Wednesday, 30 July 2025

Bills

Bail Further Amendment Bill 2025

Statement of compatibility

Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning) (10:41): In accordance with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, I table a statement of compatibility in relation to the Bail Further Amendment Bill 2025:

In accordance with section 28 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, (the Charter), I make this Statement of Compatibility with respect to the Bail Further Amendment Bill 2025.

In my opinion, the Bail Further Amendment Bill 2025, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is compatible with human rights as set out in the Charter. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview

The purpose of the Bail Further Amendment Bill 2025 (the Bill) is to deliver on the Government’s commitment to introduce a second tranche of changes to bail laws in addition to the reforms made by the Bail Amendment Act 2025, to strengthen the response to repeat high harm offending and repeat indictable offending that endangers community safety and wellbeing. This is achieved through amendments to the Bail Act 1977 (the Bail Act) to:

a. introduce a new ‘high degree of probability’ test for people charged with certain repeat, serious offences in Schedule 1 of the Bail Act alleged to have been committed while on bail for one of those specified Schedule 1 offences;

b. uplift the bail test for those accused of indictable offences while already on bail for indictable offences, subject to appropriate safeguards to ensure proportionality;

c. provide that where the Bail Act requires surrounding circumstances to be taken into account, this includes the accused being pregnant or having caring responsibilities;

d. prohibit electronic monitoring of bail conditions by private companies, subject to certain exceptions; and

e. make other consequential and technical changes to improve the operation of bail laws.

Human Rights Issues

The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to the Bill and the operation of the Bill, and the Bail Act more broadly, are:

• Right to liberty and security of the person (section 21), including the right not to be automatically detained (section 21(6));

• Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law (section 25(1));

• Right to recognition and equality before the law (section 8);

• Children in the criminal process (sections 23 and 25(3));

• Protection of families and children (section 17); and

• Rights impacted as a result of detention, namely:

• Freedom of movement (section 12)

• The right to privacy (section 13(a))

• The rights to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19)

• Freedom of expression (section 15(2))

• Peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16)

• The protection of families (section 17), and

• Property rights (section 20).

The operation of the Bail Act does limit Charter rights, and will continue to do so after these reforms, but in my opinion, these are reasonable limitations that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account relevant factors as outlined in section 7(2) of the Charter.

In Victoria, there is a presumption that a person accused of an offence who is held in custody shall be granted bail. This reflects section 25(1) of the Charter which states that a person has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and supports an accused person to remain in the community pending the determination of charges. This presumption of bail is subject to a number of exceptions, directed at ensuring that an accused person does not commit offences while on bail, is not a danger to the public, does not obstruct the course of justice in any way, and appears at subsequent criminal hearings including their trial.

While matters relating to remand principally engage the right to liberty, the very nature of being remanded in custody necessarily involves the limitation of other rights, including freedom of movement (section 12), the right to privacy (section 13(a)), the rights to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19), freedom of expression (section 15(2)), right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16), the protection of families and children (section 17) and the right to property (section 20). This is the result of the deprivation of liberty and the powers held by police officers and officers in charge of custodial facilities that are necessary to maintain good order and security of the facilities and the welfare of detained persons. The family unit will also be affected when a family member is remanded. Therefore, the discussion in this statement of the rights affected by the Bill’s impact on the right to liberty also encompasses the bundle of rights that are necessarily affected by the deprivation of liberty.

Right to liberty and security of the person

Section 21(1) of the Charter protects the right of every person to liberty and security. Section 21(3) provides that a person must not be deprived of their liberty except on grounds, and in accordance with procedures, established by law. Section 21(2) provides that a person must not be subject to arbitrary detention. Together, the effect of sub-sections 21(2) and (3) is that the right to liberty may legitimately be constrained only in circumstances where the deprivation of liberty by detention is both lawful, in that it is specifically authorised by law, and not arbitrary. In order for an interference not to be arbitrary, it must be predictable, just, and reasonable in the sense of being proportionate to a legitimate aim. In the context of bail reform, the right to liberty needs to be balanced with the right to security, specifically, the community’s right to safety and security, which includes protection from being subject to criminal offending. Section 21(6) provides that a person awaiting trial must not be automatically detained in custody.

Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law

Section 25(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The right is relevant where a statutory provision shifts the burden of proof onto an accused in a criminal proceeding, so that the accused is required to prove matters to establish, or raise evidence to suggest, that they are not guilty of an offence.

Rights of children in the criminal process

Section 17(2) of the Charter provides that every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is in their best interests and is needed by them by reason of being a child. This recognises the particular vulnerability of children due to their age and confers additional rights on them.

Section 23 of the Charter builds on the rights of the child protected by section 17(2) by specifying additional protections that are necessary for the humane treatment of a child who is detained or involved in a criminal process. These include that an accused child who is detained, or a child detained without charge, must be segregated from all detained adults (section 23(1)) and that an accused child must be brought to trial as quickly as possible (section 23(2)). Section 25(3) provides that a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of that child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s rehabilitation. This recognises the need for special procedures for children charged with criminal offences.

Recognition and equality before the law

Section 8(3) of the Charter provides that every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination. The purpose of the right to equality is to ensure that all laws and policies are applied equally, without a discriminatory effect.

Section 3(1) of the Charter adopts the definition of ‘discrimination’ in the Equal Opportunity Act 2010, which includes both direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of a protected attribute, including race, sex, disability, age, pregnancy and parental/caregiver status. Under section 9 of that Act, indirect discrimination occurs where a person imposes a requirement, condition or practice that is unreasonable and has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with a protected attribute.

Protection of families and children

Section 17(1) of the Charter recognises that families are the fundamental group unit of society and are entitled to be protected by society and the State. The right is principally concerned with unity of family. ‘Family’ in this context has a broad meaning that encompasses the diversity of families living within Victoria, not only those recognised by formal marriage or cohabitation. This right is related to section 13(a) of the Charter, which relevantly provides that every person has the right not to be subject to unlawful or arbitrary interferences with their family.

Introducing a new ‘high degree of probability’ bail test for repeat high-harm offending

The Bail Act provides a general presumption in favour of granting bail. However, the most serious offences, as listed in Schedule 1 of the Bail Act, attract the most stringent ‘reverse-onus’ bail test. For people accused of these offences, bail must not be granted unless:

• exceptional circumstances exist justifying the granting of bail (‘exceptional circumstances’ test), and

• there is no ‘unacceptable risk’ of the person: committing a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence; otherwise endangering the safety or welfare of another person; interfering with a witness or otherwise obstructing the course of justice; or failing to surrender into custody (‘unacceptable risk’ test).

