Thursday, 23 June 2022

Bills

Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Amendment Bill 2022

Statement of compatibility

Ms D’AMBROSIO (Mill Park—Minister for Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Minister for Solar Homes) (10:08): In accordance with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 I table a statement of compatibility in relation to the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Amendment Bill 2022.

In accordance with section 28 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Charter), I make this statement of compatibility with respect to the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Amendment Bill 2022 (the Bill).

In my opinion, the Bill, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is compatible with the human rights protected by the Charter. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview of the Bill

The main purposes of the Bill are to—

(a) amend the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Act 2007 to—

(i) expand the powers and functions of the Essential Services Commission under that Act; and

(ii) introduce new requirements relating to accreditation, including annual review and fit and proper person requirements; and

(iii) extend the operation of the Victorian energy efficiency target scheme; and

(iv) provide for the grant and administration of accounts for transferring certificates under that Act; and

(v) make further provision for the internal review and provide for the external review of certain decisions made by the Essential Services Commission; and

(vi) make further provision for matters relating to the enforcement of that Act and the regulations made under that Act, including by introducing new offences and engaging with the civil penalty requirement regime under the Essential Services Commission Act 2001; and

(vii) provide for the conduct of compliance audits and assurance audits of accredited persons; and

(viii) make other miscellaneous and consequential amendments; and

(b) make a consequential amendment to the Essential Services Commission Act 2001.

Human rights issues

The VEET Act established the VEET scheme, which promotes activities that will contribute to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by consumers of electricity and gas. The VEET scheme operates so that individual consumers who undertake activities to abate the use of energy can create energy certificates, which can then be sold to retailers who are required to produce a certain number of certificates each year to the Commission. Under the VEET scheme, businesses, body corporates or sole traders may become ‘accredited persons’ who are authorised to create energy efficiency certificates. Insofar as a natural person may, however, become an accredited person under the VEET scheme, a number of human rights issues arise.

The Charter rights to privacy (section 13(a)), property (section 20), and fair hearing (section 24(1)), as well as the presumption of innocence (section 25(1)), protection against self-incrimination (section 25(2)(k), and protection against double punishment (section 26), summarised below, are relevant to the Bill.

Section 13(a) of the Charter provides that a person has the right not to have their privacy unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with. An interference will be lawful if it is permitted by a law which is accessible and precise, and will be arbitrary only if it is capricious, unpredictable, unjust or unreasonable, in the sense of being disproportionate to the legitimate aim sought.

Section 20 of the Charter provides that a person must not be deprived of their property other than in accordance with law. The right will not be limited where the law (whether legislation or the common law) authorising the deprivation of property is clear and precise, accessible to the public, and does not operate arbitrarily.

Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding has the right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. The concept of a ‘civil proceeding’ is not limited to judicial processes, but may encompass the decision-making procedures of many types of tribunals, boards and other administrative decision-makers with the power to determine private rights and interests. The right may be limited if a person faces a procedural barrier to bringing their case before a court, or where procedural fairness is not provided. However, the entire decision-making process, including reviews and appeals, must be examined in order to determine whether the right is limited.

Section 25(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The right is relevant where a statutory provision shifts the burden of proof onto an accused in a criminal proceeding, so that the accused is required to prove matters to establish, or raise evidence to suggest, that they are not guilty of the offence.

Section 25(2)(k) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence is entitled not to be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt. This right is at least as broad as the common law privilege against self-incrimination. It protects against the admission, in subsequent criminal proceedings, of incriminatory material obtained from a person under compulsion, regardless of whether the information was obtained prior to or subsequent to the criminal charge being laid.

Section 26 of the Charter provides that a person must not be tried or punished more than once for an offence in respect of which they have already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with law.

Requirements to provide information to the Commission

Clauses 7, 9, 10, 24 and 38 of the Bill (described below) each require certain persons to provide information to the Commission.

