Wednesday, 4 March 2026

 David DAVIS (Southern Metropolitan) (16:14): I move:

That this house requires the Integrity and Oversight Committee to inquire into, consider and report, as soon as practicable given the state budget is scheduled to be delivered on 5 May 2026, on the adequacy of the annual budget for the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission, the Ombudsman and Integrity Oversight Victoria, and requires the committee in undertaking and reporting on this inquiry to:

(1)   hold public hearings with the agencies listed in this referral;

(2)   provide advice on what settings are appropriate for the funding of these agencies in the 2026–27 state budget; and

(3)   provide advice on the likely consequences if the funding provided by the government is inadequate.

We know that funding is inadequate. We know that the government has made a specialty over its period in government of starving the integrity agencies of money.

A member: Every year it goes up.

David DAVIS: Well, no, that is actually not true. When you look at the actual allocations and when you look at –

Members interjecting.

David DAVIS: You actually have to look not just at the budget papers, you have to look at the actual schedules. You have to look at the budget schedules in the chamber. That is exactly where you do not understand what is going on. You have got to look at the actual schedules of what is put in.

Members interjecting.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (John Berger): Order! I think we can proceed without any interruptions from anybody.

David DAVIS: Acting President, I will try not to be provoked and try to press forward. I will try not to take the bait, as it were.

Members interjecting.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (John Berger): I do not think we got too far with my request, so let us try it a second time.

David DAVIS: As I said, motion 1305 seeks to refer to the Integrity and Oversight Committee to seek their advice for the chamber ahead of the state budget. I understand Mr Batchelor has said he wants to make some changes to the motion. If they are as outlined to me verbally –

Ryan Batchelor: I’ve emailed them to you.

David DAVIS: Have you? Okay. That is all right. But in recent times, I think – very recently. Forgive me, but I do not have the capacity to both –

The ACTING PRESIDENT (John Berger): Mr Davis, perhaps we do not have to debate across the chamber as you go on with your presentation.

David DAVIS: Acting President, forgive me. I may have many skills, but both reading and speaking in the chamber concurrently is probably one that is beyond most of us, so I will just leave that to one side.

In all seriousness, this is actually a very important motion because the integrity agencies have not had the funding that they deserve and the funding that they need. They have said that both before the 2022 state election and subsequently in documents that they have released formally and communicated to each and every MP and in evidence to the Integrity and Oversight Committee. The offices have spoken more broadly on this as well. There is an issue with funding. If you compare the material in the submissions that they have made and in the materials that they have distributed, it is clear that we are also behind in the support for our integrity agencies compared to other jurisdictions. That is important to understand.

I want to make a point here. I am always in favour of cautious spending, spending that returns an outcome, but in this area being penny-wise is not the right step. In this area spending carefully but in a targeted manner at a level that gets the outcome is actually a better outcome for the community, because if you can prevent corruption, you actually make a big saving for the community. Transparency International says as a rule-of-thumb figure 3 to 8 per cent of government procurement could be corrupt in jurisdictions. That is what they say if you go and read their figures. They do not have state figures, but they do point to this around the world. In the case of Victoria we have more recent information in the form of Geoffrey Watson SC’s contribution to the Queensland inquiry. He makes it clear that it might be as much as 15 or even 30 per cent of spending on certain types of procurement, in this case Big Build procurement, where massive amounts of public money have been spent but it appears massive amounts of public money have also been lost.

That is what we need to understand: if we do not have strong integrity agencies, police included, such as IBAC and the Ombudsman, we will have more corruption in our state. If you want to clamp down on corruption, it is necessary to spend adequately and make sure that the agencies can do what they need to do to root out corruption, to prevent corruption and to act with the right education motives. The IBAC has got an important education role, but again, it cannot do these things if it does not have the resources and money that it needs, and it surely has not.

My office has actually tracked the budget of IBAC back to 2012. You could actually follow the ins and outs of the money and the rolling over. We have actually got all of the rolling over of money, because they do not always spend all the money each year.

Ryan Batchelor: They don’t spend their money?

David DAVIS: There is sometimes lumpy expenditure, if I can put it that way.

Ryan Batchelor interjected.

David DAVIS: No. Let me just be very clear that in some years there are allocations and they are spent in the following year for various reasons. The timing and the hearings and all of those sorts of things operate in a certain way. So the money, when you phase it over the period, has not been increasing in the way it should have. The money and the resources for IBAC have not kept pace. And you, Mr Batchelor, can go and look at IBAC’s own charts and you can see that in fact their share of spending has actually slipped down and they are in a position where they do not have the resources that they need. It is very clear that they actually need proper resources. That is what I want the IOC to look at, and I want them to give us advice.

In this chamber in two recent years we have sought to make a suggested amendment to the budget of the Parliament – because these agencies are addended to the Parliament’s budget, not the general budget – and to increase the funding for IBAC and the Ombudsman. We have done that because it is clear that their funding has been inadequate. It is clear that this government has sought to –

Ryan Batchelor interjected.

David DAVIS: This government is a corrupt government. It is a government that actually has tried to starve the agencies, and it has tried to starve the agencies because it does not want the scrutiny. That is the truth of the matter. They do not want the scrutiny, and they have tried to keep the money down because more scrutiny will lead to more grief for the Allan Labor government and the corruption that is associated with the Allan Labor government.

This chamber has carried a number of motions and bills that deal with some of these matters. We have obviously been dealing with a particular bill today that is looking at the follow-the-money power and looking to insert that. It is looking at widening the definition of ‘corruption’. All of these are important. Indeed there have been a number of bills considered in this Parliament and there are a number still on our notice paper. We had the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Facilitating Timely Reporting) Bill 2022, the Multicultural Victoria Amendment (Independence) Bill 2022 and the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment (Restoration of Examination Powers) Bill 2022. That was an important bill that actually sought to restore some of the powers that had been stripped by this government from IBAC in the period around 2019. And why does the government do that? Because the government wants less scrutiny, less focus on it as time goes forward, and the government’s focus on less funding for IBAC and less funding for the Ombudsman makes it clear that there can only be one reason that this government will not fund them properly. This systemic decision to starve these agencies of proper funding is designed to cover up the government’s failures and cover up the government’s corruption.

