Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations CommitteeDiscrimination in the Law
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Interim recommendation That Part 4A of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 be retained. |
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The Committee received submissions asserting that the definition of ‘guarantor’[30] in the Credit Act 1984 is discriminatory, as de facto and same-sex partners of debtors are treated differently from married partners.[31] The Committee notes that, while the Credit Act 1984 is still operative in respect of contracts entered into prior to the commencement of the Consumer Credit ( Victoria ) Act 1995, it does not apply to contracts made after the commencement of the new Act. The Consumer Credit ( Victoria ) Act 1995 does not provide any limitation on spouses acting as guarantors.
The Committee considers that there is no need to amend an Act that is still operative, but only in relation to contracts made prior to a certain date.
Interim recommendation That section 5 of the Credit Act 1984 be retained. |
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One of the principle objectives of the Juries Act 2000 (‘Act’) is to ensure that jury members are representative of the community at large, and therefore to ensure an accused person’s right to be tried by a jury of their peers.[32] The Committee received a submission[33] arguing that eligibility for jury duty is a right that should be extended to all people who can perform the task, unless they are otherwise disqualified.[34]
The Act prescribes that certain persons are ineligible to serve as jurors.[35] One such group is involuntary patients as defined under the Mental Health Act 1986. The submission argued that excluding all involuntary patients from eligibility for jury selection discriminates against people in this category.[36] It was argued that the exclusion is based on an assumption that all members of this group do not have capacity to perform jury service. The submission recommended that the blanket ineligibility be replaced with an alternative provision that a person is only ineligible to serve as a juror if the person has a disability or condition that renders them incapable of performing jury duty.
The Committee notes that the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee made a similar recommendation in its report on Jury Duty in Victoria in December 1996. Recommendation 33 of the Final Report of the Law Reform Committee states:
The current specific categories of ineligibility from jury service relating to persons with mental, intellectual and physical disabilities should be repealed in favour of a general category which renders ineligible a person who has a physical, intellectual or mental disability that makes the person incapable of effectively performing the functions of a juror.[37]
However, the Committee notes that the Law Reform Committee did not discuss the jury selection process in the context of the discussion on ineligibility.[38] In the Committee’s view, the exclusion of categories of people may be related to the process by which jurors are selected. Potential jurors may be challenged by the parties involved in the trial. Courts and Tribunals Victoria state that ‘questioning of prospective jurors is almost never allowed’ and that ‘challenges may simply be made on the basis of the person’s age, gender or type of occupation’.[39]
It appears to the Committee from these statements that there is no rigorous assessment as to a person’s actual capacity to act as a juror as part of the jury selection process, nor is there capacity within the existing selection process for such assessment to be made.
The Committee considers that, while in theory excluding people on the basis of the impact of the disability on the individual, rather than simply by the fact that the person has the disability, may be desirable, the existing jury selection process in Victoria may not have the capacity to assess a person’s actual ability to act as a juror.
Interim recommendation That the exclusion of ‘patients’, as defined under the Mental Health Act1986 in Schedule 2 of the Juries Act 2000, be retained. |
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The objective of the Occupational Health and Safety (Lead) Regulations 2000 (‘Regulations’) is to protect people against risks to their health associated with the use of lead at workplaces.[40] The Regulations adopt the Exposure Standards for Atmospheric Contaminants in the Occupational Environment, published by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission in 1995.[41]
The Regulations provide for the removal of an employee from a lead-risk job if the results of monitoring reveal that the level of lead in an employee’s blood is at or above a certain level.[42] The threshold level is lower for women of reproductive capacity and lower again for women who are pregnant or breast feeding.
The Committee received a submission contending that the Regulations discriminate against women on the basis of pregnancy.[43] It was submitted that this discrimination may not be reasonable as it regulates the target of the risk, rather than the source of the risk.
It is clear that the Regulations do treat women of reproductive capacity and those who are pregnant or breast feeding differently from women not of reproductive capacity and men. However, the Committee considers that this is for the protection of any child who is or may be born to women who are exposed to the prescribed levels of lead. The Committee does not dispute the contention that the source of the risk should also be addressed. However, it considers that such action and protection from the risks associated with lead exposure are not mutually exclusive.