Clause 7 of the Bill amends section 9 of the VEET Act, which relates to applications to the Commission to become an accredited person or to renew an existing accreditation. Relevantly, new section 9(2) requires an applicant to declare that they are a ‘fit and proper person’ and a ‘competent and capable person’ and, when applying for renewal, to include a declaration and a report as to the person’s compliance or non-compliance with any CPD obligations, or conditions or restrictions on accreditation. In addition, new section 9(4) provides that an applicant for renewal of accreditation must provide evidence to the Commission to support the person’s declaration, where the Commission so requires under new section 10A (inserted by clause 9). New section 11(4) inserted by clause 10 provides that in determining an application for the grant or renewal of accreditation, the ESC may have regard to any available information about any previous conduct of the applicant in exercising powers and performing duties as an accredited person

Clause 9 of the Bill inserts new sections 10A, 10B and 10C into the VEET Act. Under new section 10A, the Commission may require an applicant for accreditation or renewal to provide evidence as to whether they are a fit and proper person, and a competent and capable person, and to provide any other information relevant to the application. New sections 10B and 10C set out the kinds of matters which the Commission may consider, including whether the person has been found guilty of, or has a pending change in relation to, certain offences.

Clause 24 of the Bill inserts new Division 6 into Part 3 of the VEET Act, which relates to applications to the Commission to open a VEET scheme registry account. New section 26A(2)(a) provides that an applicant must include a declaration that they are a fit and proper person, and new section 26A(2)(c) requires an applicant to provide any other information requested by the Commission. Clause 24 also inserts new section 26H also powers ESC to request by ESC for further information may request a person who holds a VEET scheme registry account to provide within a period (not less than 14 days) specified in the notice—

(a) evidence as to whether the accredited person is a fit and proper person for the purposes of holding a VEET scheme registry account;

(b) any other information relevant to whether the person should hold a VEET scheme registry account.

Clause 38 inserts new Division 3 (suspension and cancellation of accreditation) into Part 3 of the VEET Act. New section 14AD(1) provides that the Commission may, by written notice, request an accredited person to provide evidence as to whether they are a fit and proper person, and a competent and capable person, and to provide any other information relevant to the accredited person.

Privacy

To the extent that the information which a person must provide to the Commission under clauses 7, 9, 10, 24 and 38 may include personal information, these clauses may interfere with the right to privacy in section 13(a) of the Charter. In my opinion, any interference with privacy effected pursuant to these clauses will be lawful, as the amended or new provisions of the VEET Act are accessible and precisely formulated. I am also satisfied that any interference with privacy made in accordance with these sections will not be arbitrary, as it is reasonably necessary to support the Commission’s ability to ensure that only fit, proper, competent and capable persons receive accreditation, which in turn supports the integrity of the VEET scheme.

In particular, any interference with a person’s privacy will be modest, as there is a reduced expectation of privacy in the context of a regulated industry like the VEET scheme. Persons participating in the scheme do so voluntarily, and so any decision to disclose information to the Commission is ultimately at the discretion of the applicant.

In addition, the kinds of matters the Commission may consider in relation to a person’s accreditation (and therefore, the information which may be ‘relevant’ to an application or to accreditation) are carefully tailored to the legislative objective of ensuring accredited persons are fit, proper, competent and capable.

Furthermore, existing section 65 of the VEET Act contains an important privacy safeguard, by making it an offence to disclose confidential information obtained during the exercise of powers or functions under, or in connection with, the VEET Act, except in limited circumstances.

Offence for failure to disclose adverse matter without reasonable excuse

Clause 13 of the Bill inserts new Subdivision 4 into Division 1 of Part 3 of the VEET Act. New section 14D provides that it is an offence for an accredited person to fail, without ‘reasonable excuse’, to disclose to the Commission any adverse matter as defined in new section 10B(2) to mean any matter that is likely to impact on the ESC considering the person to be, for the purposes of accreditation—(a) a fit and proper person, having regard to the matters specified in section 10B; or (b) a competent and capable person, having regard to the matters specified in section 10C.