I think we have been done a great favour by those in the Queensland inquiry but particularly by Geoffrey Watson SC with his thoughtful work. We know it is not just him that says there has been around $15 billion of corruption through the Big Build sites. We also know that the federal workplace commissioner thought this would be around the correct figure. He had obviously discussed that with senior Victorian officials – I think that is how he described it – and they had concluded a similar figure. So we know that that $15 billion figure actually has some robustness to it; a number of groups have come to similar conclusions. We obviously do not know an exact figure, but we do know that corruption is rife on our Big Build sites. We know that the corruption is widespread. We have seen report after report after report, and we know that Jacinta Allan, as the minister at the time, did not act adequately, did not do what was necessary and did not make the referrals that were necessary. Where she did make a referral, she sent it to IBAC in a way that could not be investigated, because in that case IBAC did not have the follow-the-money powers that it needed. IBAC wrote back to the Premier and explained that to her, and she ought to have known, she ought to have understood, that she needed to take further steps – that further steps needed to be taken to make sure that those corrupt activities that were occurring on those Big Build sites were dealt with in a constructive and significant way.

I also want to say something about the timing of this. I understood from Mr Batchelor that he wants to make a hard date of 5 May. I have tried to leave latitude, and I am open to be convinced on this. I do not think it is a terribly material fact, but I have left it open because I was wanting to leave whatever latitude the committee needed. If it needed to do it a week later, it could do it a week later. That was the logic when I wrote this. I was not trying to be harsh or prescriptive. But I am happy with 5 May, because 5 May is obviously budget day, and I would have thought that that is the time when we need to see the advice – by around that time. Obviously this chamber is not scheduled to sit on that day. I think the IOC could table a report nonetheless on 5 May, so we might see if the clerks could give us some information. I just want to hear that definitively. My understanding is that it could, but it would be helpful if the clerks, by the conclusion of this debate, could give some definitive advice on that particular matter.

Mr Batchelor says he does not like point 3. He says it is sort of leading. It is written the way it is because I actually do believe there is now a broad consensus that the agencies have not been funded well enough. They have said so, and other independent investigators have said so. A number of the groups that follow integrity agencies have said this to me and to others. I think any fair independent investigation would conclude that the agencies have not been adequately funded, to the extent that if number 3 disappeared off the list I do not think it would materially affect how the committee went about its work and I think the committee would approach it with exactly the thought process that I have had here – that actually the agencies are underfunded. That is why we are making the referral, and we want some formal advice on that so that we are in a position, when the budget comes forward, to try and persuade the government to come forward with a more adequate budgetary approach.

Is this the ultimate solution for annual appropriations for the integrity agencies? No. Are there alternate models out there? Yes. Would some of those models be better considered in the longer haul? Absolutely. But at the same time, we are not in a position where we can introduce one of those models this year, right now, ahead of the state budget on 5 May. This is the model that I have suggested for this occasion, for this year. It will mean that the IOC can hold some quick hearings, can talk to the agencies, can seek some other advice if they so wish and can come up with some thoughtful suggestions to make to the chamber to put us in a position where we can take the relevant steps that we might want to take to ensure that the agencies are in a stronger position going forward.

I just want to reiterate very clearly here that this is one of those areas where government spending returns a financial dividend. If you have got a government that is spending sensibly and in a targeted way on its integrity agencies, you can actually prevent corruption, save public money being squandered and thereby actually get a return for the taxpayer. Think about what has been squandered on these Big Build sites – $15 billion, $15,000 million. Robert Redlich said on radio the other day it might not be $15 billion; it might be $10 billion or it might be $20 billion. Either way, if it is $10,000 million or $15,000 million or $20,000 million that has been squandered, that is a gigantic amount of money that could have been spent on hospitals, schools, roads, a whole range of worthy –

Bev McArthur interjected.

David DAVIS: Less taxes. In my own portfolio I am watching very important arts organisations that have received very modest grants. $150,000 a year for Writers Victoria – well, that has been cut. Right across government, money is not being spent, because it has been squandered on these Big Build sites – corruptly squandered. The corruption is clear there, whether it be the bikie gangs, the women who have been put onto the sites in inappropriate ways, the thugs that have been there threatening firms or the treatment of apprentices – you know, those terrible stories that we read just about a year ago, broken in the Age and the Financial Review, about the treatment of some apprentices. All of these are terrible circumstances, but they are also costly circumstances for the state budget, and if you are spending $15 billion in corruptly squandered money, you are going to have less money to spend on other points.

My motion is a very simple motion. It gives the job to the IOC. It asks it to do it in a relatively short timeframe. I am open to a hard date, as opposed to a more flexible state, and I have said ‘as soon as practicable’. But the reality is this is an important motion because we need to take whatever steps are necessary to strengthen our anti-corruption agencies – whatever practical, sensible steps we can take – and part of it is funding them adequately. I urge you to support the motion.

 Ryan BATCHELOR (Southern Metropolitan) (16:31): I am very pleased to rise to speak on Mr Davis’s motion about funding for integrity agencies and the work program for the Integrity and Oversight Committee. As a member of that committee I am always up for more work to do, because the committee itself is obviously the committee of the Parliament entrusted with the responsibility to exercise oversight over our integrity agencies listed here, principally IBAC, the Ombudsman and Integrity Oversight Victoria, along with a couple of others. As independent officers of the Parliament and accountable to the Parliament, appropriated through the parliamentary appropriation, it is indeed the IOC that has the responsibility and should exercise that responsibility to ensure that the performance of these agencies and the funding of these agencies are scrutinised – and we do. In fact on Monday the Integrity and Oversight Committee held public hearings with IBAC, the Victorian Ombudsman and Integrity Oversight Victoria and discussed a range of matters relating to their performance, as is our responsibility as a committee, including their funding arrangements and their budgets. Having done it once on Monday, I am sure the committee will be able to continue to examine those issues and do that work that we do in the normal course of events as well.

I should say that the Integrity and Oversight Committee is also at the moment undertaking a performance audit of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission and Integrity Oversight Victoria, as is required under the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003. Last year we completed a performance audit of the Victorian Ombudsman, as is required under the Parliamentary Committees Act. Those reports of IOV and IBAC this year will be tabled, hopefully, at the end of August, which should again give further assurance to the Parliament, to the Council, to the chamber, that matters of the funding and performance of these agencies are being examined. Our annual report on the performance of the integrity agencies will come around that time as well, following the hearings we were holding earlier in the week.