Interim recommendation That section 158 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Lead) Regulations 2000, which adopts the national Exposure Standards for Atmospheric Contaminants in the Occupational Environment, be retained. |
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The Committee received a submission[44] that asserted that recent amendments made to the Wrongs Act 1958 (‘Act’),[45] may discriminate against people with psychiatric disabilities. The Act, as amended, defines, among other things, the threshold of impairment before a person is entitled to compensation for personal injuries for non-economic loss (pain and suffering) arising from negligence. The threshold level for psychiatric impairment is 10 per cent, while the threshold for other types of impairment is 5 per cent. This means that a person who has received a psychiatric injury must be 10 per cent impaired before they can claim compensation under the Act, whereas a person who has received any other type of injury need only demonstrate a threshold of 5 per cent impairment before an entitlement to compensation arises under the Act.
The threshold levels were introduced by amendment to the Wrongs Act 1958 in May 2003[46] and were part of the tort law reform package introduced in all Australian jurisdictions. The Committee accepts that a principle objective of the introduction of these respective impairment thresholds was an attempt to balance, on the one hand, the needs of injured persons and, on the other, the need to keep insurance viable for business by eliminating ‘trivial claims’. The Committee notes that there is no reference to the reason for the differential treatment of different types of injury in the Second Reading Speech.[47]
The Committee notes that there are also different threshold requirements for non-economic loss between psychiatric and physical injuries in the Accident Compensation Act 1985,[48] but that there is no distinction in the Transport Accident Act 1986. [49]There are also different thresholds for non-economic loss resulting in permanent psychiatric and non-psychiatric impairment in the tort laws of other States, for example NSW.[50] The Committee further notes that the NSW tort laws are currently under review.[51]
The Committee considers that given the legislative amendments to the Act are recent and that the legislature would have had the benefit of considering the operation of similar provisions in other states, there was a considered policy determination made at that time to differentiate between the thresholds for psychiatric and physical injuries in relation to non-economic loss. The Committee therefore does not intend to make a recommendation for further amendment.
Interim recommendation That section 28LB of the Wrongs Act 1958 be retained. |
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The Adoption Act 1984 (‘Act’) regulates adoption of both Australian-born children and children who were not born in Australia . Section 11 of the Act provides that an adoption order may be made in favour of a man and a woman who have been married or have lived in a de facto relationship for not less than two years,[52] a traditional marriage recognised by an Aboriginal community,[53] or a single person in ‘special circumstances’.[54] The Act does not allow for adoption by same sex-couples.
The Committee received a number of submissions arguing that not allowing same-sex couples to apply to adopt discriminates on the grounds of sexual orientation.[55] The Committee also received a number of submissions supporting the exclusion of same-sex couples from eligibility as adoptive parents. The underlying rationale expressed in the submissions that opposed same-sex adoption was the belief that homosexuality is wrong and that placing children with same-sex couples is not in the best interests of the child or in the interests of society as a whole.
The Committee acknowledges that the Adoption Act[56] discriminates against same sex couples.
The Committee notes the VLRC has been asked to inquire into the laws relating to Assisted Reproductive Technology and Adoption.[57] The Committee notes that the question of allowing same-sex couples to apply to adopt was specifically raised in the VLRC’s consultation paper.[58] As noted above, the Committee considers that, as the terms of reference for the VLRC’s review are broader than the scope of the current inquiry, it will not duplicate the review process.
Therefore, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That s 11 of the Adoption Act 1984 be retained pending review by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. |
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The main purpose of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (‘Act’) is to provide for the registration of births, deaths and marriages and changes of names in Victoria . The birth of a child is registered by application by both parents or in some cases one parent only.[59] “Parent” is not defined in the Act.
The Committee received a submission that argued that in its present form the Act would appear to entitle only biological or adoptive parents to be registered on a birth certificate as the parents of a child.[60] The submission argued that this may discriminate against a person who has a parent-like role in relation to the child, but who is not the biological parent of the child, such as the same-sex partner of the biological parent of the child.[61]
The Committee recognises that the inability of a non-biological parent of a child who has not adopted the child to be registered as a parent on that child’s birth certificate may prevent that parent establishing an enforceable legal relationship with that child.[62]
The Committee notes that the VLRC has been asked to enquire into the laws relating to Assisted Reproductive Technology and Adoption.[63] The Committee notes that the issue of registration on the birth certificate of the same-sex partner of the birth mother has been identified in the VLRC’s discussion paper.[64] As noted above, the Committee considers that, as the terms of reference for the VLRC’s review are broader than the scope of the current Inquiry, it will not duplicate the review process.
