Thursday, 19 March 2020
Bills
Justice Legislation Amendment (Drug Court and Other Matters) Bill 2020
Bills
Justice Legislation Amendment (Drug Court and Other Matters) Bill 2020
Statement of compatibility
Ms HENNESSY (Altona—Attorney-General, Minister for Workplace Safety) (10:24): In accordance with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, I table a statement of compatibility in relation to the Justice Legislation Amendment (Drug Court and Other Matters) Bill 2020.
Opening paragraphs
In accordance with section 28 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, (the Charter), I make this Statement of Compatibility with respect to the Justice Legislation Amendment (Drug Court and Other Matters) Bill 2020 (Bill).
In my opinion, the Bill, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is compatible with human rights as set out in the Charter. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.
Overview
The Bill amends the County Court Act 1958 (County Court Act) and Sentencing Act 1991 (Sentencing Act) to establish a pilot Drug Court Division in the County Court of Victoria.
The Bill also amends:
• the Charities Act 1978 (Charities Act) to provide the Attorney-General with an express power of delegation, in respect of powers or functions under that Act and its regulations;
• the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (LAA) to allow certain settlement agreements entered into between 1 July 2015 and 1 July 2018 to be set aside;
• the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (VCAT Act) to include a confidentiality provision relating to proceedings under the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (VAD Act); and
• the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (CYFA) to allow for an appointment of an additional, alternate chairperson to the Youth Parole Board, and expand eligibility for chair and alternate chair positions.
Human Rights Issues
Part 2—County Court Drug Court Pilot
The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to Part 2 of the Bill are:
• the right to a fair hearing (section 24)
• the right to recognition and equality before the law (section 8)
• rights in criminal proceedings (section 25)
• the right to freedom of movement (section 12)
• the right to privacy (section 13)
The right to a fair hearing (section 24)
Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to have the charge decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing.
Section 24(1) of the Charter is relevant to Part 2 of the Bill to the extent that it establishes a new, specialised Division in the County Court that will operate alongside the mainstream criminal court. The Bill promotes the right to a fair hearing by providing a specialised court that is targeted to the complex needs of offenders with a drug or alcohol dependency. This cohort of offenders is disadvantaged in the mainstream justice system because they have a higher risk of recidivist and escalating criminal behaviour linked to their dependency, which can result offenders becoming entrenched in the criminal justice system.
The right to recognition and equality before the law (s 8(3))
Section 8(3) of the Charter provides that every person is equal before the law, is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.
The Bill empowers the County Court Drug Court to make a therapeutic Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (DATO) (currently called a Drug Treatment Order) in respect of an offender who is dependent on drugs or alcohol, as an alternative to mainstream sentencing options. Section 8(3) of the Charter is thus relevant to the extent that the Bill may permit offenders to be treated differently based on the presence or absence of a disability (drug or alcohol dependence).
The Bill does not limit section 8(3) of the Charter because:
• individuals will not be compelled to participate in the County Court Drug Court. A DATO can only be made in respect of an offender if the offender agrees in writing to the court making the DATO.
• measures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination do not constitute discrimination under section 8(4). The Bill promotes equality before the law by addressing the disadvantage experienced by this cohort of offenders in the mainstream justice system.
Other rights relevant to Part 2 of the Bill—ss 12, 13 and 25 of the Charter
The following rights are also relevant to the County Court Drug Court model as provided for in Part 2 of the Bill:
• the right to freedom of movement (section 12)—the Drug Court will have power to impose conditions affecting freedom of movement as part of a DATO. For example, a DATO may require an offender to attend the Drug Court or periodically report to specified corrections agencies during the period of the DATO, or restrict the offender from leaving Victoria without permission while subject to a DATO.
• the right to privacy and reputation (section 13)—the Drug Court will have power to impose conditions as part of a DATO that require an offender to provide certain medical or personal information (e.g. undertake drug or alcohol tests) in the course of treatment and supervision.
• the right to a presumption of innocence (section 25(1))—Only offenders who choose to plead guilty are eligible for a DATO. This reflects that a key part of the Drug Court model is that the accused person voluntarily elects to take responsibility for their offending, and commits to carry out a DATO as an alternative mode of sentencing. However, participation in the County Court Drug Court is voluntary. All offenders retain the right to plead not guilty and be tried in the mainstream County Court.