Where a person is already on bail for a Schedule 1 offence and is accused of committing another Schedule 1 offence while on bail, they continue to face the same two-step bail test – a more onerous test does not apply despite the alleged serious, repeat offending.

To better address the risks to community safety caused by repeat, serious offending, clause 5 of the Bill introduces new section 4F into the Bail Act which is a new ‘high degree of probability’ bail test (HDOP test) for people accused of committing certain specified Schedule 1 offences (a ‘specified Schedule 1 offence’) while on bail for another specified Schedule 1 offence.

New section 4F(1) outlines the six offences that will attract the HDOP test (specified Schedule 1 offences) if alleged to have been committed while on bail for one of these offences. These are:

(a) aggravated home invasion (section 77B of the Crimes Act 1958 (‘Crimes Act’))

(b) aggravated carjacking (section 79A of the Crimes Act)

(c) armed robbery (section 75A of the Crimes Act)

(d) aggravated burglary (section 77 of the Crimes Act)

(e) home invasion (section 77A of the Crimes Act), and

(f) carjacking (section 79 of the Crimes Act).

The offences listed in (a)-(b) above are already contained in Schedule 1, while those listed in (c)-(f) above will become Schedule 1 offences when the relevant amendments in the Bail Amendment Act 2025 commence, which will occur by default on 29 September 2025, or earlier by proclamation.

The new HDOP test will form part of the existing unacceptable risk test in the Bail Act. An accused will present an ‘unacceptable risk’ and be refused bail (even if the bail decision maker is satisfied exceptional circumstances exist) unless the bail decision maker is satisfied there is a high degree of probability that the accused would not commit a specified Schedule 1 offence while on bail.

The Bill will not alter any other part of the ‘unacceptable risk’ test for the HDOP test cohort.

This means that even if the bail decision maker finds there is a low probability the offender will commit a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence on bail (such that the HDOP threshold has been met because the bail decision maker is satisfied there is a high degree of probability that the accused would not commit a specified Schedule 1 offence if released on bail), the gravity of that risk may lead to the conclusion that the risk is unacceptable and warrant the refusal of bail. Likewise, the bail decision maker may still be satisfied by the prosecution that another risk enumerated in section 4E(1)(a) is an unacceptable risk, and refuse bail.

The offences that will be subject to the HDOP test have been selected to address the heightened risks to community safety posed by this type of reoffending while on bail, given:

• these offences are more likely than other Schedule 1 offences to be charged while the accused is on bail

• these offences are charged in higher volumes than other Schedule 1 offences, and

• victims of these offences tend to be randomly targeted, meaning other legislative, policy and programmatic approaches to managing risks are limited.

Right to liberty and security of the person

The right to liberty, in particular the right not to be automatically detained in section 21(6) of the Charter, is engaged because the HDOP test increases the likelihood that an accused person will be remanded in custody. That is, an accused person may be an unacceptable risk of Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 reoffending due to the bail decision maker not being satisfied there is a high degree of probability that the accused would not commit a specified Schedule 1 offence if released on bail, where prior to the introduction of the HDOP test, they may have satisfied the unacceptable risk threshold. This represents a further limitation on the right to liberty.

The right to liberty under section 21 is a right of fundamental importance, but it is not absolute. It may be constrained legitimately in circumstances where the deprivation by detention is both lawful and not arbitrary. In order for an interference not to be arbitrary, it must be predictable, just, and reasonable in the sense of being proportionate to a legitimate aim.

The pressing and substantial purpose of the HDOP test is to protect the community from an identified risk of serious harm to the community’s safety or welfare. Having regard to that purpose, I consider the amendments are justified for the reasons outlined below.

The HDOP test will only apply to accused who are charged with a serious specified Schedule 1 offence that is alleged to have been committed while on bail for another serious specified Schedule 1 offence. The six specified Schedule 1 offences that attract the HDOP test have not been arbitrarily selected. They are all of a serious, high-harm nature which may cause serious risk to the safety of the community.

The selection of the specified Schedule 1 offences is informed by data indicating that accused persons are more likely to be charged with these offences while on bail than other Schedule 1 offences. Further, the data shows that these offences are more likely to be committed in a high volume as compared with other Schedule 1 offences. Finally, these offences often involve the targeting of random victims, usually where there is no pre-existing relationship between the accused and victim. This results in victims, and law enforcement, being unable to predict offending or increase precautions that may prevent offending. The random nature of these offences means there are limited other legislative, policy and programmatic approaches to managing risks attached to these offences.

Accordingly, the limitation is rationally connected and carefully designed to achieve the purpose of protecting the community from an identified risk of serious harm. Importantly, the HDOP test does not displace existing tests in the Bail Act, automatically deem certain offending to be an ‘unacceptable risk’, or automatically preclude the provision of bail.

One factor that guards against the HDOP test resulting in automatic detention, and which contributes to the proportionality of the HDOP test, is that it will only be applied by a court. This is because section 13(3)(a) of the Bail Act sets out that only a court may grant bail to a person accused of a Schedule 1 offence. In applying the HDOP test as part of the unacceptable risk test in section 4E of the Bail Act, the court must consider whether there are any conditions (or combination of conditions) available that will reduce the accused’s risk profile to the extent that there is a high degree of probability that the accused will not engage in serious reoffending if released on bail.

In accordance with section 3AAA of the Bail Act, the court must also take into account all the surrounding circumstances that are relevant to the risk-based HDOP assessment. The narrow focus of the HDOP test on the probability of specified Schedule 1 serious reoffending means that certain circumstances in section 3AAA which may otherwise shift the balance towards a grant of bail, such as the likely sentence to be imposed if the accused is found guilty, may not be relevant to this determination.

When deciding whether to grant bail to an Aboriginal person or a child, the court must take into account the cohort-specific considerations in sections 3A and 3B of the Bail Act. This Bill and the HDOP test do not change the obligation on bail decision makers to consider the matters in these sections. While judicial officers continue to have discretion in respect of the relevance of these factors to each individual case, they will be required to apply the HDOP test, with its focus on the probability of serious reoffending. This may result in some of the cohort-specific factors being less relevant to the overall bail determination, but will be a matter for courts to consider on a case-by-case basis.

