Wednesday, 1 April 2026

 Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Minister for Education, Minister for WorkSafe and the TAC) (11:32): In accordance with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, I table a statement of compatibility in relation to the Dangerous Goods Transport Bill 2026:

In accordance with section 28 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Charter), I make this Statement of Compatibility with respect to the Dangerous Goods Transport Bill 2026 (the Bill).

In my opinion, the Bill, as introduced to the Legislative Assembly, is compatible with the human rights protected by the Charter. I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview of the Bill

The purpose of the Bill is to create a new statute to regulate the transportation of dangerous goods, including explosives and high consequence dangerous goods (HCDG), by road, rail, or vessel on inland waters. This Bill will also repeal the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 (DG Act) and implement dangerous goods reforms to transport which are aligned to the relevant amendments to the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (the OHS Act).

This Bill will align requirements for businesses and industries which utilise dangerous goods, with national dangerous goods transport requirements. To the extent that changes may apply to individual persons, I will discuss the relevant human rights issues below.

Human Rights Issues

The human rights protected by the Charter that are relevant to the Bill are:

• the right to freedom from forced work (section 11);

• the right to privacy and reputation (section 13);

• the right to property (section 20);

• the right to a fair hearing (section 24);

• the right to be presumed innocent (section 25(1));

• the right to protection against self-incrimination (section 25(2)(k)); and

• the right not to be punished more than once (section 26).

Freedom from forced work

Section 11 of the Charter relevantly provides that a person must not be made to perform forced or compulsory labour. ‘Forced or compulsory labour’ does not include court-ordered community work as a condition of release from detention, work or service required because of an emergency threatening the Victorian community or a part of that community, or work or service that forms part of normal civil obligations.

Powers to issue directions

Clause 75 of the Bill sets out the power for an inspector to give an oral or written direction, with a time period for compliance, to a person involved in the transport of dangerous goods where the direction is necessary because of a serious risk of harm to persons or property arising from the transport of dangerous goods.

The compulsion to undertake an activity or to ‘do’ something as required by a direction made in accordance with clause 75 could potentially, if a broad view of the right was adopted, engage the right to freedom from forced work under s 11 of the Charter, specifically the prohibition on compulsory labour in s 11(2) of the Charter. This being so, I am of the view that if the right is engaged, any work required by a direction issued by an inspector would fall within the scope of the exception in s 11(3)(c) of the Charter, which provides that forced or compulsory labour does not include work or service that ‘forms part of normal civil obligations’. As the directions can only be given to a person who is involved in the transport of dangerous goods by vessel on inland water, by road or by rail and in circumstances that pose a serious risk of harm to persons or damage to property, and have a preventative or remedial purpose, namely to stop, mitigate or remedy any risks to health or damage to property, it is likely such directions to take remedial action would constitute a normal civil obligation. This is because a person in control of a regulated item that poses public safety risks assumes duties in relation to managing those risks.

When made in circumstances where dangerous goods are posing a threat to life, the directions would also be exempt under s 11(3)(b) of the Charter, which provides that work or service required because of an emergency threatening the Victorian community or part thereof does not constitute forced or compulsory labour for the purposes of s 11 of the Charter.

In the event that the exceptions in s 11(3) do not apply to the directions that may be made under clause 75, and the right is engaged, I am nevertheless of the view that it is not limited by the provision. The issue with the existing direction power under s 17K of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 is that the power to issue directions is limited to dangers arising from damaged and/or spilled dangerous goods and containers. However, serious impacts to the community and property can be caused by other risks aside from damage or spilled dangerous goods. Therefore, the power to issue directions needs to be broader in scope to address issues of serious risk of harm and prevent or mitigate a major chemical incident.

The ability to direct duty holders who may lack understanding or intentionally be non-compliant, outweighs their right not to be forced to perform work. This is especially so in the context of transport, where an incident on the road may affect the public. Furthermore, compliant duty holders would already be undertaking such requirements in accordance with the Act and regulations; the direction is only to align non-compliant behaviour with the expected level of compliance and to reduce serious risks of harm. As such, I consider that this additional power in the context of dangerous goods is appropriate, justified and proportionate to a legitimate aim and is therefore compatible with the right to freedom from forced work under s 11 of the Charter.

Power to require assistance

Clause 88 of the Bill is similar to section 19 of the DG Act. It enables an inspector to request assistance from a person who occupies a place where dangerous goods or dangerous goods paraphernalia are present, or who manages or controls a place other than a workplace.

Given that this provision requires a person to do a particular thing to assist an inspector, it may be considered to be ‘forced or compulsory labour’ and therefore may be relevant to section 11 of the Charter. However, the type of assistance required under this provision from an occupier or a person with control of a place, is likely to be practically limited in nature and of low gravity (such as assisting an inspector to gain access to an area or a vehicle). Further, the requirement to assist an inspector may fall within the internal qualification at s 11(3)(c) being a ‘normal civil obligation’ and therefore not constitute a limit on the right.

Insofar as this assistance may be considered ‘forced or compulsory labour’ under s 11 of the Charter, any interference with this right would be both minor and temporary such that the right would not be limited.

Right to privacy and reputation

Section 13 of the Charter provides that a person has the right not to have that person’s privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with.

Interferences with privacy will be lawful if it is permitted by a law which is precise and appropriately circumscribed and will not be ‘arbitrary’ if it is not capricious, unpredictable, unjust or unreasonable in the particular circumstances, in the sense of being disproportionate to the legislation sought.

Entry into residential premises and specified places

Clause 51(3) of the Bill sets out the power to enter residential premises with the consent of the occupier or in circumstances where an inspector reasonably believes dangerous goods are present at that place and a person at the residential premises is contravening or is about to contravene the Act or the regulations.

I consider the framework of the new residential entry power to appropriately balance personal privacy against protection of the wider community from dangerous goods which have unique physical risks such as explosive or other dangerous characteristics, and which can have far reaching consequences. To enter without consent, inspectors must have a reasonable belief that dangerous goods are present at the residential premises and a person at the residential premises is contravening or about to contravene the Act or regulations. This power is confined to circumstances of urgency where a contravention is occurring or about to occur – and will not permit entry to investigate past contraventions of the Act or regulations, which will require a warrant or occupier consent to enter.

Clause 51(4) of the Bill provides an inspector with the ability to enter a specified place where an inspector reasonably believes a serious risk or an immediate risk of harm to a person or property damage is present, and it is necessary to take action to address the risk at the place that is near the specified place. For example, it is necessary to physically traverse through a property to get to the incident site to prevent or reduce harm.

Legislative safeguards set out under clause 51 reduce the impact of any interference upon occupiers’ enjoyment of their property. This includes the need for an inspector to give immediate notice of entry, to enter at a reasonable time and to take reasonable steps to obtain consent from an occupier of a residential premises.

