additional accountability, sending a strong message that the use of a knife in this way elevates the seriousness of offending, and acknowledges the devastating impact that knife crime has on victims and the broader community.

The new offence criminalises the use of a knife when committing the following serious offences:

•   intentionally or recklessly causing injury or serious injury

•   assaulting or threatening to assault with intent to commit an indictable offence

•   affray, and

•   violent disorder.

The scope of the new offence captures antisocial conduct that is of increasing community concern but aims to minimise the risk of giving rise to overlapping charges or double punishment. Other offences such as carjacking and home invasion are also of significant concern, including when knives are used. However, they are not included in the new offence because they already have an ‘offensive weapon’ element (e.g. home invasion and armed robbery) or they have an aggravated version that involves having or using an ‘offensive weapon’ – such as carjacking, which is covered by aggravated carjacking, or theft, which is covered by aggravated burglary or armed robbery.

The new offence will carry a three-year maximum penalty. This is in addition to the penalty for the underlying serious offence. For example, if a person is found guilty of an affray and using a knife when committing that offence, they may be sentenced to a maximum of five years imprisonment for the affray and up to three years imprisonment for the knife crime offence.

A person can only be found guilty of the knife crime offence if they have been found guilty of the relevant underlying offence. However, the Bill makes clear that a person may be charged with the knife crime offence before they are found guilty of the underlying offence. It is expected that the relevant offence and the knife crime offence will generally be charged and proceed together through the court system.

The term ‘knife’ is not defined in the Bill so its ordinary meaning will apply. This is broad enough to capture a range of knives, such as machetes, that are often used in the commission of serious offences. The term ‘use’ is also not defined as whether or not a knife is used in the commission of the offence will depend on the circumstances of each case. For example, this could include using a knife to stab someone resulting in a serious injury or holding a knife and threatening violence during a public fight (affray).

Creating a stand-alone knife crime offence sends a clear message: anyone that uses a knife to injure another person or during a brawl, will face serious consequences.

The Bill also amends the offence of carjacking in the Crimes Act to provide that the offence will apply if a person steals a vehicle with a child victim under the age of 10 present in that vehicle. Currently, carjacking requires a person to steal a car and use force (or put or seek to put another person in fear of being subjected to force).

Recently, innocent children have been caught up in incidents where a person steals a car where a child is already inside. These alleged offenders may not have even turned their mind as to whether anyone is in the back seat. Such brazen acts of violence are terrifying for children and their parents and carers.

The Bill will ensure that in these circumstances, an accused person does not need to use force or put someone in fear to be prosecuted for carjacking. The fact that they have stolen a car with an innocent child inside is sufficient to constitute carjacking, which accurately reflects the seriousness of the conduct.

The Bill makes it clear that it is irrelevant whether the accused knew or was reckless as to whether the child was in the vehicle at the time. This is similar to the home invasion offence, which provides it is irrelevant whether the accused knew or didn’t know that there was someone in the home.

As with the current carjacking offence, this conduct will attract a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment.

I commend the Bill to the house.

 James NEWBURY (Brighton) (12:15): I move:

That the debate be adjourned.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

 Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning) (12:15): I move:

That debate be adjourned until later this day.

 James NEWBURY (Brighton) (12:15): The coalition will not be opposing the government ramming through this legislation in what has been anticipated –

Members interjecting.

James NEWBURY: I am speaking to the matter – in a rush of legislation in what is anticipated to be a 5 o’clock guillotine on this bill. A 5 o’clock guillotine has been anticipated on this bill, which will mean some 2 hours of debate on this bill – a very, very short debate on this bill. Of course the coalition has been calling for action for years, and now at the eleventh hour, when frankly the Herald Sun has put up some cases that the government has felt uncomfortable about and the Premier has been asked about them in press conferences, the government has come along with a bill and is ramming it through the chamber because it does not want the broader community to see the detail of the bill. They do not want the community to see the weakness of the bill and the loopholes that are in the bill. Only in Victoria can an offender choose not to be dealt with as an adult in an ‘adult crime, adult time’ bill. Can you imagine?

Matt Fregon interjected.

James NEWBURY: Section 157, Deputy Speaker.

Members interjecting.

The SPEAKER: Order! Member for Brighton, through the Chair.

James NEWBURY: Through the Chair, Speaker.

The SPEAKER: The Minister for Education will cease interjecting across the table.