Further, the inclusion of the HDOP test does not affect a person’s ability to respond to the allegations made against them, to advocate for why they should be released into the community, to make subsequent applications for bail or to have their matters determined consistently with criminal procedure. The HDOP test will not result in automatic or pre-determined denial of bail.

For the reasons outlined above, I consider that section 21(6) of the Charter which requires that a person awaiting trial must not automatically be detained is not limited. The limitations on a person’s right to liberty in section 21 more generally – where they are assessed as presenting an unacceptable risk to community safety ‍– are reasonable, when balanced against the right to security for members of the public. Consequently, it is my opinion that the HDOP test is an appropriately targeted and reasonably proportionate means to further the legitimate non-punitive purposes of these amendments, in particular the safety and security of the community.

Right to be presumed innocent

Bail is an ancillary criminal process and therefore is not directly relevant to a determination of guilt. However, the presumption of bail in the Bail Act reflects section 25(1) of the Charter by supporting an accused person to remain in the community pending the determination of charges. Therefore, the presumption of innocence may be described as the starting point for bail applications.

The inclusion of the HDOP test in the Bail Act will expose people accused of committing a specified Schedule 1 offence while on bail for another specified Schedule 1 offence to a more stringent test within the ‘unacceptable risk’ test. The new HDOP test is intended to make it easier for the prosecution to make out an unacceptable risk in relation to the accused, which would result in the denial of bail. This could be viewed as undermining the right to be presumed innocent.

It is my opinion that any additional limitation on the presumption of innocence due to the inclusion of the HDOP test in the unacceptable risk test is justified. As outlined in the discussion on the right to liberty and security, the limitation on section 25(1) of the Charter is justified based on the proportionality of the HDOP test, being that it is tailored to specified Schedule 1 offences that have been selected based on evidence relevant to the frequency of that type of reoffending while on bail and the known harm that it causes. It is also justified based on the purpose of the limitation, being the protection of the community from the significant risk of harm that the specified Schedule 1 offences pose, based on the repeated and randomised nature of that offending.

Furthermore, the Bill does not change the existing guiding principle in section 1B of the Bail Act which recognises the importance of the presumption of innocence (together with the right to liberty). Bail decision makers will continue to have regard to the significance of the presumption of innocence when determining bail applications.

Right to recognition and equality

The HDOP test is applicable to all accused, if they are alleged to have engaged in repeat offending of the specified Schedule 1 offences while on bail. Nevertheless, the HDOP test may indirectly limit the right to equality under section 8 of the Charter, if its application results in people with a protected attribute – such as children, Aboriginal people, persons with a disability or those who are pregnant or caregivers – being remanded in disproportionate numbers. As some cohorts with protected attributes are over-represented in the justice system, it is acknowledged that there may be disproportionate impacts of this reform.

Sections 3A and 3B of the Bail Act were introduced in 2018 to mitigate the over-representation of these cohorts. As previously noted, section 3A of the Bail Act requires a bail decision maker to consider specified factors in making a bail determination for an Aboriginal person and aims to acknowledge the unique circumstances for an Aboriginal person, including the historical and ongoing discriminatory systemic factors that have resulted in Aboriginal people being over-represented in the criminal justice system. Section 3B of the Bail Act requires a bail decision maker to consider specified factors in making a bail determination for a child, and was likewise introduced by this government in 2018. Section 3AAA does not relate specifically to one cohort, but requires a bail decision maker to consider special vulnerabilities of an accused including whether they have a disability.

It is noted that in the context of the HDOP test and its focus on an assessment of the risk of serious reoffending, not all of the factors in section 3AAA of the Bail Act will be relevant to assessing the accused person’s reoffending risk. Further, while sections 3A and 3B must still be considered and applied (where appropriate), such consideration will only be relevant to the extent that it has a bearing on reoffending risk. This means that the mitigatory impacts of sections 3A and 3B will be reduced in the context of the HDOP test. Nevertheless, the HDOP test will not change the express obligation on a bail decision maker to incorporate the section 3AAA surrounding circumstances, and the cohort-specific considerations in sections 3A and 3B, into a bail decision relating to certain people, such as a person with a disability, an Aboriginal person or a child.

The application of the HDOP test to carefully selected, clearly specified, high-harm repeat offending is rationally connected and proportionate to achieve the purpose of protecting the community from an identified risk of serious harm. Consequently, any limitation on the right to equality is proportionate and justified in accordance with section 7(2) of the Charter.

Rights of children in the criminal process

The HDOP test will apply to both adults and children charged with repeat, specified Schedule 1 offences committed while on bail for a specified Schedule 1 offence. It is therefore likely that the rights of children in the criminal process will be limited by the HDOP test, given children are accused of the specified Schedule 1 offences to which the HDOP test will apply.

Section 25(3) of the Charter requires that a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s rehabilitation. The HDOP test may increase the likelihood that children accused of specified Schedule 1 offences committed while on bail for a specified Schedule 1 offence will be remanded due to its focus on assessing the risk of serious reoffending. As noted in respect of the right to equality, while section 3B continues to require consideration of factors otherwise generally relevant to the unique vulnerabilities of children (including the child’s age, maturity and stage of development, and the importance of supporting the child to live at home or in safe, stable accommodation), such consideration will only be relevant to the extent it has a bearing on reoffending risk. While this may result in some of the child-specific factors being less relevant to the overall bail determination, their relevance to each individual case will be a matter for judicial discretion.

Where the reforms result in children being remanded as a result of the HDOP test, it is my view that any limitation on the rights of children in the criminal process is justified having regard to the purpose of the limitation being the need to protect the community from harm. This is also in view of the serious nature of the specified offences and the repeated and randomly targeted nature of the specified Schedule 1 offending. The limitation is mitigated by the requirement to consider child specific considerations in section 3B, to the extent they are relevant to reoffending risk in a particular case.

Rights impacted as a result of detention

Additional rights under the Charter will necessarily be limited when a person is detained. These include the rights to freedom of movement (section 12), the right to privacy (section 13(a)), the right to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19), the freedom of expression (section 15(2)), peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16), the protection of families (section 17) and property rights (section 20).