As such, a range of safeguards apply to ensure the powers may only be exercised in a reasonable and proportionate way that protects the privacy of individuals as much as possible. The powers serve the important purpose of enabling inspectors to address serious risks of harm caused by the presence or misuse of dangerous goods in transport. Although the powers involve some interference with the privacy, particularly of persons present at residential premises, I consider that the interference is proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting public health and is neither unlawful nor arbitrary and is therefore compatible with the right to privacy in section 13 of the Charter.

Other entry powers

Clause 51(1) enables an inspector to enter, at a reasonable time, a place (other than residential premises) believed by the inspector to have dangerous goods or related paraphernalia relating to transport. However, they may also enter at any time if they believe there is an immediate risk of harm under clause 51(2).

Clause 52 includes the power to stop, detain, inspect, or examine any vehicle or vessel used or likely to be used for the transport of dangerous goods. This includes the power for the Authority to, orally or in writing, direct the owner or person in control of the vehicle or vessel, to move the vehicle or vessel, or engage a suitable person to do so, and recover the costs from the owner. Alternatively, the inspector may direct the owner or person in control to move the vehicle or vessel if needed to inspect or examine it, by way of a written direction served on the owner or person.

These powers may interfere with a person’s privacy in relation to their premises, vehicle or vessel. However, in my view, this interference is not arbitrary or unlawful, because the entry by inspectors would be pursuant to properly circumscribed legislation, and are qualified by conditions precedent that are proportionate and tailored to the necessity of the situation, being a situation that may endanger public safety or risk property damage. The entry power enables inspectors to carry out their functions and powers under the Act to ensure compliance. There is an appropriate safeguard protecting privacy of home. Accordingly, I am satisfied these clauses balance a person’s rights to privacy against the public’s interest in having safer dangerous goods transportation.

General powers on entry

Clause 53 outlines the general powers on entry in the new Act, including powers of inspection, examination, enquiry, testing, taking of extracts of documents, seizure of evidence, taking of photographs and measurements, making sketches and all other incidental powers necessary to perform the above. These are similar to existing powers under s 13B(1) of the DG Act, with some minor modernisations and clarifications in the language used. For example, ‘seize and remove’ will replace the term ‘seize’ to explicitly state that a thing may be removed. The provision also includes greater clarity as to the range of investigative steps that inspectors are empowered to undertake, including examine, copy or take extracts from a document or seize, make audio, video or any other type of recording, take measurements or make sketches, and remove any substance or other thing for testing, if they reasonably believe that examination or testing in reasonably necessary and cannot be conducted on site.

Clause 53 includes safeguards such as the requirement to give a written record of the seizure and removal as soon as possible to the occupier of the place, minimise disruption and only remain there as long as reasonably necessary. If a vehicle or vessel is used by an inspector to remove or detain dangerous goods then the Authority must pay reasonable compensation for that use to its owner, unless the owner is later found guilty of a related dangerous goods offence. This will also closely mirror the equivalent OHS Act provision.

While the incidental powers on entry do interfere with a person’s privacy rights, including into their work or private sphere, I am of the view that, when properly exercised, they are lawful and not arbitrary, given they appropriately balance a person’s right to privacy with the need for investigatory powers reasonably required to ensure compliance with and enforcement of health and safety legislation in relation to dangerous goods. To the extent there is any limit on the privacy right, I am of the view that the powers are proportionate and appropriately justified such that they are compatible with the right to privacy under the Charter.

Powers to collect samples

Section 13D of the DG Act enables the collection of samples of any thing at the place that may require analysis. Similarly, clause 55 of the Bill enables an inspector to require an occupier or apparent occupier to give them samples of anything at a place that may require analysis and includes an offence provision for non-compliance. While this may interfere with a person’s privacy, I am of the view that any such impact is minimal, and is lawful and not arbitrary, given the sample taking is for analysis only and is proportionate to the purposes of the limitation, which is to protect public health in the context of dangerous goods transport. The provision is also subject to the notification safeguards and requirements of clause 509(3). I am therefore content that clause 55 is compatible with the right to privacy.

Power to make inquiries following certain incidents

Given the risks to health and safety associated with dangerous goods, there is a power provided for in clause 56 for an inspector to make any necessary inquiries into certain incidents, such as where a fire or explosion results in the death or injury of a person, property damage or public danger from the presence of dangerous goods. For the purpose of making such an inquiry, an inspector may enter any place.

This power mirrors similar powers of incident inquiry currently provided by section 13E of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985. Whilst a power of entry may interfere with the privacy of the person whose property or business it is, on balance, any such interference is considered justified and appropriate given the serious nature of the incident which has taken place. Inquiring into the incident, as necessary, may help understand the cause and prevent reoccurrences or future events. Accordingly, I consider that clause 56 is compatible with the right to privacy.

Entry via a search warrant

Clause 59 sets out the mechanism for an inspector to apply to the Magistrates’ Court to obtain a search warrant for a particular place. There needs to be a reasonably held belief that a ‘thing’ is at the place within the next 72 hours, and it may afford evidence of an offence against the Act or regulations. There is a high standard of proof to satisfy that criteria and obtain a court issued warrant. The warrant must be applied for in accordance with the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989. There are also other procedural protocols under the Act, including an announcement on entry. These legislated protocols ensure that the court is satisfied certain thresholds are met, and that the carrying out of the warrant is done according to set protocols and procedures. This helps to safeguard a person’s right to privacy. Therefore, to the extent that powers to search a particular place interfere with a person’s privacy rights, it is my view that any such limitation on a person’s rights is justified and appropriate in a democratic society.

Power for an inspector to intervene

Where a person who has been given a direction under clause 75(1) fails to carry out the direction, or is unlikely to safely comply with it, clause 76 of the Bill provides an inspector with a subsequent power to intervene by taking action to address the serious risk before harm eventuates. Clause 76 (2) also allows an inspector to intervene without the issue of a direction if the inspector reasonably believes that there is an immediate risk of harm to any person, or property damage arising from the dangerous goods transport. Under this provision, a higher threshold of risk is required to intervene without the issue of a preceding direction. For example, if an inspector observes flammable dangerous goods stored near an active heat source in a well-ventilated area. Given the immediate risk of fire an inspector may use their power to intervene to take immediate action to stop operations and evacuate the area.

The intervention power is contingent on a high level of risk and therefore a requisite need to act to prevent the eventuation of harm to persons or property. Given there will generally be opportunity for a person who is issued a direction to address a serious risk themselves, any interference with their right to privacy occasioned by this provision is expected to be minimal, particularly as clause 76(3) provides that the intervention provisions do not apply in relation to residential premises. Accordingly, any intervention would presumably occur in a workplace or some other area where a reduced expectation of personal privacy exists, and would be less likely to interfere with a person’s private sphere.