To the extent that any of these rights may be limited by the Bill, I consider that all those limitations are necessary, justified and proportionate to achieve the purposes of DATOs. As set out in section 18X of the Sentencing Act, the purposes of DATOs are to:
• facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by providing a judicially-supervised, therapeutically-oriented, integrated drug or alcohol treatment and supervision regime;
• take account of an offender’s drug or alcohol dependency;
• reduce the level of criminal activity associated with drug or alcohol dependency; and
• reduce the offender’s health risks associated with drug or alcohol dependency.
The eligibility criteria for a DATO, and the Drug Court’s power to set conditions as part of a DATO, are necessary features of the Drug Court model. Without those features, the County Court Drug Court could not effectively fulfil the purposes set out in section 18X of the Sentencing Act. Any limitation on Charter rights imposed by Part 2 of the Bill extend only so far as is necessary and justified to achieve the purposes of the Sentencing Act, and deliver better justice outcomes for a disadvantaged cohort of offenders while also protecting community safety. The County Court Drug Court model is broadly consistent with the model of the existing Magistrates’ Court Drug Court, which has been operating successfully since 2002.
For these reasons, I consider that Part 2 of the Bill is consistent with the Charter.
Part 3—Amendment of Charities Act 1978
The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to Part 3 of the Bill are:
• the right to property (section 20)
• the right to privacy (section 13).
Right to property (s 20)
Section 20 of the Charter provides that a person must not be deprived of their property other than in accordance with law. The right requires that powers which authorise the deprivation of property are conferred by legislation or common law, are confined and structured rather than unclear, are accessible to the public, and are formulated precisely. The right to property may be relevant to the Bill’s amendment to the Charities Act 1978, which will allow the Attorney-General to delegate any of her powers or functions under that Act and the regulations, except for the power of delegation.
The Attorney-General will be able to delegate the power to approve an application for a cy près scheme whereby the terms of a charitable trust can be amended in certain circumstances (such as where its original purposes cannot be fulfilled), to prevent the trust from failing. While trust property may be distributed in a different way from that originally envisaged, I do not consider that this limits the right to property as this will be in accordance with the legislative regime established by the Charities Act 1978.
Right to privacy (s 13)
Section 13 of the Charter provides that a person has the right not to have their privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and not to have their reputation unlawfully attacked. The right to privacy may also be relevant to the Bill’s amendment to the Charities Act 1978.
The Attorney-General will be able to delegate the power to appoint an inspector to inquire into the administration or management of any charity or charitable estate. Any interference with privacy that may result to individuals through an inquiry will be in accordance with law, and not arbitrary. The power to appoint an inspector ensures the Attorney-General can investigate the administration or management of any charity or charitable estate.
Part 4—Amendment of Limitation of Actions Act 1958
The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to Part 4 of the Bill are:
• the right to protection of children (section 17);
• the right to property (section 20);
• the right to privacy (section 13);
• the right to a fair hearing (section 24);
• the right to recognition and equality before the law (section 8(3));
• the right to freedom of religion (section 14);
• the right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 26);
• protection from retrospective criminal laws (section 27).
Protection of children (s 17(2))
Section 17(2) of the Charter provides that every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is in his or her best interests and is needed by him or her by reason of being a child.
The Bill promotes the right of a child to protection by ensuring more victims of institutional child abuse have a basis for seeking to overturn settlements, if it is just and reasonable to do so. The Bill recognises the difficulties child abuse plaintiffs faced due to barriers to seeking compensation in the courts, and that in some cases this led to child abuse survivors accepting inadequate compensation. The Bill acknowledges the harmful effects of abuse on a child’s physical and psychological well-being, and promotes their ‘best interests’ by assisting them to pursue adequate compensation if it is just and reasonable to do so.
The right to property (s 20)
Section 20 of the Charter provides that a person must not be deprived of their property other than in accordance with law. This right requires that powers which authorise the deprivation of property are conferred by legislation or common law, are confined and structured rather than unclear, are accessible to the public and are formulated precisely.
Like all rights conferred under the Charter, section 20 only applies to individuals.
The Bill allows for courts to set aside settlements entered into between 1 July 2015 and 1 July 2018, relating to child abuse, if it is just and reasonable to do so. The right to property only applies to human beings, and not entities such as non-government organisations, corporations or corporate trustees. To the extent that the property of an individual is affected by the Bill, the deprivation would be authorised by an accessible and precisely formulated law and would not be arbitrary.
Before a settlement agreement is set aside, the court must determine that it is just and reasonable to do so. Further, any deprivation of property would only be triggered by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction made in a proceeding. The Bill does not alter the legal principles that a court will apply when, having set aside a settlement, it then determines the claim and any associated liability. As in any other case, a plaintiff who has a settled cause of action set aside and pursues a new civil claim will still have to prove that the defendant is liable for the abuse. The Bill will simply deal with barriers which led to survivors accepting inadequate settlements and releasing the institution from future liability. For these reasons, the Bill does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property.
The right to privacy (s 13)
Section 13 of the Charter provides that a person has the right not to have their privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and not to have their reputation unlawfully attacked.
Nothing in Part 4 will limit the right to privacy and reputation. There is no mechanism to compel disclosure of personal information for the purpose of the proceedings. The Bill will not enable unlawful attacks on a person’s reputation. Where a court finds it is just and reasonable to set aside a settled cause of action, any subsequent allegations of child abuse made against a person in the context of proceedings will still need to satisfy the ordinary legal requirements of any claim founded on or arising from child abuse.
The right to a fair hearing (s 24)
Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that a party to a civil proceeding has the right to have the proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing.
The Bill is consistent with the right to a fair hearing. Firstly, proper safeguards have been put in place to ensure that a past settlement can only be set aside where a court finds that it is reasonable and just to do so. Secondly, the Bill does not place any obstacles in the way of a defendant having the right to be heard and to respond to any allegations made in a proceeding. This will include the defendant’s right to seek a summary dismissal or permanent stay of proceedings where the lapse of time has a burdensome effect on the defendant that is so serious that a fair trial is not possible.
The right to recognition and equality before the law (s 8(3)) and freedom of religion (s 14)
Section 8(3) of the Charter provides that every person is equal before the law, is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination. Section 14 of the Charter provides that every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief.
The Bill is consistent with the rights in both section 8(3) and section 14. Nothing in the Bill could be characterised as distinguishing between people or groups based on an attribute set out in section 6 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995, including religious belief or activity. The problem faced by child abuse plaintiffs in bringing proceedings identified by the Royal Commission and Betrayal of Trust was the result of a complex and confusing array of legal barriers to child abuse claims, which discouraged victims from bringing their claims in court, and reduced their bargaining position in settlement negotiations. The Bill rectifies this injustice, without targeting any particular organisation. The Bill therefore does not discriminate—instead it focuses on ensuring that child abuse victims are able to pursue appropriate compensation. Furthermore, there is no clause in the Bill which would interfere with or restrain the right of people to have or adopt a religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching.
The right not to be tried or punished more than once (s 26) and protection from retrospective criminal laws (s 27)
Section 26 of the Charter provides that a person must not be tried or punished more than once for an offence in respect of which they have already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law. Section 27 of the Charter provides that a person must not be found guilty of a criminal offence because of conduct that was not a criminal offence when it was engaged in.
The Bill is consistent with the rights in both section 26 and 27. Like all rights conferred under the Charter, sections 26 and 27 only apply to individuals, and not entities such as non-government organisations, corporations or corporate trustees. Additionally, sections 26 and 27 do not extend to civil trials that result in civil liability, including negligence or breach of duty of care in the failing of an institution to protect a child from abuse. The Bill allows for courts to set aside certain settlements relating to child abuse, if it is just and reasonable to do so. Any subsequent allegations of child abuse made against a person in the context of proceedings will still need to satisfy the ordinary legal requirements of any claim founded on or arising from child abuse. The Bill will apply to historical settlements, insofar as they were entered into between 1 July 2015 and 1 July 2018. These reforms under the Bill do not form part of the penalty or punishments of an offender, or to changes in procedural law, for example, shifts in trial practice or changes to the rules of evidence.
Part 5—Amendment of Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998
The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to Part 5 of the Bill are:
• the right to privacy (section 13);
• the right to a fair hearing (section 24).
The right to privacy (s 13)
Section 13 of the Charter provides that a person has the right not to have their privacy unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with and not to have their reputation unfairly attacked. The VAD Act allows the VCAT to review a decision of an assessing medical practitioner that a person does, or does not, have decision-making capacity for the purposes of accessing voluntary assisted dying. The VCAT Act does not currently provide for the confidentiality of those proceedings.
Proceedings under the VAD Act are by their nature highly sensitive and personal, and parties to these proceedings should be able to expect their privacy to be protected at all stages of the legal process. The Bill promotes the right to privacy, by ensuring that no publication or broadcast of VCAT proceedings about VAD Act matters may occur, where such publication or broadcast could lead to the identification of a party—unless VCAT is satisfied that it is in the public interest, and so orders.
The right to a fair hearing (s 24)
Section 24 of the Charter guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing. Judgments and hearings must be open to the public unless other laws provide otherwise, which gives effect to the principle of open justice. Sections 24(2) and (3) allow for specific limitations, including where another law permits the court or tribunal to order that the proceeding be closed or otherwise restricts public access to a hearing or judgment.
The Bill engages section 24, by regulating the way in which the media may report on VAD Act proceedings in VCAT. However, this is justified, given the highly confidential nature of VAD Act proceedings, and the potential for an applicant’s privacy to be infringed by the publication of identifying material. Further, the Open Courts Act 2013 already allows VCAT to make suppression orders in certain circumstances, including where the order is necessary to avoid the publication of confidential information. The Bill’s confidentiality provision will remove the need for VCAT to make suppression orders in relation to VAD Act proceedings.
Part 6—Amendment of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (CYFA)
The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to Part 6 of the Bill are:
• taking part in public life (s 18)
Taking part in public life (s 18)
Section 18 of the Charter provides that every person in Victoria has the right, and is to have the opportunity, without discrimination, to participate in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives. This right is relevant to Part 6 of the Bill which amends the CYFA to allow for an appointment of an additional, alternate chairperson to the Youth Parole Board, and expand eligibility for chair and alternate chair positions to current and former County Court judges and Magistrates and Australian lawyers of at least 10 years’ standing. I do not consider that these amendments limit this right, given that they expand the class of persons eligible for appointment.
The Hon Jill Hennessy MP
Attorney-General
Minister for Workplace Safety
Second reading
Ms HENNESSY (Altona—Attorney-General, Minister for Workplace Safety) (10:25): I move:
That this bill be now read a second time.
I ask that my second-reading speech be incorporated into Hansard.
Incorporated speech as follows:
The Justice Legislation Amendment (Drug Court and Other Matters) Bill 2020 will establish a pilot Drug Court in the County Court of Victoria. This significant initiative will build on the success of the Magistrates’ Court Drug Court by expanding the availability of specialised drug courts to a wider cohort of offenders. Drug Courts facilitate a therapeutic approach to sentencing of offenders with complex needs associated with drug and alcohol dependency. The Drug Court model is designed to ensure that this cohort are subject to the structured conditions, and receive the treatment that they need, to assist them to break the destructive cycle of addiction and recidivism. This approach has demonstrated success in reducing recidivism and promoting community safety.
The Bill will also:
• amend the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 to protect the confidentiality of applicants under the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017;
• amend the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 to allow people who entered into settlement agreements between 1 July 2015 and 1 July 2018, when the Ellis defence was effectively abolished, to apply to the court to have the agreements set aside;
• amend the Charities Act 1978 to allow the Attorney-General to delegate any of her powers or functions under that Act and the regulations; and
• amend the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (CYFA) to allow for an appointment of an additional, alternate chairperson, and expand eligibility for chair and alternate chair positions.
County Court Drug Court Pilot
The Bill will establish a pilot Drug Court in the County Court of Victoria.
Drug courts are specialised courts that provide a therapeutic approach to addressing the complex needs of offenders with drug and alcohol dependency. Traditional sentencing options can fail to adequately address the needs of drug offenders. By contrast, the Drug Court model seeks to address underlying causes of offending by providing intensive drug treatment services to offenders. Addressing these underlying causes will ultimately enhance the wellbeing and community connectedness of participants by improving their relationships, housing stability and life skills, and reducing reoffending.
The government is deeply committed to improving justice outcomes for vulnerable groups and exploring new ways to better address the complex needs of offenders, while also promoting community safety.
In Victoria, the Magistrates’ Court Drug Court has operated successfully since 2002. Evaluations in 2005 and 2014 demonstrated the superior effectiveness of the Drug Court approach compared with conventional sanctions such as imprisonment. In particular, the evaluations showed significant reductions in reoffending and a reduction in the seriousness of offences committed by reoffenders. Similarly, data from other jurisdictions demonstrates that drug courts reduce recidivism and the probability of re-arrest, have better retention rates than other types of treatment offered and increase the likelihood of employment post-program.
Given the success of the Magistrates’ Court Drug Court, it is timely to expand the Drug Court scheme to the County Court. The County Court Drug Court pilot will capture a wider group of offenders who stand to benefit from the therapeutic model and deliver benefits to the community in terms of reduced recidivism and stronger community engagement. In particular, it will address the needs of entrenched, high-level drug users who are at increased risk of engaging in recidivist and escalating criminal behaviour linked to their addiction and are therefore more likely to receive custodial sentences. The Bill will ensure that more offenders can access effective intervention and expand the individual and societal benefits of the therapeutic court model.
Overview of the County Court Drug Court
The Bill will amend the County Court Act 1958 and the Sentencing Act 1991 to establish a Drug Court Division within the County Court of Victoria. The pilot Drug Court Division will run for three years and will be independently evaluated after two years.
The new Division will utilise existing Magistrates’ Court infrastructure including judicial chambers, interview rooms and urine testing facilities. Drug Court teams will consist of a range of specialists including a case manager, defence lawyer, police prosecutor and clinician, and specialist community corrections officers.
While the County Court Drug Court will broadly align with the Magistrates’ Court model, the operational framework will differ in some ways due to differences between jurisdictions, and differences in the cohort of offenders who will participate in each Court.
The key difference between the two Courts is that the Magistrates’ Court program is only open to offenders who plead guilty to an offence with a sentence of up to two years, whereas the County Court program will be open to offenders who are liable for a maximum sentence of up to four years. This is necessary to reflect the different nature of the offending heard in the County Court, and the maximum penalties for those offences.
As in the Magistrates’ Court model, offenders wishing to participate in the County Court Drug Court program will need to satisfy certain eligibility criteria. For example, they will need to reside within the gazetted catchment area (to provide a safeguard against resources being overstretched and care compromised if uptake should be greater than expected) and plead guilty to the offence. In addition, the offender will need to satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that they are dependent on drugs and/or alcohol and that dependency contributed to the commission of the offence.
Consistent with the approach in the Magistrates’ Court, offenders convicted of sexual offences and offences involving the infliction of actual bodily harm will not be eligible to participate in the County Court Drug Court program. Offenders convicted of aggravated home invasion and aggravated carjacking will also be excluded from the program.
How Drug and Alcohol Treatment Orders in the pilot program will operate
In the County Court Drug Court, eligible offenders will be able to consent to be sentenced to a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (DATO) (currently called a Drug Treatment Order) of up to four years, as an alternative to conventional sentencing options.
DATOs consist of two parts. Firstly, there is a treatment and supervision part, which aims to address the offender’s drug or alcohol dependency via treatment in the community. Consistent with the Magistrates’ Court model, the treatment and supervision part will operate for two years, reflecting the amount of time required to effectively treat problems stemming from drug or alcohol addiction.
The second part of the DATO is the custodial part. The custodial part will be a term of imprisonment of up to four years which is “inactive” while the offender undergoes treatment in the community. The custodial part can be activated if the offender fails to comply with the conditions of the DATO. That is, if an offender reoffends or otherwise does not comply with the conditions of the DATO, they can be sent to prison to serve their custodial sentence.
Offenders will be required to comply with a range of “core” and “program” conditions as part of the DATO. These conditions will require the offender to engage intensively in treatment and rehabilitation. “Core” conditions are baseline conditions (such as requirements to report regularly to a corrections centre or undergo specified treatment) which continue for the full duration of the DATO. By contrast, “program” conditions only operate during the two-year treatment and supervision part of the order. Program conditions may include submitting to drug and alcohol testing and attending vocational or educational programs.
If an offender successfully completes the two-year treatment and supervision part of the order, the program conditions will cease. The offender will be allowed to remain in the community, subject to the core conditions, until the inactive custodial part ends. During this time the offender will still be considered to be under sentence, and this will be taken into account in the event of subsequent reoffending.
Conclusion
Expanding the drug courts in Victoria will provide eligible offenders with an opportunity to address underlying causes of their offending and an opportunity to change their future. Not only could an offender’s participation in the program break the cycle of addiction and recidivism, thereby enhancing community safety, but it could improve their relationships, life skills and their ability to find stable employment and housing.
This reform also supports broader reforms to address mental health needs and is expected to reduce pressure on our prisons, both in terms of prison bed demand and specialist prison-based rehabilitation services. Given the success of the Magistrates’ Court Drug Court, the government is confident that the County Court Drug Court will have a positive impact on the lives of offenders, their families and the broader community.
I thank the Chief Judge, and his Court, for their ongoing engagement and assistance with these reforms. I would also like to thank the Magistrate’s Court for their work in demonstrating the success and benefits of the drug court model.
Amendment to Schedule 1 of the VCAT Act
The Bill makes an important amendment to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (VCAT Act) to protect the privacy of parties to Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (VAD Act) proceedings. An applicant under the VAD Act may apply to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) for a review of certain decisions. Despite the highly personal and sensitive nature of such proceedings, the VCAT Act does not currently provide for the confidentiality of those proceedings. Schedule 1 of the Act does, however, contain confidentiality clauses in relation to other highly sensitive proceedings, including those under the Medical Treatment Planning and Decisions Act 2016, Powers of Attorney Act 2014, and the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
The Bill will ensure that no publication or broadcast of VCAT proceedings relating to VAD Act matters may occur, where such publication or broadcast could lead to the identification of a party, unless VCAT is satisfied that it is in the public interest. The new clause mirrors other Schedule 1 confidentiality clauses, and brings the treatment of VAD Act proceedings into alignment with other proceedings of a similarly sensitive nature.
Amendment to Limitations of Actions Act 1958
On 18 September 2019, the Children Legislation Amendment Act 2019 became law. That Act contained landmark Victorian Government reforms enabling survivors of institutional child abuse to apply to the courts to overturn unfair historical compensation agreements entered into before 1 July 2015. Since this time, the Government has listened to victim survivors, who raised concerns that these reforms did not apply to those who entered into agreements due to the existence of the Ellis Defence, which was abolished on 1 July 2018.
The reforms in this Bill will give those survivors the same access to justice. These reforms ensure that survivors of institutional child abuse are not left worse off as a result of their participation in internal redress schemes established by the Catholic Church and other institutions. This is not limited to sexual abuse, but includes other forms of child abuse where a deed of release has been signed.
Amendment to the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005
The Bill will amend the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 to alleviate workload pressure on the Youth Parole Board by allowing for an appointment of an additional, alternate chair person, and expanding eligibility for chair and alternate chair positions to include current and former County Court judges, magistrates and Australian lawyers of at least 10 years’ standing. This will better support the Board undertake its vital function in relation to managing the youth parole system.
Amendment to the Charities Act 1978
Finally, the Bill will amend the Charities Act 1978 to allow the Attorney-General to delegate any of her powers or functions under that Act and the regulations, except the power of delegation. This will enable the efficient exercise of these powers.
I commend the Bill to the house.
Mr SOUTHWICK (Caulfield) (10:25): I move:
That the debate be now adjourned.
Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.
Ordered that debate be adjourned for two weeks. Debate adjourned until Thursday, 2 April.