I will say a couple of things just in general terms about funding of integrity agencies, because I do not think that some of the claims that Mr Davis made should go unchallenged or uncontested. We know that there have been instances where there have been some challenges associated with Mr Davis’s interpretation of figures, and I just thought it would be helpful to put on the public record some of the facts about integrity agency funding. IBAC today has more than double the funding it had when Labor came to office – fact. The Ombudsman has nearly double the funding – a 189 per cent increase in funding since when Labor came to government – and Integrity Oversight Victoria has nearly four times the funding than when Labor came to government. So I am not really going to be lectured about the finances of these agencies by Mr Davis when Labor has invested. He said funding is being cut and you should look at the numbers.

David Davis interjected.

Ryan BATCHELOR: No, you did not say ‘effectively’, you said funding had been cut. Table 2.2 of IBAC’s annual report 2024–25, which was tabled last year, shows that in the financial year ending 2025 the total parliamentary authority provision of outputs to IBAC was $66.9 million. In the 2024 financial year, the year before that, it was $63.1 million. I am no great mathematician, but I think that $69 million is more than $63 million year on year. That says to me that in that financial year, the last financial year, funding went up, as you would expect it to, and we have doubled IBAC’s funding since we have been in government. But we also know that there was a substantial increase in IBAC’s funding in the 2022–23 budget. To quote from IBAC’s annual report 2021–22, page 52:

Similar to previous years, IBAC submitted a budget bid for consideration as part of the state government’s budget process. The budget bid related to an increase in base funding to enable IBAC to operate effectively and efficiently into the future. This bid was fundamentally informed by the work undertaken as part of the independent base review, which IBAC committed to undertake prior to submitting our 2022/23 budget bid. Central to our budget submission was a request for an increase in our base budget, so that we can maintain our current capacity and deliver our legislative functions, while also strengthening our ability to do so into the future.

In the 2022–23 state budget, the government announced funding for the IBAC budget bid. In dollar terms, IBAC will receive $32.0 million over the next four years and $8.6 million per year thereafter.

If you go and look at the output initiatives in the 2022–23 budget in the service delivery budget paper, you will note that the additional funding that IBAC is receiving this year as a result of the budget decision that was taken that year is $8.6 million. $8.6 million increased operational funding to IBAC was provided in that budget, and we saw from the annual report numbers that I just read out the increase year on year that is flowing to IBAC. I know that Mr Davis might have difficulty understanding these facts as well as other facts. I hope that the work that the IOC does, if this motion is successful, will help illuminate the increased funding that the government has provided to IBAC.

As Mr Davis foreshadowed, there are a couple of amendments I wish to move to his motion, and I ask that they now please be circulated. They are pretty straightforward. I move:

1.   Before paragraph (1), omit ‘, as soon as practicable given the state budget is scheduled to be delivered on’ and insert in their place ‘by’.

2.   In paragraph (1), after ‘referral;’ insert ‘and’.

3.   In paragraph (2), omit ‘budget; and’ and insert in their place ‘budget.’.

4.   Omit paragraph (3).

The first set of amendments just seek to give an actual reporting date to the committee. As a member of the committee, I think that it is always preferable to have an actual reporting date. We seek to do that by budget day because that was the date that Mr Davis had flagged it would be better for it to be done by, so why don’t we just do it by then. As I said, we have already held some hearings on Monday, so we are well advanced on many of the things that Mr Davis seeks to do. The last is to omit paragraph (3), which I just think is a bit unnecessary and presupposes what the committee might find. I think it is best in terms of reference for inquiries to ask committees to investigate things without presupposing what they might find. Those are the amendments that I have moved to Mr Davis’s motion. I think they are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial.

The other thing I will say is about the Ombudsman, because I do not want the Ombudsman to feel neglected in the course of this debate. I have articulated that the funding to the Ombudsman has been increasing since Labor took government. One of the challenges that the Ombudsman is facing, though has been highlighted in its last two annual reports as it has failed to meet some of its investigation performance targets. The evidence the Ombudsman gave to the IOC on Monday was that the impact of a combination of parliamentary referrals of matters to the Ombudsman and the operation of the Public Interest Disclosures Act 2012 and referrals under the PID act are having a significant effect on the capacity of the Ombudsman to undertake investigations. One of the things that hopefully we will be able to do in the course of the inquiry of understanding the budget is to also understand some of the drivers of the cost pressures that are being placed upon the Ombudsman, in particular, in being able to fulfil their function of conducting investigations of complaints made by the public, which is really what their fundamental core role and core function is. Bearing in mind that there have been four referrals from this chamber or its committees in the last couple of years, every time that occurs it results in resourcing implications for the Ombudsman, and that has flow-on effects to other work that the Ombudsman seeks to do and that the public I think has an expectation that it will be doing. I think that is one thing that we uncovered in our hearings with the Ombudsman that were held on Monday discussing their budget, which hopefully will help to inform the discussions that occur as part of the referral inquiry here. I think it will be an interesting inquiry.

 Sarah MANSFIELD (Western Victoria) (16:41): I rise to speak in support of this motion that Mr Davis has brought today. As Victorians’ elected representatives in this Parliament, we have a responsibility to safeguard the independence and effectiveness of the integrity agencies that hold this government to account. But alarmingly, our integrity agencies not only lack the powers to delve into systemic corruption but are increasingly starved of funds to do so. IBAC, the Victorian Ombudsman and the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office exist to scrutinise government, ensure its financial probity and expose maladministration, corruption and breaches of our fundamental human rights. The credibility of our integrity agencies depends on their financial independence and their capacity to operate in the knowledge that they will not suffer the cruel cuts of a cabinet razor gang in retaliation for them just doing their jobs. Today we are again reminded of the critical role these agencies play as independent officers of the Parliament as we learn that the Victorian Ombudsman rang the alarm bells about the Victorian Infrastructure Delivery Authority’s (VIDA) alleged maladministration of $100 billion in Big Build bucks months before the current Big Build scandal came to light. Today’s report notes that the Ombudsman has referred this matter to IBAC and VAGO, which begs the question: do these two agencies even have the resources required to investigate a government agency that oversees the spending of so much public money?

IBAC, the Ombudsman and VAGO have recently co-published a paper on advancing budget transparency for Victoria’s core integrity agencies. Their paper makes it clear that funding decisions about these critical integrity bodies remain opaque and it undermines their ability to fulfil their respective mandates. The joint paper outlines how these three integrity agencies face multiple interconnected barriers to budget transparency. Their funding is determined through a process shrouded in cabinet secrecy, with budget requests classified as cabinet in confidence. Neither the Integrity and Oversight Committee nor the parliamentary Public Accounts and Estimates Committee have any formal input or even visibility over budget decisions affecting the agencies they oversee. This is despite legislative provisions seemingly intended to allow such consultation in the case of the Victorian Ombudsman and IBAC.