However, to the extent that clause 76 does interfere with a person’s right to privacy, I consider that the importance of preventing harm from dangerous goods incidents outweighs any such interference, such that any limit on the right is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable and appropriate in the circumstances. I am therefore content that clause 76 is compatible with the right to privacy.

Power to issue notices

Clauses 66 to 68 of the Bill creates powers for an inspector to issue various notices in relation to dangerous goods transport.

Relevantly, clause 68 includes a power for an inspector to issue a prohibition notice in circumstances where an inspector reasonably believes an activity involving the transport of dangerous goods is occurring, or may occur, at a place that involves or will involve a serious risk to the health or safety of any person or a serious risk of property damage. The prohibition notice ceases to have effect upon the inspector certifying in writing that the matters giving rise to the risk have been remedied. Accordingly, clause 68 engages the right to privacy by prohibiting a person from undertaking a particular activity involving dangerous goods transport.

Clause 67 of the Bill sets out the power to issue improvement notices. It is similar to section 17C of the DG Act and includes an ability to provide necessary interim directions or conditions to minimise risks to person, property or environment. This will align with the proposed amendment to section 111 of the OHS Act in the OHS Amendment (Dangerous Goods) Bill 2026. The notice must state the basis for the inspector’s belief for issuing the notice, the alleged contravened provision of the Act or regulations, date by which the person must remedy the alleged contravention, review rights and more. The requirement for such information ensures accountability as each alleged contravention needs to be explicitly stated; mitigating the likelihood of breaches unfairly impacting a person’s rights or freedoms.

Through the exercise of issuing a notice, an inspector who will be enforcing dangerous goods transport laws may access personal information and may also specify certain activities, or how the activities must be carried out which again may interfere with a person’s freedom of expression.

I am of the view, however, that these powers are lawful and not arbitrary as inspectors would issue the notice pursuant to a properly circumscribed law employing an appropriately high threshold (requiring a serious risk to health, safety or property) that is proportionate to the purpose of the notices, which is to protect persons and property from harm or damage, particularly in the context of dangerous goods transport.

Further, the powers are exercisable only within the confines of the legislation and are justified and appropriate to ensure compliance. Information which is captured is not to be shared, unless it meets a threshold requirement set out in the legislation and discussed in the paragraphs below.

Power to require a name and address or to obtain information

Clause 74 enables an inspector to require a person to state their name and address if the inspector reasonably believes that the person may be able to assist in the investigation of an indictable offence under this Act. The right to privacy includes a right to be left alone and a protection against a compulsion to disclose personal information. This power is a necessary power to facilitate investigation and verify the identity of persons of interest or suspicion. It is limited to specific circumstances and qualified by the requirement to have reasonably belief in those circumstances. The inspector must inform the person of the grounds of their belief, which increases accountability for the inspector’s actions, and ensures a just and appropriate use of powers for requiring certain limited information. This is appropriate in a democratic society, where the compulsion of information and impact to a person’s rights must be weighed against the public’s interest in having a safer community.

Power to require other information

Clause 91 allows an inspector to take copies or extracts of documents provided to the inspector, which may interfere with a person’s rights to privacy.

Clause 153 sets out a power to obtain information or a document in custody of a person, for the purpose of ascertaining Act or regulatory compliance. This power is subject to a limited protection regarding self-incrimination, which will be discussed in more detail below under the right not to be compelled to testify (s 25(2)(k)).

In relation to the interference with privacy, the notice is limited to a specified purpose for requiring information, being for the purpose of ascertaining whether this Bill or the regulations have been complied with, or for investigating a suspected contravention. The Authority, as a public authority under the Charter, will be obliged to give consideration to the right to privacy when issuing a Notice and determining the scope of information to be required. The provision is common to the standard powers of a regulator to obtain information in relation to subject-matter concerning risk to public safety and environmental protection, and accordingly, I am satisfied that is compatible with the right to privacy.

Information sharing and publication

Clause 151 sets out the circumstances in which information may be used or shared. The clause provides that nothing precludes a person’s use of information to the extent that it is necessary for the Authority’s duties or functions or in the course of relevant legal proceedings. It also allows for the sharing of information with government agencies, municipal councils or law enforcement agencies (if it is in the public’s interest), corresponding authorities, and bodies approved by the Governor in Council, amongst others.

The provision is intended to operate in a similar manner as section 10D of the DG Act and apply to listed persons who are appointed or otherwise engaged by the Authority.

These provisions will enable the Authority to share information proactively with a wider cohort of persons or bodies, reducing complexity in sharing information and supporting a coordinated inter-agency response towards non-compliance, which may be of particular importance in the transport context where dangerous goods may be moving quickly from place to place.

The Authority will be able to rely on clause 151 to share information with certain persons or bodies, including law enforcement agencies, public sector bodies, Government departments or statutory authorities or councils if the Authority reasonably believes it is in the public interest or necessary for the Authority’s exercise of powers or functions, or necessary for collaboration or to eliminate/reduce serious risks to health, safety or property.

While this provision will promote information sharing and reduce opportunities for rogue operators to fall out of the line of sight of regulators who share remit, the disclosure of information by the Authority risks interfere with privacy rights to the extent that it may involve the disclosure of personal information. However, I do not consider that the right will be limited, because the information shared is unlikely to include sensitive, personal or health information, and is for a limited and specific purpose including to protect public health and safety and to enable a more proactive regulatory approach across government and other bodies, and would be pursuant to legislation. Existing legislative safeguards in the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 will continue to protect the integrity of information sharing practices.

In my view, therefore, clause 151 is compatible with right to privacy under the Charter.

Adverse Publicity Orders

Clause 128 enables Adverse Publicity Orders to be issued in relation to dangerous goods transport. The aim is to provide the regulator with a range of orders which can be made in addition to, or instead of, another penalty type imposed by the court.

This provision will grant the court discretion to make an adverse publicity order having found a person guilty of an offence. The order may require an offender to publicise the offence or contravention, its consequences, the penalty imposed and any related matter, and/or to notify a specified person of the offence or contravention and its consequences. The offender must then give the Authority evidence of their compliance with the order. Failure to do so, or do so adequately, enables the Authority to take the relevant actions specified in the adverse publicity notice, including publicising the offender’s offence and penalty. Clause 128(5) provides that a court not make an adverse publicity order unless satisfied that the costs of complying with the order do not exceed the maximum penalty amount that the court may impose on the offender for the offence concerned.

These provisions may give rise to the publication of the identity of individuals and their convictions under the Act, and thereby may impact negatively upon the reputation of those individuals, and interfere with their right not to have their reputation unlawfully attacked under s 13(b) of the Charter. However, I consider that any interference with the right to privacy and reputation resulting from these provisions will be neither unlawful nor arbitrary. Adverse publicity orders will be made by a court pursuant to properly circumscribed legislation and are a proportionate measure aimed at notifying the public about operators who are non-compliant with health and safety legislation in respect of the transport of dangerous goods and deter future non-compliance.