James NEWBURY: Only in Victoria will offenders in certain circumstances be able to opt out of being treated as an adult. They will be able to request to be dealt with as a child – what a system. I mean, I tell you what –

The SPEAKER: Order! I remind members that it is not okay to pre-empt debate and what is in the legislation that we are currently introducing to this house.

James NEWBURY: Of course, Speaker. In broad terms on the procedural debate I am setting out the coalition’s concerns and on the procedural matter the reasoning why the government is trying to ram this legislation through. Of course I am not going to take the full allocation of 30 minutes – as painful as it is for me, as I am sure you can all imagine – because I know that we will be debating this later and many of my colleagues would like to debate this legislation, but it is an important opportunity to put on record how quickly this government is trying to ram through this legislation. It is weak and it is full of loopholes, and that is why this legislation is being pushed through this chamber. It is important to note that. It is important for the house record to record that. The coalition has been calling for serious laws, for serious action and for serious consequences in this state for years. In fact we have drafted legislation and given it to the chamber to try and ask – to try and plead, frankly, with this government to seek action, so I do think it is important to put on record in this procedural debate that we are concerned about the way the government is managing this legislation. We understand what they are doing. We understand why they are trying to hide the fact that this legislation is weak and full of loopholes. We will, as you pointed out, Speaker, be making that debate in substance later today, when the government has indicated to us that this bill will be very, very briefly debated – very, very briefly – and we will talk about that in the government business program debate. But we did want on record our concerns about the way this legislation is being managed and our concerns with it.

 Tim RICHARDSON (Mordialloc) (12:19): This is an extraordinary set of circumstances where those opposite, who claim to be the thought provokers of this, have then the audacity to block debate by members of this Parliament on the very bill that would be substantiated –

Members interjecting.

Tim RICHARDSON: by time commitments that those opposite have complained will be taken away from a piece of legislation coming forward.

What is the point of establishing a procedural motion here, a procedural motion to hold up the substantive nature of the debate? What is the point of this? What is the tactic that has gone into this that suggests that we should chew up the Parliament’s time on whether or not –

James Newbury interjected.

Tim RICHARDSON: Well, those opposite brought on in their tactics the procedural motion. The geniuses on that side cannot find a role for the member for Sandringham or the member for Brighton in a Treasury capacity. The Leader of the Opposition needs to do everything. Clearly, tactics are also under the command of the Leader of the Opposition –

Members interjecting.

The SPEAKER: Member for Nepean, this is your last warning.

Tim RICHARDSON: Because to bring on a procedural motion now only strangles the time to speak on the bill.

Sam Groth interjected.

The SPEAKER: Member for Nepean, you can leave the chamber for half an hour.

Member for Nepean withdrew from chamber.

Brad Rowswell: On a point of order, Speaker, on relevance.

The SPEAKER: I ask the member for Mordialloc to talk to the procedural motion before the house.

Tim RICHARDSON: We have gone 22 minutes into this sitting week of three days, and we have a situation where the coalition has brought a procedural motion that the member for Brighton is suggesting that he is regretting in this circumstance right here today. He is now saying that their time on this legislation will be confined and their time in this place dedicated to this important bit of legislation. They are now narrating – ironically, Speaker, because I know that you have sat here and listened to debate after debate – that it has been rushed through after saying that we were not bringing it forward. Now they are saying it is being rushed through. You could not get a more contradictory, out-of-control strategy. It is literally 22 minutes in –

The SPEAKER: Order! Members will be removed from the chamber if they continue to interject.

Brad Rowswell: On a point of order, Speaker, I renew my earlier point of order.

The SPEAKER: On the point of order, member for Mordialloc.

Tim RICHARDSON: The abuse of tactics of using a procedural motion to constrain the discussion on government business –

Members interjecting.

The SPEAKER: Order! On the procedural motion, member for Mordialloc.

Tim RICHARDSON: We have a situation here where the member for Brighton is putting forward that this is being rushed through after those opposite have claimed time and time again that this needs to be brought on as soon as possible. Here we are today on one of the last sitting weeks when we are bringing forward this important legislation for discussion on behalf of Victorians, and how important this legislation is. The work that has been done to get to this point requires a situational urgency like the Premier has talked about and like the Attorney-General has talked about. That is why the urgency of this motion and the urgency of the work that has been done is on behalf of Victorians. Its time, its passage and its capacity requires that as well – not the ventilations from the member for Brighton that were put forward but listening directly to people that have been impacted to bring this discussion on behalf of Victorians. That is what this important legislation will do, that is what we have been charged with and that is what a compassionate, inclusive leader like the Premier and an amazing Attorney-General do in bringing that forward and having flexibility in the work that has been done – not some of the tactics that we see from those opposite that are all over the place and some of the ventilations from the member for Brighton around intentions here. We are not about the politics here; we are about the outcome. When you see procedural motions put forward, when you see some of those opposite hypothecating, ventilating, sniping and all kinds of different things, you see what it is really about. Some of these actions from those opposite, where tactics are out of control on that side, are looking pretty flat. There are a few out the back there I am really worried about. I will be asking for a cup of tea a bit later on.

