Wednesday, 18 March 2026
Bills
Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026
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Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026
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Committee
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Ryan BATCHELOR
- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Ryan BATCHELOR
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- Ryan BATCHELOR
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- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Evan MULHOLLAND
- Sarah MANSFIELD
- Evan MULHOLLAND
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Business of the house
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Business of the house
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Adjournment
Bills
Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026
Second reading
Debate resumed.
Rachel PAYNE (South-Eastern Metropolitan) (14:06): I rise to speak on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026 on behalf of Legalise Cannabis Victoria. If I am honest, I feel like I am getting deja vu from the number of times we have stood in this place and talked about legislative reforms for the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission, known as IBAC. But there is good reason for these plentiful motions, amendments and private members bills. Non-government members are using all the tools that we have available to us to try and get government to listen to voters and finally act on integrity. Instead of admitting fault in response to reports of $15 billion missing from Victoria’s major projects thanks to corruption, we have a Premier who ran a smear campaign on a respected integrity expert and threatened to end a press conference. At the same time, it came to light that the Premier sent a letter to IBAC asking them to investigate CFMEU corruption back in 2024, knowing they lacked – and continue to lack – the powers to investigate. And as recently as this week it came to light that there were other warnings about serious wrongdoing at the time. So the story continues, as does the government’s woeful response. The response on the issue of corruption has been disappointing. There seems to be a real fear of owning up to fault and responding with real action. It is not about debating exact figures on how much was lost; it is about Victorians who want to know how this corruption was allowed to occur and want IBAC to have the powers to actually investigate it. That is why, as non-government members facing a government who does not seem to want to take transparency seriously, we are forced to act.
I thank members of the opposition for bringing forward this bill for debate today. It takes important steps towards giving IBAC the powers it needs to more meaningfully address corrupt conduct. The bill expands the jurisdiction of the commission by inserting a new ‘associated entity’ definition. This will capture a broad range of entities and is in line with recommendation 5 of the inquiry into the adequacy of the legislative framework for the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission. As a member of the Integrity and Oversight Committee, which oversaw this inquiry, these are issues that I am deeply familiar with and recommendations that I was proud to support in the final report of the inquiry. This recommendation was that IBAC’s commissioner be given powers to investigate corrupt conduct of third-party and private subcontractors ‘where there is a substantial connection between alleged corrupt conduct and government funding’. These are known as follow-the-dollar investigatory powers. Without these powers there continues to be a glaring omission in our anti-corruption laws for what is a common practice in the construction industry: the use of third-party and private subcontractors. This bill will also remove the requirement that examinations are generally to be held in private. This was an issue that was considered in the inquiry; in fact it was almost a recommendation. While I supported the inclusion of a recommendation related to public hearings, funnily enough, opposition members of the Integrity and Oversight Committee did not support it. So today I do welcome the opposition’s change of heart on this issue.
The exceptional circumstances test for hearings to be held in public settings is far too high a bar. This means that only in a tiny minority of cases, with circumstances that are highly unusual and quite rare, would a public hearing be held. As I have mentioned in this place before, this issue is not new here in Victoria or nationally. The debate on the idea of public hearings only in exceptional circumstances came to a head with the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, who were set up with a similar requirement. At the time a survey by the Australia Institute found that less than one in five Australians believed the commission’s ability to hold public hearings should be restricted to when it should be in the public interest and in exceptional circumstances only. This was consistent across all voting intentions. While I appreciate the need to be sensitive to the high burden placed on someone from an investigation, there also is a need for public interest and the public at large to have faith in government institutions. More public hearings will allow people to see these processes at work and hopefully build their trust in the existence of systems to identify and to respond to corrupt conduct.
I understand that the Greens will be moving two amendments on this bill relating to retrospectivity and clarifying the consequences of a finding of corrupt conduct. We support these amendments as they further speak to the recommendations of the inquiry and a proper investigation into corrupt conduct in Victoria’s Big Build. Now more than ever Victorians need and deserve fit-for-purpose integrity bodies, so let us expand IBAC’s powers and resource it accordingly.
Michael GALEA (South-Eastern Metropolitan) (14:12): I rise to speak on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026, a bill which seeks to amend the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011. This is an important and complex area of law that demands of us careful consideration and attention to detail. The Integrity and Oversight Committee has conducted its inquiry into the adequacy of the legislative framework for the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission and has released a report that has considered many aspects of the law which governs it. It has laid out the considerations, concerns and challenges that would need to be navigated in order to enact various changes to the act. If the opposition had acted with the care, the good sense and the diligence required to amend this act, they would have heeded the IOC’s report. However, evidently, based on the bill that is before us today, they have failed to do that. This bill, as a result, has glaring problems that are of considerable concern.
A series of questions do remain unanswered about how these amendments operate and the impact that they would have on the rights of the individual within the act’s broader overall function. Whilst at face value these amendments would meet some of the broad recommendations of the IOC’s report, this is not merely a box-ticking exercise, nor should we be treating the commission and its objectives in that manner. These amendments would leave many issues unresolved and unanswered from the report. Simply put, the amendments within this bill are underdone.
I note my colleague Mr Batchelor has already extensively gone into detail on the action that has been taken by this government as a response to revelations of corruption in the construction sector. Whilst I do not wish to reiterate or go over his remarks again, I will note that those matters which have been referred to Victoria Police have resulted in Taskforce Hawk, which has made 17 arrests and nearly 70 charges against individuals. Indeed as well we have seen the action taken by the Labour Hire Authority which has led to the cancellation of over 174 licences – action which would not have been able to have been taken by the Labour Hire Authority had the Liberal Party got its way when it tried to block and stop that legislation in the Parliament.
Regarding this bill, there are serious concerns about the way in which this bill has its purpose and the consequences the amendments would entail. The most significant flaws are the failure to engage adequately with that IOC December report, disregarding the numerous important submissions, including those of IBAC itself, and ignoring recommendations that directly address the safe and effective operation of the act. As a result, these amendments risk introducing legal uncertainty, reducing safeguards and undermining the core objectives of anti-corruption oversight.
The amendments in this bill seek to expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to allow it to follow the money. It proposes giving IBAC powers equivalent to those of the Auditor-General to investigate contracts and subcontracts. What it fails to consider, though, is that the Auditor-General’s powers are focused on enabling them to undertake performance audits, which are important functions to ensure that key government functions can run effectively. Entities such as Victoria Police are much better placed to investigate and address allegations of criminality and industry-specific conduct.
Unfortunately some members appear to have failed to carefully review this report’s findings. By seeking to repeal section 117(1)(a) of the IBAC act, this bill would effectively be throwing out the IOC’s work by overruling the provision that public hearings should only occur in exceptional circumstances. The IOC carefully considered these issues and concluded that this amendment should not be pursued. Given how much, how often and how frequently IBAC is found to be quoted by the media, by commentators and indeed by members here, it is perhaps understandable that we forget that the exceptional nature of IBAC’s powers is there for a specific, exceptional purpose. As legislators, we must seriously consider the implications of these powers and any changes that we may seek to make to them.
To quote the IOC’s report on its IBAC inquiry:
IBAC’s examination process is notably different than the court process for giving evidence. Aside from the abrogation of privilege discussed above, submissions have also highlighted that while witnesses in IBAC examinations are able to have a lawyer present, their lawyer is not able to speak, and there is no opportunity for cross-examination to enable a right of reply.
It continues:
It has also been stated that ‘[e]xhibits used by IBAC lawyers in examinations are not provided to witnesses or their lawyers prior to the commencement of the examination, which is distinctive from court processes.
The report makes clear that IBAC examinations are not the same as trials. The standard of guilt, as a truth-finding exercise, is lower than the reasonable doubt threshold of a criminal court proceeding. We must be cognisant of these differences, the implications of IBAC’s powers and the interaction that they can have on an individual’s human rights, in particular where that intersects with the charter of human rights, including the right to privacy and reputation and the right of the individual not to have their reputation unlawfully attacked.
When we are considering how we will change the IBAC act and when we consider broadening the prevalence of public hearings, the scope of who is able to be called before them in the course of an examination or any other significant amendment, we must consider the set of powers that IBAC has and the impact that these changes could have on witnesses. We have seen already what can happen when this process goes wrong. Just two weeks ago the IBAC Commissioner publicly apologised for the conduct of IBAC under a previous Commissioner, which gravely victimised and traumatised a woman who had bravely raised a complaint and had that complaint then egregiously mishandled.