Our integrity agencies have no visibility of the Treasury advice that informs funding decisions and no opportunity to correct errors or provide context before budgetary decisions are made, and they receive no written explanation of outcomes or variations from their bids. Compounding all this, Victoria’s integrity agencies are not automatically immune from the same efficiency dividends and savings measures applied to regular government departments, despite their unique statutory mandates. They also lack any kind of contingency funding mechanism to handle unpredictable workloads – for example, the Ombudsman’s recent referral of VIDA’s alleged maladministration to IBAC and VAGO. The funding of our core integrity agencies is heading in the wrong direction. Our integrity bodies are increasingly under-resourced relative to the public sector and public investment they are charged with overseeing. Victoria’s investment in integrity functions as a proportion of total government expenditure has been trending downwards since 2016–17. It has fallen below the 0.15 per cent benchmark recommended by Transparency International Australia, and Victoria now lags behind New South Wales. Victoria’s Ombudsman has half the number of complaints officers of her New South Wales counterpart.

If we have learned anything from the evolving Big Build scandal, it is that when government infrastructure spending grows but the proportional investment in oversight shrinks, the system becomes compromised. The bodies tasked with exposing misconduct, maladministration and waste are stretched thinner each year, even as their workloads increase. Take IBAC for example. Complaints and notifications rose 18 per cent in 2024–25 above the average of the preceding three years. The result is a backlog that delays investigations and puts undue strain on complainants, witnesses and staff alike. The Victorian Ombudsman is in a similarly difficult position. Significant new functions were added to the Ombudsman Act 1973 in 2019, yet there has never been a corresponding base budget review to properly resource those expanded responsibilities. When Parliament refers urgent matters for investigation, as it should rightly be allowed to do, the Ombudsman must proceed immediately, but without any guaranteed supplementary funding. The agency relies instead on informal Treasurer’s advances that lack any legislative backing or certainty.

Other jurisdictions have recognised these emerging risks, and they have acted. In 2024 New South Wales amended its Government Sector Finance Act 2018 to enshrine a transparent funding process for five integrity agencies, including its Ombudsman, audit office and Independent Commission Against Corruption. This followed a 2020 special report by the New South Wales Auditor-General that identified precisely the emerging risks to integrity we are now seeing here in Victoria. New South Wales integrity agencies are excluded from efficiency dividends. A specialist Treasury unit manages their funding representations, and, crucially, agencies are invited to review Treasury’s own advice to cabinet before decisions are made, giving them the opportunity to correct errors and to make their case. Funding decisions are then provided in writing, with reasons given for any variation from the original bid, to both the agency and its parliamentary oversight committee. A dedicated contingency fund is also available for urgent and unexpected matters. It is important to note that these reforms do not remove cabinet’s authority over final funding decisions and they do not compromise fiscal discipline. They simply make budgetary processes more transparent and give agencies a fair hearing.

Victoria was once a leader in integrity reform, but on budget transparency we have stood still while others have moved forward. The New South Wales model is actually very modest. It is implementable and consistent with emerging best practice across jurisdictions. What is needed now is the political will to follow their lead. Transparency in budget processes for our core integrity agencies is a key democratic safeguard, and at a time when trust in public administration is faltering ensuring that integrity agencies are transparently and appropriately funded is essential to maintaining public confidence in the system. If our core integrity agencies are perceived to be financially constrained by the very executive they oversee, public trust is eroded. I commend this motion to the house.

 Moira DEEMING (Western Metropolitan) (16:49): I rise to lend my support to this motion. Here we are again. It is just getting to be a tired old theme, talking about corruption in this state. Victorians are reassured constantly that our watchdogs are there: they are doing their job, they have got the powers and they have got the money. It sounds reassuring of course, but we all know that it is just not true. We know from our lived experience that it is just not true. We might have IBAC and the Ombudsman and Integrity Oversight Victoria – they are supposed to investigate corruption and protect taxpayer money – but we have all heard the responses when reports come out called ‘educational reports’. We have watched as reports are delayed in being released. We have heard them argue themselves that they do not have enough funding to do their jobs and that they cannot handle the volume of complaints. We know now about the underlying problems with secrecy in terms of when they are asking for more funding. Even that level of transparency from the government is missing, let alone the actual funding measures themselves. It makes you wonder whether perhaps it was designed to fail.

We have already heard all the other motions seeking to restore the powers and to grant extra powers so that these organisations and institutions can actually have teeth when they discover things, but this one is mostly about money. I find it very amusing and interesting that one of the defences that government ministers bring up all the time is: ‘Well, I referred that to the relevant agency. We referred that to the relevant agency at the time.’ They stand there and say that knowing that there is no guaranteed funding to finish. How unsatisfying.

It is no wonder public concern about corruption has grown across Victoria. We know that the construction sector is of particular concern. We have heard about the $15 billion to $30 billion scandal. Instinctively I think both of those numbers would be on the lower side. I would love to be proven wrong, but that would take some kind of investigation, and we need funding for that.

This government claim to be running the largest infrastructure program in Victoria’s history and that they are investing more than $100 billion through major transport and construction projects. First of all, it does not feel like we are getting any delivery for that. Most of this money seems to go on planning and ghost shifts and things like that. All of these layers –

Members interjecting.

Moira DEEMING: The Metro Tunnel, which trains apparently cannot get around the corners on and that firefighters will not go down into – yes, that. Thank you for reminding me. Public money that moves through this many layers before reaching its final destination –

Members interjecting.

Moira DEEMING: Acting President, I cannot hear myself.

The ACTING PRESIDENT (John Berger): Order!

Moira DEEMING: Public money that moves through this many layers before reaching its final destination – this volume of public money – necessitates strong oversight. Anything less is actually scandalous. I would not even call it negligence. Obviously, the taxpayer is the one that pays. They pay for whatever abysmal quality of project is eventually delivered, they pay for the cuts on top for the corruption, and they also pay for the toothless, hobbled oversight bodies just sitting there, trying their best, unable to get the job done.