The application of the HDOP test increases the overall likelihood that a person who engages in the specified Schedule 1 offending while on bail for a specified Schedule 1 offence is remanded. Nevertheless, I do not consider that the HDOP test limits the rights impacted as a result of detention. This is because the HDOP test does not impose any new limitations or interfere with the existing consequences that flow from a person being remanded.

Uplifting those accused of an indictable offence while on bail for another indictable offence to a higher bail test

The Bill will apply a more stringent bail test when a person is accused of committing an indictable offence while on bail for another indictable offence by imposing the reverse-onus ‘show compelling reason’ test (a process referred to as ‘uplift’). This uplift will be subject to exceptions so that lower-level or non-violent offending is excluded, particularly as these types of offending (such as theft of low-value items) occur in higher volumes and are often linked to vulnerability and disadvantage. This is intended to mitigate the impact on overrepresented and disadvantaged cohorts.

Reforms in the Bail Amendment Act 2025 re-introduced the offence of ‘committing an indictable offence while on bail for another indictable offence’. The offence, however, is subject to the standard ‘unacceptable risk’ test and not a stricter bail test, despite the fact that an accused is alleged to have engaged in further indictable offending on bail. Data indicates a significant amount of indictable offending occurs while on bail ‍– this has a detrimental impact on community safety.

‘Uplift’ is a term used to describe situations where an accused becomes subject to a more stringent bail test due to the circumstances of their alleged offending. The uplift reform in the Bill (inserted by Division 2, Part 2) provides that a person accused of committing an indictable offence while on bail for another indictable offence will not be granted bail unless:

• a compelling reason exists to justify bail, and

• there is no unacceptable risk of the person committing a further Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence, otherwise endangering the safety or welfare of another person, interfering with the course of justice, or failing to surrender into custody (‘unacceptable risk’ test).

The uplift will apply to indictable offences allegedly committed while on bail for an indictable offence, and subject to numerous indictable offences being exempt or ‘carved out’ from the uplift. Schedules 4 and 5 of the Bill (inserted by clause 12) contain offences that are exempt or ‘carved-out’ from the uplift – Schedule 4 lists the indictable offences excluded from the uplift in their entirety, while Schedule 5 lists the offences excluded from uplift if specified threshold or quantities are not exceeded. These offences have been selected to be excluded from uplift because they are often higher-volume, lower-level indictable offences that are commonly associated with disadvantage, or non-violent offences. Examples of these offences include low-value theft and lower-level drug possession.

In selecting offences for inclusion in Schedules 4 and 5, consideration was given first to those indictable offences that are charged at higher volumes in relation to people on bail, according to available data. Consideration of the inherent nature of the offences (e.g. elements of violence or other serious harm) along with information from the Sentencing Advisory Council (about the type of disposition and/or sentence length these offences typically attract) and available demographic data informed an overall assessment about the seriousness of these offences and their suitability for exclusion from uplift.

Other offences exempted from uplift were selected on the basis that they do not contain an element of force or violence and so pose a less direct threat to community safety. The offences excluded by reason of Schedules 4 and 5 therefore also capture many dishonesty or property offences, such as obtaining property by deception, handling stolen goods and giving false or misleading information.

This is to ensure the uplift is targeted to more serious offending and operates in a way that is proportionate to respond to the risk of harm to the safety and welfare of the community. Key offences that occur at greater rates than other offences, and which will be subject to the new uplift provisions include:

• burglary

• motor vehicle theft

• assaults

• robbery

• riot and affray

• firearms and controlled weapons offences

• theft, where the value of items are above $2,500, and

• criminal damage, where the value of damage is above $5,000, or where damage is caused by fire.

The carve-outs are an essential element of this reform, to ensure the uplift targets offending that most endangers community safety, while reducing the risk of people being remanded due to alleged lower-level offending associated with disadvantage. The scope of the uplift reform is also confined to people who are alleged to have reoffended while on bail (not those who are subject to other forms of conditional liberty).

Right to liberty

The uplift reform engages the right to liberty protected by section 21 of the Charter, as it expands the offences for which the presumption of bail is reversed and an accused person is required to satisfy a reverse-onus bail test such that they must satisfy the bail decision maker that a compelling reason exists to be granted bail. By expanding the reversal of the presumption of bail, the uplift reforms also engage section 21(6) of the Charter, which requires that a person awaiting trial must not be automatically detained.

The purpose of these reforms is to protect the community from repeat offending on bail that poses a risk to community safety and welfare. Subjecting people accused of this kind of repeat offending to a more stringent bail test makes it more likely that they will be refused bail, protecting the community from further potential harm.

Whilst noting the importance of community safety, significant consideration has been given to ensuring lower-level offending that does not have a direct and significant impact on community safety is excluded from the uplift reforms. This reduces the likelihood that the reform will constitute an unjustifiable limit on the right to liberty. To this end, only alleged indictable offending while on bail for previous indictable offending is captured: as set out in new sections 4AA(4A), (4B) and (4C) and inserted by clause 9, all summary offences (which carry lesser penalties) are excluded from these reforms, as well as certain indictable offending that is commonly associated with vulnerability and disadvantage.

The Victorian statute book contains many indictable offences, and there are many Commonwealth indictable offences. The approach taken to excluding indictable offences from the uplift reforms has been to focus on indictable offence types that are committed at a higher volume, whilst also being assessed as having a less significant impact on the safety and welfare of the community. Further, there are known correlations between many of the excluded offences and poverty, homelessness, vulnerability and disadvantage. Thresholds have been applied to the offences of theft, criminal damage and drug possession listed in new Schedule 5 (inserted by clause 12). This will mean that the reforms will apply only to higher-level offending and reduce the likelihood of vulnerable and disadvantaged cohorts being disproportionately impacted by the reforms. This approach has been taken because identifying and ‘carving out’ higher-volume, lower-level offences from the uplift is expected to have the greatest protective impact.

The development of the uplift reform has also been mindful of the unintended consequence of uplifting minor offending to the most onerous ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, as resulted from the ‘double uplift’ effected by the 2018 bail reforms, which was criticised in the findings of the coronial inquest into the passing of proud Gunditjmara, Dja Dja Wurrung, Wiradjuri and Yorta Yorta woman Veronica Nelson. The Bill avoids the ‘double uplift’ because the uplift will operate so that the accused person will face the ‘show compelling reason’ test, rather than the most onerous ‘exceptional circumstances’ test as occurred under the 2018 bail reforms. It will be less difficult for an accused person to satisfy a bail decision maker that there are compelling reasons justifying the granting of bail than it would be if the accused was required to show exceptional circumstances.