In my view, it is appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances that there is a power to name persons and detail conduct by way of Adverse Publicity Order as it serves the purposes of promoting accountability and transparency as to non-compliance and reflects important public policy. It may also help to deter other similar duty holders in the dangerous goods transport industry. I therefore consider that clause 128 is compatible with the right to privacy and reputation under the Charter.

Further, an adverse publicity order may only be made following conviction for an offence, with the associated safeguards of principles of justice and procedural fairness applying to the exercise of judicial discretion and the court process. Further, information in respect of a court order is likely to be on the public record in any event due to the judicial proceedings.

Property rights

Section 20 of the Charter sets out that a person must not be deprived of that person’s property other than in accordance with law. This right requires that powers which authorise the deprivation of property are conferred by legislation or common law, are confined and structured rather than unclear, are accessible to the public, and are formulated precisely.

Certain insurance provisions are void

Clause 162 of the Bill replicates section 51D of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, by setting out that a term of a contract, or other arrangement, that purports to insure or indemnify a person for the person’s liability to pay a pecuniary penalty under this Act, is void to the extent that the term provides for that insurance or indemnity. This provision may interfere with existing contractual rights, which would likely be regarded as falling within the definition of property under the Charter.

The reason for making such a provision void, is to prevent unscrupulous behaviour by operators who may seek to avoid their liability by gaining insurance to cover their acts or omissions which may not have been done in good faith. The provision thereby promotes accountability for operators’ behaviour. I consider the provision to satisfy the requirements of being in accordance with law, and to be compatible with the Charter’s property right.

To the extent that Clause 162 may also interfere with broader freedoms to enter into arrangements or to seek insurance, I consider that, on balance, the interference is appropriate and justified to the extent that it helps to protect persons and property from harm.

Powers to impose a charge on land

As outlined above, clause 76 enables an inspector to intervene and undertake remediation works on a property where an inspector issues a direction and the person in receipt has failed, or is likely to fail, to comply. An inspector may also intervene if there is an immediate risk of harm to persons or damage to property or the environment.

Clause 77 enables the Authority to issue a costs notice to a person whom the Authority reasonably believes caused the circumstances which led to the inspector’s intervention as well as to an occupier or previous occupier of the relevant place.

Clause 78 then allows the Authority to commence legal proceedings to seek to recover the remediation costs specified in a costs notice if a person to whom the notice has been issued does not pay within the relevant time period.

Clause 80 of the Bill then enables a charge to be imposed on the land on which the inspector took the intervention action if the costs notice is unpaid at the end of the relevant payment period and the Authority has followed the required procedure for advertising. The lodgment of such a charge may interfere with a person’s right not to be deprived of their property, other than in accordance with law. This is because a charge may affect the way in which a person uses their property, including affecting ownership rights and property transactions.

Safeguards under s 106B of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 apply to the imposition of the charge and removal thereof, requiring the Authority to comply with such requirements.

Given a charge on land may restrict or prevent the transfer of that land, clause 80 may therefore be relevant to property rights under s20 of the Charter. However, the charge would be imposed pursuant to a properly circumscribed law that is precise and accessible by the public, in order to facilitate the recovery of remediation costs incurred due to a breach of dangerous goods transport laws. Therefore, in my view, any interference with a landowner’s property rights will be in accordance with the law and such that the provisions are compatible with s 20 of the Charter.

Sale of land to recover debt

Clause 82 of the Bill then provides the Authority with the power to enforce a charge imposed on the land under clause 80 if the charge has been registered for at least 12 months, and the court has made an order requiring payment and payment has not been made within 12 months of the recovery order being made.

The sale of property to recover remediation costs will deprive the relevant property owner of that property and therefore interfere with their property rights under s 20 of the Charter. However, I am content that the right is not limited because the deprivation of property would be pursuant to law, and is a reasonable and proportionate measure to recover debts incurred in remediating OHS breaches in respect of dangerous goods. Judicial oversight of costs enforcement proceedings and the requirement for the making of a court order before land can be sold, as well as notice requirements to the landowner, properly safeguards property rights. I consider that the provision strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of the affected parties and enabling the Authority to recover outstanding debts and properly administer its compliance and enforcement regime in respect of dangerous goods. I am therefore of the view that clause 82 is compatible with the right to property under the Charter.

Forfeiture of seized property

Division 7 of Part 5 of the Bill creates provisions which are specific to the return and forfeiture of seized things (including HCDG, explosives and containers). These provisions are based on forfeiture provisions under section 16B of the DG Act. These relate to a thing or document (exclusive of HCDG, explosives or related containers) and set out the parameters for forfeiture of such seized things. This may include forfeiture when the Authority cannot find or return the goods to their owner despite making reasonable enquiries or efforts to do so, or when necessary to prevent an offence. The provision does require written notification to the owner with the review rights.

Clause 62 requires the Authority to, as soon as possible after seizing anything, return the thing to its owner unless the Authority considers it necessary to retain because it may afford evidence in a proceeding, it has been forfeited, the owner transferred ownership or the Authority is otherwise authorised to retain, destroy or dispose of the thing. Clause 63 pertains to the forfeiture of seized items.

Clause 64 creates a similar provision to clause 62 but is specific to the return or forfeiture of seized HCDG, explosives and containers. Under this provision, the Authority is required to return the thing to its owner immediately where retention is no longer necessary, unless forfeited to the Authority under clause 63 of the Bill.

If not immediately returned or forfeited, then the Authority must return it within 12 months of seizure or as soon after a proceeding and appeal has concluded. However, the Authority is not permitted to return it to a person unauthorised under the Act to possess the thing, and need not return it if the Authority cannot reasonably locate, or return it to, its owner. Clause 65 also allows for the forfeiture of HCDG, explosives and containers used in connection with these items, where the owner cannot be found, is unknown, or where the items cannot be returned despite reasonable efforts.

While the forfeiture of goods can interfere with property rights, I am of the view that the interference is lawful, being pursuant to properly circumscribed legislation in circumstances where the goods have and may still pose a risk to public safety, and where efforts have been made to locate the owner and return the goods. Accordingly, I consider these clauses are compatible with the right to property under the Charter.

Forfeiture and disposal order

Clause 107 enables various entities to seek an order from the Magistrates’ Court for forfeiture and disposal of HCDG, explosives or containers before any contravention of the OHS legislation has occurred, legal proceedings have been conducted or a conviction recorded. There are certain requirements including that the Court must be satisfied that unless forfeited or destroyed there is a reasonable likelihood that a contravention of the Act or offence against this Act or another, will occur. Special provision for this is required given that the storage of these specific dangerous goods may expose the Authority’s workers to higher safety risks. In cases where seized explosives are unknown, they may well be past their expiration date and unstable, making it riskier for WorkSafe’s magazine keeper to store the explosives. Explosives and high consequence dangerous goods require strict procedures and security measures for their storage.