I was going to go through the list of them. I will just do it quickly. Who could forget the ghost shifts on major infrastructure projects? Who could forget the red shirts affair, when they said, ‘We put it back when we got caught’; Operation Watts, with political parties getting funded with taxpayer money to branch stack; Operation Sandon, with planning powers; or Operation Daintree, where there was improper influence – millions and millions of dollars? Even the failures that fell short of criminal corruption technically are very important. You can think of all the other kinds of scandals. There is just not a culture where corruption struggles to thrive in this state. Remember the Eloque joint venture? The Victorian Auditor-General’s Office examined that. We lost $20 million, and the conflicts of interest on that project with government ministers were obscene – and we do not know how our bridges are going.

These agencies themselves say that they are under significant resource pressure. The government says funding was not cut. Well, it just goes to show you that the corruption is so bad in this state that even if I granted you that funding has not been cut, even if I were to grant all of those arguments, clearly corruption is so bad that it is still not enough. That is an abysmal state of affairs. The Victorian Ombudsman received over 16,000 complaints in the most recent reporting year. Only about 4000 progressed to inquiries, and 23 formal investigations were completed out of almost 17,000 complaints.

Investigative capacity determines how many complaints are going to receive proper scrutiny, how many are going to be thoroughly investigated and how many are going to be completed. Integrity Oversight Victoria operates with about 27½ staff while overseeing multiple integrity bodies handling these public complaints. The scale of responsibility is absolutely enormous compared to the availability of resources. As many people have said, public trust depends on transparency, independence and investigative capacity. Everybody here has said that Victorians deserve the confidence that corruption risks receive serious scrutiny, but I think that we should not have even had to ask for this review. All of this anti-corruption, systemic institutional infrastructure should have already been in place. You should not be allowed to keep cabinet-in-confidence funding requests from our integrity oversight bodies. That is a disgrace; there is no good reason for that. There is no good governance reason for the way the system is set up. There are only very, very dubious reasons for the way that it is set up. I commend this motion to the house.

 Michael GALEA (South-Eastern Metropolitan) (16:56): I might actually start where my colleague Mrs Deeming left off when she openly asked why we need to be asking for this at all. I would concur with the question. She may wish to ask Mr Davis that. I would concur because I understand that the Integrity and Oversight Committee actually conducted their annual performance hearings into all of these integrity agencies quite some time ago – well, it was actually Monday this week. It was two days ago that they conducted these very inquiries, so Mrs Deeming may well be right to inquire. She may wish to query why we need to ask for this, and I would actually join her in that question. Mr Davis might be able to explain why, just two days after the IOC conducted inquiries into the integrity agencies and their finances and their performance outcomes, we need to be doing another inquiry into this. But that is the situation we find ourselves in today, and hopefully Mr Davis can illuminate it for us. He did not give us much illumination in his earlier ramblings on this motion, but hopefully in his summary he might be able to inform us.

Harriet Shing interjected.

Michael GALEA: His florid ramblings on this subject, yes. Flush with just two days ago having these hearings take place – and I am sure many of us will eagerly look forward to reading the transcripts of those hearings when they do become available, and they might provide some basis for what the IOC can do as part of its continuing work – I also wish to note some other of the more curious comments made by Mr Davis in his opening ramblings, when he claimed that the budgets for these agencies have been slashed. Slashed – what an outrageous thing for a government to be slashing the funding of these integrity agencies, as indeed it would be if it were true. But unfortunately it is hard to reconcile those claims from Mr Davis when you do look at the fact that funding for IBAC over the time that we have been in government has doubled, indeed with a further increase of $6 million just in the past year alone, as Mr Batchelor was outlining, which is buried – tucked away – in a very hard-to-find, secret place in IBAC’s annual report. If Mr Davis cared to look at that, he might even see that in there for himself. He might even be able to see, if he looks at the Ombudsman’s annual reports, that their funding has also almost doubled over the time that we have been in government and indeed, as Mr Batchelor outlined, that Integrity Oversight Victoria’s (IOV) funds increased somewhat – fourfold – in that time too. So it is a curious definition of the word ‘slashed’, but as with many things that Mr Davis brings before this house, ‘curious’ is indeed an apt adjective.

I do want to address something else that has been said a couple of times, and that is in relation to efficiency dividends. Throughout the course of the Silver review, which sought efficiencies from right across the public service, there were very few areas that were specifically remarked to not be included in those reviews and in search of those efficiency dividends, and that includes the integrity agencies. So I would just remind the house that when we talk about these other things interplaying with this, such as the Silver review, there are no efficiency dividends being expected of the integrity agencies.

Mr Davis, you were also outlining to this house, and you apparently claimed, that the integrity agencies, or at least one of them, were not spending all of their budget. So it is a curious thing to turn around and say that they are underfunded too, again given the fact that funding has increased year on year. I was probably a little bit more perturbed and surprised, though she has left the chamber now, by Mrs Deeming’s apparent, extraordinary attack on the agencies at the outset of her speech, where she implied that they were not doing their job. Now we can and should – and certainly this is the role of the IOC – examine and give proper oversight to these vital agencies, and we can as a Parliament obviously debate many things around it, but I do not think it is a reasonable claim to make that these integrity agencies are not doing their job.

I was further confused and not sure where the Metro Tunnel comes into this specifically, but to say that the trains are not able to turn corners or the tunnels cannot turn corners, whatever the claim was – I would suggest that Mrs Deeming actually go and have a look at the trains that are running through the Metro Tunnel and the benefit that it is having in her own electorate.

For the Liberals to run a scare campaign saying that the trains will not be able to run through the tunnels before the tunnel opens is one thing, but it is quite another more outrageous claim to make several months after the tunnel has opened and trains have been running quite smoothly and managing to turn those corners in the tunnels seemingly several times a minute. But there we have it: that is the take of the modern Liberal Party. They are running their scare campaigns even after the project has opened and even after the proof has come into place.

As if to contradict some of her earlier remarks on these integrity agencies not doing their job, apparently, Mrs Deeming then raised a litany of work and research that these agencies have done and included Operation Sandon in that. I am not sure why a member of the Liberal Party is trying to draw attention to an investigation of alleged corrupt activity of Liberal councillors, but is she is welcome to do that, and I at least welcome her bipartisan approach to look at everything from a broader angle. You might learn a thing or two from that, Mr Davis.