The exceptional circumstances test of the act, which this bill seeks to remove, is intended to weigh the risks involved in a public examination against its merits. However, this bill, as proposed, does not change the test or the criteria in which the exceptional circumstances would be deemed to have been met; rather the bill removes section 117(1)(a) wholesale. The legislation, as it already exists, is careful, deliberate and purposeful in how it protects the rights of individuals against the potential adverse consequences of public examinations. The committee examined this question, considered the issue carefully and then made the finding that while the exceptional circumstances test in section 117(1)(a) of the IBAC act exists, which provides for an examination in public, it is critical to consider the risk associated with IBAC’s public examinations. This includes reputational damage. It is for these reasons that the IOC’s report recommended that section 117(1)(a) and the exceptional circumstances test for public examinations should be retained. The bill does not consider safeguards to ensure witness welfare and avoid prejudicing criminal proceedings. IBAC has also previously stated that the confidentiality of its investigations is indeed in many cases critical to preventing compromise. This bill does not address those competing interests: reputational damage, public interest, safety or indeed the IBAC’s own powers to undertake its role effectively.
This is a complex area of law, and the Integrity and Oversight Committee has done a great deal of work to sift through this issue and resolve the challenges in this space. The amendments in this bill, by contrast, ride roughshod over the work and findings of that report, picking and choosing what it accepts and what it ignores, which is to say that the issues it does not even try to resolve are the implications and the consequences for human rights that would eventuate as a result. There was significant work that went into this report, and the amendments before us today frankly ignore a lot of it and indeed in some cases run completely contrary to it.
Similarly, we saw the Greens move a bill that also ignored the committee’s recommendations and sought to remove the exceptional circumstances test. That bill also sought, on the face of it, to implement recommendation 24 of the report to empower IBAC to make findings of corrupt conduct. However, it then ignored the indelibly related recommendations 25 and 26 of the report as they pertain to furthering procedural fairness requirements and expressly state that findings of corrupt conduct do not amount to findings of guilt. That bill would have trampled on the protections for witnesses that the IOC recommended. This bill ignores the recommendations of the IOC to protect witnesses from harm caused by public hearings by retaining section 117(1)(a).
What the government is doing by comparison is actually carefully considering and reviewing the findings and the recommendations of the IOC’s report. It will provide a comprehensive response to all of these issues so that when amendments are made to an exceptionally complex piece of law that may have the potential to have the effect of abrogating the rights of citizens, including their fundamental human rights, any steps taken will be done so in a very careful and considered way. This government is acting prudently. By contrast, the bill before us today is a half-baked affair focused on being seen to do something more than to achieve good reform through effective, considered legislation.
Richard WELCH (North-Eastern Metropolitan) (14:23): I rise to speak on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026. I think in essence every Labor member of Parliament has a choice today – whether they are serious about getting to the bottom of organised crime and corruption on state-run building sites or not and whether they are for maintaining the integrity of government or not. There are clear questions that have to be answered that can only be answered with expanded powers for IBAC if we are to fall short of having a royal commission, which is probably the ultimate destination for these matters. The Liberals and Nationals want to pass this law to provide Victoria’s chief anti-corruption watchdog with the powers it has asked for and needs to allow it to chase down every single taxpayer dollar rorted under the Allan government’s watch. Premier Allan and Labor must choose: you either support our laws and strengthen Victoria’s anti-corruption laws or you vote to continue the cover-up.
There have been a range of contributions today. I am not going to even attempt to paraphrase them, but I will address them in kind. There have been various claims of ‘The best place for this is the police. If you have any knowledge of crime, report it to the police.’ What happens if the state does not report it to the police? What happens then? What is the use of the police then? We know from the Metro Tunnel that crimes were not reported to the police. What is the point of referring something to IBAC if you were all along conscious of the fact IBAC could not investigate the matter to the fullest extent?
In some ways I think, logically, the Premier, whether she knows it or not, actually agrees with us, because surely when she referred this matter to IBAC her intention was for IBAC to get to the bottom of it. Surely it was not as contrived as her knowingly saying, ‘I’m referring it in a way that is so constrained that it will not be able to get back to it.’ When the Premier referred it to IBAC, there was no discussion of the complexities of this matter. There was no discussion of human rights issues. Nothing was complex about it then. Surely the intention was to get to the bottom of it, unless the level of disingenuousness is beyond imagination. So she wants IBAC to address this, which means she must want these powers. If she was concerned about all the other complications, why didn’t she address them then? There has been ample time. We know that the warnings of corruption have been in place and received by her and other ministers of state since 2023, if not earlier, and on numerous occasions. It is now a pattern of behaviour that these warnings, variously dismissed as anecdotal and other watering-down sort of language, were there, and anyone with even the slightest intellectual curiosity would start to join the dots and say, ‘We have a serious problem here.’ That is in itself the most generous interpretation of the lack of action. That is the most generous, because if you look at it through any other lens, it is wilful. They are wilfully looking the other way, claiming wilful ignorance and wilful denial of what is absolutely plain for all to see in what is happening.
I think there is another really important point that is missed in all this when we say these powers are not required or we do not need a royal commission. That point is that when one of the parties implicated in corruption – and deeply implicated in the corruption – is the state itself, then the normal instruments of state are also in jeopardy and the status quo will not do. We do not want a situation like we saw in the COVID inquiry, where ministers and senior public servants either were not compelled to turn up or, if they turned up, could say, ‘I don’t remember. I don’t recall. You’ll have to ask somebody else.’ You have to wonder: why are we learning more about this in our own state from a Queensland inquiry or Senate public estimates than we are learning from our own government? That is because the state is implicated in the corruption. The normal instruments should not and would not apply. This is why there should be a royal commission, but if we are not going to get to a royal commission just yet, this is the least we can do. To complain now and layer on complexity after complexity of why this is so difficult to do – let us be clear about a couple of things. This government have never hesitated to bring faulty legislation before this Council before – bail bills, machete bills et cetera – and then they tweak them and tweak them and tweak them, so that is hardly an argument that the government can apply. If they do not find this legislation perfect, that is hardly an argument from their own side.
If you want to control the passage of an issue going through our society and our state, then you should act on it. You have had plenty of time to act on it. But you cannot not act; you cannot turn a blind eye and then complain about other people doing something about it in a way you do not perfectly agree with. You have abdicated the right to control this process. That is why you are in a minority in this chamber, because corruption is rampant in our state. It is a stain on our public institutions across the board, it is a stain on the Parliament, it is a stain on the public service, it is a stain on anyone trying to do the right thing in this state, it is a stain on unions and it is a stain on everybody that you have failed to address it not just through negligence but wilfully as the state, as the government of the day. It will not pass. It will not stand. It cannot.
If the only way we can make you accountable is to add some powers to IBAC that IBAC have been asking for for years, then so be it. That is what is going to happen. We cannot have corruption indefinitely in Victoria. We cannot have our corruption in Victoria revealed to us by Queensland inquiries. We need to get to the bottom of this for this generation and for the next generation, because not only are laws broken and lives destroyed with sexual harassment abounding, we are leaving the next generation with intergenerational debt directly borne of this corruption – directly. It is totally interlocked. $15 billion at a minimum – many other quotes say it is much, much more.
I can tell you one thing: when there is a bit of corruption in one area, it does not stay within a neat boundary. If you have walked by standard after standard on one matter, there is no doubt you will have walked by standards on every other matter that you engage with. Your tolerance for corruption can only spread. We are not just talking about black-and-white examples like what we have seen on Big Build, but the grey corruption that is rampant. The fish stinks from the head. The state of Victoria is in an appalling state. We have an obligation as elected representatives of our communities to not stand by and allow it to happen indefinitely, and the government wants it to happen indefinitely because there has been no meaningful action. No-one can deny that. Referring matters to IBAC when you know they do not have the powers is not action. Having criminal matters brought to your attention – for example, on the Metro – and not reporting them to the police is not action. Coming very, very late in the day and setting up an authority to look at labour providers – very late in the day, after it has all occurred, more than a year after you were notified of it – is not action. You know what that is? That is media management. That is perception management and it is window-dressing to the problem. No-one believes it. Everyone sees through it. We have all had enough. The community, who at times find it hard to make a direct relationship between billions and billions of dollars of waste and their everyday lives, have now made the connection. We know what price it is costing us. Of course corruption costs us at every level, and the state is implicated. The authority and the coercive power of the state is implicated in the corruption. Let us not lose sight of this. That being the case, the normal status quo will not do.