Following the unintended impact of the 2018 reforms, the uplift of the previous ‘commit indictable offence whist on bail’ offence to the most onerous ‘exceptional circumstances’ test was removed from the Bail Act in 2023. Unfortunately, despite changes which came into effect in late 2024 to strengthen consideration of community safety in decisions relating to bail revocation, repeat serious offending remains a serious problem. This reform is necessary to ensure bail decision making is calibrated to reflect the seriousness of this kind of repeat indictable offending, while avoiding the disproportionate impacts of previous bail settings.

A key tenet of the Bail Act is tailored and individualised consideration of an accused’s circumstances. The existing tests in the Bail Act, such as the unacceptable risk test, will continue to operate as they currently do, as will the existing (and enhanced) safeguards. One such safeguard is the requirement in section 3AAA of the Bail Act for the bail decision maker to consider all ‘surrounding circumstances’ relevant to a bail decision, such as the nature and seriousness of the alleged offending, including whether it is a serious example of the offence, and the likely sentence to be imposed should the accused be found guilty. While all indictable offending on bail will be included in these reforms unless specifically carved out, the tailored nature of bail decision making means that less serious conduct is more likely to meet the ‘show compelling reason’ test, providing a pathway for bail to be granted in appropriate circumstances (if such offending is not already carved out by operation of clause 9 of the Bill).

The list of surrounding circumstances in section 3AAA of the Bail Act also directs a bail decision maker to consider surrounding circumstances, including particular vulnerabilities, such as mental illness or disability. The Bill strengthens this list of considerations by adding a requirement for bail decision makers to expressly consider whether an accused is pregnant or has caring responsibilities. As discussed in the section on signposting pregnancy and caring responsibilities, previous bail decisions have considered pregnancy and caring responsibilities as important factors in favour of granting bail. Where relevant to an accused, bail decision makers will also continue to be required to consider Aboriginal-specific and child-specific factors set out in section 3A and 3B of the Bail Act respectively.

Additional safeguards include the requirement for a bail decision maker to take into account the guiding principles of the Act, including the importance of the presumption of innocence and right to liberty, and the need for bail decision makers to impose conditions that may mitigate the risk and probability of reoffending.

Noting the previous unintended and disproportionate impact of the 2018 uplift reforms, these uplift reforms (alongside other reforms in the Bill) will be subject to a statutory review in 2027 (clause 18 of the Bill). Importantly, the Bill requires that the statutory review specifically examine the impact of relevant reforms on Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders, without limiting the broader scope of the review.

These factors, in particular limiting the uplift of an accused to face the ‘show compelling reason’ test rather than the most onerous ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, contribute to my assessment that less restrictive means are not reasonably available to achieve the purpose of community safety that this reform is targeting. The Bill is clear as to which types of indictable offending are captured, and provides that certain types of offending are to be excluded from the uplift. This allows me to conclude that it does not infringe on the right of a person not to be subjected to arbitrary detention protected by section 21(2) of the Charter.

The extent of the limitation on the right to liberty is uplifting an accused to face the ‘show compelling reason’ test, in circumstances where the accused is alleged to have committed further, higher-harm indictable offending while on bail for indictable offending. The protection of the community in the face of repeat indictable offending that threatens community safety and welfare is pressing and substantial. As discussed above, the safeguards in the Bail Act mean that the reforms will not result in pre-determined detention contrary to section 21(6) of the Charter, because the accused will continue to have the right to present compelling reasons for their release on bail, with regard to the nature and seriousness of the alleged offending and their individual circumstances.

As outlined in relation to the HDOP test, while the right to liberty is of fundamental importance, it is not absolute and may be legitimately constrained if a deprivation of liberty is lawful and not arbitrary. In my view, the features of the uplift reform I have outlined demonstrate that any deprivation of an accused person’s liberty will be predictable and reasonable in the sense of being proportionate to a legitimate aim. Accordingly, while the reform engages the right to liberty, I consider that the purpose and extent of the limitation on the right are demonstrably justified in accordance with section 7(2) of the Charter.

Right to be presumed innocent

As noted in the discussion of the HDOP test, the presumption of innocence may be described as the starting point for bail applications. In uplifting more cases to face a reverse-onus test, where the accused bears the onus of demonstrating compelling reasons to justify a grant of bail, the reforms have the effect of creating a presumption against bail and thus limiting section 25(1) of the Charter.

In my opinion, the limitation on the right to be presumed innocent is justified. The uplift reforms do not make existing reverse-onus tests more difficult to satisfy, and do not preclude an accused from making submissions in support of their innocence or providing compelling reasons for why they should be released on bail. Furthermore, where an accused is charged with a threshold offence (listed in Schedule 5), the onus is on the prosecution to satisfy the bail decision maker that the threshold has been met and the uplift therefore applies. The Bill does not change the existing guiding principle in section 1B of the Bail Act which recognises the importance of the presumption of innocence, and bail decision makers will continue to have regard to the significance of the presumption of innocence when determining bail applications. As a result, the extent of the limitation caused by the reforms on this right is low. Having regard to this, in conjunction with the purpose of the limitation – to protect the community from repeat offending that poses a risk to its safety and welfare ‍– I am satisfied that this reform is compatible with section 25(1) of the Charter.

Right to recognition and equality

The purpose of the right to recognition and equality in section 8 of the Charter is to ensure that all laws and policies are applied equally, without a discriminatory effect. The uplift reforms may indirectly engage the right to equality, given cohorts with a protected attribute such as children, Aboriginal people or persons with a disability are over-represented in the criminal justice system.

The uplift reforms specifically contemplate how to reduce the potential disproportionate impact on such cohorts. The reforms seek to achieve this outcome by excluding some offences from the application of uplift ‍– in selecting these offences, consideration has been given to selecting offences commonly linked to offending by vulnerable and disadvantaged cohorts. Schedules 4 and 5 set out these offences in full, being primarily offences for low-value theft and criminal damage, non-violent deception offences and lower-level drug possession.