This clause engages the Charter right to privacy (section 13(a)), the presumption of innocence (section 25(1)), and protection against self-incrimination (section 25(2)(k)). However, for the reasons set out below, I do not consider that clause 13 limits these rights.

Privacy

The requirement in new section 14D for an accredited person to disclose any ‘adverse matter’ to the Commission may interfere with an accredited person’s privacy (where they are a natural person). However, for the reasons set out above in relation to clauses9, 10, 24 and 38, any such interference will be lawful (new section 14D is accessible and precise) and reasonably necessary to the objective of safeguarding the integrity of the VEET scheme. Therefore, clause 13 does not limit the right to privacy.

Presumption of innocence

New section 14D engages the presumption of innocence because the ‘reasonable excuse’ exception places an evidential burden on a person accused of the offence. However, it does not transfer the legal burden of proof to the accused. Once the accused has adduced (or pointed to) evidence of a reasonable excuse, which will ordinarily be particularly within their knowledge, the burden shifts back to the prosecution to prove the essential elements of the offence. I do not consider that an evidential onus of this kind limits the right to be presumed innocent in section 25(1) of the Charter.

Protection against self-incrimination

New section 14D requires an accredited a person to disclose any adverse matter (as defined in new section 10B(2) ) to the Commission, which includes whether the person has been found guilty of certain criminal offences (new section 10B(a) to (c)), whether the person has a pending charge for an alleged commission of an offence specified in new section 10B(a) to (c) (new section 10B(d)), whether the person has engaged in any improper or adverse conduct (new section 10B(f)), and whether the person has failed to comply with a court or tribunal or ESC order (new section 10B(k)). Failure to disclose, without reasonable excuse, is an offence.

To the extent that a person may be required to disclose information which could tend to incriminate them, new section 14D may engage the protection against self-incrimination under section 25(2)(k) of the Charter. In my view, however, the right is not limited because the duty to disclose is subject to a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence, which expressly includes under new section 14E that that it is a reasonable excuse for the purposes of section 14D(1) for a person to refuse or fail to disclose an adverse matter within the meaning of that section if the disclosure of the adverse matter would tend to incriminate the person.

This is also consistent with existing protections against self-incrimination contained in sections 52 and 62 of the VEET Act.

Commission’s power to suspend or cancel accreditation or VEET scheme registry account

Clause 38 replaces sections 14 and 14A of the VEET Act with new Division 3 (suspension and cancellation of accreditation) of Part 3. New section 14 empowers the Commission to suspend (for a period not exceeding 12 months) or cancel a person’s accreditation, or cancel a person’s accreditation and disqualify them from reapplying for renewal (for a period not exceeding 5 years), where it believes on reasonable grounds that any of the grounds set out in subsection 14(1) are met. The grounds include that the accredited person has committed an offence against the VEET Act, failed to comply with the requirement of the VEET Act or regulations relating to the recording or undertaking of prescribed activities, or obtained accreditation improperly. New section 15A(c) (inserted by clause 39) provides that it is an offence for a person to undertake a prescribed activity if their accreditation is suspended or has been cancelled. New section 14AB provides that the Commission may suspend the accreditation of an accredited person without notice if the Commission considers immediate suspension necessary, having regard to whether the person is a fit and proper person, whether the person is a competent and capable person, and the purposes of the VEET Act.

Clause 24 of the Bill inserts new Division 6 (VEET scheme registry accounts) into Part 3 of the VEET Act. New section 26D provides that the Commission may suspend a VEET scheme registry account for a period of up to 12 months if the Commission determines that the account holder is not a fit and proper person, or the account holder breaches a condition of the account. New section 26F empowers the Commission to suspend an account without notice where it considers that immediate suspension is necessary, having regard to whether the account holder is a fit and proper person, and the purposes of the VEET Act. New section 26I provides that the Commission may cancel an account if the Commission has suspended the account on 3 occasions. A person must not trade or surrender a certificate if the person’s account is suspended or cancelled, unless the Commission has granted them permission (new section 26K(2)).