Another thing I was struck by with this inquiry motion is that the wording has changed a bit since it was first drafted. Mr Davis, you might be able to illuminate for us in your concluding remarks as to the role of the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee. I understand that you were going to give us on that committee some extra work as well, and I actually think it is an interesting thing to consider. The IOC does do its routine inquiries into the role of the various integrity agencies – IOV, the Ombudsman and IBAC. PAEC meets and fulfils its obligations to engage properly, oversee and meet regularly with the Auditor-General and with the Parliamentary Budget Office, but we do not do that in a public forum. That is perhaps an interesting thing for us to contemplate in future – or perhaps for a future Parliament to contemplate as to the role of PAEC. I am not quite sure why that was included and then taken out, but I would be genuinely quite interested to know your thinking along those lines as it relates to the Auditor-General.

To conclude where I started, the role of the IOC is a very important one. As with many of the joint investigatory committees, it does have that very important oversight function. As part of its routine work it looks at things such as the budget, performance, performance targets and all those various aspects of their operation as well. Indeed members need look no further than Monday, two days ago, to see the committee in action doing just the sort of thing that Mr Davis is advocating.

I would actually note on that point that I am pleased to support the amendments moved by my colleague Mr Batchelor. I think they are sensible amendments. Firstly, they provide a reporting date to the motion. It is one thing to sit down, have a ramble and write out a motion on a Monday night, perhaps, send it through and say, ‘It can report back whenever.’ Maybe giving the committee a specific timeline, a deadline, might be a constructive thing. Especially if it is a referral in relation to the budget, let us make the reporting date before the budget. That is what Mr Batchelor has proposed, and I think it is very sensible.

The second part of the proposed amendments by Mr Batchelor goes to perhaps not predetermining the outcome of any investigation. If Mr Davis wishes to run a sideshow, he is free to attempt to do that. But if he wishes to run a fair and genuine inquiry, that inquiry should not predetermine whatever outcome may flow through. If that is what he wants to do, then I am sure he would be all too supportive of Mr Batchelor’s amendments in that space too, because they do tighten it up and make this a more robust inquiry that will be narrowly focused. I know Mr Davis loves to be narrowly focused, and this will be an inquiry narrowly focused on what he intended it to do. I expect there to be a proper inquiry done should this motion pass the house today, and I am sure the members of the IOC are only too thrilled and excited to get their teeth into it. No doubt the fact that they have looked into this matter just two days ago will help keep things fresh in their minds as they undertake that inquiry.

As for the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, we will continue to do our work through the estimates process in just a couple of months time as well. As I said, I am looking forward to Mr Davis’s views on the ins and outs of why that was included and why it was not. It may well form the basis for some further opportunities that other committees, such as PAEC, can undertake in future as well. In closing, I am pleased to commend Mr Batchelor’s amendments to the house.

 David LIMBRICK (South-Eastern Metropolitan) (17:05): I also would like to say a few words on this motion put forward by Mr Davis to set up an inquiry to look at the adequacy of the budget funding for IBAC, the Ombudsman and also Integrity Oversight Victoria. I would start by saying these agencies are probably one of the very few things that I have actually advocated for more funding for. I would like to think that they do a good job all the time. That is not necessarily the case, but certainly I have seen some great work by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office and the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman in particular in the last term of Parliament during the pandemic played an absolutely critical role in highlighting some of the human rights problems that happened during the pandemic and with the pandemic response. I think the best example of that was the investigation into the housing tower lockdown. That highlighted some of the quite horrific, frankly, things that happened to people and their experiences of not being able to go outside and get fresh air, being fed inappropriate food and all sorts of awful things that happened to people. They were locked inside, and they were locked inside other people’s houses because they were visiting. It was just a terrible, terrible situation. In my opinion the Ombudsman did a fantastic job of highlighting these problems and came up with sensible recommendations for many of them. In fact the Libertarian Party last term attempted to implement one of those recommendations, which was to say that if anyone is locked in a housing tower ever again, God forbid, they must be guaranteed access to fresh air and exercise. Unfortunately, the government and the Greens voted against allowing fresh air and exercise – one of the things that I thought we could all agree on, but apparently not.

The Auditor-General – although I do not know that they are going to actually be part of this – have done some fantastic work as well. IBAC have as well. I know people have differing views on the effectiveness of IBAC. I know that many people say that they do not have the powers to do their job and this sort of thing, and that was a debate earlier today. But certainly they have shone some light on things that are of interest to Victorians, and shining that light on things can sometimes help inform future directions on how we manage processes and how we prevent corruption and this sort of thing. So I think that that is a sensible and appropriate thing for this committee to be looking at. That is their job. It will give these agencies a platform to argue what their funding levels should be and why, and I hope that the committee does a good job in scrutinising that. If it is the case that they require more funding in order to do their job – we all know that corruption is a big problem in Victoria, so having these agencies be effective is very important. In the scheme of things many of these budgets, in comparison to the losses from corruption, are minuscule, so in fact it seems like a good investment if they are doing their job properly. It does seem like a good investment.

I would also say another thing with the Ombudsman. People see the big Ombudsman’s reports that they put out, but the thing that people do not see is when – I am guessing it happens with other MPs’ offices – people come to MPs. Usually they see them as the end of the line – they have tried every other avenue – and quite often we will recommend people to go to the Ombudsman and use that as a channel of referral. Sometimes they can get their problems fixed. Sometimes the Ombudsman comes back and says that it is not within their jurisdiction or they cannot fix it or whatever. But sometimes that is a really good pathway to recommend people to. Sometimes a letter from the Ombudsman to whatever agency it is that the constituent is having trouble with is enough to fix the problem, amazingly. They do not want the Ombudsman to come down on them.

I do think that it is important that these agencies are doing their job well, and to do their job well they need the appropriate resourcing, and the Integrity and Oversight Committee looking at whether that resourcing is appropriate is a totally normal and good thing for this committee to do. Therefore the Libertarian Party will be supporting this motion.

Rachel PAYNE (South-Eastern Metropolitan) incorporated the following:

I rise to speak in support of motion 1305, in Mr Davis’ name.

This motion requires the Integrity and Oversight Committee to inquire into, consider and report, as soon as practicable, on the adequacy of the annual budget for the Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission, the Ombudsman and Integrity Oversight Victoria.

The motion also requires the Committee in undertaking and reporting on this inquiry to hold public hearings with these agencies, provide advice on what settings are appropriate for the funding of these agencies in the 2026–27 State Budget and provide advice on the likely consequences if the funding provided by the government is inadequate.