I am so pleased that we have what appears to be a majority of support in this chamber to do the right thing, because we are the only ones willing to do the right thing. It is not complicated. When you come to moral absolutes, you know what, it is easier than cancelling the Commonwealth Games. That is how simple this decision is. It needs to be done. I absolutely endorse this bill to the house.
David LIMBRICK (South-Eastern Metropolitan) (14:34): I am also pleased to talk on this bill, the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026. I will start by saying that the Libertarian Party will not be opposing this bill; however, I think that both the opposition and the Greens have been remarkably overselling what this will do. In my view this bill will do very little, because what it is looking at is trying to fix the consequences of a problem without looking at the root causes. I am very supportive of a royal commission, which was brought up recently, and I think that that is a good idea because we do have a good chance of actually looking at the root causes. I am less convinced that this will do that. I have spoken many times about the root causes. I do not think anyone is under any illusions that organised crime is out of control in this state. In fact organised crime dominates the market in some markets – we know in the tobacco market, and I have spoken about that many, many times in here, which also related to the same groups that are dealing with construction and drugs and vaping and all sorts of other industries –
Members interjecting.
David LIMBRICK: Yes, waste management. There are lots of industries that are either majority run by organised crime or at least infiltrated by organised crime in this state. Many of these root causes are blatantly obvious and driven by government policy, and this is what irks me the most about the government and the Greens, for that matter, who wholeheartedly support these policies that have led us to this place and yet refuse to acknowledge what has caused it. The obvious one is tobacco. We know the root cause is tobacco excise tax. We know that with organised crime infiltration into waste management it is the waste management levy that has caused it. We know with infiltration into labour hire companies that a large cause of it is the way that EBAs are negotiated and also the government’s own procurement policies. They are trying to set up procurement policies that have a social outcome; they want more women or more Aboriginal people, and these are good things that people want. But their policies have not actually resulted in what they thought they would result in; they have resulted in organised crime having new vectors to infiltrate government construction projects. Of course the largest thing of all which is related to organised crime is the size of government projects, the amount of money that the government is spending. The idea that we can spend hundreds of billions of dollars and not have corruption and organised crime involved is fanciful. Similarly, the idea that giving IBAC a few more powers is going to fix that is just as fanciful. It is not going to fix that at all. We are not going to fix this until we get to the root cause.
I want to reflect on something that I experienced in the past, and in hindsight it is more terrifying now that there have been all these revelations, especially around what happened in 2021. I will tell you about something that happened in 2021, a cover-up that happened. It was covered up by this government. It was covered up by the union movement. Back in 2021 you will remember we were right in the middle of the pandemic and there was lots of civil unrest at the time from many different sectors, and one of those sectors was the CFMEU union members themselves. There were two main concerns that they were upset about. They did not get much sympathy from the public, because the general public were looking around and saying, ‘What have you got to complain about? You’re still working,’ because the government organised it so that construction would still keep operating, even though the rest of the economy was locked down. The government said they wanted to keep jobs. They did not worry about the other jobs, but they kept construction going – hell or high water, construction would keep rolling.
When union members started protesting, they protested at first by having their lunch out on the street. They were upset about two things mainly. They were upset about the lunch sheds being closed. They had fought for many years to have that right to have their lunch indoors in sheds and stuff, and they were pissed off about them being closed. So they decided to move tables and chairs out onto the street at their lunchbreak, and they sat out there. Actually, the leadership of the union at the time said, ‘Well, it’s not really a protest. They just need to eat their lunch somewhere.’ It just happened to be on the tram tracks in the middle of the street. That was happening in the weeks before this.
Then the other thing that had been talked about was the prospect of vaccine mandates, and lots of people in the union movement were concerned about this, especially in the CFMEU. What happened in September one morning was there was a protest, another protest – there were lots of protests during the pandemic. This protest was very unusual and unique, though, because my team heard that there was a commotion down on Queen Street at the CFMEU office. People were not protesting against the government for once, they were not protesting against the police; they were union members protesting against their own union. This was at the CFMEU head office on Queen Street of course. My team, because we do not trust what the government says and we do not trust what the media says, went down there to see with our own eyes what was going on. I went down there and to my surprise there were a bunch of them that actually knew me and came up to talk to me. They were happy to have a witness to what was going on. I was a bit scared actually; I did not know how they would react to me being there. Anyway, I had a chat to a few of them, and basically my team and I just sat back well away from the action. We just wanted to watch what was happening and listen to people. We had to talk to a few people. Interestingly, it was not just union members; it was also contractors to government construction projects. I spoke to a few of them. They were upset about what was going on with the sheds and vaccine mandates and stuff because they were going to lose staff and they were unhappy. It was a very weird situation where you had workers and bosses protesting against the union.
What they wanted was the union to march on Parliament, to lead them to Parliament, to protest against the sheds being closed and the vaccine mandate that was going to be imposed, and it got very rowdy. One man I spoke to came up to me and said, ‘Stay away from those guys standing out the front of the office. They’re not our members, they’re bikies.’ That is what he said to me, and I suppose I was a bit naive, I guess. I just thought maybe that was a tall tale or something. But then after that they had altercations with the union officials that were inside the office, and it got violent eventually. Interestingly, unlike any other protest I had seen, the police did nothing. They stood there and watched what was happening. They did not intervene until very, very late in the piece. Many of these union members who were protesting against their union had their chants of course, as you have at protests, and one of the chants really caught my ear. It was not about vaccines, it was not about sheds and it was not about leading them on to Parliament, it was about organised crime. They were chanting, ‘Eff the bikies.’ They were upset. They felt that their union bosses had sided with these organised criminals, and they were protesting against that as well. There is probably video footage of it. I saw it with my own eyes. My staff saw it as well. They were chanting, ‘Eff the bikies,’ and they saw them as somehow aligned with the union. I do not understand exactly how it works, but in hindsight that is quite terrifying.
What happened next was even more interesting. Keep in mind we had a group of people that were upset. They were upset about the sheds, they were upset about vaccine mandates and they were also upset about organised crime in their union; they were protesting against the union. Then something happened. The government, the ACTU and Bill Shorten all put out statements immediately – it was all coordinated. Bill Shorten called them ‘man baby Nazis’, the ACTU, from Sally McManus’s account on Twitter I think, put out a statement saying that these right-wing extremists had been protesting against the union. Keep in mind that I saw these people and spoke to them. There were a lot of Islanders, Samoan people, Indians. They did not look like any Nazis I had ever seen or come into contact with. They certainly did not seem like right-wing extremists. They were all wearing union gear and stuff, so I did not find that. And the government itself – they all started smearing this group of people as right-wing extremists. They did not like them protesting against the union, and maybe in hindsight they did not like them calling out organised crime involvement.
I do not know why that smothering happened or why that cover-up happened, but in hindsight I think if we have a royal commission – and I think we do need a royal commission – they need to look at what was happening during that time, because if you look at the reports about when some of this corruption happened, that was smack bang in the middle of when a lot of this stuff was going down. What did those workers protesting actually know? Why were they so upset with the bikies? Obviously they had had contact with them. They knew who they were; they had seen them. They warned people like me to not go near them because they are dangerous. What was really going on there? I do not think the government has ever said anything about that. And the Greens piled in on that as well. They liked smearing everyone that was protesting here as right-wing extremists and Nazis and stuff – they love doing that. In fact the government and others used to smear everyone as right-wing extremists so much that when actual neo-Nazis showed up everyone was surprised because they were nothing like what everyone expected. They were totally different, and they are much nastier, actually, than disgruntled workers who are upset with their union.
