Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee

Report on an Interim Privacy Code of Conduct
for Members of the Victorian Parliament, May 2001

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1. INTRODUCTION

The law, or best practice?

A Privacy Code of Conduct for Members of the Victorian Parliament is being considered because they are exempt from the provisions of the Information Privacy Act which will apply to most of the Victorian Public Service from 1 September 2001[1]. The legislation as introduced expressly covered Members[2]. The exemption was introduced because of concerns about the possible interference with the work of MPs, and of Parliament, if MPs were subject to the Act, and about inconsistency with federal legislation[3]. There was however cross-party agreement that it would not be acceptable to leave MPs entirely outside a privacy protection framework[4], and the Minister gave a reference to the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee to draft a Code of Conduct – an interim Code by 31 May 2001, with a final version by 31 December 2001.

The fact that MPs would be adopting a ‘voluntary’ code rather than being bound by the law would have both advantages and disadvantages.

On the one hand it would allow a flexibility to avoid technical compliance issues which might interfere with the conduct of MPs’ work without doing anything substantive for privacy protection. It would also allow for the Information Privacy Principles to be modified if necessary where other important public interests, such as Parliamentary Privilege, outweigh privacy interests.

On the other hand, it would remove the ‘excuse’ that something might technically be exempt from the law – and would put a greater onus on MPs to do the ‘right thing’ as perceived by individuals. For example, arguing that electoral roll or white pages information may technically be exempt from some of the Information Privacy Principles (because they are generally available publications) would not be likely to be received sympathetically by the public if the way MPs handle that information did not accord with community expectations.

In other words, the freedom of a voluntary code may in some cases lead to the adoption of higher standards than the law would have required.

Scope of a Code – the different roles of Members of Parliament

MPs hold personal information about individuals in a variety of capacities. They hold information about constituents and community contacts in their capacity as representatives, but they also hold information about many of the same people as electors in their capacity as candidates for election, in most cases as the nominated candidate of a political party. It is this information about constituents/electors and others, held in these two capacities, which the Code seeks to protect. The issue of separating the two roles is discussed further below.

Those MPs who are Ministers or parliamentary secretaries will also hold personal information in that capacity. For this information, they are subject to the Act[5], and will be guided by the privacy policies of the agency or agencies for which they are responsible.

Many MPs will also play other roles – as members or office holders of non-government organizations; as appointed or elected members of various boards, trusts or other bodies; and as private individuals with business and personal interests. In some of these roles they will handle personal information, and will be subject to whatever privacy principles apply – either under the Victorian Act, or for private sector activities, under the Privacy Act 1988 (Clth)[6]. They should receive guidance on their obligations when operating in these other capacities from the relevant organization.

The interim Code does not deal with the protection of the personal information about MPs themselves and their employees held in the context of human resource functions. While these individuals have as much of an interest in having their ‘personnel’ information protected as anyone else, the IPA exempts the Joint Services Department (JSD).[7] The JSD, as the employer of MP’s staff and as the administrator of MPs remuneration and allowances and conditions, holds the same range of personal information as does any other employer. Whether the JSD should voluntarily adopt a privacy policy, perhaps based on work already under way in other Victorian government agencies, is a separate matter for the Parliament to decide. If it chose to do so, the existing Code of Conduct for parliamentary employees, which already deals with confidentiality and security[8], could also be updated to include compliance with all of the privacy principles, reflecting the policy.

Representative or Party?

In practice, MPs do not clearly distinguish the capacities in which they deal with individuals – a constituent with a problem will also be a voter at the next election, and all electors are potential ‘cases’. Knowledge acquired about an individual in one context will inevitably be taken into account in the other. At a legal level this merging of roles could be confusing, given that political parties are wholly exempt from the Privacy Act 1988 (Clth). But at a practical level this need not create any difficulty if Victorian MPs are prepared to treat personal information they hold about constituents and others in the same way whether it comes to them, or is used by them, in a party political or representative context.

The only other way of dealing with the two roles would be to try to separate the records, and say that all ‘party’ or campaigning information (such as assessments of voting intentions) should be outside the scope of the Code. This would leave the Code applying only to information collected about constituents in the course of constituency casework. While this distinction might be easy to apply to paper files, it would be very difficult to apply to computerised records, where MPs typically use party supplied software programs to store both basic information about electors provided by the Electoral Commission; voting intentions and at least brief details of casework. Unless the Parliament decides otherwise, it is recommended that no attempt be made to ‘separate’ campaign information from constituency information for the purposes of this Code. Internal party information held separately (such as papers of caucus, branch and faction meetings), will be outside the scope of the Code – in line with the exemption from the Privacy Act 1988 (Clth).