There has been a lot of talk recently about what legislative changes are needed for our integrity bodies to ensure they can properly fulfil their roles.

As a member of the Integrity and Oversight Committee, I have been privy to these discussions, many of which have been had over the course of our inquiry into the Adequacy of the Legislative Framework for the Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission (IBAC).

The final report from this inquiry recommended a number of important changes to IBAC’s legislative framework, including expanding its jurisdiction through changes to the definition of corrupt conduct and removal of the relevant offence requirement.

These changes are critical to capturing grey corruption – the kind of behaviour that may fall short of a criminal offence but still represents a lack of integrity and is worthy of investigation.

But these changes cannot happen in isolation. More powers to investigate more corrupt conduct must be accompanied by more resources to effectively use those powers.

In Integrity and Oversight Hearings earlier this week I asked the IBAC Commissioner about the consequences of a broader definition of corrupt conduct, particularly if it were to have a retrospective application.

The Commissioner rightly pointed out that additional resources are critical for any such changes to be effective.

This government must act on integrity, reform these laws, and fund Victoria’s integrity agencies appropriately.

If it takes a short sharp inquiry like the one put forward in this motion to make this happen, then that is what we will do.

Thank you.

John BERGER (Southern Metropolitan) incorporated the following:

I rise to speak on the motion regarding the referral of matters relating to Victoria’s Integrity Agency Funding.

Integrity in this place is not an optional extra.

It is fundamental to public trust in government.

Victorian’s expect transparency, accountability and proper oversight of public institutions.

They expect independent bodies to investigate misconduct, scrutinise expenditure, and uphold the standards that underpin our democratic system.

That is why since the establishment of IBAC successive Labor Governments have not only maintained the Commission but strengthened it.

Including year on year increases of funding into our integrity agencies.

IBAC was established as a permanent, independent statutory authority with coercive investigative powers to examine serious corruption and police misconduct.

Its creation marked a serious change in Victoria’s accountability structure.

Labor Governments have continued to provide operational funding through successive state budgets to these integrity agencies.

Integrity bodies are subject to estimates scrutiny and required to table annual report to this Parliament.

The funding model for our integrity agencies ensures transparency while maintaining independence.

Those opposite speak frequently about integrity but it was a previous Liberal Kennett Government who sacked the Auditor General legislating to abolish the office.

In contrast, Labor Governments have maintained and supported independent integrity institutions, preserving their statutory independence and funding through transparent processes.

Beyond funding, legislative reform has also strengthened elements of Victoria’s integrity framework.

The Integrity and Accountability Legislation Amendment (Public Interest Disclosures, Oversight and Independence) Act 2018 modernised Victoria’s Public Interest Disclosure framework.

It increased responsibility for the actions and decisions of public officials and bodies by encouraging people to report wrongdoing.

Ensuring serious wrongdoing is effectively investigated.

Creating independence, strengthening the roles of key integrity bodies and supports the investigation of serious wrongdoing by investigating entities who are independent from government influence and control.

Each integrity body has appropriate and proportionate powers that allow them to achieve their objectives effectively within the system.

This Act ensures transparency by providing clear guidance on how complaints are to be treated by the public sector and integrity bodies, and how integrity bodies are overseen by the Victorian Inspectorate.

Allows integrity bodies to collaborate more effectively with each other and with the public sector.

Promotes cohesion by resolving discrepancies between integrity bodies’ jurisdictions and improves referral mechanisms, which will prevent the duplication efforts between bodies and will help to ensure matters are resolved in a timely, efficient manner.

It also added additional safeguards to protect the rights, safety and welfare of people who are involved in an integrity body’s investigation, to ensure that people are treated fairly and equally.

It acquitted commitments that the Government made during its previous term to resolve jurisdictional issues between key integrity bodies and evaluate the Protected Disclosure Act, and builds on the reforms delivered by the Government’s Stronger System Act to acquit the Government’s commitment to provide Victoria with a robust and effective integrity and accountability system.

More recently, the Justice Legislation Amendment (Integrity, Defamation and Other Matters) Act 2024 made technical and procedural amendments to improve the operation and coordination of Victoria’s integrity agencies.

Parts 5 to 12 make a range of significant technical amendments to ensure that Victoria’s integrity and accountability system is clear, accessible and efficient.

This Act included reforms to the Ombudsman Act 1973, Victorian Inspectorate Act 2011, Freedom of Information Act 1982, Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014, Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011 (IBAC Act), Public Interest Monitor Act 2011, Public Interests Disclosure Act 2022.

The 2024 legislation also clarifies the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate an authority under public interest complaints as referred by IBAC or to examine improper third-party conduct in relation to that authority.

These are refinements designed to improve clarity and coordination within the integrity system.

Integrity reform is not always dramatic. Often it involves technical amendments that improve administrative processes and ensure agencies can work effectively together.

That is responsible governance.

Integrity is also about prevention.

Victoria has strengthened political donation and electoral transparency laws through amendments to the Electoral Act 2002.

Donation caps have been introduced.

Foreign political donations have been banned.

Disclosure requirements have been strengthened.

Integrity begins not only with investigation after wrongdoing occurs, but with transparency in how elections are funded and how political actors are regulated.

Victoria maintains a public Register of Lobbyists and ministerial standards that govern conduct.

These frameworks promote transparency and reduce the risk of improper influence.

The Local Government Act 2020 strengthened councillor conduct frameworks, governance standards and oversight mechanisms within local councils.

IBAC retains jurisdiction to investigate serious corruption in local government, reinforcing accountability across all levels of public administration.

Taken together, these measures demonstrate that integrity in Victoria is not confined to a single agency or a single budget line.

It is embedded across legislative frameworks, oversight institutions, electoral processes and administrative systems.

The motion before us concerns funding for integrity agencies.

Scrutiny of funding is appropriate.

Public expenditure should always be subject to parliamentary examination.

But scrutiny must be principled. It must be evidence-based. And it must not be reactionary.

Integrity bodies exist to uphold public trust.

They are not instruments for day-to-day political contest.

Referrals to oversight committees should be grounded in clear statutory purpose and evidence

not used as responses in the political cycle.

When integrity institutions are drawn into partisan disputes, we risk undermining the independence we claim to defend.

The opposition seeks to frame integrity funding as a political vulnerability or to use oversight mechanisms as a vehicle for government attack, and they should be honest about that.