While clause 107 may interfere with the HCDG owners’ property rights, I am of the view that there is no limit on s 20, as the forfeiture of property is in accordance with the law, overseen by the Magistrates Court and is a proportionate measure to ensure public safety in the context of dangerous goods.

Right to a fair hearing

Section 24 of the Charter recognises a right to a fair hearing so that a person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding has the right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing.

Rights of appeal process to Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT)

Part 6 of the Bill sets out the review process for eligible persons whose interests are affected by an administrative decision.

Section 10A of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 enables the Authority’s administrative decisions to be reviewable by Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) without a prior internal review.

The Bill will not replicate this right to a merits review from VCAT in relation to directions and step-in powers used by inspectors in relation to dangerous goods transport. Reviews will be limited to judicial review only. This will maintain a pathway to ensure inspectors are acting within their legal authority; but removes an alternative decision outcome based upon a merits review from VCAT.

The removal of the right to apply to VCAT for review of directions and step-in powers decisions of the Authority is relevant to the right to fair hearing under s 24(1) of the Charter, which utilises a broad concept of ‘civil proceeding’ that encompasses administrative decision-makers with powers to determine private rights and interests. While recognising the broad scope of s 24(1), the term ‘proceeding’ and ‘party’ suggest that s 24(1) was intended to apply only to decision-makers who conduct proceedings with parties. As many of the decisions here (directions and step-in powers) do not involve the conduct of proceedings with parties, there is a question as to whether the right to a fair hearing is engaged. In any event, I will proceed to discuss the impact on fair hearing in the event a broad reading of s 24(1) is adopted.

While the opportunity to be heard by an independent tribunal on merits review has now been removed, an affected person will still ultimately have the right of judicial review.

To the extent, however that fair hearing rights are limited, in that an applicant is not afforded a right to merits review before an independent tribunal in relation to a decision which affects their private rights, I am satisfied that the limits are reasonable and justified in the circumstances in accordance with s 7(2) of the Charter. This is because the powers to issue a direction and to intervene are based upon a risk assessment at a point in time and by an officer with technical expertise in assessing dangerous goods. In my view, this type of decision is not suited to a merits review by a generalist tribunal such as VCAT which lacks the necessary technical expertise to make an informed decision. The VCAT process can also cause significant delays to exercising powers in instances of serious or immediate risk that require an urgent response. I consider that the removal of merits reviews in VCAT, while have the potential to engage the right to a fair hearing, appropriately balances this interference with rights with the need to take urgent action in the face of serious risks to public health and safety.

Accordingly, I am content that Part 6 of the Bill is compatible with the right to fair hearing under s 24 of the Charter.

Right to be presumed innocent

Section 25(1) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The right is relevant where a statutory provision shifts the burden of proof onto an accused in a criminal proceeding, so that the accused is required to prove matters to establish, or raise evidence to suggest, that they are not guilty of an offence.

Reasonable or lawful excuse offence provision

The following clauses insert offences which contain a ‘reasonable excuse’ or ‘lawful excuse’ exception:

• Clause 20 – Duty to not recklessly engage in the transport of dangerous goods that places or may place a person in danger of serious injury or death.

• Clause 22 – Failure to notify the Authority immediately after becoming aware that an incident has occurred during the transport of dangerous goods.

• Clause 23 – Failure to preserve incident sites.

• Clause 52 – Failure to comply with a direction.

• Clause 54 – Failure to produce a document or part of a document or to answer questions.

• Clause 55 – Failure to give an inspector samples.

• Clause 66 – Failure to comply with a non-disturbance notice.

• Clause 75 – Failure to comply with a direction.

• Clause 86 – Failure to comply with a modified section 75 direction.

• Clause 87 – Failure to comply with a modified section 75 direction.

• Clause 88(1) and (2) – Failure for occupier or person with management and control to provide assistance to an inspector that they may reasonably require.

• Clause 153 – Failure to give information or produce a document.

• Clause 163 – Duty to not enter into, or be party to, a contract or arrangement that purports to insure or indemnify someone against liability to pay a pecuniary penalty under this Act or regulations.

By creating a ‘reasonable excuse’ or ‘lawful excuse’ exception, these offences place an evidential burden on the accused, in that they require the accused to raise evidence of a reasonable excuse. However, in doing so, these offences do not transfer the legal burden of proof. Once the accused has pointed to evidence of a reasonable or lawful excuse, which will ordinarily be peculiarly within their knowledge, the burden shifts back to the prosecution to prove the essential elements of the offence. I therefore do not consider that an evidential onus of this kind limits the right to be presumed innocent.

Accordingly, I am of the view that the above clauses are compatible with the right to the presumption of innocence under s 25(1) of the Charter.

Presumptions in criminal proceedings

Clause 103 sets out matters that, when provided in evidence by an inspector in criminal matters, are presumed to be factual. For example, Clause 103(1)(a) provides that, in a proceeding for an offence, where an inspector gives evidence that they suspected that dangerous goods were involved in an offence and provides evidence of the grounds of their suspicion, and the court considers that suspicion is reasonable, the particular dangerous goods are taken to have been involved in the offence unless contrary evidence is provided. Subsections (1)(b)-(d) provide similar provisions for other evidence that is provided by an inspector.

Section 25(1) is not engaged where there is an evidential burden as opposed to a persuasive burden. To avoid doubt, clause 103 places an evidential burden on the accused by requiring them to raise evidence to rebut the prima facie evidence. However, the legal burden of proof for the matter overall continues to remain with the Authority who must prove the elements of the offence. If the accused provides evidence that rebuts the prima facie evidence, the evidential burden shifts back to the prosecution to lead evidence which proves the allegation. Noting this, the right to be presumed innocent in section 25(1) of the Charter is not engaged or limited.

Forfeiture and disposal orders

Before making a forfeiture and disposal order under clause 107, subclause (3) requires the Magistrates’ Court to be satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that, if the order is not made, the HCDG, explosives or container used for the transport of the same will be used in connection with a contravention of the Act or regulations or any other Act. The court must also be satisfied that the Order is in the interests of public safety.

When making an order under subclause (3), clause 107(4)(b) also provides for the Magistrates’ Court to include findings of fact as to the quantity or nature of dangerous goods to include in a forfeiture and disposal order. A finding of fact can subsequently be produced in proceedings and as provided under Clause 107(6) will be prima facie evidence of the matter to which the finding relates.

The prima facie evidence status of a finding of fact in such an order is relevant to the right to presumption of innocence under s 25(1) because it places an evidential burden for the accused by requiring them to raise evidence to the contrary. It does not transfer the legal burden of proof. If evidence sufficient to rebut the prima facie evidence is raised by the defendant, the evidential burden shifts back to the prosecution to lead evidence which supports the finding of fact.