Therefore, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That section 15(1) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 be retained pending review by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. |
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The Evidence Act 1958 (‘Act’)[65] states that husbands and wives do not have to disclose to a court any communication between them while they were married, other than in criminal proceedings or bail proceedings.[66] The Committee received a submission contending that this discriminates against de facto and same-sex couples.[67]
The Committee considers that the aim of the provision is to protect the privacy of the relationship between husband and wife. There does not appear to the Committee to be any cogent reasons for not extending the same privilege to marriage-like relationships such as de facto and same-sex couples.
The Committee notes that the VLRC is currently conducting a review of the Act.[68] The Committee has been advised that this issue will be covered by the VLRC’s review.[69] As noted above, the Committee considers that, as the terms of reference for the VLRC’s review are broader than the scope of this Inquiry, it will not duplicate the review process.
Therefore, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That section 27 of the Evidence Act 1958 be retained pending review by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. |
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Religious confessions privilege – the use of gender-specific language
The Act also provides that a ‘clergyman’ cannot be compelled to disclose a confession made to him in his professional capacity according to the usage of the church or religious denomination to which he belongs without the consent of the person concerned.[70] It was submitted that the term ‘clergyman’ is gender-specific and should be amended to be gender-neutral.[71] The Committee notes that the provision also refers to ‘medical men’, which is a similarly gender-specific term.[72]
The Committee further notes that the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee recommended in its 1996 inquiry into the Act that the medical practitioner privilege be abolished.[73]
The Committee notes that the Act is currently under review by the VLRC.[74] The aim of that review is to bring Victoria ’s evidence laws in line with the uniform Evidence Act (based on the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)). The Committee notes that the language in the Commonwealth Evidence Act in relation to the religious confession privilege is gender-neutral.[75] The Committee also notes that the Commonwealth Evidence Act does not contain a medical privilege.
Given this, the Committee considers it likely that the issues raised in the submission will be remedied by the recommendations arising from the VLRC’s review.
Therefore, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That section 28 of the Evidence Act 1958 be retained, pending review by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. |
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The main purpose of this Act is to regulate the use of in-vitro and other fertilisation procedures and donor insemination procedures, and to make provisions with respect to surrogacy agreements.[76]
Most submissions received by the Committee on this Act[77] argued that it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status, as it restricts access to infertility treatment to married women and women in heterosexual de facto relationships.[78] The Act requires a woman’s husband to consent to the treatment, and refers to the determination of ‘infertility’ by a doctor as a prerequisite for eligibility to receive assisted reproductive treatment.[79]
The Committee also received a number of submissions arguing that access to assisted reproduction services should be limited to heterosexual, married couples. The arguments are based on the belief that only traditional nuclear families should have the benefit of government funding to assist them to have children.[80]
The Committee acknowledges that the Act discriminates against women on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status. The Committee also notes the Federal Court decision in Mc Bain v State of Victoria,[81] in which it was held that the Act breached s 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of marital status. The court held that the Act is inoperative to the extent that it restricts access to assisted reproductive technology to married and de facto couples.
The Committee notes that the Act is included in the VLRC’s Inquiry into Assisted Reproductive Technology and Adoption.[82] The Committee further notes that the VLRC has made an interim recommendation that the marital status requirement be removed.[83]
In light of the specificity of the VLRC’s review on this issue, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That section 8 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 be retained, pending review by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. |
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The Committee received submissions that argued that ss 93E and 93F of the Accident Compensation Act1985 (‘Act’) discriminate on the grounds of age.[84]
One of the objects of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 is to provide for compensation to injured workers. Section 93E limits the amount of weekly compensation payable to workers injured two years before ‘retirement age’ to 104 weeks of compensation.[85] ‘Retirement age’ is defined as the normal retiring age, if there is a normal retiring age for workers in the particular occupation, or the age of 65 years, whichever is the earlier.[86] Section 93F provides that a worker is not entitled to weekly compensation if they are injured after retirement age.
In introducing the amendment altering section 93E, the Minister for WorkCover stated:
Currently, a worker who is injured within 52 weeks of retirement age (generally at age 65), or after retirement age, is only entitled to receive up to 52 weeks of compensation.