Integrity institutions deserve better than to be used as instruments of political theatre.

The record shows that integrity agencies continue to receive operational funding through annual budgets.

Their funding is published in Budget Papers.

Their operations are scrutinised through Estimates hearings.

Their reports are tabled publicly.

IBAC continues to conduct investigations and publish findings.

The Ombudsman continues to examine maladministration.

The Auditor-General continues to audit public expenditure.

The Victorian Inspectorate continues to oversee the exercise of coercive powers.

There is no evidence before this House that integrity agencies have been stripped of their capacity to function.

On the contrary, they continue to operate within their statutory mandates.

Funding decisions must balance competing priorities.

Health services, schools, emergency response, infrastructure and social services all require investment.

Responsible fiscal management requires careful allocation of resources across the public sector.

But fiscal responsibility does not equate to neglect of integrity.

Integrity is not measured by the volume of motions brought before this Chamber. It is measured by institutional design, legislative clarity, independence, transparency and sustained support.

On those measures, Victoria’s integrity framework remains robust.

It was established through legislation. It has been refined through further legislative amendment.

It is funded transparently.

It is overseen by Parliament.

It publishes its findings independently.

This Government has:

•   Maintained independent statutory integrity bodies.

•   Provided operational funding through successive State Budgets.

•   Respected the independence of integrity agencies by not interfering in their statutory functions.

•   Modernised public interest disclosure protections.

•   Strengthened information-sharing and coordination through legislative amendment.

•   Improved electoral transparency and donation regulation.

•   Strengthened local government governance standards.

•   Supported parliamentary oversight mechanisms.

That is a record grounded in statute and public documentation.

Integrity should not be reduced to a partisan talking point.

It is foundational to democratic governance.

It requires steady institutional stewardship, not political escalation.

Victoria’s integrity agencies continue to operate independently and transparently in the interests of the Victorian people.

This Government remains committed to maintaining the highest standards of integrity and accountability in public administration.

Not through rhetoric, but through legislation, funding and respect for institutional independence.

It is important to state clearly that the government does not direct IBAC investigations.

It does not determine findings and it does not interfere with its statutory functions.

That separation is embedded into legislation and respected in practice.

The Allan Labor Government has strengthened the powers and given record funding to IBAC making it better able to serve its mandate of uncovering, investigating and fighting corruption.

This not only gave IBAC budget independence and the confidence to continue to be fearless in its efforts against corruption.

The 2025–26 budget delivered $65.5 million for IBAC to keep it working effectively in the best interests of the Victorian people.

Justice Legislation Amendment (Integrity, Defamation and Other Matters) 2024 improved the operation and effectiveness of Victoria’s integrity agencies.

By making technical and procedural amendments to various integrity and justice acts to enhance the administrative processes of the integrity system.

For instance, the bill enables the Ombudsman and the Victorian Inspectorate to share information with a Victoria royal commission, board of inquiry or other commission of inquiry.

The IBAC will also be given similar provisions to disclose information to the appointed commissioner of inquiry under division 5 of part 7 of the Local Government Act 2020.

This amendment will assist the integrity bodies to acquire information relevant to their role.

Of course, the sharing of information will only be done when it is relevant and appropriate and must not lead to the identification of a person who has made a public interest disclosure.

The bill also clarifies the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate an authority under public interest complaints as referred by IBAC or improper third-party conduct in relation to the authority.

This ensures that our integrity system maintains the highest standards of integrity and accountability.

Integrity reform should not be reactionary but serious and evidence based. These integrity agencies should not be used as a political vehicle to attack the government.

 David DAVIS (Southern Metropolitan) (17:10): This is a straightforward motion. I am relaxed, as I have said, about the proposed amendments by Mr Batchelor. I think on one level they are trivial, but on another they are a little bit more prescriptive for the committee, and I was trying to be a bit more generous to allow the committee to have the elbow room that it may need. But having said that, he wants to move it. I certainly do not oppose giving a very clear instruction to the committee to come back by budget day, and that can be tabled in the Assembly because it is an Assembly committee. But we can give them a reference, and it will be tabled here in the next sitting day after that. That is the advice of the clerks.

I want to just draw attention to a brief from the Department of Justice and Community Safety to the Attorney-General, dated 18 October 2022. It paints a picture of a falling share of funding for the integrity agencies on page 17:

A challenge under all three options is how to set funding levels.

It goes on about benchmarks and international benchmarks. In that paper Transparency International Australia called for sustainable budgets of all core public integrity agencies at federal, state and territory levels of not less than 0.15 per cent of public expenditure combined. It also called for funding to be based on four-year direct budget allocation by Parliament. But what the chart presented to Jaclyn Symes, the then relevant minister, shows is a declining level of funding at that point, down to 0.13 under the required level, when the various agencies are added together. It shows that that integrity funding had fallen, and that is a problem which is replicated, importantly, in Advancing Budget Transparency for Victoria’s Core Integrity Agencies, the February 2026 paper by the Ombudsman, IBAC and the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office.

I pick up Mr Galea’s point. In the end I decided to bring a simple motion that was a single referral to a single committee of the three agencies which that committee has oversight over. It may be hard for Mr Galea to understand, but the other equivalent agencies, the Auditor-General and the Parliamentary Budget Office, are answerable to the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee. But I just thought in the circumstance it was simpler to do a single referral for the agencies which the Integrity and Oversight Committee is responsible for. So that is an answer to his question there.

Picking up on the February 2026 paper, it does show Victoria falling behind New South Wales and the 0.15 per cent minimum standard, and goodness knows with the corruption that has been uncovered in our state we do need to spend properly on our integrity agencies. It is a false economy to starve the agencies of the funding they need and to expect that there will not be corruption in government programs. What we have seen with the material that has come from Queensland and the significant statements and report and testimony of Geoffrey Watson SC is that $15 billion has been corruptly squandered by this government. I say that every cent of integrity money spent bolstering IBAC, bolstering the Ombudsman and ensuring that those agencies are able to do their work to root out corruption wherever it is, to get to these Big Build sites, to dig out the corruption, to stop it – we have got to put a stop to it. If that requires more resources, I say to the Integrity and Oversight committee: tell us, and the chamber will be in a position to move suggested amendments to actually strengthen the budget if the government continues its activity in trying to starve our integrity agencies in this state. The reason it is trying to starve them is it is trying to avoid embarrassment.

Amendments agreed to; amended motion agreed to.