Section 3AAA of the Bail Act directs a bail decision maker to consider whether a person has any special vulnerability, including being an Aboriginal person, child, or having a disability. Where Aboriginal people and children are subject to the uplift, the cohort specific considerations in sections 3A and 3B of the Bail Act will apply. An accused who is pregnant or has caring responsibilities will also have these protected attributes considered by a bail decision maker, due to reforms introduced by this Bill. While it will be up to the bail decision maker to determine how much weight to give these factors, the express requirement for bail decision makers to consider these attributes will ensure they receive thorough consideration and go towards mitigating unintended consequences of the uplift reforms on these cohorts.

As such, it is my view that if the right to equality is engaged, there are sufficient mitigating features to justify any limitation.

Signposting pregnancy and caring responsibilities in bail applications

Section 3AAA of the Bail Act sets out a list of ‘surrounding circumstances’ that must be taken into account by the bail decision maker if they are relevant to the bail determination. Clause 17 of the Bill expands the list of surrounding circumstances, to include express consideration of whether an accused is pregnant or has caring responsibilities.

While bail decision makers must consider all relevant circumstances – not just those listed in the Bail Act – explicitly signposting pregnancy and caring responsibilities in the list of ‘surrounding circumstances’ will encourage bail decision makers to give particular consideration to these factors, if appropriate. Their inclusion in the legislation will also ensure that bail decision makers receive education and training on these specific factors, allowing them to increase their understanding of these factors and their salience in bail decisions, and to give thorough consideration to them.

Protection of families and children

The express inclusion of pregnancy and caring responsibilities promotes the protection of families and children in section 17 of the Charter.

While the consideration of these factors is not determinative of whether an accused will be granted bail, their inclusion highlights the known impact of remand on children, families and individuals who are pregnant. For instance, bail decisions such as Re Ngo [2024] VSC 474 and the Application for bail by SP [2022] VSC 626 have considered pregnancy and caring responsibilities including for the impending birth of a child, respectively, as important factors in favour of granting bail.

Right to recognition and equality

Section 8 of the Charter protects the right to enjoyment of human rights without discrimination, and the entitlement to equal protection of the law without discrimination.

Section 3(1) of the Charter adopts the definition of ‘discrimination’ in the Equal Opportunity Act 2010, thereby protecting the attributes of breastfeeding, pregnancy and a person’s parental status or status as a carer. Under the Charter, discrimination includes direct discrimination, which occurs if a person treats a person with a protected attribute unfavourably because of that attribute, and indirect discrimination, which occurs if a person imposes, or proposes to impose, a requirement, condition or practice that is not reasonable and that disadvantages people with a protected attribute.

Given the inclusion of pregnancy and caring responsibilities as factors a bail decision maker must consider in making a bail decision will not result in unfavourable treatment for people with the attributes listed above, I do not consider that this reform engages the right to equality. Nor do I consider that this reform would constitute discrimination against people not holding the attributes listed above, given pregnancy and caring responsibilities are among a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that bail decision makers must take into account.

Prohibiting privately provided electronic monitoring as a condition of bail

The Bill will ban bail decision makers from imposing privately provided electronic monitoring as a condition of bail. Once new sections 5AAA(7) and (8) (inserted by clause 14) commence, bail decision makers will be prohibited from imposing electronic monitoring conditions on bail orders, unless expressly permitted. The permitted reasons are where the monitoring is facilitated by a prescribed entity, or in accordance with the government-led trial of electronic monitoring of children on bail provided for in Part 2A of the Bail Act (‘child EM trial’). The prohibition in new section 5AAA(7) will apply prospectively, leaving existing electronic monitoring conditions unaffected.

Currently, apart from the child EM trial, section 5AAA of the Bail Act gives bail decision makers the power to impose electronic monitoring in the same way as they may impose any other condition of bail, in order to mitigate risks an accused person may pose. Applicants for bail may obtain privately funded electronic monitoring services as a measure to increase a bail decision maker’s confidence that the applicant will comply with other bail conditions.

The prohibition on privately provided electronically monitored bail follows the collapse of a private company, BailSafe Health Group Pty Ltd (BailSafe), which had offered electronic monitoring services to people on bail. As a result of BailSafe’s failure, any person on bail subject to a bail condition that they be monitored by BailSafe was no longer monitored. While Victoria’s prosecuting agencies took immediate steps to appropriately respond to the collapse of BailSafe to manage risks and promote community safety, this model lacks the rigorous oversight expected in the justice system. Prohibiting the use of electronic monitoring conditions, unless there is appropriate oversight of the provider, is required to promote the safety of the community.

Right to liberty

The right to liberty in section 21 of the Charter may be engaged by this reform, as the unavailability of an electronic monitoring condition (other than as part of the child EM trial) may result in a small number of persons being remanded, when they would otherwise have been granted bail.

In my view, the right under section 21 is not limited by the reform. Section 21(6) provides that a person awaiting trial must not be automatically detained in custody, but that person’s release may be subject to guarantees to attend for trial or other stages of the proceeding. The Supreme Court’s decision in Woods v DPP (Vic) [2014] VSC 1 noted that ‘[u]nder the Bail Act, there is no automatic detention’. Prohibiting a certain class of conduct condition does not affect that conclusion.

Prohibiting the use of private electronic monitoring conditions for bail does not oblige bail decision makers to consider factors that they are not already considering (for example, the non-exhaustive list of ‘surrounding circumstances’ in section 3AAA of the Bail Act), although the absence of the ability to attach a private electronic monitoring condition may result in bail decision makers having one less tool to mitigate the risks that an accused person may pose if released on bail.

The risk to community safety that arose from the failure of a private company providing electronic monitoring services for a fee was unacceptable and requires that private, unregulated electronic monitoring be prohibited. If the right to liberty is engaged, my view is that any limitation on the right is demonstrably justified.

Firstly, the amendment gives effect to a clear purpose of the Bail Act, namely the guiding principle in section 1B(1AA) regarding the overarching importance of maximising, to the greatest extent possible, the safety of the community and persons affected by crime. The community is safest when bail decision makers assess risk and impose conditions that they consider will mitigate risks posed by an accused person on bail. Electronic monitoring that is unregulated and not subject to quality assurance is not able to provide the additional assurance about compliance with bail conditions that a bail decision maker may expect.

Secondly, the extent of the limitation is a marginally higher risk of remand for persons who would not be granted bail except for the imposition of an electronic monitoring condition. It is proportionate to the legitimate aim of promoting community safety, and there are no less restrictive means reasonably available to respond to this identified risk.