But I think in hindsight there were a lot of mistakes made then, and we need to investigate this. I think we are not going to solve any of this until the government itself acknowledges that its own policies have led to many of these vectors for organised crime to get involved. Giving IBAC more powers is just like changing the shape of a bandaid on a gunshot wound. It is not going to stem the flow here. It is tinkering around the edges. If you want to stop it, you need to stop it at the source, at the cause, and the causes are government policies, the amount of money that they are spending and the fact that they are not asking questions about what was actually really going on at that point in time. No-one seems to want to know, and we need to know if we are going to fix this state. We certainly need to know if the government is going to be spending hundreds of millions of dollars on this Suburban Rail Loop project and still does not even understand what the causes of this organised crime infiltration are. I think it is irresponsible to do anything other than knock that project on the head, because we do not even know how it is happening. The government keeps complaining: ‘This $15 billion figure is wrong.’ Well, what is the figure then? How much is it? I think even Mr Watson would concede that it is rough as guts. But what is the number? How much money needs to get siphoned to organised crime before the government gets upset about it? Is it $15 billion? Is it $1 billion? Is it $100 million? I do not know what the number is, but it sounds like it should be investigated. It sounds like it is serious, whatever the number is. Maybe it is worse; maybe it is a lot worse. We just do not know, and we need to know if we are going to fix things and get this state back on track and get our finances under control.
Jacinta ERMACORA (Western Victoria) (14:47): I want to begin by saying, and I think we all agree, that Victorians deserve a strong and well-resourced and effective integrity system, of which IBAC is a part, and that is a value that this government shares without reservation. The question before us is not whether IBAC should be strong, because it should be and it is. I just want to respond first on the government’s record on IBAC, because context is very important. When Labor came to government IBAC’s total funding was $31.5 million. This year IBAC’s base funding stands at $65.6 million. That is a 208 per cent increase on before we took office. Every single year this government has increased IBAC’s base funding. IBAC today has almost 300 staff and is one of the best resourced integrity agencies this state has ever had. When members opposite speak critically of IBAC, they are simply not dealing honestly with the facts.
Turning to the substance of this bill, the centrepiece is the so-called follow-the-money power. The proposal is to give IBAC equivalent powers to the Auditor-General to examine contracts and subcontracts. I want to be precise here, because the rhetoric and the reality are somewhat at odds. Despite the name of this bill, there is a notable absence of any reference in the actual text to money, funds or dollars. What is being proposed is the extension of audit-style powers to a law enforcement and anti-corruption body. The Auditor-General’s powers are designed for a specific purpose: performance audits. These are detailed forensic examinations of whether or not government agencies are meeting their aims effectively, using resources efficiently and complying with relevant legislation. That is the exact right tool for the Auditor-General. But IBAC is a different body with a different mandate. Entities like the Victoria Police and the Labour Hire Authority are far better placed to investigate and deal with allegations of criminality and industry-specific misconduct. Critically, those bodies have the powers, and they are using them. Victoria Police has already laid over 70 charges, as has already been mentioned by my colleagues; the Labour Hire Authority has cancelled over 147 licences; and Operation Hawk, established in 2024, has resulted in 17 offenders being processed, along with those 70 charges. Those charges include fraud, thefts and threats. That is not a government standing idly by, that is a government acting decisively. We have passed new laws banning bikies and criminals from setting foot on worksites. We have created a protected complaints pathway with criminal offences for threatening whistleblowers. We have also established an independent review and are carrying out every recommendation of that review. The review resulted in a construction complaints referral service, amendments to the labour hire legislation, strengthening the fit and proper person test and an alliance of state and federal law enforcement agencies to better share information. These changes, as we can see, are working. The culture on construction worksites is improving.
I want to turn now to the second major element of this bill, the removal of the exceptional circumstances threshold for public examinations. This is where I have the most serious concerns. The Integrity and Oversight Committee explicitly recommended that the exceptional circumstances test for public examinations be retained. The IOC considered that retaining this limb was appropriate when considering the risks associated with IBAC’s public examinations, and those risks are real, because IBAC has extraordinary powers even compared to a criminal court. Those extraordinary powers include witnesses who have less protection. Their lawyers are not able to speak on their behalf. There is no opportunity for cross-examination or a right of reply. Exhibits are not provided to witnesses or lawyers in advance. The threshold for findings is lower than in a criminal proceeding. We have seen tragic outcomes for persons involved in IBAC investigations under our current settings. This bill does not consider safeguards to ensure witnesses’ welfare and avoid prejudicing criminal proceedings. IBAC has previously raised that the confidentiality of its investigations is critical to ensuring they are not compromised. This bill does not look at those competing interests of reputational damage, public interest, safety and serious conduct. Given the extraordinary powers that I have just described, some individuals might think twice before reporting their concerns, especially if they know that those concerns would be aired publicly. They might find it embarrassing or humiliating or experience intimidation as a result. To remove the exceptional circumstances threshold without carefully working through those tensions is not careful lawmaking. It is really a stunt masquerading as a reform.
I will just go on now to note the Greens amendment proposing retrospectivity. This is an uncapped retrospectivity. The Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee advises that all retrospective provisions should be specific, that they include the reason for a specific retrospectivity and that a date should be chosen. The committee also recommends analysis of the adverse impacts. These requirements clearly have not been met in this bill. This raises serious charter of human rights implications, including the right to privacy and reputation, the right to liberty and the right to a fair hearing. It is also possible that these changes may facilitate an increase in vexatious accusations. In fact all of these changes may provide a platform for that. It also cuts against the rule of law principles and ignores the legal principle of finality in administrative decisions. Unless these legal issues are carefully worked through, it risks giving IBAC powers that would not withstand a challenge.
This brings me to perhaps the most frustrating dimension of this debate. Both the Liberals and the Greens are members of the Integrity and Oversight Committee, which undertook hearings and produced a detailed report with 31 recommendations. You do not reform something as complex as our integrity system with a change here and a change there and call it a day. This is not paint by numbers. What Victoria needs and what this government is committed to delivering is a thoughtful, comprehensive response to the IOC’s work, one that strengthens IBAC’s powers where appropriate, includes the necessary safeguards that keeps our integrity system coherent and is consistent with the context within which IBAC operates. The government is working through that response, and it will be completed later this year.
This bill compromises human rights, risks the mental health of witnesses, has the potential to reduce the number of reports of corruption out of fear of public reporting, will clog up the IBAC system with retrospective powers that do not even stand up in any jurisdiction and contradicts the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee’s recommendations. This bill is attempting to create a gotcha moment for the opposition rather than actual, genuine, thoughtful and careful reform. It is more about politics than about improvements. I urge members to allow the process that our government has underway to continue and also to acknowledge the responses and the work that has been undertaken, which I have referred to, to prevent corruption in the building industry and the actions that have improved the culture and conduct in the building industry to date.
Trung LUU (Western Metropolitan) (14:59): I rise today to speak on the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Bill 2026, to address the matter of significant public concern involving the integrity of Victoria’s infrastructure program and the capacity of this state’s anti-corruption system to respond effectively. Before I continue addressing the bill, I just want to respond to some of the contributions across the chamber. How many times have we heard this government’s deflection after deflection of responsibility, hiding from inquiry after inquiry from investigative bodies that have inappropriate power to follow up. Too many times over the years we have heard of inquiries where senior officials, people in senior positions, have not turned up. They know full well the power of investigative bodies doing inquiries. Now we have seen senior officials dodge responsibilities. They cannot recall their responsibilities and cannot recall their actions time after time. What we hear today is an allegation of a magnitude of public funds, an allegation in relation to the money. IBAC investigate corruption. Clearly we know what the charter of IBAC is. They investigate corruption of government bodies, police and government officials, employees and contractors in all tiers of governments but not third-party entities. So what they are seeking is the power to do so.
Those opposite are saying, ‘Refer it to police’ – how convenient when police resources have been cut by this government and you are seeing station after station across the state reduce their hours. Manpower is restrained, so how convenient it is to just say, ‘Refer it to police.’ Well, I will tell you one thing: when IBAC has established all of those involved, those who are responsible will be prosecuted by the police. I can assure you of that.
To go on in relation to this bill, over recent months multiple investigations and inquiries have revealed deeply troubling allegations concerning the infiltration of Victorian construction sectors by an organised crime network, including bikie gangs and underworld figures. Imagine that – bikie gangs and underworld figures and organised crime. The report indicates that the infiltration occurred primarily through the Victorian branch of the Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union, known as the CFMEU, and that misconduct took place on publicly funded worksites connected with the multibillion-dollar Big Build program. The question has to be asked: has this got any weight? In all of Victoria’s government major infrastructure projects, has this government continuously experienced budget blowout after budget blowout on every major infrastructure program and project?