I do not consider that the prima facie evidence status of an order issued under Clause 107 limits the right to be presumed innocent, and Clause 107 of the Bill is therefore compatible with this right.

Right to protection against self-incrimination

Section 25(2)(k) of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence is entitled without discrimination to (amongst other things) not be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt. This right is at least as broad as the common law privilege against self-incrimination. It applies to protect a charged person against the admission in subsequent criminal proceedings of incriminatory material obtained under compulsion, regardless of whether the information was obtained prior to or subsequent to the charge being laid.

Production of documents

Section 19F(1) of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 currently allows a person to refuse or fail to give information or do any other thing that the person is required to do under this Act if giving the information, or doing the other thing, would tend to incriminate the person. Section 19F(2) however excludes the production of a document or part of a document required by the Act; or the giving of a person’s name or address in accordance with section 18 of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985.

Clause 160 of the Bill replicates that privilege and sets out the protection against self-incrimination in relation to the provision of information, but not in relation to the production of documents or the giving of one’s name and address. To the extent that the Authority can compel the production of a document, there may be interference with the right against self-incrimination under s25(2)(k) of the Charter.

At common law, the High Court has held that the protection accorded to pre-existing documents in relation to self-incrimination is considerably weaker than that accorded to oral testimony or to documents that are brought into existence to comply with a request for information. The compulsion to produce pre-existing documents that speak for themselves is in strong contrast to testimonial oral or written evidence that is brought into existence as a direct response to questions. This is particularly so in the context of a regulated industry or subject matter (such as dangerous goods), where documents or records are required to be produced during the course of a person’s participation in that industry or engagement with that regulated subject matter, and are brought into existence for the dominant purpose of demonstrating that person’s compliance with relevant duties and obligations when inspected. This is particularly justified where the main purpose of the regulation is to protect the public and prevent harm to persons and property in relation to the transport of dangerous goods.

The duty to provide documents in this context is consistent with the reasonable expectations of persons who are engaging within a regulated scheme and assuming the responsibilities and duties that apply to a person’s manufacture, storage, transport, transfer, sale and use of dangerous goods. To provide for a full document-use immunity would unreasonably obstruct the role of inspectors and the accountability aims of the record-keeping obligations, as well as give the holders of such documents an unfair forensic advantage in relation to criminal and civil penalty investigations. Accordingly, any protection afforded to documentary material by the privilege is limited in scope and not as fundamental to the nature of the right as the protection against the requirement that verbal answers be provided. A further safeguard is provided excusing the disclosure of any information the subject of client legal privilege.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that clause 160 of the Act is compatible with the protection of self-incrimination afforded under s 25(2)(k) of the Charter.

Right not to be tried or punished more than once

Section 26 of the Charter provides that a person must not be tried or punished more than once for an offence in respect of which that person has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with law. This right reflects the principle of double jeopardy. However, the principle only applies in respect of criminal offences – it will not prevent civil proceedings being brought in respect of a person’s conduct which has previously been the subject of criminal proceedings, or vice versa.

The civil penalty regime in Division 3 of Part 7 of the Bill may interfere with a person’s right not to be punished more than once given the proposed parallel operation of the civil penalty regimes with criminal laws. The civil penalty regime is modelled on the Environment Protection Act 2017 which provides that a person cannot be given a civil penalty order if a person has been convicted of an offence constituting the same conduct.

Clause 116 of the Bill provides that the Court must not make a civil penalty order against a person who has been convicted of an offence constituted by substantially the same conduct.

Clause 117 of the Bill then provides that civil proceedings for contravention of a civil penalty provision must be stayed if criminal proceedings are brought for an offence constituted by substantially the same conduct that is alleged to constitute the civil penalty contravention.

These provisions seek to protect against concurrent civil and criminal proceedings for conduct that is substantially the same. However, if a person is not convicted of the criminal offence, Clause 117(2) provides that civil penalty proceedings may be resumed.

Clause 118 enables criminal proceedings to be brought against a person regardless of whether a civil penalty order has been made for conduct that is substantially the same as the conduct constituting the offence. Accordingly, a person may receive a civil penalty and then have a subsequent criminal sanction imposed upon a conviction for the same conduct, which is relevant to the protection against double punishment. Whether the right is limited in this context will depend on whether the civil penalty is of such nature and magnitude to constitute truly penal consequences. In my view, the civil penalties for breaching the relevant provisions would not be considered to be punitive, or in effect, criminal sanctions. Although some of the maximum pecuniary penalties are up to 2000 penalty units, the purpose of the civil penalties is to encourage regulatory compliance, which is necessary due to the serious risks of harm to human health that may arise from a contravention of the Act. A civil penalty order will be enforceable as a judgment debt and a person will not be liable to be imprisoned for failure to discharge the debt.

While I do not consider that these clauses limit s 26 of the Charter, to the extent that right may be limited, if a court should consider that the larger civil penalties do constitute punishment, I am of the view that the limit is reasonable and justified in the circumstances. This approach mirrors the ‘pyramid of sanctions’ model of enforcement employed by comparative regulatory schemes in other jurisdictions. This model is predicated on findings that implementing a bar against the use of both criminal and civil proceedings can undermine effective enforcement. Civil penalty proceedings can be more efficient in enforcing the scheme and deterring misconduct due to the lower burden of proof, streamlined procedure, availability of negotiated settlements and lower costs. However, civil penalties alone can be an insufficient deterrent in relation to the more serious and harmful misconduct which warrant criminal punishment. Criminal sanctions are directed at appropriate punishment and serve as a greater deterrent. A criminal conviction poses much more reputational risks for a defendant, with bad publicity and stigma of a conviction far outweighing the label attached to an adverse decision in civil proceedings and/or the making of civil penalty orders. The availability to commence criminal proceedings notwithstanding whether a civil penalty has been imposed is an important part of the pyramidal structure of enforcement of sanctions for more serious cases, while still providing for effective and efficient deterrence.

The Bill implements sufficient safeguards to protect criminal process rights, including deeming any information and documents produced by an individual in a proceeding for a contravention order to be inadmissible in a criminal proceeding concerning substantially the same conduct. Further, the Bill does not interfere with existing sentencing discretions, including a sentencing judge’s consideration of the principle of totality and rule against double punishment in relation to imposing a criminal sanction for substantially the same conduct already subject to a civil contravention order.

Accordingly, I consider that this Bill is compatible with the right not to be tried or punished more than once as set out in s 26 of the Charter.

Rights in criminal proceedings

Section 25(1) of the Charter sets out that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law and section 25(2) provides for minimum guarantees relating to prompt information about the offence and appropriate defence opportunities, amongst other things.