The reforms do not operate retrospectively and permit existing electronic monitoring conditions of bail to continue. This provides protection to accused persons who are subject to private electronic monitoring conditions at the time these changes come into effect, as they will not face an increased risk of remand as a result of the banning of private electronic monitoring.

The reforms acknowledge the potential of electronic monitoring of bail provided there is adequate oversight. This is why the prohibition excludes the child EM trial, which commenced on 22 April 2025. In addition, the amendment allows flexibility for the future use of electronic monitoring conditions in the event government prescribes one or more entities to do so. This would allow for mechanisms to be developed to support a different approach in future, potentially to permit electronic monitoring by reputable and reliable private companies subject to appropriate regulatory oversight, while ensuring that what happened with BailSafe does not occur again.

For the reasons outlined above, in my view, the amendments to prohibit electronic monitoring of people on bail do not engage, nor are they incompatible with, any of the rights enshrined in the Charter.

Conclusion

In my opinion the Bill does not unreasonably limit any Charter rights. The amendments to the Bail Act achieve a proportionate balance between the rights protected under the Charter and the protection of the community.

I consider the Bill to be compatible with the Charter.

The Hon. Sonya Kilkenny MP

Attorney-General

Minister for Planning

Second reading

Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning) (10:41): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I ask that my second-reading speech be incorporated into Hansard.

Incorporated speech as follows:

The Bail Further Amendment Bill 2025 (Bill) will amend the Bail Act 1977 (Bail Act) to further protect community safety from the risk posed by repeat, serious offending while on bail.

This Bill builds upon the bail reforms passed by Parliament on 21 March 2025 in the Bail Amendment Act 2025 (Tranche 1). This first tranche of reforms bolstered community safety by prioritising community safety in all bail decisions; strengthening bail tests for several serious crimes; reintroducing bail offences; and removing the principle of remand as a last resort for children. These changes followed earlier reforms in December 2024 which strengthened consideration of community safety in decisions around revoking bail.

Tranche 1 reforms – which will soon commence in full – were designed to jolt the system and send an unambiguous message: bail must be respected. The evidence shows that Tranche 1 is already having its intended effect. As of May 2025, there are 465 more people on remand in Victoria’s prisons and 39 more young people on remand in Youth Justice, compared to April last year.

This Bill delivers on the Government’s commitments to:

• introduce a new ‘high degree of probability’ test for people charged with certain repeat, serious offences in Schedule 1 of the Bail Act

• uplift the bail test for those accused of an indictable offence while already on bail for an indictable offence to the reverse-onus ‘show compelling reasons’ test, subject to safeguards to ensure proportionality

• prohibit privately-provided electronic monitoring as a condition of bail, subject to further regulation.

I will now explain the key features of the reforms in further detail.

Introducing a new ‘high degree of probability’ bail test for specified repeat, serious offending

The Bill introduces a new ‘high degree of probability’ bail test (HDOP test) that will apply to people accused of specified repeat, serious offences committed while they are on bail. The new HDOP test will be extremely hard to pass.

The Bail Act provides a general presumption in favour of granting bail. However, where somebody is charged with a serious offence listed in Schedule 1 or 2 to the Bail Act, more stringent ‘reverse-onus’ bail tests apply. These tests require the accused to satisfy the bail decision maker (BDM) they should be granted bail.

The most serious offences are listed in Schedule 1 of the Bail Act and attract the most onerous bail test. A person charged with a Schedule 1 offence must not be granted bail unless:

• exceptional circumstances exist justifying the granting of bail, and

• there is no ‘unacceptable risk’ of the accused committing a Schedule 1 or 2 offence; otherwise endangering the safety or welfare of another person; interfering with a witness or otherwise obstructing the course of justice; or failing to surrender into custody if they are released on bail.

Where a person is already on bail for a Schedule 1 offence and is accused of committing another Schedule 1 offence, they continue to face the same two-step bail test – no more onerous test applies despite the alleged repeat offending.

To better address the risks to community safety caused by repeat, serious offending, the Bill will introduce the stringent HDOP test for people accused of committing a specified Schedule 1 offence while already on bail for another specified Schedule 1 offence. The specified Schedule 1 offences that will be subject to the new HDOP test are:

• aggravated home invasion

• aggravated carjacking

• armed robbery

• aggravated burglary

• home invasion, and

• carjacking

The HDOP test has been targeted towards these six Schedule 1 offences to address the heightened risks to community safety posed by this type of reoffending while on bail, given these offences:

• are more likely than other Schedule 1 offences to be allegedly committed on bail

• are committed in higher volumes compared to other Schedule 1 offences, and

• tend to be randomly targeted, meaning other legislative, policy and programmatic approaches to managing risks are limited.

The new HDOP test will form part of the existing unacceptable risk test in the Bail Act. An accused will present an ‘unacceptable risk’ and be refused bail unless the BDM is satisfied there is a high degree of probability that the accused would not commit a specified Schedule 1 offence while on bail. As with the existing unacceptable risk test, the onus of establishing the HDOP test will rest with the prosecution.

The HDOP test will operate in a similar way as the ‘high degree of confidence’ test in NSW, but unlike NSW, the HDOP test will apply to both adults and children, will apply to a broader range of offending, and will not be subject to a sunset clause (but will instead be subject to statutory review).

The other ways in which an ‘unacceptable risk’ can be established will still apply to the HDOP test cohort. For example, even if a person ‘passes’ the HDOP test, they could still be refused bail if they pose an unacceptable risk of interfering with a witness.

Importantly, when applying the HDOP provisions, BDMs will still be required to consider existing factors in the Bail Act which ensure a risk-based, proportionate application of bail tests. These include consideration of whether there are any available bail conditions that may mitigate the risk of re-offending. BDMs will also still be required to consider any surrounding circumstances relevant to the risk-based focus of the HDOP test. Certain surrounding circumstances that do not go to risk of re-offending, such as the likely sentence if the accused were found guilty, will however be less relevant to determining the HDOP test. Aboriginal-specific and child-specific considerations will also continue to apply and inform the BDM’s assessment of whether bail should be granted. However, some of the specific considerations are again likely to be less relevant. The HDOP test will be difficult to pass, but, it will be possible where re-offending risks can be appropriately mitigated and managed. This may be through the imposition of bail conditions, including conditions (or a combination of conditions) that had not previously been imposed on the accused person.