For the reasons set out below, I consider that clauses 24, 38 and 39 may engage, but do not limit, the Charter rights to privacy (section 13(a)), property (section 20) and fair hearing (section 24(1)), and the protection against self-incrimination (section 25(2)(k)) and double punishment (section 26).

Privacy

Restrictions upon a person’s ability to work may engage the right to privacy in circumstances where they have a sufficient impact upon a person’s capacity to experience a private life, maintain social relations or pursue employment. Therefore, clauses 24, 38 and 39 may empower the Commission to interfere with a person’s right to privacy.

However, any interference will be neither unlawful (because it is authorised by an accessible and precise law) nor arbitrary.

In particular, the Commission may only suspend or cancel a person’s accreditation, or cancel an accreditation and disqualify the person from seeking renewal, for one of the reasons listed in section 14(1). These grounds are appropriately tailored to the objective of enabling the Commission to ensure accredited persons are of good character and to protect the reputation and integrity of the VEET scheme. There are express time limits on suspension or disqualification. Similarly, the Commission may only suspend or cancel a VEET scheme registry account where the holder is no longer a fit and proper person (for example, because they have been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or fraud), or has breached a condition of the account. This power is reasonably necessary to uphold the integrity of the accounts, and the effective operation of the certificate market more broadly.

Moreover, a person may apply for the Commission to reconsider a decision made under new sections 14 or 26D (section 56(2), replaced by clauses 25 and 42) and apply to VCAT for review of any such decision (section 56B, inserted by clauses 26 and 43). This offers further protection against any arbitrary interferences with privacy under clauses 24, 38 and 39.

Property

Insofar as an accreditation or a VEET scheme registry account could be characterised as ‘property’ under section 20 of the Charter, the Commission’s powers to suspend or cancel an accreditation or account may be considered to affect a deprivation of a person’s property.

However, I do not consider that clauses 24, 38 and 39 limit the Charter right to property because any deprivation of property made pursuant to the sections inserted into the VEET Act by those clauses will be ‘in accordance with law’. In particular, the detailed list of grounds pursuant to which the Commission may suspend or cancel an accreditation or VEET scheme registry account protects against arbitrary exercises of the Commission’s powers.

Fair hearing

Insofar as clause 38 provides for the immediate suspension of an accreditation (new section 14AB), and clause 24 provides for the immediate suspension of a VEET scheme registry account (new section 26F), the right to a fair hearing in a civil proceeding (section 24(1)) may be engaged. While there is doubt under the current case law as to whether the Commission would be considered a ‘tribunal’ so as to enliven this right, or whether ‘civil proceeding’ extends to administrative decision-making of this nature (involving determination of provisional and conditional interests such as accreditation or registry accounts), I will nevertheless consider this right.

The concept of a fair hearing encompasses procedural fairness, which requires a party to a proceeding to have a reasonable opportunity to put forward their case under conditions which do not place them at a substantial disadvantage to their opponent. Absence of notice prior to suspension may therefore engage this aspect of the right.

However, having regard to the entirety of the process for suspensions of accreditation or VEET scheme registry accounts, I am satisfied that a person who is a party to those proceedings will be accorded a fair hearing. In particular, new section 14AB(2) provides that the Commission must give a person whose accreditation is immediately suspended written notice stating the grounds for the suspension, and inviting the person to make a submission to establish why their accreditation should not be suspended. This allows affected persons to be properly informed of the case being advanced by the Commission, and provides them a reasonable opportunity to respond. New section 14AF(1) provides that, after considering any submissions made by the person and any other available information, the Commission may revoke a suspension under new section 14AB(1), take any action under new section 14, or take no further action. A similar process is set out in new sections 26F(2) and 26H(1) in relation to immediate suspensions of VEET scheme registry accounts. Last, as discussed above, a person may apply to the Commission to reconsider any decision of the Commission under new sections 14 or 26D (section 56(2), replaced by clauses 25 and 42) and may apply to VCAT for review of any such decision (section 56B, inserted by clauses 26 and 43).