To address this issue and create greater equity for older workers, the bill proposes to extend the period of entitlement from 52 weeks to 104 weeks for older workers who are injured when they are over 63 years of age.[87] This initiative recognises the crucial role older workers play in the work force and that they will continue to play in the future. It signifies the government's respect and recognition of the ongoing contribution of older workers to the Victorian economy.[88]
The Committee considers that the policy consideration underlying the limitation of entitlements is the extent to which employers should be liable for payment to injured workers. In this regard, the Committee also recognises that there may be higher insurance premiums associated with older workers.
The Committee accepts that the recent amendment sought to put in place a reasonable policy balance by expanding entitlements from 52 to 104 weeks of entitlement. However, the amendment still relies on age (65 years) as the criteria for determining eligibility.
Compulsory retirement was abolished on 1 January 1997.[89] This means that workers do not have to retire at 65 years of age. The abolition of compulsory retirement reflects the community expectation that workers in many industries continue to work beyond the age of 65.
Given the competing policy issues, the Committee considers that further evidence should be sought concerning the economic impact of expanding entitlements to compensation for older workers.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information through public hearings concerning the reference to the age of 65 in the definition of ‘retirement age’ in section 5 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985. |
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The Crimes Act 1958 (‘Act’) prescribes offences and sets out the procedure for the conduct of criminal proceedings. The Committee notes that review of the Act by 2007 is a key initiative under the Attorney-General’s Justice Statement.[90] However, as this initiative has not yet been referred to a body, the Committee considers it appropriate to make recommendations in relation to the Act.
The Committee received a submission arguing that the failure to include same-sex partners for the purposes of the scope of particular crimes under the Act was discriminatory.[91] The identified sections use the terms ‘spouse’ and ‘de facto spouse’ to define subjects of the crime, or to exclude spouses from the scope of the crime.[92]
The identified sections encompass the crimes of incest,[93] sexual offences against people with impaired mental functioning[94] and sexual offences against residents of residential facilities.[95]
The definition of the crime of incest uses the term ‘de facto spouse’[96] to identify children against whom the crime of incest can be committed.[97]
The Committee considers that the amendment made to the Act to include the children and step-children of a person’s de facto spouse for the purposes of defining the crime of incest was to protect children who have child-parent-like relationships from abuse, regardless of whether the parents were married or not. There does not appear to the Committee to be good reason for not extending similar protection to the children and step-children of same-sex couples.
Respectively, ss 51 and 52 of the Crimes Act 1958 provide for sexual offences against people with impaired mental functioning and against residents of residential facilities.[98] In both sections a ‘spouse’ or ‘de facto spouse’ is excluded from the offence. The Committee considers that the policy objective of defining these crimes was to protect vulnerable people from abuse committed by service providers. The exception recognises that certain services may also be provided by spouses. In light of the amendments made by the Relationship Acts, the Committee considers that the extension of the spousal exclusion to same-sex spouses should be examined.
The Committee is of the opinion that it would be useful to hear from legal experts in this area, to ensure that its recommendation does not have any unintended consequences. Therefore, the Committee will seek further information on these issues at public hearings.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information on the potential impact of replacing the definition of de facto spouse in section 35(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 with a new section defining the term ‘domestic partner’ as defined in the Statute Law Amendment (Relationships) Act 2001 and of replacing the term ‘de facto spouse’ with ‘domestic partner’ in sections 44(2), 51 and 52 of the Crimes Act 1958. |
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The submission also identified sections in the Act relating to the delineation of criminal liability of married persons as discriminating against de facto and same-sex couples.[99] In some of these sections, liability is limited or excepted because of the person’s marital status.[100] In one section, liability attaches regardless of marital status.[101]
The Committee considers that the reason behind the definition of such liability in relation to married persons is to protect the marriage relationship. In light of the amendments made by the Relationship Acts, the Committee considers that the extension of such protections to marriage-type relationships, such as de facto and same-sex couples, should be examined.
The Committee is of the opinion that it would be useful to hear from legal experts in this area, in order to ensure that its recommendation does not have any unintended consequences. Therefore, the Committee will seek further information on these issues at public hearings.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information at public hearings on the potential impact of extending the delineation of criminal liability of married persons in sections 337, 338 and 339 of the Crimes Act 1958 to de facto and same-sex spouses. |
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The Committee received two submissions that argued that the discretionary provisions enabling husbands and wives to be exempt from acting as witnesses against their spouses[102] were discriminatory, in that the discretion did not extend to enable de facto or same-sex partners to be similarly exempt.[103]
The Committee considers the purpose of the discretion to exempt certain witnesses from giving evidence is the protection of spousal and familial relationships.[104] The Committee notes that there is a discretion to exempt such witnesses and that courts need to consider a number of criteria to determine whether a particular exemption is to be permitted.[105] In light of the amendments made by the Relationship Acts, the Committee considers that the extension of the discretion to marriage-type relationships, such as de facto and same-sex couples, should be examined.