Uplifting the bail test for individuals accused of repeat indictable offending

The Bill will also uplift the bail test for people accused of committing an indictable offence while already on bail for an indictable offence, subject to safeguards to ensure proportionality.

The Tranche 1 reforms re-introduced the offence of committing an indictable offence while on bail.

To further protect the community from the risk of harm caused by repeat indictable offending, the Bill will ‘uplift’ the bail test – that is, those accused of committing an indictable offence while on bail for another indictable offence will face the reverse-onus ‘show compelling reasons’ bail test.

While the uplift will apply to a broad range of indictable offences – such as burglary, stalking, assaults and conduct endangering life or persons – a range of indictable offences will be exempt or ‘carved out’ from the uplift, to ensure proportionality.

Previous uplift reforms highlight the critical importance of these carve-outs in managing impacts on vulnerable and overrepresented cohorts in the criminal justice system. For example, 2018 reforms that resulted in a ‘double-uplift’ effect had disproportionate and detrimental impacts on Aboriginal people and women. The ‘double-uplift’ resulted in people accused of even minor repeat indictable offences – that are largely driven by disadvantage and do not have a significant impact on community safety – having to face the most onerous ‘exceptional circumstances’ bail test.

To avoid detrimental and unintended consequences of previous reforms, the Bill will ‘carve-out’ a range of lower-level indictable offences from the uplift. Key carve-outs include low-value theft and criminal damage; non-violent property and deception offences; and lower-level drug possession – offences that are often linked to disadvantage, homelessness, and other underlying factors.

The approach to what is included in the uplift and what is carved out is ultimately guided by which offences pose the biggest risk to community safety and welfare. Offences which are more likely to cause harm to the community, particularly when repeatedly engaged in, have been targeted. Conversely, offences that have been carved out of the uplift include those that are often driven by disadvantage, as well as other non-violent or low-level offences.

Importantly, the ‘double-uplift’ effect will also not be possible under the proposed reforms.

While carve-outs are the most important factor ensuring proportionality in the uplift, existing mechanisms in the Bail Act will provide an additional level of safeguarding. These include requirements for BDMs to consider circumstances surrounding a person’s alleged offending, as well as Aboriginal-specific and child-specific factors where relevant. Consideration of these factors was bolstered through 2023 bail reforms and will be further strengthened through the Bill (see below).

Existing bail tests will also help ensure a proportionate, risk-based approach to bail decisions. For example, where an accused is charged with a minor indictable offence that is not captured by the uplift, the ‘unacceptable risk’ test will continue to apply. Where offences are captured by the uplift, the ‘show compelling reason’ test, in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances and Aboriginal and child-specific factors in the Bail Act, will also promote proportionality. Less serious alleged conduct is more likely to satisfy the ‘show compelling reason’ test, providing an opportunity for the granting of bail in appropriate circumstances.

Signposting pregnancy and caring responsibilities in bail applications

The Bill will specifically list pregnancy and caring responsibilities as ‘surrounding circumstances’ to be considered in bail decisions.

Section 3AAA of the Bail Act lists a broad range of circumstances that BDMs need to consider in every bail decision. While BDMs must consider all relevant circumstances – not just those listed in the Bail Act – signposting factors in legislation can encourage thorough consideration by BDMs and ensures BDMs receive education and training on each of them.

For these reasons, the Bill will add pregnancy and caring responsibilities into the list of surrounding circumstances. More thorough and well-informed consideration of these factors will in turn help mitigate unintended consequences of reforms on people who are pregnant or have caring responsibilities.

The amendments will be particularly helpful in mitigating any disproportionate and detrimental impacts of the uplift on women and children. While the scope of uplift carve-outs is the most critical factor for managing these risks, the reforms to surrounding circumstances will provide an additional level of safeguarding.

To support implementation of the Bill, government will ensure affected stakeholders – such as Victoria Police, the Courts and Office of Public Prosecutions – are provided with training on key elements such as the HDOP test and uplift.

Statutory review of Bail Act amendments

Importantly, the Bill will also amend the existing statutory review provision in the Bail Act to specifically require that review to examine the impact of bail reform on Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander people. The Department of Justice and Community Safety will work with Aboriginal Justice Caucus on the design of the statutory review, which must start no later than two years after the commencement of the Bail Amendment Act 2025. I have also asked my Department to engage with Aboriginal Justice Caucus and relevant agencies on training and related materials, particularly around the surrounding circumstances and related factors BDMs must take into account.

Prohibiting the use of electronic monitoring as a condition of bail

The Bill will prohibit BDMs from imposing electronic monitoring as a bail condition – including any electronic monitoring by private companies – unless the service is provided by an entity prescribed in regulations.

This reform responds to community safety concerns that arise where the viability of private companies providing electronic monitoring of bail (EM) cannot be assured. While the Bill will ban such private electronic monitoring of bail, the reform provides flexibility for EM to be delivered by reliable, reputable organisations if government prescribes them in regulations. This ability to prescribe providers recognises that a regulatory approach to private EM could in future be an effective way to manage risks of releasing an accused on bail.

Other changes to improve the operation of bail laws

The Bill will include further amendments to improve the operation of bail laws, including:

• ensuring individuals released on bail pending family violence intervention order proceedings can be charged with contravening their bail conditions, and

• providing for reforms in the Bill to be captured in the scheduled statutory review of the Bail Act.

Conclusion

Tranche 1 reforms passed earlier this year have ensured community safety is at the centre of bail laws in line with Victorians’ expectations. The Bill will bolster community safety further, by targeting repeat serious offending and repeat indictable offending. However, learning from past bail reforms, the Bill will also include critical safeguards, to help minimise any unintended consequences on vulnerable and overrepresented cohorts.

Importantly, enduring community safety requires more than bail reform. That is why the government is investing in bail support and interventions alongside the Bill, and has a range of policy settings to tackle the underlying causes of crime.

This complementary work recognises that the best outcome is for people to avoid contact with the criminal justice system altogether and, when people do engage with the system, to provide timely and effective supports to get their lives back on track.

I commend the Bill to the House.

Michael O’BRIEN (Malvern) (10:41): I move:

That the debate be now adjourned.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

Ordered that debate be adjourned for two weeks. Debate adjourned until Wednesday 13 August.