What is more astonishing is that in recent days we have had the revelation that the Premier herself had been advised and was informed of such allegations of corruption on the worksites. An independent investigative body led by a respected barrister and administrator has estimated that the financial impact of unlawful conduct and alleged fraud may be in the order of $15 billion. Now, this is a conservative estimation, with some assessments suggesting that the total cost could be much, much higher, around $30 billion. These findings reflect claims of cost inflations, job-selling schemes, criminal profiteering and project disruptions streaming from misconduct and organised crime infiltrations. The report also questioned why so little was done to stop the illegal activities and criminal racketeering on government worksites. To put this in perspective, in today’s dollars the recently opened Footscray Hospital in my electorate, the Western Metropolitan Region, cost $1.5 billion. That is in today’s dollars. So we are looking at at least 10 new hospitals similar to Footscray funded across our state to address the health crisis mess or opening and staffing over 200 new 24/7 police stations to address the crime crisis we are in at the moment. These allegations do not merely raise financial concern; they strike at the core of public trust. Victorians rightly expect that funds allocated to public infrastructure and projects are used solely for public benefit and protected from criminal interference. To be quite clear, we are not looking at any small construction project, but Victoria’s Big Build. You have all heard about that through the TV and all the commercials. It is a massive, ongoing state infrastructure program comprising more than 180 road and rail projects, with private firms having been given around $100 billion in public money to deliver the various Big Build projects we are looking at at the moment. It is safe to say that Victorians expect that government projects should shape the transport network, our economy, our future and our communities, and in the administration there should be transparency and accountability at every stage. Those in charge need to take ownership of and responsibility for their actions. This is not too much to ask. It is public funds, taxpayers money, in the millions and billions of dollars that we speak of here today – money that could be better spent serving Victoria’s health, education, community safety and public infrastructure.
What is equally troubling for me is that I have spent numerous years serving with Victoria Police and protecting the Victorian community, investigating and apprehending criminals in major fraud cases, disrupting and stopping organised criminal syndicates, and now we hear that IBAC, the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission, the principal body designed to investigate corruption in this state, has stated clearly that it lacks sufficient power to fully examine financial flows associated with private subcontracts on public projects. That is as clear as mud. But what is more disturbing is that the government is unwilling to give IBAC the power to investigate, to follow the trail, to follow the money and to stop the criminal elements in government infrastructure projects. Yet it deflects and makes excuses. IBAC itself has communicated that it does not possess the follow-the-money powers necessary to track funds once they move beyond direct government entities, particularly into complex private networks surrounding major infrastructure initiatives such as the Big Build. I worked on major fraud for many years. Do you know how long it would take to investigate all the big projects in this state? Well past the next election, I can tell you that right now. How convenient.
This illustrates not only the limitations but a misconception. It is real. It is already affecting investigations. Numerous allegations referred to IBAC could not be pursued comprehensively due to these statutory restrictions. As a consequence, significant questions remain about the extent of misconduct, the identity of beneficiaries and the true scale of the loss of taxpayers money – mum and dad’s money out there. Without enhanced investigative authority, IBAC cannot complete the work the public expects it to complete. The Parliament has an obligation to ensure the anti-corruption framework is not only symbolic but operational, performing the way it is meant to, equipped with the full set of legislative tools necessary to safeguard the integrity of public expenditure.
The report before us describes not isolated misconduct but widespread, systematic issues that developed over many years under this Labor government. In some cases, officials and administrators involved in inquiries have expressed concern that early warnings were not effectively acted upon, contributing to a further deterioration in oversight. The gravity of these findings requires a response that is decisive, responsible and proportional to the scale of the risk – $15 billion at least – the scale of criminal activities and the scale of allegations of corruption, with bikie gangs and organised syndicates on government worksites. Strengthening IBAC’s power to follow the money is not a political matter; it is a fundamental measure of good governance. It enhances transparency, protects public funds and supports the ongoing integrity of major projects in this state, and that is essential for Victoria’s future. Therefore, I call on the Parliament to consider this legislative amendment that empowers IBAC to – just to name a few things – investigate financial flows through the entirety of contracting and subcontracting chains, access compelled financial records, conduct comprehensive examinations of private entities where public funds are involved and collaborate more effectively with all the effective bodies. These reforms are not extraordinary; these are reasonable measures and necessary given the circumstances before us.
Victoria has long prided itself on maintaining institutions that uphold integrity and public confidence. Ensuring IBAC is fully empowered to perform its statutory role is essential to preserving that tradition. Let us equip IBAC with the authority it needs, it asks for and it seeks. Let us restore public confidence in the governance of major infrastructure – and there are many projects on the way, and many have been done. Let us send a clear message in Victoria that if you misuse public funds, whoever you are, you will be caught. Misconduct and organised crime will not be tolerated. I will end it there. I fully support and commend this bill.
Evan MULHOLLAND (Northern Metropolitan) (15:11): It has been a very interesting debate on this bill, but I thank all parliamentary colleagues for their willingness to engage on this issue or, for some, their reluctance to engage on this particular issue. This is a necessary integrity reform to restore trust in Victoria. Public confidence in how taxpayer money is managed has been seriously damaged by the biggest corruption scandal in the history of this state. This bill is about restoring accountability. This is ensuring taxpayer dollars can be traced. It is giving integrity bodies the tools they have asked for, and it is ending a culture of denial and inaction. $15 billion has been lost to the criminal underworld and bikies. The government says that is untested. They will talk about the number and they will outrageously attack that report’s author, but isn’t it interesting that this government have not offered up a number of their own? They clearly know that a lot of money has been lost to corruption, to the criminal underworld, to bikies through the CFMEU; they are just not willing to offer up how much.
We have seen IBAC themselves call for these greater powers and say that their remit is currently limited to public officers and public entities and cannot be traced down through contractors and associated entities. That is what we are wanting to do in this place. This is important to actually get to the bottom of this and trace financial flows. We know that the Premier for quite a while bandied this letter about, saying that she actually referred everything to IBAC in July 2024, only for IBAC to then make an extraordinary public declaration that it had responded to the Premier’s letter by saying that it was outside of IBAC’s jurisdiction. It is outside of IBAC’s jurisdiction, and the Premier would have known that. Instead of saying, ‘Okay, it’s outside of their jurisdiction – what can I do to make sure it’s within their remit?’ what did the Premier do? Nothing. It is no wonder backbenchers are talking around the corridors of this place about leadership, because the Premier has shown no leadership in this scandal. This is a necessary integrity reform. IBAC has requested these powers. The government has ignored those requests. Internal briefings suggest a reluctance at senior levels. We do need to enforce the law, we need to find the money and we need to stop the rorts, and this is part of our plan to do that.
I want to thank colleagues in particular and acknowledge the Greens for the collaborative way they have engaged on this particular bill and all other colleagues in the chamber that have engaged on this bill. I think it is really important that we follow the money, that IBAC is given those powers and that IBAC is also given greater discretion to hold public hearings. That is really important. It is a default at the moment that they are private hearings. We think that is a greater transparency measure as well, and that is also part of our bill. This is really, really important, because IBAC does not have the remit to investigate these powers.
I want to talk about this briefly because it is an important bit of case law. IBAC cannot currently investigate anything that has happened on the North East Link. We know a hell of a lot of bad stuff has happened on the North East Link, and we have seen that reported in the last couple of days. I spent well over two years battling the government to release this document, a document prepared by Spark North East Link, which is a consortium that is building the North East Link with taxpayer dollars. Do you think IBAC can investigate things that have gone through that consortium? No, it cannot. In my trying to FOI Spark North East Link, the government refused the whole way through and then sent it to the information commissioner. Of course they have been starved of funds as well, so it takes about a year and a half for them to do any report saying that this is in the public interest, and it was 100 per cent a slam dunk report saying it was in the public interest. They then took me to VCAT arguing against the precedent and saying that Spark North East Link is not the government. They took me to VCAT. We had a hearing. The submissions were about to close and then all of a sudden they abandoned their case because they realised what they were arguing was wrong. It is an important bit of case law, won by me, that Spark North East Link is an arm of the government because the government is building the North East Link. So I could access this document, but IBAC cannot investigate Spark North East Link.