Power to redirect certain body corporate obligations

Clauses 86 and 87 of the Bill will adopt a new power for the Authority to issue a notice to redirect certain body corporate obligations to appropriate officers of the body corporate or other persons to whom a notice was issued. These provisions may be relevant to the presumption of innocence to the extent that they may operate to deem an individual liable for the actions of the body corporate that are indictable offences and carry criminal penalties (being a failure to comply with a non-disturbance notice, improvement notice or prohibition notice).

However, to the extent that this results in a limit on the right, I consider the limit reasonably justified. The power serves an important and legitimate purpose. The power will ensure obligations follow responsible individuals who might reasonably be said to bear some responsibility for the non-compliance. It would ensure that bodies corporates cannot avoid accountability by going into liquidation or phoenixing to avoid obligations and allow the Authority to continue to prosecute the responsible party for non-compliance. In my view, it is appropriate to transfer obligations under the Bill to officers of bodies corporate, and to make principals liable for the conduct of the body corporate and its employees and agents, in order to ensure proper compliance with the relevant OHS schemes and to protect public health and safety. A person who elects to undertake a position as an officer of a body corporate accepts that they will be subject to certain requirements and duties, including a duty to ensure that the body corporate complies with its legal obligations, and does not commit offences. Affected persons should be well aware of the regulatory requirements and, as such, should have the necessary processes and systems in place to effectively meet these requirements and not incur accessorial liability.

In terms of the extent of the limitation, the power is conditional on the Authority being satisfied of a number of mandatory elements with a relatively high threshold, including that the person knew or ought reasonably to have known of the circumstances that resulting the issuing of the specified notice, was in a position to influence the body corporate in relation to its compliance with the specified notice, and, in the case of a failure to comply, and that it would not be oppressive, unjust or unreasonable for the Authority to issue the officer the redirection notice. In being satisfied of the last matter, being that the redirection notice was not oppressive, unjust or unreasonable, the Authority will relevantly need to take into account human rights under the Charter, including the presumption of innocence.

Finally, the prosecution would still be required to prove each element of an offence, and any burden placed on an officer (such as to establish an applicable reasonable excuse defence) would be evidential only. In my view, there are no less restrictive means reasonably available for ensuring adequate deterrence for bodies corporate for breaches of OHS requirements in respect of the transport of dangerous good that may cause significant public harm.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that these provisions are compatible with the right under the Charter to the presumption of innocence.’

The Hon Ben Carroll MP

Minister for WorkSafe and the TAC

 Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Minister for Education, Minister for WorkSafe and the TAC) (11:32): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I ask that my second-reading speech be incorporated into Hansard.

Incorporated speech as follows:

This Bill gives effect to reforms that will improve safety for the Victorian community by modernising the regulation of the transport of dangerous goods and strengthening WorkSafe’s ability to enforce compliance with dangerous goods transport laws.

This Bill delivers on the Victorian Government’s commitment to implement legislative reforms recommended in the Final Report of the Independent Review of the Dangerous Goods Act 1985 and associated regulations led by Andrew Palmer KC, now Judge Palmer (the Palmer Report).

The Victorian Government commissioned the Independent Review in response to the major chemical fires that occurred in suburban Melbourne in 2018 and 2019 as a result of illegal stockpiling of chemicals. These fires released significant amounts of toxic smoke and dangerous chemicals in suburban Melbourne, affecting nearby communities. The Independent Reviewer was asked to review Victoria’s dangerous goods laws and regulations to strengthen laws and help prevent such significant incidents from occurring again.

The Palmer Report found that the current dangerous goods regulatory framework is outdated, difficult to navigate and inconsistent with other regulatory frameworks dangerous goods duty holders are required to comply with. The Independent Reviewer also considered that this is likely contributing to non-compliance and illegal activity as unscrupulous operators take advantage of weaknesses in regulation and regulatory oversight. To address these findings the Palmer Report made 49 recommendations, including four recommendations specific to the transport of dangerous goods. This Bill gives effect to accepted recommendations from the Palmer Report that are relevant to the transport of dangerous goods in Victoria.

This Bill has been drafted with regard to the Model Act on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road or Rail to promote national consistency in the safety requirements and controls that apply to the transport of dangerous goods. The regulations, which will be developed after the passage of the Bill, will also promote consistency with other jurisdictions through the application of the Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road & Rail (ADG Code). This Bill will also regulate the transport of explosives and high consequence dangerous goods, including management of security risks arising from their transport. However, the Bill includes some differences from the national approach, such as the inclusion of a broad general duty applying to a person involved in the transport of dangerous goods by vessel on inland waters, by road or by rail. The Victorian Government considers that such differences are appropriate to align administrative procedure and regulatory functions and powers with other Victorian statutes, and importantly, to align with reforms to the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 contained in the Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Dangerous Goods) Bill 2026.

I will now address the key amendments in more detail.

Transport-specific dangerous goods legislation will support the transport industry

This Bill provides transport-specific dangerous goods laws to support businesses to understand and comply with their duties. It will also provide WorkSafe Victoria, as the regulator of dangerous goods transport, with a suite of modern regulatory tools to promote and enforce compliance with dangerous goods transport laws.

The Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Dangerous Goods) Bill 2026 will modernise and incorporate the regulation of all other dangerous goods activities into the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004. Similar obligations and language across occupational health and safety laws and dangerous goods transport laws will promote consistency and streamline laws for the benefit of duty holders and the wider community.

This Bill will also repeal the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, which is over 40 years old. This will allow for this Bill if enacted to provide the primary regulatory framework for the transport of dangerous goods by road, by rail and by vessel on inland waters in Victoria. It will also allow for the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 to become the primary framework for the regulation of the handling of dangerous goods.

Consistent duties will make it easier for duty holders to understand responsibilities

The Bill modernises the regulation of the transport of dangerous goods by introducing a broad general duty requiring a person involved in the transport of dangerous goods to ensure that dangerous goods are transported in a manner that is safe and without risks to public safety, property and the environment. This duty applies to dangerous goods transported by road or rail or on a vessel on inland waters in the State of Victoria. Broad, principle-based duties are a familiar feature of Victoria’s regulatory landscape with Victorian industry already subject to duties-based regulation in the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 and the Environment Protection Act 2017. Importantly, the new general duty applying to the transport of dangerous goods aligns with the new general duty applying to the handling of dangerous goods in the

Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Dangerous Goods) Bill 2026. This will ensure that dangerous goods duty holders are subject to similar duties-based regulatory frameworks across the lifecycle of dangerous goods.

The Bill also provides for the new transport of dangerous goods general duty to be supported by regulations, the ADG Code, Compliance Codes and non-statutory guidance for duty holders. These will provide duty holders with further information about how the transport of dangerous goods general duty should be performed and will promote continued improvements to the state of knowledge about ensuring the safe transport of dangerous goods.