Accordingly, I am of the view that clauses 24 and 38 are compatible with the right to a fair hearing.

Protection against self-incrimination

New sections 14A and 14AB(2) (inserted by clause 38) provides for a person whose accreditation is proposed to be suspended or cancelled, or who may be disqualified from seeking renewal, or whose accreditation has been immediately suspended, to make submissions to the Commission to establish why the action should not be taken. A similar process for submissions is included in new sections 26E and 26F(2) (inserted by clause 24), in relation to the suspension or cancellation of VEET scheme registry accounts. To the extent that the submission may relate to conduct that could also be the subject of a criminal charge against the person (for example, improper or adverse conduct, or failure to comply with a court order), clauses 24 and 38 may engage the protection against self-incrimination in section 25(2)(k) of the Charter.

While it is not mandatory for an accredited person to make a submission to the Commission, a person may nevertheless be considered to be ‘compelled’ (in a practical sense) to make a submission in order for the person to retain their accreditation or their VEET scheme registry account, especially where this may be critical to their livelihood.

Nevertheless, I do not consider that these provisions limit the protection against self-incrimination, because new section 14AE it is a reasonable excuse for the purposes of section 14AD(1) for a person to refuse or fail to disclose an adverse matter within the meaning of that section if the disclosure of the adverse matter would tend to incriminate the person. This is also the case in new sections 14E, 26I, and 55P. In other words, information submitted by a person to the Commission cannot subsequently be used against them in a criminal proceeding.

This is also consistent with existing protections against self-incrimination contained in sections 52 and 62 of the VEET Act.

Protection against double punishment

Clauses 24 and 38 may engage the protection against double punishment insofar as a natural person who has been previously been tried and convicted of a criminal offence may have their accreditation suspended or cancelled, and be disqualified from applying for reaccreditation, or have their VEET scheme registry account suspended or cancelled, on the basis of the same underlying conduct.

In my view, however, these clauses do not limit the protection against double punishment in section 26 of the Charter, because they do not impose penal consequences. Rather, the legislative purpose is to enable the Commission to ensure accredited persons are of good character, and to protect the integrity of the VEET scheme and the effective operation of the certificates market.

This may also apply to clause 41 in so far as a natural person is liable to an offence for not complying with a shortfall statement issued to the person under section 36. In my view, however, these clauses do not limit the protection against double punishment in section 26 of the Charter, because the consequence from the new offence in section 37A under clause 41 is distinct and independent as a failure to comply with the statement issued by the ESC under section 36, as distinct from the civil pecuniary penalty which is a kind of restitution type payment required under section 28.

Compliance audits

Clause 52 of the Bill inserts new Part 7A into the VEET Act, which is intended to strengthen the legal framework that applies to compliance and assurance audits. New section 55A provides that, if the Commission has reasonable grounds to suspect that an accredited person has contravened a provision of the VEET Act or regulations, the Commission may conduct a compliance audit of the accredited person, or require the accredited person to arrange for a compliance audit by an independent auditor. Similarly, new section 55G provides that the Commission may require an accredited person to arrange for the conduct of an assurance audit by an independent auditor. New section 55R allows the Commission to publish information about compliance and assurance audits for accredited persons on the Commission’s internet site.

This clause engages the Charter right to privacy (section 13(a)), the right to property (section 20), and the protection against self-incrimination (section 25(2)(k)). However, for the reasons set out below, I do not consider that clause 52 limits any of these rights.

Privacy

To the extent that the information that may be published on the Commission’s internet site pursuant to new section 55R may include personal information, clause 52 will engage, but not limit, the right to privacy. Any interference with privacy will be lawful, as new section 55R is accessible and precisely formulated, and will not be arbitrary as it is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of maintaining the integrity of and maintaining public confidence in the VEET scheme.

In particular, any interference with a person’s privacy will be modest, as there is a reduced expectation of privacy in the context of a regulated industry like the VEET scheme and persons participating in the scheme do so voluntarily. Also, new section 55R limits the type of information which may be published: the Commission may not publish information about an accredited person where the auditor identified significant issues.

Lastly, the Commission is a ‘public authority’ under the Charter, so it must act in accordance with human rights (including the right to privacy) when disclosing personal information (s 38 of the Charter).

Property

It is possible that clause 52 may be considered to result in a deprivation of property insofar as an accredited person is required to bear the costs associated with the conduct of a compliance or assurance audit (new sections 55F(2), 55J(2)).

However, I do not consider that clause 52 limits the Charter right to property because any deprivation resulting from an audit required by the Commission, in accordance with new Part 7A, will be ‘in accordance with law’. In particular, the requirement for an accredited person to bear the cost of an audit is reasonably necessary to support the objective of maintaining the integrity of the VEET scheme.

Protection against self-incrimination

New sections 55B(c) and 55F(1)(b) (inserted by clause 52) require an accredited person to comply with the Commission or independent auditor in the conduct of a compliance audit. Similarly, new section 55J(1)(b) requires an accredited person to cooperate with an independent auditor in the conduct of an assurance audit. Under new section 55O, it is an offence for a person who is required to disclose information to an auditor for the purposes of a compliance or assurance audit to withhold the information or otherwise fail to disclose it. To the extent information which an accredited person must disclose to an auditor may relate to a matter which may also be the subject of a criminal charge against that person, and therefore compel the person to incriminate themselves, the protection against self-incrimination in section 25(2)(k) may be engaged.

Nevertheless, I do not consider that these provisions limit the protection against self-incrimination, because new section 55P provides it is a reasonable excuse for the purposes of sections 55N and 55O for a person to refuse or fail to disclose information or produce a document to an auditor or withhold the information, if the disclosure of the information or production of the document would tend to incriminate the person. In other words, information required to be submitted by a person to an auditor cannot subsequently be used against that person in a criminal proceeding.

This is also consistent with existing protections against self-incrimination contained in sections 52 and 62 of the VEET Act.

Application of civil penalty regime

Clause 45 inserts new section 6A into the VEET Act, and clause 46 inserts new Part 6A. Together, these clauses apply the Essential Services Commission Act 2001 enforcement and civil penalty regime to provisions of the VEET Act specified as civil penalty requirements in the Schedule (inserted by clauses 29, 37, 44, 46, and 47).

The possibility that a natural person who has been tried and finally convicted of an offence may be subsequently tried for a civil penalty and/or punished for the same underlying conduct, engages the right not to be tried or punished more than once under section 26 of the Charter.

However, in my view, the protection against double jeopardy is not limited because new section 40D expressly provides that a contravention of a civil penalty provision is not an offence. Moreover, I do not consider that a penalty imposed for breach of a civil penalty requirement under the Essential Services Commission Act 2001 serves a punitive function, so as to limit the protection against double punishment. For example, section 54(2) requires a person who is subject to a civil penalty order to pay the civil penalty amount into the Essential Services Commission Enforcement Fund, which supports the regulatory functions of the Commission (section 54ZR).

Expansion of the Commission’s power to disclose information

Clause 65 amends section 66 of the VEET Act to expand the range of persons and bodies to whom the Commission (or a person authorised by the Commission) may divulge or communicate information.

To the extent that the information which the Commission may provide to these persons and bodies includes personal information, clause 65 will engage the right to privacy in section 13(a) of the Charter. However, in my opinion, the right is not limited as any interference with privacy effected pursuant to section 66 (as amended) will be lawful, as the section is accessible and precisely formulated, and non-arbitrary.