Members interjecting.

Brad Rowswell: On a point of order, Speaker, I renew my point of order once removed.

The SPEAKER: Member for Mordialloc, on the point of order.

Tim RICHARDSON: I was going to say it really slowly, with lots of purpose and looking up to the camera. No, I will come back to relevance.

Members interjecting.

 Gabrielle DE VIETRI (Richmond) (12:24): I rise to speak against this motion. This bill is not urgent and the government should go through the normal bill process. What does seem urgent is the Premier’s desperation to be re-elected. Like so many responses to community safety, the major parties’ political judgement seems to get more tunnel-visioned, more narrow-minded and more punitive the closer it gets to an election.

This is what happened in 2018. This is what happened in Queensland, where Labor and the Liberals engaged in a race to the bottom that hurt the most vulnerable and disadvantaged in their community. And we are seeing it again here in Victoria, just a year out from an election that is now pushing this government into a crime and punishment, more prisons, more police perspective, without caring about the impacts that this will have by reducing community safety now and in the long term.

These changes that they are trying to get rushed through – I will not call them reforms because they are shockingly regressive – not only threaten to breach our own charter of human rights and responsibilities but they would also directly conflict with Australia’s binding human rights obligations under international law, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which require that imprisonment be a last resort and that children be treated according to their developmental capacity. Now, barely a year since this Parliament passed the Youth Justice Act 2024 –

Sonya Kilkenny: On a point of order, Speaker, I appreciate that the member for Richmond is on her feet and I was reluctant to interrupt. However, this is a procedural motion, and I do ask that the member comes back to the procedural motion before the house.

The SPEAKER: I remind the member for Richmond that this is a procedural debate and to stick to the procedure of introducing a bill.

Gabrielle DE VIETRI: Thank you, Speaker. The reason why this bill is not urgent and that the government should go through the normal processes is because it has been barely one year since the Parliament passed the Youth Justice Act 2024, which explicitly states that imprisonment be used as a last resort here in Victoria. Now this government is suddenly deciding that it is absolutely urgent to wind back its own reforms? How on earth can you trust this Labor government and Jacinta Allan as Premier with this absolute backflip that they are now saying is absolutely urgent?

In this bill that is being proposed, children aged 14 to 17 found guilty of committing aggravated burglary or aggravated carjacking could be sentenced to life in prison. Should we be rushing that? Should we be rushing through that kind of life-changing law? That is sentencing that is equivalent to murder. This bill will send children who allegedly commit a range of offences to the County Court rather than the Children’s Court, and that will mean that children will not be seen by magistrates who have specialisation in child development.

The SPEAKER: Order! Member for Richmond, this is a procedural debate. I would ask you not to stray into discussion of the bill.

Gabrielle DE VIETRI: Thank you, Speaker. Should we be rushing through a bill that does all of these things? Is it really that urgent that we cut down the time that we have to examine this bill for consultation with the relevant human rights and community legal organisations, with those advocates and experts who know exactly how this bill will impact those who are most vulnerable? Should we be rushing that through? Is that the kind of government that this is?

Real community safety comes from addressing the causes of youth offending, and rushing this bill through will not address them. Poverty, trauma, racism, social isolation, insecure housing, lack of support – real community safety comes from addressing these things, and this government is not rushing that through. Community-led, culturally safe, trauma-informed programs keep children connected to school, family and culture and reduce reoffending. These services work, and yet they remain critically underfunded. The Victorian Labor government is not rushing through any of those things, but they are rushing in more police and more prisons and they are increasing the budgets to those areas. Victoria must invest urgently in early intervention, in diversion, in prevention and not rush through measures that are proven to entrench cycles of harm.

 Sarah CONNOLLY (Laverton) (12:29): I was quick to stand on this one; I would not say rushing to stand on it. What I would say to the member for Richmond in following her contribution is that this is not a matter of rushing through legislation, this is about getting things done. Even though the member for Richmond has only been in this chamber for the last three years – and part time, I must say – she will very soon realise that Labor governments on this side of the house get things done, and that is exactly what we are doing with this bill.