Strengthening the regulation of dangerous goods waste

The Dangerous Goods Act 1985 currently provides the primary framework for regulating the transport of dangerous goods in Victoria but does not apply to the transport of reportable priority waste subject to the Environment Protection Act 2017.

The Palmer Report found that this exemption has resulted in the transport of dangerous goods waste not being subject to the same safety requirements that apply to the transport of all other dangerous goods. However, the same risks arise when transporting dangerous goods waste as those that arise when transporting all other dangerous goods. Accordingly, the Palmer Report recommended that the transport of all dangerous goods be subject to the same requirements regardless of whether they are also waste. This Bill delivers on that recommendation and will apply consistently to ensure the safe transport of both dangerous goods and dangerous goods waste.

The Environment Protection Act 2017 will continue to apply to risks of harm to human health or the environment from the transport of dangerous goods waste.

Strengthened enforcement, prosecution and penalties

This Bill ensures that there is an effective enforcement system comprising a range of enforcement options that are flexible enough to deter the full range of non-compliant behaviour. Importantly, enforcement options provided in this Bill are consistent with those that will apply to the handling of dangerous goods should the Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Dangerous Goods Bill) 2026 be enacted.

Contravention of the transport of dangerous goods general duty will be subject to significant maximum penalties of 2,000 penalty units for a natural person and 10,000 penalty units for a body corporate. The Bill also includes offences for an aggravated breach of the transport of dangerous goods general duty, and for a person who recklessly engages in the transport of dangerous goods that places, or may place, another person in danger of serious injury or death. These offences will apply to circumstances where the conduct of the offender represents a higher degree of culpability than other offences in the Act. An aggravated breach will be subject to higher maximum penalties of 4,000 penalty units, 5 years imprisonment or both for a natural person and 20,000 penalty units for a body corporate. The recklessness offence will be subject to maximum penalties of 5,000 penalty units, 10 years imprisonment or both for a natural person or 40,000 penalty units for a body corporate.

The Bill also expands the enforcement tools that can be used to address breaches across a range of transport of dangerous goods offences. This includes the introduction of civil penalties provisions which will offer alternative legal proceedings where criminal prosecution is not warranted. Where a civil penalty provision is contravened, a court may make an order that the person pay a pecuniary penalty (up to a legislated maximum penalty) and/or make any other order that the court considers appropriate. Other orders that a court may make in civil proceedings include compliance and restraining orders, adverse publicity orders, monetary benefit orders. These expanded enforcement tools will provide for tailored enforcement to suit particular contraventions.

Specific transport-related orders for compensation will align with the Model Transport Act to enable road or rail authorities to receive compensation for damages to road or rail caused by or contributed to by an offender under the Act.

The Bill also provides stronger enforcement powers to capture liable officers. Officers of body corporates will have a positive duty to exercise due diligence and take reasonable steps to be informed and ensure body corporates are complying with their duties. If an officer fails in their due diligence duty, the officer commits an offence and may be subject to the natural person penalty for an offence for failing to comply with the relevant duty or obligation. An officer of a partnership or unincorporated body or association will also be required to exercise due diligence and take reasonable steps to be informed. A failure by the partnership or unincorporated body or association will not be an offence by the officer if the officer exercised their due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence.

This Bill will also provide a mechanism to redirect obligations to comply with a direction to take actions to address serious risks arising from dangerous goods to a related or associated entity where there was control, or to an officer of the body corporate, who knew or ought reasonably to have known about the circumstances that have led to the direction being issued and who have influence over the entity’s compliance. This new mechanism seeks to stamp out companies phoenixing, or refusal to comply, in order to avoid responsibility for their actions.

Providing WorkSafe with adequate powers to identify non-compliance, enforce compliance and take action to address serious risks

The Bill provides WorkSafe Victoria, as the regulator of the transport of dangerous goods, with adequate powers to identify non-compliance, to act and enforce contraventions of the Act. The Bill includes provisions for the appointment of inspectors and specifies their functions and powers in relation to the transport of dangerous goods by road or rail or by a vessel on inland waters. Many of these powers are consistent with inspector powers currently provided under

the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 and the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, which this Act will replace, but the Bill also strengthens inspector powers in a similar manner to the Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Dangerous Goods) Bill 2026. Specifically, the Bill provides WorkSafe inspectors with an expanded power to intervene and take action to address a serious risk in circumstances where a person has refused or failed to comply, or is unable to comply in a safe manner, with a direction given by an inspector to address that serious risk. WorkSafe inspectors will also be empowered to take intervening actions where there is an immediate risk of harm to a person or the environment, or of damage to any property arising from the transport of dangerous goods. The Bill also provides a new entry power allowing an inspector to access a place if such entry is necessary to allow an inspector to exercise their power to intervene to address a serious or immediate risk near the place. While powers to intervene currently exist under the Dangerous Goods Act 1985, the Palmer Report found that they did not adequately capture the cause and scope of risks that warrant intervention. The inability to access another place when necessary to facilitate an intervention to address a serious or immediate risk was also found to limit WorkSafe’s ability to take effective action.

To support WorkSafe’s powers to intervene, the Bill also provides a new cost recovery mechanism which will better enable WorkSafe to recover costs of taking action from a person who is believed to have caused the circumstances that gave rise to the risk, or the occupier or previous occupier of the place where the inspector took action, or owners or possessors of the dangerous goods when the inspector took action. WorkSafe will also be able to place a charge on the property where the inspector took action and amounts are unpaid, noting that the owner may have benefited from remediation works, and may enforce the charge in certain circumstances. Impacted landlords may seek to recover as a cause of action from their tenants’ who may have undertaken the unscrupulous conduct or caused the incident at the property which WorkSafe had to remediate. Ensuring WorkSafe has access to an effective cost recovery mechanism is essential to ensure that responsible parties continue to be subject to the financial consequences of their action, or inaction even when the public interest requires WorkSafe to intervene to address serious or immediate risks arising from dangerous goods.

The Bill also provides WorkSafe with powers to identify non-compliance and take action to address serious risks by enabling WorkSafe inspector powers to enter residential premises where it is reasonably believed that dangerous goods are present and a person is contravening or is about to contravene the Act or regulations.

The Bill provides for information sharing between agencies with complementary regulatory objectives by specifying additional agencies and departments with whom WorkSafe Victoria can share information.

To conclude, this Bill makes important reforms to modernise and improve the regulation of the transport of dangerous goods in Victoria. The changes in this Bill will support Victorian industry to comply with their obligations by complimenting requirements that will apply to all other activities involving dangerous goods and promoting national consistency. Importantly, they will help keep Victorians safe from incidents involving the transport of dangerous goods.

I commend the Bill to the house.

 Cindy McLEISH (Eildon) (11:33): I move:

That the debate be adjourned.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

Ordered that debate be adjourned for two weeks. Debate adjourned until Wednesday 15 April.