What did we find in this document? We found that the CFMEU were pushing surveyors offsite and not allowing them onsite. They also delayed the assembly of the tunnel-boring machines by a cumulative total of 109 days. This monthly report goes to government. What did Jacinta Allan do with this report? She claims that the first time she was made aware of all these issues was July 2024, when consistently these reports have been saying otherwise and that the CFMEU were causing issues. Why did the then transport infrastructure minister not act? If it is now case law that Spark North East Link is the government, then IBAC ought to be able to investigate that. They ought to have the ability to deep-dive and investigate that as well. I am going to leave my remarks there, but I thank all colleagues that have engaged in this process.
Council divided on motion:
Ayes (23): Melina Bath, Jeff Bourman, Gaelle Broad, Katherine Copsey, Georgie Crozier, Moira Deeming, David Ettershank, Anasina Gray-Barberio, Renee Heath, Ann-Marie Hermans, David Limbrick, Wendy Lovell, Trung Luu, Sarah Mansfield, Bev McArthur, Joe McCracken, Nick McGowan, Evan Mulholland, Rachel Payne, Aiv Puglielli, Georgie Purcell, Rikkie-Lee Tyrrell, Richard Welch
Noes (14): Ryan Batchelor, John Berger, Lizzie Blandthorn, Enver Erdogan, Jacinta Ermacora, Michael Galea, Shaun Leane, Tom McIntosh, Harriet Shing, Ingrid Stitt, Jaclyn Symes, Lee Tarlamis, Gayle Tierney, Sheena Watt
Motion agreed to.
Read second time.
Committed.
Committee
Clause 1 (15:26)
Ryan BATCHELOR: I have got a range of questions. I thought I would just try and get the bulk of them out of the way, if that is helpful. The bill seeks to add the words ‘or person’ to the definition of those who receive funds to perform a public function to determine whether something is a public function for the purposes of the act in section 6(3). What sorts of people are you envisaging being determinative of whether something is a public function?
Evan MULHOLLAND: I will just be one second. That would be for anyone who IBAC determines is within scope.
Ryan BATCHELOR: With the funding that that person receives, is there a threshold amount that you think is relevant? Is it an individual who is in receipt of a government grant, for example, which they may have received by way of disaster recovery? Are those the types of persons that you are envisaging being publicly funded and therefore subject to the expanded jurisdiction of IBAC?
Evan MULHOLLAND: That is not necessarily who we envision. But again, it is for IBAC to determine over the course of its investigation to follow that particular dollar down to where it has passed through, and that, obviously, would have to involve a level of investigation and suspicion of corrupt conduct.
Ryan BATCHELOR: So anyone in the state of Victoria who has been in receipt of public funds individually has the potential to be exercising a public function under the factors that IBAC may determine. You shake your head, Mr Mulholland, but it says:
In determining if a function is a public function the factors that may be taken into account include –
…
(d) that the body –
and you wish to insert ‘or person’ –
is publicly funded to perform the function.
I am just trying to figure out the extent of the scope. If someone has received a grant to assist with some land clearing, would that be a public function?
Evan MULHOLLAND: The test is not based on the person themselves. The test is corruption. It is corrupt behaviour. So the scope of any IBAC investigation would be corruption.
Ryan BATCHELOR: With respect, that is not the applicable test. This is determining what constitutes a public body, a public officer or a public function, further defined earlier in section 61(e), for example, in making a determination as to the scope of those bodies that IBAC might investigate. I am trying to figure it out as you are redrawing the boundaries of IBAC’s powers. It is a fairly wide scope that would include anybody who is in receipt of public funds to perform a function. If someone receives a grant to clean up an area that is public land – it might be a park, for example – that could constitute a public function that they are receiving public funds for. Would you agree?
Evan MULHOLLAND: Mr Batchelor, it is up to IBAC to determine where they believe an issue may exist. I can very much see IBAC investigating a person where that person may have been doing, say, contract work on a construction site, say, on the Hurstbridge rail site, where we saw a huge amount of misbehaviour by lots of individuals, some of whom were not meant to be there. It is up to IBAC to determine, first, the threshold of whether what they are investigating is corrupt conduct and where they believe an issue may exist that is potentially corrupt.
Ryan BATCHELOR: Is the answer to my question yes?
Evan MULHOLLAND: Mr Batchelor can keep asking questions, and I will keep answering them in a similar fashion. As I have said, the test is not based on the person. The test is based on corrupt behaviour, and the scope of that behaviour is corruption. IBAC will determine where they believe an issue may exist.
Ryan BATCHELOR: I think it is clear that the scope of the people who may be brought under IBAC’s jurisdiction here could be quite significant. The reason we ask these questions is because they are useful for the purpose of statutory interpretation to understand the limits of IBAC’s powers. If IBAC is the one making the determination, the only way to challenge that is with reference to the courts. The courts will look to what the Parliament intended, and that is why it is important to get this, but I think it is clear that it is a pretty wide jurisdiction there.
I just want to go to the proposed amendment to remove section 117(1)(a). Obviously it is not a matter that was recommended by the Integrity and Oversight Committee (IOC). There were a range of witnesses who gave us some evidence as to why they did not support this change, including the Police Association Victoria. Who did you have discussions with in the development of this particular amendment?
Evan MULHOLLAND: Can you just repeat for me the amendment you are talking about?
Ryan BATCHELOR: The amendment is to repeal section 117(1)(a) of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011.
Evan MULHOLLAND: I will be one second.
We have had consultation on this, and we have come to a view that the balance of public hearings was wrong. It was misaligned. Therefore we propose this amendment.
Ryan BATCHELOR: In their submission to the Integrity and Oversight Committee’s inquiry into the legislative framework for IBAC, the police association said:
The Association considers that public examinations should be truly exceptional and rare, as the detriment to individuals invariably exceeds any purported benefit achieved. All examinees before IBAC, including the Association’s members, should be afforded the fundamental right to respond to allegations in a private setting that protects their reputation and preserves their dignity and wellbeing pending the outcome of the investigation by IBAC. There exists no compelling justification for public examinations in circumstances where identical investigative outcomes can be achieved through private examinations without jeopardising reputations, prejudicing subsequent legal proceedings or undermining public confidence in the integrity of the investigative process.
Did you have consultation with the police association prior to putting this amendment to the Parliament, and if so, what was their view?
Evan MULHOLLAND: As I said, we have had consultations. I will not go into a list of who with, but I will say this is about removing a provision requiring certain exemptions to be held in private, therefore enabling greater flexibility in the conduct of hearings. It seeks to change the exceptional circumstances rule involving public hearings when a public hearing is in the public interest. This new power will change the default level of when a public hearing can occur. It should be in public, not just where it is. There is a balance of when public hearings occur, and this bill seeks to strike that right balance, because we believe, as I have said, that balance is misaligned.
Ryan BATCHELOR: Will this amendment affect both the public sector corruption and police oversight jurisdiction that IBAC has?
Evan MULHOLLAND: The intention is to give IBAC greater flexibility in order to hold public hearings.
Ryan BATCHELOR: Is that a yes?
Evan MULHOLLAND: As I said, Mr Batchelor, the discretion powers are there. This is the power to change the exceptional circumstances rule for public hearings, and it is intended to give IBAC greater flexibility when public hearings are in the public interest.
Ryan BATCHELOR: I will take that as a yes. The IOC, in respect of public hearings, did not recommend this change but recommended a series of other changes to strengthen oversight by Integrity Oversight Victoria in terms of increased notification of the exercise of coercive powers and also the publication of hearing guidelines. Those are recommendations 8 and 9 of the report. Is there a reason why you have not included additional safeguards in the bill for the exercise of these coercive powers, which include the abrogation of the right to self-incrimination and the ability for lawyers to raise questions during proceedings and for witnesses to have evidence given to them prior to them being questioned on it, potentially in public? Is there any reason why you did not think that additional safeguards were required, as recommended by Integrity Oversight Victoria and the Integrity and Oversight Committee?
Evan MULHOLLAND: Mr Batchelor, we are always happy to take suggestions for further IBAC reform on board. As you know, the Liberals and Nationals have a great history when it comes to integrity in the creation of IBAC after calls from the public for greater transparency in government following the defeat of – and under – the Brumby government. So we have a proud record on this, and we are always looking for more ways to improve our integrity and oversight bodies. As you have noted, we have had a lot to say in this particular space, but I would note the matter that we are dealing with is quite urgent. It is quite urgent because there has been a report before a royal commission in Queensland that has found that $15 billion, at a conservative estimate, has been funnelled through the CFMEU to the criminal underworld and bikies.