I cannot wait to speak on this bill. My community and people in Melbourne’s west – people in the real world, people that the member for Richmond should spend more time hanging around and talking to and she would have a much better understanding of what people in the real world are saying about this –want to see this bill go through. They are tired of the talking, they are tired of the squabbling and they are tired of the political pointscoring of those opposite. They want us to get on and move this bill, to talk about this bill and get it through this place and become law, and I cannot wait to stand and make a contribution on this bill later today. This is about getting things done. Sometimes, yes, it has to be done quickly, and we are going to be doing it this week. This bill is something our community want to see, and they can rely on this side of the house to have their back and get this done.

 Will FOWLES (Ringwood) (12:30): It has been suggested by members of the government that this is about moving quickly. We have a situation with this bill, with this disgraceful process, that we have gone from press release to in three weeks putting a bill in the chamber, and yet suddenly we have to ram through the bill with 2 or perhaps 3 but probably 2 hours of debate. We got the bill at 3 o’clock yesterday. We were briefed on it at 10 this morning. This is being done with unseemly haste, and the only justification for the outrageous haste is politics. It has got nothing to do with the policy, because if you look at the policy side of this there is almost no justification for what the government is proposing. For 11 years the government has taken a range of actions which stand strictly in contrast to the content of this bill, and there is no justification for it being rammed through in this way. I cannot remember a time in my seven years in this place when a bill has been introduced and bashed through both houses in the same week, perhaps one of the pandemic emergency bills– perhaps. This is not an emergency – make no mistake. We are talking about substantial reforms to the justice system. We are talking about substantial reforms to youth justice and sentencing, and yet there is no evidence base for it. There is not even an opportunity to discuss the evidence base for it or the lack of an evidence base for it, because here we have a government ramming through a bill with almost no debate. It is an absolute disgrace.

I am sure there are members of the government caucus who do not support the bill. I mean, if you believe the press speculation, the Attorney-General herself does not support the content of this legislation, but there will be plenty of members over there who would stick to their principles and say, ‘We don’t agree with the substance of this bill,’ because for the last 11 years they have voted up legislation that stands in strict contrast to the content of this disgraceful piece of legislation.

If it is not bad enough that the legislation is bad, we are now looking at this unseemly haste of jamming through this place with 2 hours of debate a major set of reforms to youth justice in the state of Victoria – a major regressive set of reforms. They are using the most right-wing process that has been used in the life of this government for the most right-wing bill in the life of this government. I am not surprised that coalition members are supporting it going through, because it frankly sits more in their bailiwick to be introducing legislation like this. The paradox is, if Labor were sitting in opposition they would be howling and screaming about this process. They would be howling and screaming about the bill. But because they are on the Treasury benches they are in fact the arbiters of this disgrace. It is an absolute travesty of the processes of this place. It is an absolute betrayal of the working people who put these people into government. It is an absolute betrayal of young people in our state. It is an absolute betrayal of the Westminster traditions of having things properly considered and debated in this place. It is simply not good enough – not good enough for the government to be wedging this through in such an appalling timeframe and not good enough for the government to be turning its back on a whole series of reforms, including reforms led by ministers who are sitting in this chamber today, on youth justice and raising the age. Remember that debate. It was not that long ago where the government was arguing for the polar opposite of the matters contained in this bill. This is a shameful abuse of the parliamentary processes and it is a shameful abuse of those who voted this government in, because this government is now turning its back on 11 years of reforms and unwinding those reforms in a thoroughly disgraceful fashion.

It is absolutely unbelievable that the government is prepared to engage in such base politics in order to secure re-election, or purportedly to secure re-election, and turning its back on the evidence, turning its back on young people, turning its back on Indigenous Victorians, turning its back on a whole range of people who have skin in the game here and turning its back, most importantly, on the evidence.

I disagree with both government and opposition members. This is a bill that should be considered properly. I support the member for Richmond in what she says. This should be considered properly because it is a substantial bill. This is not emergency legislation. It should not be being rammed through the two chambers in this Parliament in the space of a week. This is unseemly haste for an ill-conceived bill that stands in stark contrast to the values that this government purported to be elected on, the values of its membership and the values, I dare say, of a very great number of the government caucus. This bill should not be debated in this way.

Assembly divided on motion: