Tuesday, 9 September 2025

Bills

Statewide Treaty Bill 2025

Introduction and first reading

Jacinta ALLAN (Bendigo East – Premier) (15:09): I move:

That I introduce a bill for an act to establish a First Peoples’ representative and deliberative body named Gellung Warl, to amend the Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 and the Treaty Authority and Other Treaty Elements Act 2022, to consequentially amend other acts and for other purposes.

Motion agreed to.

Read first time.

Jacinta ALLAN: Under standing order 61(3)(b) I advise the house that representatives of the other parties and independents have been provided with a copy of the bill and a briefing in accordance with the standing order. I therefore move:

That this bill be read a second time immediately.

Motion agreed to.

Statement of compatibility

Jacinta ALLAN (Bendigo East – Premier) (15:12): In accordance with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, I table a statement of compatibility in relation to the Statewide Treaty Bill 2025:

In accordance with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Charter), I make this statement of compatibility with respect to the Statewide Treaty Bill 2025 (the Bill).

In my opinion, the Bill, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is compatible with the human rights protected by the Charter. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview of the Bill

The objects of the Bill are:

• to give effect to the first Statewide Treaty; and

• to provide foundations for ongoing Statewide Treaty-making between Gellung Warl and the State, including to negotiate further functions and powers of Gellung Warl over time; and

• to advance the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples; and

• to address the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation and ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

The Bill establishes Gellung Warl in the form of a statutory corporation comprising of three arms, being: 

• The First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria (Assembly), which is intended to be a self-determined, democratically elected, enduring institution for the political representation of First Peoples;

• Nginma Ngainga Wara, which has the purposes of evaluating and monitoring the actions and performance of State government towards achieving State government outcomes directed to First Peoples, implementing recommendations of the Yoorrook Justice Commission, and recommending practical and feasible measures to improve outcomes for First Peoples; and

• Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna, which has the purposes of facilitating truth-telling about historical events, including any continuing impacts, and ongoing healing and reconciliation, collecting information on the impact of colonisation on First Peoples and Victoria’s history, and maintaining an archive of truth-telling information.

The Gellung Warl is an evolution of the current First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria Ltd (FPAV), which has been a powerful and influential voice for First Peoples in Victoria. The design and structure of the FPAV was driven by First Peoples, via consultations conducted by an Aboriginal Treaty Working Group and the Treaty Advancement Commissioner in 2016–2018. That work led to Australia’s first Treaty legislation – the Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 – enshrining the State’s commitment to pursuing Treaty and the establishment of an independent and democratically elected representative body for First People, the FPAV. The FPAV conducted elections in 2019 and 2023 and has been the representative body for First Peoples in Victoria in the conduct of the Statewide Treaty negotiations which commenced in November 2024.

The Bill makes amendments to the Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018, the Treaty Authority and Other Treaty Elements Act 2022 and to other Acts. These amendments give effect to matters negotiated during the Statewide Treaty negotiation process, including the conferral of statutory appointment powers upon the Assembly under the Heritage Act 2017 and the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006. The amendments also provide for the application of governance and integrity legislation to Gellung Warl, including the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Act 2011, Financial Management Act 1994, and Freedom of Information Act 1982, and confer additional functions on the Treaty Authority that arise from Statewide Treaty.

Human rights issues

The following rights are relevant to the Bill:

• Right to equality (section 8)

• Right to privacy and reputation (section 13)

• Freedom of expression (section 15)

• Taking part in public life (section 18)

• Cultural rights (section 19)

• Property rights (section 20)

• Fair hearing (section 24)

• Protection against double punishment (section 26)

Right to equality

Section 8(2) of the Charter provides that every person has the right to enjoy their human rights without discrimination. Section 8(3) of the Charter relevantly provides that every person is entitled to equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination. The purpose of this component of the right to equality is to ensure that all laws and policies are applied equally, and do not have a discriminatory effect.

‘Discrimination’ under the Charter is defined by reference to the definition in the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (EO Act) on the basis of an attribute in section 6 of that Act. Direct discrimination occurs where a person treats, or proposes to treat, a person with an attribute unfavourably because of that attribute. Indirect discrimination occurs where a person imposes a requirement, condition or practice that has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with a protected attribute, but only where that requirement, condition or practice is not reasonable.

Section 8(4) of the Charter provides that measures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination do not constitute discrimination. Section 8 as a whole is concerned with substantive rather than merely formal equality. This means that any measure taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing a group disadvantaged because of discrimination, such as First Peoples, will not constitute discrimination where it satisfies the test for establishing a special measure. This includes demonstrating that the disadvantage to be targeted by the measure is caused by discrimination, that the measure is reasonably3 likely to advance or benefit the disadvantaged group, and that it addresses a need and goes no further than is necessary to address that need.

Right to privacy and reputation

Section 13(a) of the Charter provides that a person has the right not to have their privacy unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with. An interference will be lawful if it is permitted by a law which is precise and appropriately circumscribed, and will be arbitrary only if it is capricious, unpredictable, unjust or unreasonable, in the sense of being disproportionate to the legitimate aim sought.

Section 13(b) of the Charter relevantly provides that a person has the right not to have their reputation unlawfully attacked. An ‘attack’ on reputation will be lawful if it is permitted by a precise and appropriately circumscribed law.

Right to freedom of expression

Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that every person has the right to hold an opinion without interference. The right is concerned with a person’s internal autonomy, and embraces not only the right to hold an opinion, but also the right not to hold any particular opinion.

Section 15(2) of the Charter provides that every person has the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, or not to express an opinion or impart information. However, section 15(3) provides that special duties and responsibilities attach to this right, which may be subject to lawful restrictions reasonably necessary to respect the rights and reputations of others, or for the protection of national security, public order, public health or public morality.

Right to take part in public life

Section 18(1) of the Charter provides that every person in Victoria has the right, and is to have the opportunity, without discrimination, to participate in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Section 18(2) further provides that every eligible person has the right, and is to have the opportunity, without discrimination, to vote and be elected at periodic State and municipal elections that guarantee the free expression of the will of the electors, and to have access, on general terms of equality, to the Victorian public service and public office.

Cultural rights

Section 19(1) of the Charter provides that all persons with a particular cultural, religious, racial or linguistic background must not be denied the right, in community with other persons of that background, to enjoy their culture, declare and practise their religion, and use their language. Section 19(2) of the Charter further provides specific protection for Aboriginal persons, providing that they must not be denied the right, with other members of their community, to enjoy their identity and culture, maintain and use their language, maintain kinship ties, and maintain their distinct spiritual, material and economic relationship with the land and waters and other resources with which they have a connection under traditional laws and customs.

The rights in section 19 are intended to protect and promote the cultural, religious, racial and linguistic diversity of Victorian society. The rights are concerned not only with the preservation of the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of particular cultural groups, but also with their continued development.

Section 19(2) is based on article 27 of the ICCPR and authoritative guidance of the United Nations Human Rights Committee extending the understanding of article 27 as protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples. Section 19(2)(d) is also modelled on article 25 of the United Nations Draft Declarations on Indigenous Rights, which later became article 25 of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Rights.

Right to property

Section 20 of the Charter provides that a person must not be deprived of their property other than in accordance with law. This right requires that powers which authorise the deprivation of property are conferred by legislation or common law, are confined and structured rather than unclear, are accessible to the public, and are formulated precisely.

Right to a fair hearing

Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding has the right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. The concept of a ‘civil proceeding’ is not limited to judicial decision makers, but may encompass the decision-making procedures of many types of tribunals, boards and other administrative decision-makers with the power to determine private rights and interests. The right may be limited if a person faces a procedural barrier to bringing their case before a court, or where procedural fairness is not provided. However, the entire decision-making process, including reviews and appeals, must be examined in order to determine whether the right is limited.

Right not to be tried or punished more than once

Section 26 of the Charter provides that a person must not be tried or punished more than once for an offence in respect of which they have already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with law. This right reflects the principle of double jeopardy. However the principle only applies in respect of criminal offences – it will not prevent civil proceedings being brought in respect of a person’s conduct which has previously been the subject of criminal proceedings, or vice versa.

Penalties and sanctions imposed by professional disciplinary bodies do not usually constitute a form of ‘punishment’ for the purposes of this right as they are not considered to be punitive.

The establishment and powers of the arms of Gellung Warl: the Assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara and Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna

Establishment and powers of the Assembly

Part 3 of the Bill establishes the Assembly within Gellung Warl. Clause 16 provides that the Assembly is to be a self-determining and deliberative elected institution for the political representation of First Peoples which remains answerable to First Peoples through its democratic nature and its cultural obligations and responsibilities. Clause 18 sets out the functions of the Assembly, which include representing and making decisions in relation to First Peoples in Victoria, to advocate for their interests, to represent First Peoples in Statewide Treaty negotiations, and to make representations to Parliament, State government, public authorities and State funded service providers in relation to matters that affect First Peoples, as well as engage in capacity building activities in First Peoples’ communities.

Clauses 31–32 of Part 4 of the Bill give the Assembly the power to make substantive rules relating to how First Peoples organisations in Victoria provide certificates evidencing that a person is accepted as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person. Clause 33 gives the Assembly the power to make internal rules, including its electoral rules.

Part 7 provides for an annual address by the Assembly to a joint sitting of the Legislative Counsel and Legislative Assembly (clause 64) and allows the Assembly to request certain information (clause 69) and give reports to Parliament, with accompanying requirements that relevant Ministers must respond to such reports (clause 74). Clause 66 requires the preparation of a Statement of Treaty compatibility for each Bill introduced into Parliament, which outlines any consultation with and representations made by the Assembly on the Bill and whether the Bill is compatible with the rights and self-determination of First Peoples and addressing the disadvantage experienced by First Peoples.

Part 8 establishes processes to facilitate the making of representations and provision of advice from the Assembly to State government and State-funded service providers. This Part establishes representation meetings between the Assembly and the Cabinet (Division 2), requires hearings and briefings to be held where the Assembly can be informed about and can ask Ministers, Secretaries and the Chief Commissioner of Police questions about the work of their Departments or Victoria Police as relating to First Peoples (Division 3 and Division 5) and allows the Assembly to make submissions to and ask questions of Ministers, authorities and State-funded service providers (Division 4 and Division 7). Division 6 also imposes a requirement on each Secretary and the Chief Commissioner of Police to develop guidelines in consultation with the Assembly.

Establishment and powers of Nginma Ngainga Wara and Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna

Part 9 establishes Nginma Ngainga Wara and provides that its functions are to evaluate and monitor the performance of State government in achieving outcomes directed to First Peoples and implementing the recommendations of the Yoorrook Justice Commission, to conduct research and inquiries and to make recommendations to the Assembly to improve outcomes for First Peoples (clause 94). Clause 99 provides that Nginma Ngainga Wara is independent from the Assembly. The powers of Nginma Ngainga Wara include the power to conduct inquiries (Part 9, Division 4).

Part 10 establishes Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna. Clause 121 sets out that its functions are to promote and facilitate ongoing truth-telling, healing and reconciliation, to provide education, conduct research and collect and maintain a historical archive of truth-telling information. Clause 124 provides that Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna is independent from the Assembly.

Electorate and membership of the Assembly; the capacity to make complaints

Transitional arrangements for first election and initial constitution of the Assembly

Parts 18 and 19 of the Bill make arrangements for transitional elections and the initial constitution of the Assembly. Under those provisions:

• A transitional election will be conducted in accordance with adapted election rules of the FPAV on the basis of the FPAV electoral roll (clauses 192, 194, and 195).

• Under the FPAV election rules a person is only eligible to be registered on the roll if, amongst other things, they are a Victorian Traditional Owner or an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander who lives in Victoria (rule 12). A person is only eligible to stand as a candidate if, amongst other things, they are an eligible elector and they are a Victorian Traditional Owner (rule 28);

• On 1 May 2026, the Assembly will be constituted by members elected in the transitional election and the ‘transitional reserved members’ (clause 203). Transitional reserved members are those people who hold office as a reserved member of the FPAV immediately before 1 May 2026 (clause 201). Under the FPAV Constitution, reserved members of the FPAV are appointed by Traditional Owner Groups in accordance with FPAV Appointment Rules which provide, amongst other things, that only a Victorian Traditional Owner may be a reserved member (rule 8).

Future electorate and membership of Assembly

Clause 17 of the Bill provides for the ongoing establishment of the Assembly and provides that it consists of general members and reserved members. General members are elected in accordance with electoral rules, while reserved members are appointed by a Traditional Owner group in accordance with procedures developed by that Traditional Owner group in accordance with the electoral rules.

Part 6 of the Bill relates to election and appointment of members to the Assembly.

• The Electoral Officer must establish and maintain the electoral role and conduct an election in accordance with the electoral rules (clauses 55 and 56);

• The electoral rules must include, as a minimum, eligibility requirements which include that a person is either a Traditional Owner or is an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person who meets specified residency requirements (Schedule 2, item 5.1);

• Each Traditional Owner group is also entitled to appoint a reserved member in accordance with their procedures and the electoral rules (clause 62).

Clause 21(1) of the Bill provides that a person is qualified to be a member of the Assembly if they meet the requirements set out in the internal rules. Internal rules must include qualifications including, amongst other things, that a person is on the electoral roll and is a Traditional Owner (Schedule 1, item 3.1). Clause 21(2) sets out disqualifications to be a member of the Assembly. Disqualifications are considered further below.

Complaints regarding internal rules and elections

Clause 44(1) of the Bill provides that First Peoples or First Peoples organisations may dispute the validity of an internal rule or a substantive rule made by the Assembly, under section 103 of the Supreme Court Act 1986.

Part 15 of the Bill concerns the ability of First Peoples to make complaints about Gellung Warl’s fulfilment of its obligations. Clause 166 provides that a complaint may be made about any matter specified in the internal rules, save for electoral complaints. Subsection 166(3) provides that a complaint may be made by any First Peoples individual or any First Peoples organisation that has an interest in the subject matter of the complaint.

Division 3 of Part 15 of the Bill then relates to electoral complaints, with clause 172 providing that an electoral complaint may be made, in the case of a complaint about enrolment or eligibility for enrolment – the person affected by the decision of the Electoral Officer, and in any other case, an eligible elector, which would be a Traditional Owner.

Creation of measures specifically for First Peoples

In the context outlined above, the Bill establishes the following measures only for First Peoples (including Traditional Owners):

• eligibility to be registered on the Gellung Warl electoral roll and be eligible to vote;

• eligibility to stand for election or appointment as a member of the Assembly;

• the ability to dispute the validity of an internal rule or substantive rule;

• the ability to dispute the validity of an election; and

• the ability to make a complaint about Gellung Warl’s fulfilment of its obligations.

These measures, exercised and enjoyed by individual First Peoples, enable the measures exercised collectively through the Gellung Warl and its arms to be realised and held to account. Those measures are outlined in detail above.

Right to equality (section 8) and right to take part in public life (section 18(1) and (2)(b))

The differential treatment between First Peoples (particularly Traditional Owners) and Victorians who are not First Peoples engages the right to equality and the right to take part in public life under sections 8 and 18 of the Charter respectively. Section 8(3) provides that every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal and effective protection from discrimination. Section 18(1) of the Charter protects the right of every person in Victoria to participate without discrimination in the conduct of public affairs and section 18(2)(b) of the Charter provides that eligible Victorians have the right to have access without discrimination to public office, on general terms of equality.

I consider that the functions and powers conferred on Gellung Warl and the Assembly by the Bill bring it within the realm of ‘public affairs’ for the purposes of section 18(1) of the Charter. The Bill confers members of the Assembly with functions, powers and duties to be exercised for public purposes. While ‘public office’ is not defined in the Charter, I have assumed out of an abundance of caution and in order to undertake the broadest possible assessment of Charter compatibility that members of the Assembly may hold public office for the purposes of section 18(2)(b) of the Charter.

Both the rights to equality and to take part in public life hinge on whether the relevant differential treatment constitutes discrimination as it is defined in the EO Act, being unfavourable treatment on the basis of a protected attribute (direct discrimination), or the imposition of a requirement, condition or practice that has the effect of disadvantaging persons with a protected attribute (indirect discrimination).

In conferring specific eligibility and entitlements on First Peoples, and in enabling the exercise of collective measures through the Gellung Warl, and in particular the Assembly, the Bill might be considered to limit the rights of Victorians who are not First Peoples. Nevertheless, because the Bill creates new measures, and because the substantive rule-making powers only extend to First Peoples and First Peoples organisations, any limits on rights may be minimal.

I am of the view, however, that any limits on rights resulting from these provisions would not amount to discrimination as they constitute a special measure under section 8(4) of the Charter. This is because their purpose is to support the advancement of First Peoples in order to promote or realise their substantive equality in the enjoyment of all their human rights, by addressing the disadvantage inflicted on them by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation. They constitute a proportionate and justified measure in the context of the gap between outcomes for First Peoples and other Victorians, including in life expectancy, education, and health that has been caused to by the impacts of colonisation in the past, and which continue today.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that the creation of these measures specifically for First Peoples is not discriminatory and therefore does not limit the right to equality or the right to take part in public life under the Charter.

Reasonable limit under section 7(2) of the Charter

However, if it were accepted that the Bill does in fact limit the rights to equality and participation in the public life of Victorians who are not First Peoples, I consider that these limits would be reasonably justified under section 7(2) of the Charter.

The Bill establishes new means of participation in public life, and does not impose any limits on other existing means of participation in the conduct of public affairs. It does not limit the existing right or opportunity of any person to participate in other aspects of public life.

The purpose of Gellung Warl, including the Assembly, and their role in the Treaty process, is to achieve substantive equality of First Peoples, and it is a significant step in re-framing the relationship between First Peoples and the State. The aim of the Treaty process is to improve outcomes for First Peoples and address the disadvantage created by colonisation, while giving effect to the inherent right of First Peoples to self-determination (and providing a mechanism whereby First Peoples can elect their representatives by way of a process chosen and carried out by First Peoples, which is a key way in which the Bill seeks to promote rights). Any limitation on rights is therefore itself protective of rights, because it advances the rights of First Peoples to equality, participation in public life, and cultural rights and the unique right to self-determination of First Peoples under international law, including under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The purpose of the measures which could lead to any limitation is also intended to benefit the rights of every person in Victoria, through reconciliation and better policy design and outcomes. The establishment of Gellung Warl also recognises the unique status of First Peoples.

The establishment of a self-determinative body for First Peoples that represents Traditional Owners and other First Peoples promotes First Peoples’ rights and substantive equality. In my view there is no less restrictive alternative available, as allowing Victorians who are not First Peoples to vote in the election for or to become members of the Assembly, or to hold Gellung Warl to account, would undermine its very purpose and function, which is to be a self-determinative, generative body that reflects Aboriginal Lore, Law and Cultural Authority and the responsibilities of Traditional Owners to Country and to all peoples who are on Country.

In my view, any limits on the rights to equality and to take part in public life of Victorians who are not First Peoples are reasonable and justified under section 7(2) of the Charter.

Differential treatment between Traditional Owners and other Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples

Further, in the context above, only Traditional Owners, and not other First Peoples who are not Traditional Owners, are eligible to be appointed or elected as reserved or general members of the Assembly.

Right to equality (section 8), right to take part in public life (section 18(1) and (2)(b)), and cultural rights (section 19)

To the extent that the Bill provides for the unique role of Traditional Owners, and restricts membership of or election to the Assembly to Traditional Owners, I have assumed that the equality rights, the right to take part in public life and cultural rights of First Nations people who are not Traditional Owners may also be engaged in order to undertake the broadest possible assessment of Charter compatibility. As discussed above, the limitation of these first two rights turns on discriminatory treatment. The exclusion of First Nations people who are not Traditional Owners from membership of the Assembly may constitute direct discrimination, being unfavourable treatment on the basis of race, where race includes ‘descent or ancestry’. In this context, the restriction on membership of the Assembly is unlikely to constitute a special measure, given its purpose is not to promote or advance equality for Traditional Owners as distinct from other First Peoples. Accordingly, if this restriction did constitute direct discrimination, the equality rights and right to take part in public life of First Peoples who are not Traditional Owners may be limited.

In relation to cultural rights, section 19(2) of the Charter provides that Aboriginal persons must not be denied the right to, amongst other things, maintain their distinctive spiritual, material and economic relationship with the lands and waters and other resources with which they have a connection under traditional laws and customs. Given it is intended that Gellung Warl will be both an expression of Aboriginal culture and a political mechanism that will allow for the exercise and enjoyment of cultural rights, access to Gellung Warl and participation in its work, particularly the Assembly, is relevant to cultural rights under the Charter.

For cultural rights to be limited, a First Nations person must be denied the enjoyment of these rights, which international jurisprudence has found must amount to a ‘substantial restriction on enjoyment of culture’. Given the structure of Gellung Warl is self-determined and reflects Aboriginal Law, Lore and Cultural Authority (and more broadly that the Treaty process was a process shared by First Peoples and the State, including the model provided for in the Bill of Gellung Warl, including the Assembly), it is strongly arguable that the restriction placed on membership of the Assembly would not amount to a ‘substantial restriction’ on rights. It could instead be said that it is a measure that reflects and supports the cultural rights of First Peoples through a democratic process determined by First Peoples, and therefore does not constitute a limit on cultural rights under section 19(2) of the Charter.

Reasonable limit under section 7(2) of the Charter

If, however, the equality rights, right to access public life and cultural rights of First Peoples who are not Traditional Owners are in fact limited by the differential treatment of Traditional Owners in the Bill, I am of the view that these limits are justified in the circumstances under section 7(2) of the Charter. The establishment of Gellung Warl, and the Assembly in particular, provides a formal mechanism through which First Peoples in Victoria will be able to exercise their right to self-determination and provides a means by which First Peoples can raise and address issues relevant to Victorian First Peoples with the State. While there are restrictions on the membership of the Assembly, these matters reflect outcomes negotiated with the FPAV, being the representative and deliberative body with authority to negotiate on behalf of First Peoples with the State. The Assembly is nevertheless answerable to First Peoples through its democratic nature and its cultural obligations and responsibilities.

Further, by confining membership to Traditional Owners, the structure of representation in the Assembly reflects Aboriginal Law, Lore and Cultural Authority, thereby furthering the right to self-determination of First Peoples and in turn maintains public confidence in the integrity and effectiveness of Gellung Warl. In this context, I am of the view there is a direct connection between the limit on rights and its purpose and that there is no less restrictive means reasonably available that would maintain the character of a self-determined, culturally appropriate body.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that any limit on the equality rights, the right to take part in public life and the cultural rights of First Nations people who are not Traditional Owners by their restriction from membership and election to the Assembly, is reasonable and justified under section 7(2) of the Charter.

Other qualifications to be a member of the Assembly, the Nginma Ngainga Wara, the Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna and suspension or removal from office

Clause 21 of the Bill outlines the qualification criteria to be a member of the First Peoples’ Assembly. As noted above, a person is qualified to be a member of the Assembly if the person meets the requirements set out in the internal rules, subject to particular disqualifying criteria set out in clause 21(2)–(3). Clauses 100 and 125 of the Bill provide that a person is not eligible for appointment as a Nginma Ngainga Wara or Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna member in certain circumstances. The disqualifying criteria set out in these clauses is broadly similar and provide that a person is not qualified to be a member of the Assembly, the Nginma Ngainga Wara or the Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna if the person:

• holds any of the following public offices or is employed in the following positions (and only in relation to the Assembly is not on leave from and not performing the duties of that office or position):

• member of Parliament of the Commonwealth or any State or Territory;

• Ministerial officer, Parliamentary officer or an electorate officer employed by a member of the Commonwealth, or any State or Territory Parliament;

• Councillor of a Council or a member of Council staff from any State or Territory;

• member of the Treaty Authority or holds a paid position with the Treaty Authority;

• CEO of Gellung Warl;

• member of any of the other two bodies;

• staff member of or holds a paid position with Gellung Warl; or

• public sector employee of the Commonwealth or any State or Territory;

• is disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 of the Corporations Act;

• is currently held in prison;

• is subject to an order under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997; or

• has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an indictable offence and is subject to a parole order that includes travel restriction condition.

The Bill provides for the suspension of a member of the Assembly (clause 23), of Nginma Ngainga Wara members (clause 101) and Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna members (clause 126) in accordance with the internal rules, which under Schedule 1 of the Bill, must include the grounds and procedures for suspension, and procedures for suspension where an allegation of misconduct or serious misconduct is made. The Bill also provides for the removal of a member of the Assembly (clause 24), of Nginma Ngainga Wara members (clause 102) and Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna members (clause 127) in accordance with the internal rules, which under Schedule 1 must include the grounds of removal. Grounds for removal of members of the Assembly must include, relevantly, ceasing to be qualified to be a member (for example, if a member assumes any of the offices or positions above or is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in particular circumstances), being unable to perform the duties of the office or having been found to have engaged in serious misconduct. Grounds for removal of members of Nginma Ngainga Wara or Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna must include, relevantly, being found to have engaged in serious misconduct, assuming public office or being employed in a position which would make a person ineligible to be appointed to these bodies, being sentenced to certain terms of imprisonment or being currently held in a prison.

Clauses 232–237 of the Bill amend the Heritage Act 2017 to enable the Assembly to appoint, remove and temporarily suspend a member of the Heritage Council (being the person referred to in section 10(2)(c) of the Heritage Act 2017). These provisions are similar to the existing processes for the suspension and removal of other Heritage Council members under Schedule 1 of the Heritage Act 2017.

Right to access public office (section 18(2)(b))

The above provisions which disqualify a person from being a member of the Assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara or Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna or allow for their removal from these positions on the basis of holding another position or public office may limit the right under section 18(2)(b).

The right in section 18(2)(b) will only be limited where the Bill gives rise to ‘discrimination’, within the meaning of the EO Act as discussed under the equality right above, being direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of protected attributes, which in this case, would be employment activity and political activity.

If it were accepted that the Bill does in fact limit the section 18 rights of persons in these circumstances, then I nevertheless consider that those limits are justifiable as reasonable limits under section 7(2) of the Charter. The exclusion of certain persons who hold political offices (or politically-related offices) or are employed in the specified positions from being eligible to be a member of one these bodies is necessary to ensure the independence and proper functioning of these bodies. Additionally, the exclusion serves to avoid potential conflicts of interests and, in relation to members of the Commonwealth and other Parliaments, other potential legal and practical difficulties.

Right to a fair hearing (section 24)

The provisions governing suspension or removal from the Assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara, Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna or the Heritage Council may be relevant to the right to a fair hearing.

The concept of a ‘civil proceeding’ is not limited to judicial decision makers but may encompass the decision-making procedures of many types of tribunals, boards and other administrative decision-makers with the power to determine private rights and interests, such as holding professional registration. While recognising the broad scope of section 24(1), the term ‘proceeding’ and ‘party’ suggest that section 24(1) was intended to apply only to decision-makers who conduct proceedings with parties. As the administrative decisions at issue here, being a decision to suspend or remove a member of one of these bodies, appear unlikely to involve the conduct of proceedings with parties, there is a question as to whether the right to a fair hearing is engaged.

In any event, if a broad reading of section 24(1) is adopted and it is understood that the fair hearing right is engaged by this Bill, any limitation and its justification will ultimately be determined having regard to the process for suspension or removal set out in the internal rules or adopted by the Assembly in relation to suspension or removal of a Heritage Council member, including whether procedural fairness is afforded to the affected person and any opportunities for review or appeal of the decision. As the Assembly, as part of Gellung Warl, is a public authority for the purposes of the Charter (clause 10(4)), it will be required by section 38 of the Charter to give proper consideration to, and act compatibly with, human rights (including fair hearing rights) in making any suspension or removal decision.

Right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 26)

The nexus between criminal convictions and qualification for membership of and removal as a member of the Assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara or Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna could engage the right not to be punished more than once for the same offence under section 26 of the Charter.

In my view, however, these limitations on the qualifications of members or prospective members are unlikely to constitute punishment for the purposes of this right. The mere fact that a law operates to impose a detriment on a person does not make it punitive. Rather, the question of whether the imposition of a detriment is properly characterised as punitive will depend upon a range of factors including the nature of the detriment, the criteria by reference to which that detriment is imposed, and the purpose(s) for which the detriment is imposed.

The nature of the detriment in this instance – that is, removal of the ability for a person to qualify or continue as a member of these bodies – is not typically associated with criminal punishment. No conviction flows from this outcome. Further, the nature of the detriment is unlikely to be considered as non-criminal punishment (that is, punishment on a basis other than breach of the criminal law) because these provisions serve a protective rather than punitive purpose: they ensure the integrity and good governance of the Assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara and Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna, and promote public trust and confidence in these bodies and their members. The clause is also of a similar nature and scope to comparable qualification provisions that govern membership of representative bodies. It is limited to matters directly connected to integrity, competency and good governance, and does not extend to circumstances that could be considered arbitrary or punitive, such as disqualification solely on the basis of having low level summary convictions.

Accordingly, as the disqualification and removal from membership to the Assembly, the Nginma Ngainga Wara or the Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna does not amount to punishment, it will not engage the right against double punishment for the purpose of section 26 of the Charter, and is compatible with the Charter.

Electoral Officer provisions

Clause 231 of the Bill inserts a new Part (‘Part 3 – Electoral Officer’) into the Treaty Authority and Other Treaty Elements Act 2022. New Part 3 governs the appointment of the Electoral Officer by the Treaty Authority (Division 1, Part 3), which potentially engages sections 18 and 26 of the Charter, and also contains provisions authorising the Electoral Officer’s access to electoral information in the course of their functions to administer the Gellung Warl electoral roll and conduct elections (Division 2, Part 3), which potentially engages section 13 of the Charter.

Right to access public office (section 18(2)(b))

Clause 20(3) of the proposed Part 3 of the Treaty Authority and Other Treaty Elements Act 2022 excludes specific people from appointment to be the Electoral Officer. This includes holding particular public offices or being employed in particular positions, similar to those which disqualify a person from being a member of the Assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara or Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna as outlined above. A person is also not qualified if they are, amongst other things, currently held in a prison or have been sentenced to certain terms of imprisonment. Under clause 20(4) of the proposed Part 3, the office of Electoral Officer will become vacant on grounds including these grounds.

As discussed above, section 18(2)(b) of the Charter provides that eligible Victorians have the right, and are to have the opportunity, without discrimination, to have access, on general terms of equality, to public office. As stated above, I have assumed out of an abundance of caution and in order to undertake the broadest possible assessment of Charter compatibility that the Electoral Officer may hold public office for the purposes of section 18(2)(b) of the Charter.

The right in section 18(2)(b) will only be limited where the Bill gives rise to ‘discrimination’, within the meaning of the EO Act as discussed under the equality right above, being direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of protected attributes, which in this case, would be employment activity and political activity.

If it were accepted that the Bill does in fact limit the section 18 rights of persons who work in the positions excluded by Part 3 from appointment to be an Electoral Officer, then I nevertheless consider that those limits are justifiable as reasonable limits under section 7(2) of the Charter. The exclusion of certain persons who hold political offices or who are members of First Nations’ bodies from appointment as the Electoral Officer is necessary to ensure the integrity of elections and mitigate the risk of bias or perceived bias. Here, any interference with the right to take part of public life is justified insofar as to support the objective of appointing an impartial, apolitical Electoral Officer who can administer fair and democratic electoral processes.

Right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 26)

The nexus between criminal convictions and qualification for appointment or the vacation of the office of the Electoral Officer could engage the right not to be punished more than once for the same offence under section 26 of the Charter.

As noted above, the mere fact that a law operates to impose a detriment on a person (in this case, disqualification from appointment or the vacation of this office) does not make it punitive. As with the provisions in relation to qualification for the membership for the Assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara or Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna, these proposed provisions pursue non-punitive purposes, including the promotion of integrity and good governance of this office and the protection of public trust and confidence in the Electoral Officer. Therefore I consider that these provisions do not constitute punishment, so will not engage the right against double punishment for the purpose of section 26 of the Charter.

Right to privacy (section 13)

Division 2 of proposed Part 3 authorises the Electoral Officer and persons assisting the Electoral Officer authorised by the Treaty Authority to access electoral information (clause 27, Division 2, Part 3) and the Gellung Warl electoral roll information (clause 28, Division 2, Part 3). The proposed Part also places restrictions on the disclosure of electoral information and Gellung Warl electoral information unless one of the exceptions in clause 29 applies to the Electoral Officer or the person authorised by the Treaty Authority. While the provisions likely interfere with the right to privacy, I consider these interferences to be lawful and not arbitrary.

The information sharing powers are necessary to authorise the Electoral Officer to carry out their functions in administering and conducting elections under the Treaty Authority Act. Section 29 of Part 3 ensures that the sharing of information is only authorised where the receiver is already authorised to access electoral information under Part 3. The prohibition on disclosure without obtaining the requisite authorisation safeguards the right to privacy and supports the integrity of election processes under the Treaty Authority and Other Treaty Elements Act 2022.

I consider that these provisions strike an appropriate balance between enabling the Electoral Officer to effectively exercise their functions and powers and protecting the right to privacy of persons of voters to whom the information is attributed. In my view, the information sharing powers are proportionate to the purpose of the limitation and therefore, will not be an arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy.

Election campaign donation cap

Clause 56 of the Bill provides that the Assembly must make electoral rules in accordance with Part 4 and Schedules 1 and 2 and that an election must be conducted in accordance with these rules. Pursuant to Schedule 2, Item 7.1(a), the electoral rules must specify that all election campaign donations are capped at or below the dollar amount specified by the general cap within the meaning of the Electoral Act 2002 as indexed under section 217Q of that Act.

Freedom of expression (section 15)

By restricting the donation amount that can be received by a candidate for an election campaign, this cap may limit the right to freedom of expression of donors under section 15(2) of the Charter. However, I consider that this is a lawful restriction which is reasonably necessary to protect public order and the rights of others within the meaning of the internal limitation in section 15(3) of the Charter. The protection of public order is a wide and flexible concept dealing with rights or obligations that facilitate the proper functioning of the rule of law and includes measures for giving effect to peace and good order and public safety. The meaning of protecting the rights of others is similarly broad, not confined to the human rights set out in the Charter and would include restrictions reasonably necessary to protect rights of equal opportunity of political participation.

The purpose of the cap is to prevent corruption and undue influence in the Assembly, which may occur if payments of large sums of money are allowed to be made by way of political donation. Further, the cap also acts to promote equality of opportunity of political participation and may in fact promote freedom of expression by levelling the field of political debate and promoting a more equal dissemination of diverse points of view. Finally, the cap also serves the important purpose of overcoming any perception of corruption or undue influence that may be accompanied by unlimited political donations and so fosters confidence in the integrity of the Assembly. On this basis, I consider the cap on electoral donations required to be included in the electoral rules is reasonably necessary to protect the integrity and proper functioning of the Assembly, as well rights of equal opportunity of political participation in the work of the Assembly.

I consider that Schedule 1, Item 7.1(a) falls within section 15(3) of the Charter and imposes no limitation on the freedom of expression.

Forfeiture of election donations

Clause 58(1) of the Bill provides that if a candidate for election to the Assembly accepts an election campaign donation in a way that is contrary to the electoral rules, an amount equal to the donation amount or the value of the donation is payable by the candidate to Gellung Warl. Clause 58(2) also provides that any amount payable under this section may be recovered by the Chief Executive Officer as a debt due to Gellung Warl in any court of competent jurisdiction.

Right to property (section 20)

By requiring the payment of the donation amount to Gellung Warl and providing that this amount can be recovered as a debt against the candidate, this clause could be considered to deprive a person of their property rights. However, any such deprivation will be ‘in accordance with law’ and will therefore not limit the Charter right to property. The clause clearly sets out the circumstances in which a candidate will be required to pay the donation amount to Gellung Warl, that is where the acceptance of such a donation is contrary to the electoral rules (clause 58(1)), and the potential consequences of non-payment, being that the candidate may be subject to debt recovery proceedings (clause 58(2)). Although the electoral rules are yet to be made by the Assembly pursuant to clause 56(1) the provisions in Schedule 2 expressly provide the minimum content in respect to conduct in elections (Schedule 2, item 1) and electoral expenditure matters (Schedule 2, item 7). For example, anonymous election campaign donations of or above $1,000 are prohibited (Schedule 2, item 7.1(e)). As such, potential election campaigners can be reasonably expected to know the minimum standards of conduct and expenditure in an election and (when made) the electoral rules ahead of time, and can regulate their conduct accordingly.

Further, any deprivation of property in this context is reasonably necessary to act as a deterrence mechanism to discourage and prevent corruption and undue influence in the Assembly. In turn, compliance with the electoral rules in respect to donations promotes equality of opportunity of political participation and to foster confidence in the integrity of Gellung Warl. In my view, and noting that the property right is not limited, any interference with property rights here is justified so as to support the important objective of ensuring that elections are free, fair and transparent (which is expressly required as a minimum standard of conduct in elections under item 1.1(f) in Schedule 2).

Transfer of property, rights and liabilities of FPAV to Gellung Warl

Part 19 of the Bill contains transitional provisions, some of which concern the transition of the FPAV to Gellung Warl. This includes provisions which allow for the transfer of property, rights and liabilities from FPAV to Gellung Warl, or otherwise vest property, rights and liabilities in Gellung Warl.

Right to property

Clause 210 of the Bill provides that the CEO of FPAV may give the Minister, within the period requested by the Minister, a statement or statements relating to the property, rights and liabilities of the FPAV, and that a statement may allocate to Gellung Warl the property, rights and liabilities of the FPAV. Clause 212 provides that, on the relevant date for an allocation statement, all property and rights of the FPAV that are allocated under that allocation statement vest in Gellung Warl in accordance with the statement, and all liabilities of the FPAV allocated under that allocation statement become liabilities of Gellung Warl in accordance with the statement.

Additionally, clause 213 provides that, on 1 July 2026, all property and rights of FPAV that have not been previously vested or transferred under an allocation statement are vested in Gellung Warl, and all liabilities of the FPAV existing immediately before 1 July 2026, wherever located, become liabilities of Gellung Warl.

Further, where the rights and liabilities of the FPAV under an agreement vest in Gellung Warl then Gellung Warl becomes, on the relevant date for that allocation statement, a party to the agreement in place of the FPAV, and the agreement has effect as if Gellung Warl had always been a party to the agreement (clause 215). This is also the case with instruments, in that clause 216 provides that instruments relating to former FPAV property allocated to Gellung Warl under an allocation statement or vested in Gellung Warl continue to have effect according to their terms on and after the relevant date for that allocation statement as if a reference in the instrument to the FPAV were a reference to Gellung Warl.

The transfer of any of FPAV’s property, rights and liabilities to Gellung Warl, including in relation to agreements with third parties, is relevant to the property rights of natural persons who hold an interest in the property or liability transferred. However, the transfer of the property or liability from FPAV to Gellung Warl will not limit the property rights of persons holding the interest, as they are not being deprived of their interest in the property or liability, but rather, the property or liability is transferred without altering the substantive content of that property right or liability.

Insofar as a cause of action in relation to any potential liability held by the FPAV may be considered ‘property’ within the meaning of section 20 of the Charter, the Bill may engage this right. However, in my opinion, the Bill does not effect a deprivation of property as it does not extinguish any cause of action which a person may have against FPAV. Rather, liability is transferred to Gellung Warl.

Finally, even if the Bill could be considered to deprive a person of property, any such deprivation would be ‘in accordance with law’ and will therefore not limit the Charter right to property. In particular, the Part 19 clauses of the Bill dealing with the transfer of property, rights and liabilities from the FPAV to the Authority, as outlined above, are drafted in clear and precise terms, and are sufficiently accessible.

Accordingly, I consider that the transfer of FPAV’s property, rights and liabilities to the Gellung Warl is compatible with the property rights in section 20 of the Charter.

Information sharing and confidentiality provisions

Part 11 of the Bill contains the information sharing powers of the arms of Gellung Warl. The clauses prescribe the circumstances in which disclosure of restricted information (defined as information that is marked as confidential by the entity or the entity advises is confidential), confidential information (defined as information specified in the internal rules to be confidential) and culturally sensitive or culturally secret information is permitted between the arms of Gellung Warl and between Gellung Warl and external entities.

The sharing of restricted information between the arms of Gellung Warl requires the consent of the entity that is providing the information (clause 131–133). For culturally sensitive or culturally secret information, the information is to be given in accordance with the internal rules (clause 134). Clause 135 of the Bill requires that an entity must not consent to disclosure of restricted information if it would otherwise be prohibited by the Bill or any other Act.

The sharing of culturally sensitive or culturally secret information from Gellung Warl to external entities is not authorised unless the disclosure is made with consent given in accordance with the internal rules (clause 136). The internal rules must include requirements for persons or groups to whom the information is attributed to consent to disclosure or publication of restricted information that is culturally sensitive or culturally secret information (Schedule 1, item 8). Any disclosure of culturally sensitive or culturally secret information to external entities must be accompanied by a copy of the guidelines for handling culturally sensitive or culturally secret information made by the Assembly (clause 137).

The sharing of restricted information or confidential information to external entities is prohibited, unless the disclosure is for a permitted purpose (i.e. in the course of legal proceedings or pursuant to an order of the court or a tribunal; to a law enforcement agency or an integrity agency; or it is permitted, required or authorised under the Bill or any other Act) (clause 138–139).

Clause 140 of the Bill clarifies that nothing in the Bill requires or authorises disclosure to Gellung Warl of information (including personal information and health information) that is protected by confidentiality or privilege, or not otherwise authorised or permitted by any other Act or law.

Right to privacy (section 13(a))

Part 11 of the Bill authorises the sharing of restricted information, confidential information and culturally sensitive or culturally secret information in prescribed circumstances. The clauses likely interfere with the right to privacy, however, I consider these interferences to be lawful and not arbitrary.

While Part 11 generally prohibits the disclosure of information without obtaining the appropriate consent, clauses 136(2) and 139 permit disclosure to certain organisations for permitted purposes, such as courts and tribunals and law enforcement or integrity agencies. The exceptions are confined to circumstances where there are legitimate public interest reasons to disclose information, in addition to ensuring compliance with other Victorian laws. I consider that the public interest in certain organisations obtaining relevant information substantially outweighs the public interest in protecting the right to privacy.

Absent any exception, Part 11 of the Bill ensures that the sharing of information is only authorised where consent has been given by the entity providing the information, and for culturally sensitive or culturally secret information, where consent has been given in accordance with the internal rules. The internal rules must include certain minimum requirements, which include a process whereby persons or groups who provide information to the entities can nominate whether the information is culturally sensitive or culturally secrets (Schedule 1, item 8). Any information which has been marked as restricted, confidential or culturally sensitive or culturally secret will then be subject to the disclosure requirements in Part 11 of the Bill. The prohibition on disclosure without obtaining the requisite consent safeguards the right to privacy and supports Indigenous Data Sovereignty and First Peoples’ self-determination over the collection, use and disclosure of their information. I consider that these clauses strike an appropriate balance between enabling Gellung Warl and its arms to effectively exercise their functions and powers and protecting the right to privacy of persons or groups to whom the information is attributed. In my view, the information sharing powers are proportionate to the purpose of the limitation and therefore, will not be an arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy.

Inquiries and research

The Nginma Ngainga Wara’s functions include the power to conduct inquiries and to conduct research (clause 94). Clause106 of the Bill provides that the Nginma Ngainga Wara may conduct an inquiry in any manner it considers fit, including receiving submissions from any person or body and inviting any person or body to appear or otherwise participate in the inquiry. Clause 107 authorises the Nginma Ngainga Wara to request a Minister or an agency head or an agency to give the Nginma Ngainga Wara any information or any document that Nginma Ngainga Wara is reasonably satisfied is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. Clause 109 requires the Nginma Ngainga Wara to give a report of the inquiry to the Assembly.

The Nginma Ngainga Wara may, on its own initiative or in response to a referral from the Assembly, conduct research on any matter listed at clause 111(1) of the Bill. The Nginma Ngainga Wara may, on its own initiative or at the request of the Assembly, give a report of its research activities or its ongoing evaluation and monitoring activities to the Assembly (clauses 110 and 112).

The Nginma Ngainga Wara may, in accordance with clause 113 of the Bill, refer a matter, including a matter relating to an individual, to a person or body specified in Schedule 4 (e.g. Chief Commissioner of Police; Commission for Children and Young People).

Clause 114 provides that the Nginma Ngainga Wara and an agency may make an agreement that permits the agency to give de-identified data to the Nginma Ngainga Wara for the purposes of conducting monitoring and evaluation, research or an inquiry.

The Nginma Ngainga Wara must not publish a report of an inquiry, a monitoring report or a research report or give it to any person other than the Assembly (clause 115). The Assembly may publish any report of an inquiry, monitoring report or research report, but must not publish it if the Nginma Ngainga Wara has notified the Assembly it is not to be published (clause 116(1) and (2)). The Assembly must not publish any restricted Nginma Ngainga Wara information or culturally sensitive or culturally secret information without obtaining the requisite consent of the person, group or entity who provided the information (clause 116(3) and (4)).

Right to privacy (section 13(a))

The inquiries and research functions of the Nginma Ngainga Wara may involve the collection, use and disclosure of personal, health and sensitive information of persons or groups participating in the inquiries or research. While these clauses may interfere with the right to privacy, I do not consider these interferences to be unlawful or arbitrary.

The gathering of information is necessary to allow Nginma Ngainga Wara to reach meaningful findings in its inquiries and research, and to assist Nginma Ngainga Wara to operate as an effective First Nations-led accountability body. I consider any interference occasioned by these clauses is not arbitrary given that the scope of the inquiries and research powers are appropriately prescribed and proportionate to the legitimate aims of the Bill. For instance, the clauses do not authorise Nginma Ngainga Wara to compel a person or group to participate in an inquiry or to contribute to research. If persons or groups decide to participate in an inquiry or contribute to research, the person or group to whom the information is attributed can elect to classify the information as culturally sensitive or culturally secret in accordance with the internal rules. The disclosure of any culturally sensitive or culturally secret information or restricted information which has been marked as confidential must comply with the information sharing framework in Part 11 of the Bill.

Nginma Ngainga Wara is also prohibited from disclosing an inquiry, research or evaluation and monitoring report to any person other than the Assembly, and inquiry reports are exempt from the FOI Act (clause 141). The Assembly is not subject to any publication requirement, but if it decides to publish a report, it must comply with the publication requirements at clause 116 of the Bill, including obtaining the consent of the person, group or entity who provided the information if the information is restricted or culturally sensitive or culturally secret information. These powers go no further than is necessary to enable Nginma Ngainga Wara to exercise its functions.

In relation to de-identified data agreements, I consider that the procedural safeguards provided for in the Bill ensure compatibility with the right to privacy. The requirement that the data is de-identified ensures that the data no longer relates to an identifiable individual or an individual who can be reasonably identified. The de-identified data agreement must also specify the type of de-identified data to be provided and specify the purpose for which the de-identified data is to be provided.

Accordingly, I consider these clauses strike an appropriate balance between protecting the privacy of persons or groups who contribute to inquiries or research and ensuring that Nginma Ngainga Wara has sufficient information to perform its functions. In my view, the powers relating to the collection, use and disclosure of information are proportionate to the purpose of the limitation and therefore will not be an arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy. The Nginma Ngainga Wara’s referral powers may require the divulging of information to other persons or bodies that would otherwise be private in nature. The referral of individual complaints or matters that the Nginma Ngainga Wara becomes aware of as it performs its functions is important to ensure matters are dealt with by other oversight and integrity bodies that have the requisite functions and powers for investigation. As discussed, the Nginma Ngainga Wara is not authorised to compel the disclosure of information from persons or groups who may be the subject of matters referred under clause 113 of the Bill. Further, the other oversight and integrity bodies listed at Schedule 4 must handle matters in accordance with their own governing legislation, thus attracting additional procedural safeguards to protect the privacy of persons or groups to whom information may be attributed. As such, I consider that any interference with the right to privacy will not be an arbitrary or unlawful interference.

Truth-telling information

Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna’s functions include receiving and collecting truth-telling information about historical events, holding an archive of truth-telling information and publishing material contained in the archive (clause 121(b) and (c)).

Clause 128 of the Bill provides that Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna may collect and hold personal information in accordance with the internal rules. Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna may publish information in accordance with the internal rules, but Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna must not publish any restricted or culturally sensitive or culturally secret information without obtaining consent in accordance with the Bill and the internal rules, or publish any information that is not otherwise permitted to be published under any other Act (clause 129).

Right to privacy (section 13(a))

The clauses may interfere with the privacy rights of the person or group to whom the information is attributed, however, I consider any interference is not unlawful or arbitrary.

The clauses of the Bill are necessary to enable Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna to perform its functions. Without the ability to collect, archive and publish information, Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna will not be able to facilitate truth-telling about historical events, including any continuing impacts, and ongoing health and reconciliation. Any interference with the right to privacy will be prescribed by law, and Part 11 of the Bill otherwise prohibits the disclosure of restricted information which has been marked as confidential or culturally sensitive or culturally secret information without obtaining consent in accordance with the Bill and the internal rules. Therefore, as any interference with privacy will be authorised under legislation and is subject to appropriate safeguards, I consider the clauses are proportionate to the purpose of the limitation and do not amount to an unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy.

Disclosure of information to the Treaty Authority by IBAC or Ombudsman

Clause 264 of the Bill amends the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (IBAC Act) to authorise the disclosure or provision of information by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) to the Treaty Authority. Clause 278 of the Bill similarly amends the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Ombudsman Act) to provide for the disclosure of information by the Ombudsman to the Treaty Authority.

Right to privacy (section 13(a))

The amendments to the IBAC Act and the Ombudsman Act may involve the disclosure of personal, health and sensitive information gathered for the purposes of an IBAC or Ombudsman investigation. While the sharing of this information may interfere with the right to privacy, I consider these interferences to be lawful and not arbitrary.

The gathering of information is necessary for the Treaty Authority to exercise its duties and functions effectively. The relevant provisions of the IBAC Act and the Ombudsman Act limit the sharing of information to circumstances where the IBAC and the Ombudsman are satisfied that the information is relevant to the performance of the duties and functions of the Treaty Authority. For instance, the IBAC or the Ombudsman may share information with the Treaty Authority if satisfied that the information is relevant to the Treaty Authority’s handling of an electoral complaint made under Part 15 of the Bill. The sharing of information is subject to further limitations, including that information must not be disclosed to the Treaty Authority if the information would likely lead to the identification of a person who made an assessable disclosure under the IBAC Act or the Ombudsman Act. Given the procedural safeguards on the sharing of information, I consider that the powers go no further than is necessary to enable the Treaty Authority to exercise its functions, and therefore any interference with the right to privacy is lawful and not arbitrary.

Amendment of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012

Clauses 287 and 258 of the Bill amend the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (PID Act) to provide for the making of public interest disclosures relating to Gellung Warl, an Assembly member, a Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna member, a Nginma Ngainga Wara member or a Gellung Warl staff member.

Right to privacy (section 13(a))

The amendments to the PID Act may require the divulging of information about persons or groups that would otherwise be private in nature, thus engaging the right to privacy. However, any impacts on the right to privacy are not arbitrary or unlawful and can be balanced against the need to ensure the transparent and accountable operation of Gellung Warl, the integrity of Gellung Warl’s decision-making and the prevention of the misuse of public positions. The role of public bodies and public officers are roles to which special duties and responsibilities attach, and in this regard there is a reduced expectation of privacy with regards to this type of information. Further, disclosures under the PID Act are subject to certain safeguards to ensure the proper assessment and, where necessary, investigation of disclosures. To the extent that disclosure about Gellung Warl, a member, or a staff member will interfere with privacy, any such interference will be lawful and not arbitrary, and will therefore be compatible with the right to privacy.

Changes to the freedom of information regime

Clause 242 of the Bill amends the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) to provide that Gellung Warl is subject to the FOI Act and that the Chairperson of the Assembly must fulfil the same responsibilities as a responsible Minister of an agency.

Clause 243 of the Bill amends the FOI Act to require that Gellung Warl publish information about its structure, functions and the types of documents it holds in accordance with section 7 of the FOI Act. Clause 245 of the Bill exempts Gellung Warl from the operation of section 11 of the FOI Act, which requires agencies to publicly list the documents that it holds.

The Bill introduces new exemptions from the FOI Act for the following documents:

• restricted Nginma Ngainga Wara information (clause 141);

• a report of an Nginma Ngainga Wara inquiry under Division 4 of Part 9 of the Bill (clause 141);

• documents containing Treaty negotiations information (clause 250; new section 32A of the FOI Act);

• documents containing culturally sensitive information or culturally secret information (clause 250; new section 32B of the FOI Act);

• documents containing Assembly consensus meeting information (clause 250; new section 32C of the FOI Act); and

• documents, or copies or drafts of, or containing extracts from, that are relevant to representation meetings under Division 2 of Part 8 of the Bill and which clause 79 of the Bill designates as subject to Cabinet confidentiality (other than a document by which a decision of the Cabinet was officially published) (clause 249; new section 28(4) of the FOI Act).

Freedom of expression (section 15)

These exemptions restrict access to documents which may otherwise be accessible to the public through the freedom of information scheme and so may limit the right to freedom of expression under section 15(2) of the Charter. However, I consider that this is a lawful restriction which is reasonably necessary to protect public order and the rights of others, including restrictions reasonably necessary to protect right to privacy, reputation and cultural rights, within the meaning of the internal limitation in section 15(3) of the Charter.

One of the functions of Nginma Ngainga Wara is to conduct inquiries. The purpose of exempting a report of an inquiry under Division 4 of Part 9 of the Bill is to protect the integrity of the inquiry process, and to protect the privacy of those who provide information to the inquiry. The exemption ensures that inquiries can operate effectively and without the danger that sensitive information will be publicly released. I consider that the restriction on section 15(2) is tailored to this purpose and reasonably necessary to encourage frank disclosure and meaningful findings by Nginma Ngainga Wara, ultimately protecting public order and the right to privacy.

The purpose of the exclusion of documents relating to Treaty negotiations, representation meetings and consensus meetings is to ensure frank and candid disclosures during participation in negotiations and meetings. The exemptions also protect the principle of collective decision-making and responsibility by ensuring that State representatives and members of Gellung Warl and its arms can freely discuss and debate matters without fear of premature disclosure. The exemptions for consensus meeting and representation meeting documents cease to apply to a document brought into existence after 1 July 2026 when a period of 10 years has elapsed since the last day of the year in which the document came into existence (clauses 249 and 250). The exemptions do not apply to consensus meeting and representation meeting documents that contain purely statistical, technical or scientific material unless disclosure of the document would involve disclosure of any deliberation or decision of the Cabinet or content or subject of any meeting (clauses 249 and 250). The exemptions go no further than is necessary to uphold the deliberative processes of Gellung Warl and its arms. I consider that the clauses strike an appropriate balance between protecting the right to freedom of expression through the freedom of information scheme while ensuring that Gellung Warl and its arms can exercise their powers and functions effectively.

Clause 4 of the Bill defines ‘culturally sensitive or culturally secret information’ as information that the individual or group providing it advises is culturally sensitive or culturally secret information, or alternatively, information that is determined to be culturally sensitive or culturally secret information in accordance with the internal rules. The purpose of excluding these documents from possible disclosure is to protect the privacy and cultural rights of individuals and groups who provide culturally sensitive or culturally secret information to Gellung Warl and its arms. I consider this exemption reasonably necessary to ensure that persons are not discouraged from candidly providing information and disclosing all possible documents, thereby protecting the right to privacy and cultural rights.

For these reasons, I consider the amendments to the FOI Act fall within section 15(3) of the Charter and impose no limitation on the freedom of expression.

Amendments to the Public Records Act 1973

Clause 293 of the Bill amends the Public Records Act 1973 (PR Act) to introduce a new exemption for records required to be transferred from Gellung Warl to the Public Record Office that the Assembly Chairperson is of the opinion contain matters of such a private or personal nature that they should not be open for public inspection. Clause 263 of the Bill amends the PR Act to provide that the Assembly Chairperson may declare that the records shall not be available for public inspection for a period of not more than 30 years after the date of their transfer to the Public Record Office.

Clause 297 of the Bill amends the PR Act to exempt a record that is beneficially owned by Gellung Warl from the operation of section 16 of the PR Act. Section 16 of the PR Act authorises the Minister to declare that a record is a prescribed record for the purposes of the PR Act if satisfied that:

• it would be a public record but for the fact that it is beneficially owned by a person or body other than the Crown or a public office;

• it is of historic significance to Victoria; and

• should be preserved by the State.

Freedom of expression (section 15)

The amendments to the PR Act may restrict access to documents which may otherwise be accessible to the public, thereby limiting the right to freedom of expression under section 15(2) of the Charter. However, I consider any restriction to be lawful and reasonably necessary to protect the rights of others within the meaning of the internal limitation in section 15(3) of the Charter.

The purpose of excluding records that, in the opinion of the Assembly Chairperson, contain matters of such a private or personal nature that they should not be open for public inspection is to protect the privacy and reputation of those who provide information to Gellung Warl. The scope of the exemption mirrors the already existing exemption at section 9 of the PR Act for records required to be transferred from other public offices to the Public Record Office. I consider the exemption introduced by the Bill to be reasonably necessary to protect the rights to privacy and reputation of those who disclose information to Gellung Warl in the performance of its functions.

The purpose of the exemption of a record that is beneficially owned by Gellung Warl from the operation of section 16 of the PR Act is to support Indigenous Data Sovereignty and First Peoples’ self-determination over culturally sensitive or culturally secret information. I consider the exemption to be reasonably necessary to promote this purpose, thus protecting the right to privacy and the cultural rights of persons and groups who disclose information to Gellung Warl.

I consider the amendments to the PR Act fall within section 15(3) of the Charter and impose no limitation on the freedom of expression.

The Hon. Jacinta Allan

Premier of Victoria

Second reading

Jacinta ALLAN (Bendigo East – Premier) (15:12): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

Acknowledgement and overview

I acknowledge the traditional owners and custodians of the land on which this Parliament stands, the Wurundjeri Woi Wurrung people of the Kulin nations.

I pay my respects to their elders past and present and to all traditional owners and First Peoples across Victoria and their elders.

I acknowledge the First Peoples who are with us today in this Parliament and who are watching this sitting from elsewhere.

I acknowledge the generations of advocacy by First Peoples which has led to this moment.

First Peoples have an unbroken relationship to the lands and waters we now call Victoria.

They have practised their laws, customs and languages, and they have nurtured country through their spiritual, material and economic connections to land, water and resources.

This place holds the oldest living cultures on earth – a fact that we uphold with pride through treaty.

I also want to acknowledge and pay respects to the members and co-chairs of the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria and to all of the past members and co-chairs and to their elders.

The First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria is the independent, elected representative body for First Peoples in Victoria and carries the collective strength of First Peoples communities as an expression of their inherent right to self-determination.

Since 2019, the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria has partnered with us on our journey towards treaty.

I want to thank the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria for the trust they have shown in undertaking this journey with us towards the first treaty in Australia’s history.

I also want to acknowledge the Treaty Authority and its members for their role in ensuring a fair negotiations process and supporting the parties to reach this historic outcome.

I want to acknowledge the work of the Yoorrook Justice Commission, Australia’s first formal truth-telling commission.

I am proud to be the first Premier in Australia’s history to sit before a truth-telling inquiry.

The Yoorrook Justice Commission undertook the complex task of bringing together stories from across Victoria to form the findings and recommendations in the Truth Be Told report – laying bare the effects of colonisation on First Peoples in Victoria.

First Peoples have long experienced and told us of this truth, but for many Victorians Truth Be Told is the first time they have heard the true story of colonisation and its impact.

Truth Be Told makes clear that the gap between outcomes for First Peoples and other Victorians in life expectancy, in education, in health and in all other areas has been caused by the impacts of colonisation which continue today.

Finally, I thank the Victorian people for coming with us on this journey.

Treaty is in your name, too, and it benefits us all.

At its heart is a practical purpose and a simple principle: all families are better off when they have responsibility over their lives, their future and the things that affect them.

Aboriginal families are no different.

Treaty makes sense because it gives Aboriginal people a say in how their services are run.

Our first treaty sets clear rules to achieve real, practical change over time.

Treaty doesn’t take anything away from anyone.

It’s about improving people’s lives and giving everyone a better future.

We all are united in wanting that better future – one that is just, fair and equitable for all Victorians, including First Peoples, one where the gap between First Peoples and other Victorians has been closed.

Achieving this involves change, and we achieve this change together through treaty.

In standing together to support this treaty today we commit to listening to and learning from First Peoples – affirming the inherent right of First Peoples to self-determination and upholding their ability to make decisions for their people, communities and country.

We commit to upholding the promises we have made and closing the gap between First Peoples and other Victorians.

Treaty makes the changes necessary so that the state hears from First Peoples on matters that affect them.

Treaty will support a new future where First Peoples design and deliver practical solutions to improve outcomes by doing what works for their communities.

Treaty is a new beginning – resetting the relationship between First Peoples and the state to create a better future together for generations to come.

Path to treaty

In Victoria, the state has been on the path to truth and treaty for nearly a decade.

Over this time, we have laid strong foundations.

We have passed the Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 and the Treaty Authority and Other Treaty Elements Act 2022, which provide the foundations of the Victorian treaty process, underpinning how treaty is negotiated.

Alongside the assembly, we have agreed the treaty negotiation framework, which sets out the rules for both statewide and traditional owner treaty negotiations.

We have established the Treaty Authority to act as the independent umpire overseeing negotiations.

The Treaty Authority is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the treaty process for all Victorians and that parties follow the rules set out in the treaty negotiation framework.

Since the opening of Statewide Treaty negotiations in November last year, the assembly and the state have been engaged in negotiations on the content and form of the first Statewide Treaty and the Statewide Treaty Bill 2025.

Negotiations have focused on how treaty can provide practical solutions, improve the way that First Peoples interact with the state and empower First Peoples communities through upholding their inherent right to self-determination.

The Statewide Treaty Bill 2025 is a landmark piece of legislation in this country, but not this world.

Other comparable nations, such as Canada, New Zealand and the United States, all have a treaty of some kind with their indigenous peoples.

Despite generations of advocacy from First Peoples and the wider Australian population, Australia has remained an outlier.

Today, I am proud to introduce to Parliament the Statewide Treaty Bill 2025.

In passing this historic bill we will lead Australia, take a step closer to righting the wrongs of the past and building a better future for all Victorians.

Establishment of Gellung Warl

The assembly has brought First Peoples and traditional owner groups in Victoria together.

The bill builds on the proven success of the assembly, evolving the assembly into Gellung Warl – an ongoing representative body for First Peoples – to continue the work of the assembly to date.

Gellung Warl comes from the Gunaikurnai language.

Gellung Warl will have governance, oversight and decision-making powers in relation to First Peoples’ matters.

In its new form it will interact more closely with Victoria’s existing parliamentary and democratic structures and will take on greater powers and responsibilities.

Gellung Warl will provide advice and information to the Victorian Parliament and Victorian government, make specific decisions in relation to First Peoples’ matters and ensure the government is held accountable for its commitments to First Peoples.

It will also support Victoria’s continuing journey towards understanding its past by supporting ongoing truth and healing within the Victorian community.

The bill establishes Gellung Warl to have separate offices to serve these advisory and determinative, accountability and truth-telling functions.

Those offices, as well as other terms in the bill, have been given names in the languages of First Peoples.

Use of First Nations language is a practical way we can show respect.

Gellung Warl will lead the renewed relationship with the state created by treaty.

Working with the state, it will use its functions and powers to action Statewide Treaty reforms – the practical outcomes set out in the Statewide Treaty.

Gellung Warl will support the strengthening of Victoria’s curriculum – helping to build resources for students from foundation to year 10 to teach our children about the shared history of our state, as recorded by the Yoorrook Justice Commission.

Gellung Warl will propose names for national and state parks, and waterways and waterfalls on state land, increasing the use of traditional place names and First Nations languages.

Gellung Warl will also take on responsibility for outcomes which currently sit with the state.

It will operate a First Peoples’ Infrastructure Fund to ensure that Aboriginal community-controlled organisations have the infrastructure they need to provide crucial services for First Peoples communities.

It will also lead Victoria in the celebration of First Peoples excellence, delivering the Victorian Aboriginal Honour Roll, the Victorian Aboriginal Remembrance Service, the Ricci Marks Awards and funding the Victorian NAIDOC Week events.

Gellung Warl will be established as a statutory corporation and sit within the architecture of our existing democratic structures.

The bill aims to build a collaborative and solutions-focused relationship between the state and Gellung Warl.

Gellung Warl will not have coercive powers or powers to veto policy or legislation.

The bill obliges both the state and Gellung Warl to act in good faith towards each other in relation to the discharge of Gellung Warl’s powers and functions.

The bill aims to facilitate a renewed relationship, focused on the shared goal of achieving better outcomes.

First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria

Gellung Warl will have a chamber of democratically elected representatives, mirroring the assembly’s existing structure.

Acknowledging the successes of the assembly, and to provide continuity between the existing assembly structure and the entity created by this bill, these elected and appointed representatives will continue to be known as the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria.

The assembly will be the main decision-making and operative arm of Gellung Warl and will make rules about how Gellung Warl operates.

The bill provides minimum content to be included in those rules.

This unique structure provides community with certainty about the good governance of Gellung Warl while allowing Gellung Warl to determine its own practices and meet cultural obligations.

The assembly will be able to provide advice and information to the government, putting First Peoples’ views and concerns directly to the members of Parliament.

It will provide a yearly address to a joint sitting of Parliament about matters that affect First Peoples.

Additionally, the assembly will be able to inform Parliament about how new legislation may affect First Peoples.

The bill provides for the assembly to be given notice of new legislation on its introduction to Parliament and requires the member presenting the bill to table a statement which sets out whether the assembly’s views have been sought on that legislation.

This statement will also set out whether the bill is compatible with certain objects of Statewide Treaty, advancing self-determination, addressing historical wrongs, and the equal enjoyment of human rights.

The assembly will also be able to make written submissions to Parliament and may be requested to address Parliament on matters affecting First Peoples.

The findings of the Yoorrook Justice Commission highlighted how, in the past, Parliament actively disempowered and silenced First Peoples.

There has been no structure in place to allow Parliament to hear directly from First Peoples about how decisions it made might impact First Peoples communities.

This has led to a lack of understanding, often producing harmful and ineffective laws and policies.

Ensuring that the members of Parliament hear directly from First Peoples’ elected representatives is one of the ways we can reset the relationship between the state and First Peoples, ensure the mistakes of the past are not repeated, and support the Parliament make informed decisions which are in the best interests of all Victorians, including First Peoples.

Treaty will strengthen and streamline how the executive government engages with First Peoples, ensuring more efficient and effective consultation.

The bill provides for the assembly to give information to the executive government and empowers the assembly to meet with senior members of the government, as well as with cabinet.

The assembly will be able to ask questions of ministers and certain state-funded entities to allow it to develop a full picture of the effectiveness of services and policies.

These powers, and the requirement they be exercised in good faith, aim to build a collaborative and solutions-focused relationship between the Victorian government and the assembly.

Failure to engage with requests made by the assembly will not result in any penalties for individuals, entities or organisations.

The state will be held accountable for the effects and outcomes of its policymaking and legislation on First Peoples at a yearly engagement hearing, held at the request of the assembly, which will consider how the decisions and practices of the state are affecting First Peoples.

The bill creates a duty for Victorian government departments and Victoria Police to create guidelines including about how they will consult with the assembly on laws and policies that are specifically directed at First Peoples.

It also requires the minister to consult the assembly prior to appointing an administrator under the Aboriginal Lands Act 1970.

While these advisory powers are the first of their kind in Victoria, they have been modelled on existing best practice examples from elsewhere in Australia, namely the ACT and South Australia, and internationally, from treaty jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Canada.

These models show how hearing directly from First Peoples leads to better outcomes.

The assembly’s engagement with the state in this way seeks to address the government’s historical failure to listen to First Peoples’ perspectives.

Legislating advisory powers for the assembly also directly responds to key recommendations from the Productivity Commission in its Review of the National Agreement on Closing the Gap in January 2024, calling for governments to share power with First Peoples and relinquish control over decisions that affect First Peoples.

Providing the assembly with advisory powers is a practical way to give effect to the self-determination of First Peoples and to ensure that laws passed by this Parliament are better informed and more effective in achieving their objectives as they relate to First Peoples and avoid repeating the wrongs of the past.

The bill empowers the assembly to make rules, guidelines and standards about issues that directly affect First Peoples.

The assembly will be able to make rules establishing processes for how certification should be given by First Peoples organisations that a person is accepted as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’s community.

Rules made by the assembly will only apply by operation of the bill to First Peoples and First Peoples organisations in Victoria, although other organisations may choose to adopt them.

It will also be able to make non-binding guidelines about the sharing and trading between First Peoples of water entitlements held by First Peoples or First Peoples’ organisations, as well as best practice cultural safety guidelines.

Guidelines made by the assembly will be non-binding, optional, and must not be contrary to existing state or Commonwealth legislation.

The bill also gives the assembly the power to make appointments of First Peoples to the Aboriginal Heritage Council and the Heritage Council of Victoria.

These decision-making powers will provide certainty and clarity for First Peoples.

Rules and guidelines will be about matters which affect First Peoples and about which the state holds neither the necessary expertise nor authority to effectively make.

Appointments made by the assembly will be to roles reserved by legislation for First Peoples.

Treaty recognises that it is not appropriate for the state to make these decisions and that it is more efficient and effective to have First Peoples making these decisions for their communities.

These rule-, guideline- and decision-making powers exemplify what self-determination looks like in the treaty era – building on First Peoples knowledge and leadership to improve outcomes on matters that affect First Peoples and their communities.

Nginma Ngainga Wara

The National Agreement on Closing the Gap identifies accountability as key to achieving better outcomes for First Peoples to ensure the substantive equality of First Peoples and the equal enjoyment by First Peoples of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The bill creates Nginma Ngainga Wara as an accountability mechanism within the structure of the Gellung Warl.

Nginma Ngainga Wara comes from the Wadi Wadi language.

The Nginma Ngainga Wara’s role will be to ensure accountability for the state’s commitments to First Peoples.

Led by members appointed by the assembly, Nginma Ngainga Wara will conduct inquiries to evaluate and monitor how effective the state government is in achieving better outcomes for First Peoples.

It will not have coercive powers and will be subject to the mutual obligation to act in good faith in any engagement with the state.

Based on the findings of its inquiries, it will provide concrete solutions and recommendations to improve outcomes.

Collaboration in good faith by the state and the assembly to facilitate inquiries by Nginma Ngainga Wara will support progress and improve outcomes.

Its work will allow both community and government to better assess how effective existing government policy and programs are and help us to build more efficient solutions together.

Nginma Ngainga Wara will acquit the state’s commitments under the National Agreement on Closing the Gap to create an independent accountability mechanism to provide concrete solutions and recommendations to improve outcomes for First Peoples.

It will monitor government programs and actions in relation to First Peoples, and implementation of Yoorrook Justice Commission recommendations, by conducting inquiries.

It will also conduct its inquiries independent of both the assembly and the truth-telling arm of Gellung Warl and will not be subject to the direction or control of a minister.

Its processes will be self-determined and led by its members.

Nginma Ngainga Wara will present its findings to the assembly, who will then be able to make use of its representation powers and functions to provide this information to the state with the aim of delivering improved and enduring outcomes for First Peoples.

The requirement that this accountability mechanism established in legislation provide practical and implementable solutions means that the state will have a clearer path to implement the necessary changes and close the gap between First Peoples in Victoria and the broader Victorian community.

Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna

Through this bill and treaty, we commit to continuing to seek a better understanding of the truth of our shared history.

Victoria took the first step towards understanding when we established the Yoorrook Justice Commission. Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna, an office to lead truth-telling and healing established by this bill, is the next step in that journey.

Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna comes from the Wamba Wamba / Wemba Wemba language.

It will be led by three members, appointed by the assembly, who are broadly reflective of the diversity of the experiences and views of First Peoples and other Victorians.

Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna will lead ongoing truth-telling, healing and reconciliation across Victorian towns and regions, promoting our understanding of local history and place.

It will collect stories about the period before 14 May 2021, the commencement of the Yoorrook Justice Commission.

The bill empowers Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna to collect these stories while ensuring that those who share their stories remain largely in control of their information and how it is used.

The office will ensure that confidential information shared with it will not be published without the consent of the person or community who provided that information.

Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna will retain an archive of the truth-telling information it receives and, with the permission of those who have shared their stories, will use the information it collects to support the education of the broader public about our shared history and the impacts of colonisation.

Establishing the office in this way means that First Peoples retain control of culturally sensitive or culturally secret information held by Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna, promoting Indigenous data sovereignty.

Through Nyerna Yoorrook Telkuna, First Peoples in Victoria will have control, access and possession of the information that they have provided to the office, which is about their traditional owner groups, knowledge systems, customs, resources, or territories.

Oversight and accountability

Negotiations have identified the importance of Gellung Warl being subject to sufficient oversight to maintain the trust in Gellung Warl that we have seen in the assembly.

It is important that this oversight is culturally safe and does not undermine Gellung Warl’s independence from the state or its ability to be self-determining.

One way the bill creates this oversight is by amending the Treaty Authority and Other Treaty Elements Act to create a new role of electoral officer within the Treaty Authority to oversee and run the assembly’s elections.

Electoral processes will be independent of Gellung Warl but will be run and overseen by a culturally safe entity and in a manner that respects and is guided by the cultural rights of First Peoples.

Gellung Warl will also be subject to oversight by the same state integrity agencies that usually apply to Victorian government entities, including the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission, Victoria Auditor-General’s Office and the Ombudsman.

This oversight will affirm public confidence in Gellung Warl and its management of its resources and its internal practices.

In addition, the existing strong community accountability demonstrated by the assembly will remain.

Gellung Warl must demonstrate community answerability and will have a community governance and answerability framework, an engagement charter and a vision that sets out how this will be achieved.

Gellung Warl will be democratically and publicly accountable and answerable to community in the performance of its functions, powers and duties.

This framework builds on the successes of the assembly and is informed by established models of deliberative democracy and community engagement, such as local governments.

Gellung Warl will continue to have public reporting obligations, clear election processes, a participatory governance structure and cultural oversight from elders.

Closing remarks

This landmark bill is the next step in Victoria’s journey towards treaty.

Gellung Warl will provide an ongoing representative body for First Peoples which is free from the interference of the state, self-determined and grounded in the lore, law and cultural authority of traditional owners and First Peoples.

It is a product of Victoria’s unique treaty model and an outcome of fair negotiations with the current First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria.

Subject to the passage of this bill through Parliament, the state and the current First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria will formalise the first Statewide Treaty.

This will mark a significant shift in the relationship between the Victorian government and First Peoples – a pathway to change what isn’t working and give First Peoples a say on the legislation and policies that impact their lives.

This bill together with the first Statewide Treaty form the foundation of the new relationship under treaty.

This relationship is premised on the realisation of First Peoples’ unique and inherent right to self-determination.

The bill also enacts special measures for the advancement of First Peoples in order to ensure true, substantive equality for First Peoples in the enjoyment and exercise of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In these ways, the bill reflects and gives effect to the rights and principles enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

This nation-leading bill, and the treaty process as a whole, shows what we can achieve when we listen to First Peoples and work together for better outcomes.

It honours and affirms the special connection which First Peoples have to country, this place now known as Victoria, which we all call home.

It reckons with the wrongs of the past and sets a new course, guided by truth, to a better future.

Treaty will be a source of pride for all Victorians – representative of a proudly diverse and multicultural state which values its history and all of its people.

Because this is not about taking anything away from anyone – it is about practical changes to do things better, together.

I am proud to support this next step in treaty. I am proud that, together, we are improving people’s lives and giving everyone a better future.

I commend the bill to the house.

Danny O’BRIEN (Gippsland South) (15:39): I move:

That the debate be now adjourned.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

Ordered that debate be adjourned for two weeks. Debate adjourned until Tuesday 23 September.