What we are dealing with is urgent, and the Premier has rejected calls to enable IBAC to have these powers, regardless of the fact that they actually have called for them. But also she was the one bandying around this letter saying that she had referred it to IBAC, so it was all good, and she only found out in July 2024 – we know that is not the case. But then IBAC, in an extraordinary public statement, actually put out a statement saying that they had advised that it was not within their jurisdiction. I think the urgency here is making sure these powers are within IBAC’s jurisdiction, because I think all Victorians agree. Something like 75 per cent wanted a royal commission and believe that this issue is a very serious issue, so we are doing what the public is asking of us, which is dealing with the urgent matters that are before us.
Ryan BATCHELOR: I am conscious of time, so I am going to try and get through the questions I have got quickly, because these are significant changes to a body that has significant coercive powers that I think the Parliament should consider properly. Mr Mulholland might like to actually answer some of the questions. On the retrospectivity amendment that you have proposed, what is the date, therefore, of effective operation of the proposed changes should that amendment be included in the bill?
Evan MULHOLLAND: Do you mean the end?
Ryan BATCHELOR: The date from which conduct would be subject to IBAC’s jurisdiction under the retrospectivity amendment that you have proposed.
Evan MULHOLLAND: That would be from the commencement of IBAC.
Ryan BATCHELOR: Do you have a date?
Evan MULHOLLAND: I would have to check Hansard for when the IBAC legislation received royal assent – I believe it was 2011 or 2012 – but it is from the commencement of IBAC.
Ryan BATCHELOR: The reason I asked was because it does not appear that this amendment has been considered by the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulation Committee (SARC), which has some matters that it likes to specify or request of those who seek to introduce retrospective laws, including that they should be specific and that they should articulate why a particular date was chosen and understand the effect of retrospectivity. It worries me that you do not know what date the law that you are proposing comes into effect, so do you know the date that these amendments would apply to conduct in the state of Victoria which could now be subject to the jurisdiction of IBAC?
Evan MULHOLLAND: I believe IBAC, despite being established in 2012, became operational in early 2013. Mr Batchelor, as you were just discussing and as we all know, interpretation can often be left to the committee stages of a debate on legislation. As we are discussing now, it is quite clear from the author of the bill that this retrospectivity clause is intended to go back to when IBAC first started its jurisdiction. I am being quite clear, and I will also say it is a bit rich for Mr Batchelor to suggest further IBAC reform when he just voted against this current IBAC reform.
Ryan BATCHELOR: So the follow-the-money powers, as you describe them, would apply to decisions taken by government in 2013 and 2014 as well as any decisions taken post that point?
Evan MULHOLLAND: Yes.
Ryan BATCHELOR: Again, I am just conscious of time. In the formulation of this particular amendment, I was right that it did not go through any of the SARC processes. Is that correct?
Evan MULHOLLAND: Mr Batchelor, this issue we are debating requires a deep level of urgency that the government has not been very keen to act on – particularly when this entire chamber voted for a royal commission and particularly when this entire chamber just voted to give IBAC further powers that it has called for, which it has told the Premier that it does not have. So I think this does require urgency from the Parliament to get this bill through and pass it into law, because the status quo is not an option. We have had, as a conservative estimate, $15 billion lost to the criminal underworld and bikies while we are having to merge health services, cut a whole bunch of programs and increase taxes, which Victorians are paying the price for. To see their money fly out the door to the criminal underworld – it does require answers. I know some on that side of the chamber believe it does not, but it actually does require deep thought and answers. And that involves giving IBAC the powers it needs to be able to follow taxpayer dollars where they go.
Clause agreed to; clauses 2 to 5 agreed to.
New clauses 5A to 5C (15:49)
Sarah MANSFIELD: I move:
1. Insert the following New Clauses to follow clause 5 –
‘5A Definitions
In section 3(1) of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011, the definition of relevant offence is repealed.
5B Corrupt conduct
(1) In section 4(1) of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 –
(a) in paragraph (e), for “or (da) –” substitute “or (da).”;
(b) omit “being conduct that would constitute a relevant offence.”.
(2) Section 4(1A) of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 is repealed.
5C Conduct occurring before the commencement of this section
At the end of section 11 of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 insert –
“(2) This Act as amended by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Act 2026 applies to and in respect of conduct all or part of which occurred before the commencement of this subsection if the conduct would have been corrupt conduct within the meaning of this Act as amended by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Act 2026 had this subsection been in force at the time the conduct occurred.”.’.
This bill, as I said earlier, gives IBAC two of the three critical powers it needs to get to the bottom of the Big Build corruption fiasco. It gives them the follow-the-money power and the ability to hold public hearings, but it does not expand the jurisdiction of IBAC to be able to investigate so-called grey corruption. The Greens’ two amendments today propose to go that extra mile to give IBAC the teeth it needs to give Victorians the full picture of how the $15 billion was lost. This first amendment here is about expanding IBAC’s jurisdiction. IBAC’s jurisdiction is currently limited to corrupt conduct linked to serious indictable offences or common-law crimes such as bribery and misconduct in public office. Without expanding these powers, a vast body of corruption allegations will go uninvestigated, and Victorians will never know how $15 billion or potentially more of their taxpayer money was squandered through graft and greed. Our first proposed amendment seeks to expand the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ so IBAC is no longer restricted to investigating serious indictable crimes or common-law offences like misconduct in public office, bribery or perverting the course of justice. This would empower IBAC to identify, investigate and expose corrupt conduct of public officers and dodgy third parties that does not constitute a criminal offence but that still damages citizens’ confidence in public administration.
Ryan BATCHELOR: I am just interested, Dr Mansfield, in the expansion of the public sector jurisdiction of IBAC proposed in this amendment and what impact that is likely to have on IBAC’s police oversight jurisdiction, given the operations of section 15(1A).
Sarah MANSFIELD: The intention of this amendment is that it is a standalone. There is a separate section of the act that deals with police oversight, and this does not interact with section 5. This will expand jurisdiction, and it deals with corruption under section 4 of the act.
Ryan BATCHELOR: Okay. I raise the issue because it came up in the IOC’s last set of hearings that one of the reasons why there have been some deficiencies – and we heard this from Inner Melbourne Community Legal and the Police Accountability Project – is that there is a concern that the operation of section 15 of the act, by prioritising public sector corrupt conduct, is diminishing the resources and attention that IBAC provides to police oversight. There was quite a lengthy discussion at the IOC, particularly with some key witnesses, about the way that under existing rules the prioritisation that was required by section 15 to public sector corruption over police oversight is skewing IBAC’s ability to undertake its police oversight jurisdiction. The proposed amendment that you are moving here would, in removing the criminal offence requirement in conjunction with the retrospectivity requirement, massively expand the scope of IBAC’s public sector corruption jurisdiction, which I understand to be the intent. I am trying to understand the consequences and the extent to which there has been consideration given to the impact of these changes that you are proposing here on the police oversight functions that IBAC undertakes.
Sarah MANSFIELD: I am fully aware that these amendments will expand the workload of IBAC, and therefore IBAC needs more resources so it can undertake all of those functions adequately, including its police oversight functions. If there is concern that those functions are not adequately being undertaken by IBAC, even currently, because of resource limitations, then I think that is yet another example of why IBAC desperately need more resources so they can do their job properly.
Ryan BATCHELOR: This amendment will change the definition of corrupt conduct in section 6. What impact will that have on other acts?
Sarah MANSFIELD: Mr Batchelor, our amendment does not affect section 6.
Ryan BATCHELOR: Interesting. No, that must have been one from last week. You mentioned in your contribution – and I raised this in the contribution last week – the difficulty in making definitions with clarity about what would constitute grey corruption. Do you have any further clarity about the sorts of matters I raised last week – I will not go through them again – matters about specific conduct that you think would form part of the widened scope of corrupt conduct here? Do you have any further clarity in response to the questions I raised?
Sarah MANSFIELD: The expanded jurisdiction does seek to extend the definitions of ‘corrupt conduct’. It removes the requirement that the conduct must also constitute a relevant offence where it is defined as an indictable offence or specific common-law offence like bribery, misconduct in public office or perverting the course of justice. But the expansion of the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ from our amendments will mean that IBAC can investigate and make findings of corrupt conduct consistent with the existing definition in section 4(1) without the conduct having to also meet the threshold of being a relevant or indictable criminal offence. Section 4(1) of the act retains numerous sections defining corrupt conduct, including acting dishonestly, breaching public trust, misuse of information or obtaining a direct benefit in the person’s role as a public officer or office holder. I also refer you to section 15(1A) of the IBAC act, which states that:
In performing its functions, the IBAC must prioritise its attention to the investigation and exposure of corrupt conduct which the IBAC considers may constitute serious corrupt conduct or systemic corrupt conduct.