More specifically, amended section 66 only permits the Commission to share information with persons and bodies who are listed, and only for specific purposes that are reasonably connected to the VEET scheme. For example, the Commission may disclose information to a public sector body or Council for the purposes of administering a program related to prescribed activities (new section 66(j)) or to a distribution network service provider for the purpose of assessing the impact of prescribed activities on energy demand (new section 66(l)). In other words, any interference with privacy will be reasonably necessary to achieve specified purposes.

Furthermore, any interference with a person’s privacy will be modest, as there is a reduced expectation of privacy in the context of a regulated industry like the VEET scheme. Persons participating in the scheme do so voluntarily, and so any decision to disclose personal information to the Commission is ultimately at the discretion of the participant. In addition, the Commission is a ‘public authority’ under the Charter, so it must act in accordance with human rights (including the right to privacy) when disclosing personal information (section 38 of the Charter).

Hon. Lily D’Ambrosio

Minister for Energy, Environment and Climate Change

Second reading

Ms D’AMBROSIO (Mill Park—Minister for Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Minister for Solar Homes) (10:09): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I ask that my second-reading speech be incorporated into Hansard.

Incorporated speech as follows:

The Victorian Government has been a leader in taking strong action on climate change, while saving Victorian households and businesses money. Energy efficiency is at the heart of this approach, not only saving consumers money, but making them more comfortable in their homes and businesses and supporting jobs and innovation.

The Victorian Energy Upgrades program is the largest energy efficiency initiative in Victoria and is also a major contributor to the achievement of Victoria’s interim emissions reductions targets established under the Climate Change Act 2017. Since the program commenced in 2009, over two million households and 141,000 businesses have participated in the program, and it has reduced Victoria’s greenhouse gas emissions by over 73 million tonnes.

The Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Act 2007 establishes the regulatory framework for the Victorian Energy Upgrades program. Under the program, ‘accredited providers’ provide Victorian households and businesses with energy saving products and services at discounted prices or, in some cases, at no cost, by selling certificates which represent these energy and greenhouse savings. Discounts on energy saving products and services encourage more households and businesses to save energy, which reduces overall energy demand and therefore reduces prices for everyone. Energy retailers are obligated to buy certificates to meet the energy saving target for the year. To date, the cost of meeting the target has been more than offset by the impact of reduced demand reducing prices—meaning all consumers save money, even those who do not participate.

This Bill will ensure the Victorian Energy Upgrades program has an appropriate legislative framework and strong consumer protections as it transitions to higher targets, more installations of energy saving equipment and greater energy savings for Victorian households and businesses. Strong consumer protections, compliance and consumer trust in the program is essential to ensuring the benefits will continue to be realised.

This Bill will ensure that the accredited providers under the program are appropriately qualified—through requirements to demonstrate they are a fit and proper person and a competent and capable person. They will need to annually renew their accreditation and undertake independent assurance audits. And the regulator, the Essential Services Commission, will be able to reject applications to renew an accreditation and revoke, suspend or impose conditions on accreditations.

This Bill will strengthen consumer protections by introducing penalties for all businesses providing services under the program, including subcontracted telemarketers or installers (rather than just accredited providers). This with strengthen the Essential Services Commission’s powers to enforce the Code of Conduct for the program.

Finally, the Bill will empower the Essential Services Commission to take strong action to ensure compliance. The Bill introduces of new offences, enforcement tools and greater flexibility. The Essential Services Commission’s enhanced powers will be balanced by greater accountability—to ensure stakeholder can be confident this important program is operated by a strong regulator.

I commend the Bill to the house.

Mr WAKELING (Ferntree Gully) (10:09): I move:

That the debate be adjourned.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

Ordered that debate be adjourned for two weeks. Debate adjourned until Thursday, 7 July.