Inconsistency with federal law

One of the reasons given for exempting Members from the IPA was potential inconsistency with the Privacy Act 1988 (Clth), which exempts members of (all Australian) parliaments, political parties and their contractors and volunteers for all acts and practices relating to the political or electoral process[9]. Reference was made in debate to the practical problem of co-located federal and state electorate offices[10].

If the Victorian Parliament voluntarily adopts a Code of Conduct on privacy, some inconsistency is inevitable and unavoidable, unless members voluntarily extend their compliance with the Code to any information they deal with in relation to all political activities. This has been suggested above in relation to ‘campaign’ information but not internal party information. For the latter information, and in the case of co-located offices, Members will have to work out an arrangement to differentiate information subject to the Code.

2. PERSONAL INFORMATION HELD BY MPs

It is helpful to set out the typical way in which personal information is collected and held by Victorian MPs, as a context for the draft Code:

Basic personal details about all electors in the Member’s constituency are received on disk from the Electoral Commission, with monthly updates. This information comprises name, address and gender. Most members will enter this information to a computerised database which also contains telephone numbers and other contact details, and at least a coded reference to the elector’s characteristics or dealings with the member. In some cases the database may contain ‘free text’ details of any casework or other ‘intelligence’ about the elector, although most members will keep the bulk of correspondence with constituents on a paper file. In some constituencies, the database will also be used to record party affiliations and assessments of voting intentions (more so in marginal electorates).

Members of the main political parties use party supplied software programs, and the electoral roll information is supplied and updated by the party offices, with additional information such as telephone numbers and party affiliations already added.

All Members have at least two desktop computers and a portable notebook computer, with standard proprietary software including Microsoft Office, Internet Explorer for accessing the World Wide Web (Internet) and Lotus Notes for E-mail. Members will typically use this equipment to record details of community, media and other contacts, and to prepare and store word-processed correspondence. While this basic infrastructure is supplied and supported by the Joint Services Department, there is no restriction on what other computing or communications equipment a member may use, and some Members will keep some personal information on other computers as well as in paper files.

The physical location of files and computers varies, with most of them held in electorate offices (some shared) but some information held at least temporarily in Parliament House offices or at the Member’s home. The notebook computers can of course be anywhere – they can access the Parliament network (ParlyNet) by wireless connection within the Parliamentary precinct and by dial-up connection elsewhere.

E-mail between members and between members and third parties is facilitated by the ParlyNet, with each member’s ‘mailboxes’ residing on servers in Parliament House.

3. MPs AND THEIR STAFF

Although electorate office staff are employed by the Parliament, they are responsible on a day to day basis to the Member to whom they are assigned. It is suggested that this Code should apply to staff as well as to MPs themselves (although some provisions such as those concerning privilege will only apply to MPs). In the event of any breach of the Code it would be a matter of fact, to be determined by investigation, as to who was actually responsible. If the staff member had been following specific or general instructions, the Member could be responsible, just as they are for their own actions. If on the other hand a staff member undertook some action on their own account outside the accepted policies, they may be liable in their own right.

Many MPs make use of volunteer workers. Whether they are engaged by the Member or by a political party, they should be required to sign a confidentiality agreement before being given access to any personal information. Because there may be limited recourse to sanctions and remedies for breaches committed by volunteers, Members should consider carefully whether it is appropriate for volunteer workers to be given access to some categories of personal information.

4. THE INFORMATION PRIVACY PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

The discussion in this chapter supports the interim Code which is contained in Appendix 1.

Collection – IPP 1 (all personal information) & IPP 10 (sensitive information)

Member’s main concerns with the application of the Collection principles are:

• Will they impose any limitation on the availability of information?

• Will the requirement to notify individuals about the purpose etc of collection be onerous?

Sources

The electoral roll information is fairly and lawfully obtained and in any case is arguably partially exempt. Information provided by individuals and others in the course of casework, and from canvassing can also be justified and can comply with the principle.

While electors and constituents will expect MPs to keep basic particulars about them, and to record any direct communications, they may be less sympathetic to the collection of information about them from other sources. At one end of the spectrum, no-one could reasonably object to matching with the white pages to add telephone numbers – people have the choice of not listing their phone numbers (although there is a separate privacy issue as to whether this should be free of charge and/or the default). Members (and political parties) should not however use ‘reverse directories’ that allow one to find a name and address from a number. Reverse directories are not allowed to be provided within the telecommunications industry, and use of the few commercial products that are still available would be arguably unlawful and certainly unfair.

Matching to acquire other publicly available information – eg: chairman of community association; Telstra shareholder; recent home improver – would not technically be covered by the Information Privacy Act, due to the exemption for generally available publications (s.11), but individuals could be expected to be sensitive to such record-keeping and Members could demonstrate their commitment by applying the Code to all such information.

So-called ‘soft’ information, or intelligence, is perhaps the most difficult area of data collection. Do people have a reasonable expectation, and awareness, that their MPs may record opinions or unverified attributes about them, eg: green sympathies, labor voter, anti-abortion? Even if they don’t, perhaps they should do given that recording such information is arguably a necessary and desirable part of the democratic process? The Code should not place any restriction in principle on recording of political ‘intelligence’, but should deal with any concerns by adopting the access and correction principle (see later).

Unsolicited information needs to be assessed for relevance and quality to ensure that it is necessary, and caution may be needed in some cases to assess whether the information may have been obtained unlawfully – as with ‘leaks’. Whether a Member decides to record and use unlawfully acquired information will be a political judgement, but Members should be aware that it could place them in breach of this Principle, as well as potentially committing or aiding and abetting a criminal offence.

Notification

It would be prohibitively expensive to write to all electors notifying them retrospectively that information about them is held by their members of parliament. The Act recognises this for other agencies by applying IPP1 and 10 only to information collected after commencement. There is in any case a reasonable expectation that this information will be provided to MPs. The Electoral Commission will contribute to creating this expectation by satisfying its obligation under the Act to notify electors about uses of the roll when registering[11].

Members can comply with these principles by taking advantage of opportunities for notice in course of future communications, particularly those which solicit information – eg circulars or advertisements that invite constituents to call or write with any concerns. Such communications could carry a brief reference to the fact that the Member is subject to a Privacy Code of Conduct and invite individuals to enquire for further details.

Sensitive Information

IPP10 imposes stricter conditions on collection of sensitive information – defined in the Act to include such things as racial or ethnic origins, political opinions and religious affiliations (but not health information – see below). All of these categories of information will be recorded for at least some constituents by MPs and it would be unrealistic to apply the strict conditions of IPP 10, which would usually require consent to collect. MPs need to have the freedom to collect these categories of information – the compensatory safeguard being the right of access and correction and the ‘proportionate use’ principle that is suggested below.

Health information

Health information has been excluded from the coverage of the Information Privacy Act and is protected instead by the Health Records Act 2001, which does apply to MPs, although not to the Parliamentary Departments. The collection principle under the Health Records Act (HPP1) is similar but not identical to IPP1. Further work is needed to establish exactly what the obligations of MPs are in relation to any health related information that they collect and hold. The draft Interim Code acknowledges that these obligations exist.

Use & Disclosure – IPP 2

There will be no difficulty complying with this principle for the majority of ‘primary’, uses. Information provided by constituents can be used to pursue casework, including disclosure to relevant agencies. Information about issues and preferences obtained from individuals themselves while canvassing can be used to communicate back to them during elections. These uses are justified on the basis of being the primary purpose of collection (which should have been communicated to the individuals while collecting). In many cases there will also be either implied or express consent[12].

Casework

In relation to casework, MPs should be careful not to exceed the reasonable expectations and wishes of constituents. MPs should not assume that someone bringing a problem to their local member necessarily authorises whatever uses and disclosures the MP thinks may be required to resolve the issue. A dialogue is required, with MPs and their staff making sure that the constituent understands and approves of the proposed action at each step. Some may be willing to give the Member free rein, but others will, for instance, not want an agency contacted until they have explored their options. The same applies to referrals – the Member may decide that a constituent’s problem is best handled by another agency or public official, but they should not simply hand over the case to the other agency without the express consent of the individual.

Political communication

Member’s main interest in ‘secondary’ uses of personal information about constituents and electors is in political ‘direct marketing’. Members will typically wish to use information about a voter’s activities and preferences obtained indirectly (from third party sources) to convince them to vote for the Member at the next election - or to become a more active supporter or helper.

Unlike the National Principle 2 in the Privacy Act 1988 (Clth), the Victorian IPP 2 does not have a special exception dealing with direct marketing (allowing businesses one ‘unexpected’ communication on condition that they then offer an ‘opt-out’). If IPP 2 applied, political direct marketing, whether it is by personally addressed letter or E-mail, or by phone call, would have to fit within the exception for ‘related purposes within the individual’s reasonable expectation’[13].

Experience suggests that individuals’ ‘reasonable expectation’ about uses does not necessarily co-incide with what MPs regard as normal and appropriate.

One solution to this mismatch would be to voluntarily offer electors an ‘opt-out’ from receipt of any further personalised communication (this would not constrain non-personalised communications such as letterbox drops of campaign leaflets). This should be in the interests of Members and their parties as it would ensure that materials were not wasted. But politicians are understandably reluctant to close off channels of communication – on the basis that voter’s circumstances change and their voting preferences are volatile, and in the hope that the next message may be the one that changes someone’s mind. Some would argue that political communications are so important in a participatory democracy that individuals’ preferences should be overridden, leaving MPs free to ‘direct market’ their message to any elector at any time.

Whether they want to go as far as offering a no communication option is something only MPs can collectively decide, and needs further debate during the development of the final Code of Conduct. In the meantime, the interim Code does not seek to place conditions on political direct marketing, accepting it as an additional exception to the principle.

Petitions and Privilege

Another practical example is petitions. Do signatories to petitions expect that their support for a cause will be made public? Under the procedures applying to petitions to Parliament, signatories are asked to give their name and address to verify themselves and prevent fictitious ‘stacking’[14]. Maybe they should expect their identity to be published, but there have been complaints when petitions have been tabled in Parliament complete with names and addresses of all signatories.

Disclosures in Parliament do of course attract privilege, and are in a sense the ultimate case of disclosure authorised by law. MPs may nevertheless wish to voluntarily bind themselves to exercise restraint in the disclosure of personal information. The Code could require consideration of whether the disclosure, and the amount of detail disclosed, are really necessary to achieve the particular purpose – such as accountability. In the case of petitions, the purpose would usually be served by the disclosure of the text, perhaps the names of the principal sponsors and just the number (and perhaps the geographical distribution) of other signatories. The Standing Orders and Rules of the House regarding petitions already address privacy concerns by providing for the number of signatures to be printed in Hansard and for a copy of the petition (but not all the signatories) to be referred to the relevant Minister[15].

This example supports a provision in the Code committing MPs to ‘proportionate’ use of personal information – not just in Parliament itself but in all their activities. This has been included in the draft Interim Code. In deciding what is proportionate, the sensitivity of the personal information should be taken into account[16]. Most members already apply this rule in practice, and would for instance not include a constituent’s name in a media release without express consent.

Other exceptions

MPs will of course have to disclose personal information to third parties if required to do so by law – for instance by a court, and will presumably wish to retain the discretion to use and disclose where authorised by law, and in emergencies[17]. On the other hand, MPs may well see no need for exceptions that allow use and disclosure of personal information for law enforcement, revenue protection etc[18]. It is unlikely that law enforcement or revenue authorities would see the routine bulk information held by Members as useful – they have their own channels for appropriate access to the electoral roll. Presumably MPs would see their constituents’ casework as at least potentially highly confidential, and would not want to release details without their consent or a legal requirement. The only exception might be if they became aware of unlawful activity and felt a duty to report it – for this reason MPs should have the benefit of the appropriate exception in IPP 2[19].

Statistical analysis of their electorate is becoming a common tool for MPs, and there is no reason why they cannot use personal information for research and analysis, provided the results are not published in a form which identifies any individual. This is provided for as an exception in the Victorian IPP, where seeking consent is not practicable, although it is arguably not a use of personal information that needs protection – no such exception has been provided in the federal NPP 2. It is suggested that MPs should retain the discretion to analyse personal information in this way subject only to the no-identification condition.

Data Quality – IPP 3

There is no reason why Victorian MPs cannot comply with this principle in full. It requires that reasonable steps be taken to ensure that personal information is accurate, complete and up-to-date. In practical terms it means only that information recorded about constituents, where it not recent, should wherever possible be verified before use – preferably by checking with the individual concerned. MPs are entitled to assume that the latest version of the electoral roll meets this principle, and that information provided by constituents themselves can be taken at face value, except where it relates to another individual, when judgement needs to be applied. It is acknowledged that some information collected and held by MPs will by its nature be unverifiable and of uncertain provenance and quality, in which case judgement is again called for in its use.

Security – IPP 4

There seems no reason why Victorian MPs cannot meet the requirements of the security principle in full. The security built into ParlyNet, partly to meet Members concerns about confidential party communications, meets and exceeds the specifications required to secure any personal information held on the servers or in transit. There is however a need for continual monitoring and periodic audits of the implementation of IT security.

Responsibility for security for personal information held on the desktops or notebook PCs and for paper files, rests with the individual MP and his or her electorate office staff.

MPs should make use of security features of the computer hardware and software they use such as password controlled access and automatic time-out log off. It may be appropriate for different staff members, and any volunteers authorised to use the computers, to have different access privileges. Regular use of back-up facilities is an important precaution against loss of data, but appropriate care needs to be taken to store back-up disks or tapes securely. Further guidance from the Joint Services Department IT unit on computer security may be required.

MPs should take advantage of the confidential waste disposal service for paper waste available through the Joint Services Department.

The inevitable use of Members’ homes as an alternate office poses some additional security risks. Members will not only use their notebook PC at home but will also often have paper records at home. While acknowledging the importance of trust in family members, there is always the prospect of visitors and tradespersons having potential access to what could be quite sensitive information. Generally only the members themselves (and staff) should be given password access to constituents’ information on the notebook computer and it would be desirable for members to have, and use, lockable filing cabinets for storage of work related papers in their homes.

There is an unresolved issue concerning the fate of an MP’s records on retirement or defeat at an election. The convention is for MPs in this position to be given a few weeks to settle their affairs and vacate their electorate and Parliament House offices. But there is no formal guidance on what they should do with their records, including personal information about constituents. Practice varies between transfer to the incoming member (usually only if of the same party); transfer to party offices, or disposal.

This issue involves many other considerations besides privacy. It is suggested that the Parliament should develop a formal policy on transfer/disposal of records by retiring Members. The outcome of this policy can then be reflected in the final Privacy Code of Conduct.

Openness – IPP 5

This is an important principle designed to make information handling of personal information more open and transparent, and to allow individuals to assess whether an organization might hold personal information about them.

It would be unnecessary and onerous for each MP to have to prepare a document to comply with this principle. There is sufficient commonality in the way in which all MPs collect, hold and use personal information to make a single document a more appropriate means of compliance.

It is suggested that this Code of Conduct be made publicly available and publicised, together with an explanatory document to be prepared by one of the Parliamentary Departments, summarising in general terms what sort of personal information MPs hold, for what purposes, and how they collect, hold, use and disclose that information.

Access & Correction – IPP 6

It is fundamental to any privacy regime that individuals should, in principle, be able to see what information is held about them and be able to challenge its accuracy, currency and completeness. Having said that, all privacy laws accept that there is a range of legitimate grounds for withholding information.

The question is what exemptions from the access principle are appropriate for MPs – which of those in IPP 6 are relevant and are additional grounds required? Protection of confidential sources is one obvious area which may require additional grounds.

This is a complex issue which requires further study and discussion as input to the final Code. It is suggested that for the interim Code, there should be a general discretion for MPs to withhold information on any grounds they think appropriate, but that this should be balanced by a right to be informed of any withholding and a right of appeal to a relevant officer of the Parliament (see section on sanctions and remedies).

A common misunderstanding about the access principle is that it will involve an exhaustive search for all the information about an individual that may be held. On computer files it will be easy to search for a name, but an individual may be mentioned in a letter filed by topic or under the name of the sender. In practice, it is quite legitimate to ask the requester for clues as to the context, and therefore likely location of information about them, eg: have they been canvassed? are they involved in a particular community issue? If information cannot be located fairly easily, it does not need to be provided.

Members should be able to comply with those parts of the principle that deal with explanations, use of intermediaries, and with correction rights, and these have been retained in the interim Code. The provision for charging for access has been removed pending further consideration for the final Code.

Unique Identifiers – IPP 7

This principle is intended to limit the development of multi-function identifiers, which are widely seen as undesirable incursions into personal privacy because of their role in facilitating data matching and record linkage. It is not intended to prevent the use of identifiers within an individual MP’s record-keeping system - only the assignment and use of identifiers in common between different MPs or between MPs and other organizations.

It is suggested that MPs should commit to a simplified version of this principle.

Anonymity – IPP 8

This Principle aims to preserve the ability of individuals to deal with agencies without revealing their identity wherever that is lawful and practicable. Applied to MPs it simply means that they should be prepared to respond to initial enquiries or complaints from people who prefer to remain anonymous. There will be relatively few cases where it will be possible to pursue an issue without needing to be aware of a person’s identity, but some where it may be essential (ie whistleblowers).

Trans-border Data Flows – IPP 9

IPP 9 is a response to the international concerns about movement of personal information ‘evading’ the protection provided by the law in any particular jurisdiction. Australia is moving towards a reasonably comprehensive framework of privacy protection, with laws applying to the Commonwealth and NSW public sectors as well as Victoria’s, and the Commonwealth Act covering, or expressly exempting, the private sector. Transfers of personal information within these protected areas should not be a problem. There remains an issue if personal information is transferred to a public sector body in another State or Territory (except NSW), or to anyone in another country that does not have adequate privacy protection.

The Commonwealth and NSW Privacy Commissioners will be issuing advice on adequacy in other jurisdictions and the European Union will be making a judgement about the overall adequacy of Australia’s privacy protection. In the meantime, it is suggested that the interim Code simply acknowledges the issue and commits MPs to consult the Victorian Privacy Commissioner before they transfer any personal information to a jurisdiction without privacy laws.

Sensitive Information – IPP 10

IPP 10 contains special rules for the collection of sensitive information (excluding health information). It has already been discussed under the Collection Principles heading above (see IPP 1).

5. SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES

It is obviously desirable that there should be some process by which individuals who suspect a breach of the Code can seek redress.

The Act provides for investigation and conciliation by the Privacy Commissioner, and determination of any outstanding disputes by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). However, one of the main reasons for the exemption of MPs from the Act was that it was considered inappropriate to subject Members to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and the VCAT in relation to the performance of their functions as Members of Parliament. This could be seen as inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers[20].

One option would be to vest authority to investigate breaches of the Code in a committee of the Parliament itself, while another would be to leave this role to the Presiding Officers. Precedents exist in relation to the Register of Members’ Interests[21]; and the right of reply in the Legislative Assembly[22]. While these initiatives each have a different origin and the precise mechanism for investigation and dispute resolution varies, they share the common characteristic of peer review, thereby avoiding any external interference with Parliamentary sovereignty.

In contrast, the draft policies on E-mail and Internet Use and on Equal Opportunity and Harassment[23] do not specify any complaint or dispute resolution mechanisms, but only refer in general terms to the prospect of legal liability. This carries some weight because a range of criminal and civil actions could be taken against MPs under various applicable laws. In the case of privacy however, there would be no point in simply referring to alternative remedies, as the avenues of redress through the Privacy Commissioner and the VCAT have been expressly ruled out by the exemption of MPs from the IPA.

Consideration will need to be given to appropriate sanctions for breaches of a privacy Code. Under the IPA, agencies can be ordered by the VCAT to take a range of actions including apologies, undertakings, remedial steps, and, where appropriate, payment of compensation of up to $100,000[24]. Sanctions against Members’ staff acting without authority could be disciplinary action by the Joint Services Department, but there is at present no precedent for specific sanctions against Members breaching the Code, other than that wilful breaches of the Register of Interests code of conduct are a contempt of the Parliament and can attract a fine of up to $2,000.

The details of a mechanism for handling complaints about breaches of the Code, and the issue of appropriate sanctions, should be considered during the development of the final Code. It is suggested that the interim Code should simply commit MPs to be accountable for compliance to an Presiding Officer or Committee of Parliament. The interim Code should also make staff accountable to management of the relevant Parliamentary Department (for electorate office staff, the JSD) for any of their actions which breach the Code but which were undertaken outside the scope of their authority (ie: contrary to instructions from their Member).

Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee
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