So I think you could potentially define the grey corruption that we are trying to capture here – or soft corruption or just corruption, as we do with this amendment – as any conduct that falls within the retained legislative constraints of the IBAC act if our amendments were to pass. I might anticipate that your next inquiry about that is ‘Well, is that too broad a definition, and how do we deal with some of the uncertainty around that?’ I am comfortable with the definition of corrupt conduct put forward by these amendments, which is very similar to the one used by the National Anti-Corruption Commission. We think IBAC should live up to its name as a broad-based anti-corruption commission and not be a narrow-based one. We consulted widely on this change, and we have done it over many years – this is not just a recent thing. While nearly all experts admittedly have a different opinion on the exact wording and the legislative framework to adopt, all agree that change is long overdue and necessary in Victoria. I will quote Associate Professor Yee-Fui Ng and Dr Stephen Gray in their evidence in the IOC report, which I know you are familiar with, Mr Batchelor. They said there is ‘no consensus’, that ‘there is no single perfect model or design’ and that ‘there is no definitive framework that specifies the granular detail for institutional design’.
Further, I point you to existing section 4(1) of the act, which I have gone over some of. Essentially this provides clear guidance to IBAC to prioritise serious and systemic corrupt conduct in determining a policy of what corrupt conduct should be investigated, which will exclude petty or trivial issues. IBAC will be able to determine what it believes meets that threshold.
Ryan BATCHELOR: I appreciate Dr Mansfield’s clarification. I do think, as I mentioned in my second-reading contribution, there are considerable challenges associated with drawing the boundaries around what terms like ‘grey corruption’ and ‘soft corruption’ mean, and I think there is a lot of blurriness there that is not particularly helpful.
I will just come back – sorry, I misspoke earlier when I said section 6; I meant section 4. The definitions in section 4 of the IBAC act have consequences in other pieces of legislation. I am interested if this amendment is intended to affect the operation of other acts and other agencies, and if so, what those effects might be.
Sarah MANSFIELD: We are comfortable with the changes to the definitions that they make, and if they broaden the definitions of corrupt conduct and there are consequences in other areas, then that is something that we are comfortable with.
Ryan BATCHELOR: I am conscious of time, so I have got one more, just on the special reports. Following the conversations we had last week, an addition seems to have been made to the amendments that you have proposed this week, which appear to respond to recommendation 26 of the IOC’s report and the concerns that IBAC put to the IOC about the need for safeguards with the publication of special reports, and particularly the clarity that there is a statement that the finding of corrupt conduct is not a finding of criminal liability or that they are liable for a disciplinary offence. Can I just confirm that your intention is to make sure that the special reports will make clear that they are not those things, consistent with IBAC’s recommendations?
Sarah MANSFIELD: Mr Batchelor, this is actually with respect to my next amendment, which I have not moved, but I am happy to answer this. Yes, your understanding is correct. This is a clarification amendment. Our understanding is that IBAC already do this, but it is to provide clarification so that they can provide some of those additional comforts and protections to those who may be subject to an investigation and a report.
Ryan BATCHELOR: And just a last one on that. The other was recommendation 25, which talks about procedural fairness for those who are mentioned in special reports. Where are those protections that IBAC suggested were required and that the IOC recommended in recommendation 25?
Sarah MANSFIELD: We have limited our amendments to what we see as the absolutely essential things that we need to get on with now. We are very open to broader amendments to the IBAC legislation and would welcome them if you or the government were to bring them forward.
Council divided on new clauses:
Ayes (8): Katherine Copsey, David Ettershank, Anasina Gray-Barberio, David Limbrick, Sarah Mansfield, Rachel Payne, Aiv Puglielli, Georgie Purcell
Noes (29): Ryan Batchelor, Melina Bath, John Berger, Lizzie Blandthorn, Jeff Bourman, Gaelle Broad, Georgie Crozier, Moira Deeming, Enver Erdogan, Jacinta Ermacora, Michael Galea, Renee Heath, Ann-Marie Hermans, Shaun Leane, Wendy Lovell, Trung Luu, Bev McArthur, Joe McCracken, Nick McGowan, Tom McIntosh, Evan Mulholland, Harriet Shing, Ingrid Stitt, Jaclyn Symes, Lee Tarlamis, Gayle Tierney, Rikkie-Lee Tyrrell, Sheena Watt, Richard Welch
New clauses negatived.
New clauses 5A and 5B (16:11)
Sarah MANSFIELD: I move:
1. Insert the following New Clauses to follow clause 5 –
‘5A Special reports
After section 162(6) of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 insert –
“(6A) To avoid doubt, subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit the IBAC from including in a report under this section a finding or opinion that a specified person has committed or engaged in corrupt conduct.
(6B) However, if the IBAC includes in a report under this section a finding or opinion that a specified person has committed or engaged in corrupt conduct, the IBAC must include in the report a statement that the finding or opinion is not a finding or an opinion that a specified person is guilty of or has committed, is committing or is about to commit, any criminal offence or disciplinary offence.”.
5B Matters to be included in annual report
After section 165(6) of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 substitute –
“(6A) To avoid doubt, subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit the IBAC from including in a report under this section a finding or opinion that a specified person has committed or engaged in corrupt conduct.
(6B) However, if the IBAC includes in a report under this section a finding or opinion that a specified person has committed or engaged in corrupt conduct, the IBAC must include in the report a statement that the finding or opinion is not a finding or an opinion that a specified person is guilty of or has committed, is committing or is about to commit, any criminal offence or disciplinary offence.”.’.
I discussed these amendments briefly in response to Mr Batchelor’s questions. IBAC has long adopted a conservative interpretation of the IBAC act in order to avoid breaching section 162(6), given that the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ is confined to serious indictable offences or common-law offences. This is precisely why Victoria’s anti-corruption commission has until now stopped short of making formal findings of corrupt conduct. To address the constraint, this amendment makes clear that any such finding is not a finding of criminal guilt but rather a jurisdictional determination. I commend these amendments to the house.
Evan MULHOLLAND: I would like to thank Dr Mansfield for putting forward these amendments in the constructive way in which she has done, but as discussed, the Liberals and Nationals will not be supporting these amendments at this time.
New clauses negatived.
New clause 5A (16:12)
Evan MULHOLLAND: I move:
1. Insert the following New Clause to follow clause 5 –
‘5A New section 200 inserted
After section 199 of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 insert –
“200 Transitional provision – Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Act 2026
This Act as amended by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Act 2026 applies to and in respect of conduct all or part of which occurred before the commencement of this section if the corrupt conduct concerns a public officer or public body within the meaning of this Act as amended by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Follow the Money) Act 2026 had this subsection been in force at the time the conduct occurred.”.’.
This amendment is simply to have a retrospective application of the entire bill. I would like to particularly thank the engagement that we have had with the Greens on this particular part, which is what we requested in the bill but certainly clarifies that that is the determined intent of the amendment.
Sarah MANSFIELD: I thank Mr Mulholland for putting this amendment forward and likewise acknowledge the constructive way he and Mr Newbury have worked with us on this particular amendment. As members will see, we have an identical amendment, so we believe that this is an important change. As I have said, as a matter of public policy, IBAC should not be barred from investigating corruption to the tune of billions of dollars because those who engaged in the corrupt conduct did not know at the time that IBAC might uncover their misdeeds. This retrospective power will allow them to go back and look at things like what has gone on on some of the Big Build sites. So we are very supportive of this amendment.
New clause agreed to; clause 6 agreed to.
Reported to house with an amendment.
Evan MULHOLLAND (Northern Metropolitan) (16:15): I move:
That the report be now adopted.
Motion agreed to.
Report adopted.
Third reading
Evan MULHOLLAND (Northern Metropolitan) (16:15): I move:
That the bill be now read a third time.
Motion agreed to.
Read third time.
The DEPUTY PRESIDENT: Pursuant to standing order 14.25, the bill will be transmitted to the Assembly with a message requesting their agreement.