The Committee is of the opinion that it would be useful to hear from legal experts in this area, to ensure that its recommendation does not have any unintended consequences. Therefore, the Committee will seek further information on these issues at public hearings.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information at public hearings on the potential impact of extending the discretion to exempt married spouses as witnesses in section 400 of the Crimes Act1958 to include de facto and same-sex spouses. |
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The Children and Young Persons Act 1989 (‘CYPA’), among other things, allows protection orders to be made for children who are under the age of 17 years.[106] A young person subject to a protection order obtained before they turn 17 is covered by the CYPA until they turn 18.[107] However, because of the way in which ‘child’ is defined under the CYPA, an application for a protection order cannot be made for a young person after they turn 17.
The Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 provides for the care and protection of people with a disability that affects their decision-making capacity. The Act enables a guardian or administrator to be appointed for a person who is 18 years or older.[108]
The Committee received a submission arguing that the interaction of these two Acts leaves a gap in coverage in relation to a young person who has turned 17 years, but who is not yet 18 years of age. It was contended that this gap may discriminate against 17-year-olds with a disability in relation to whom no protection order had been made prior to them attaining 17 years of age, but who are in need of a guardian or administrator.[109]
In view of the objectives of these two Acts, the Committee considers that there may be an unintended lacuna, or gap in the statutory protections for a person who has turned 17 but is under 18 years of age.
The Committee notes that the CYPA is currently under review by the Department of Human Services, and understands that the protection needs of a 17-year-old person with a disability may be under consideration in the review.[110]
The Committee considers that the legislative gap may be remedied by either amending the definition of ‘child’ in the CYPA for the purposes of the application for protection orders, or by lowering the minimum age in relation to which an application for guardianship or administration under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 may be made from 18 to 17 years old.
The Committee considers it would be useful to have the benefit of expert advice in relation to which solution may be more appropriate. It will therefore seek further information at public hearings.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information at public hearings about the most suitable way to address the legislative gap in relation to the provision of protection, guardianship or administration orders, in relation to young people who are 17 but under 18 years of age. |
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The Committee received submissions relating to provisions of the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 (‘Act’) that restrict the circumstances in which alcohol may be supplied to a person under the age of 18,[111] limit access to licensed premises[112] and create offences for the purchase and consumption of alcohol to persons under the age of 18 years.[113] The Act provides exceptions where the person under the age of 18 years is in the company of their parent or guardian, or their married spouse who is over the age of 18 years and where the alcohol is being consumed as part of a meal.[114]
The Committee received submissions[115] asserting that the limitation of this exception to people who have married spouses discriminates against de facto and same-sex couples. The Committee notes that an amendment to the Act in 2004 inserted a definition of ‘spouse’ in the Act as meaning ‘a person to whom the person is married’.[116] The Committee received advice from the Minister of Consumer Affairs[117] that the definition of ‘spouse’ was deliberately narrowly defined as a measure to limit under-age drinking.
The Committee considers that the purpose of the exception in the Act is to allow people under the age of 18 to consume liquor with a meal in the context of a family gathering.
Given that the amendment was recent and in light of the advice received from the Minister, the Committee considers it would be useful to receive further evidence as to the implications of extending the under-age drinking exception to include adult de facto and same-sex partners.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information at public hearings as to the implications of extending the under-age alcohol exceptions to persons under 18 years who are in the company of their adult spouse, to include adult de facto and same-sex partners. |
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The Committee received a submission that concerned Part V of the Property Law Act 1958 (‘Act’),[118] which provides a process for identifying lineage in property law proceedings that concern inheritance.[119] It was argued that inheritance of property as regulated under Part V of the Ac t is discriminatory in that it is based on the ‘male line’ and therefore discriminates against women.
Part V of the Property Law Act concerns the identification of the common law ‘heir-at-law’. These provisions identified inheritors before the introduction of the statutory next-of-kin. The identification of the common law heir-at-law has become less and less relevant as time has gone on. In NSW, subject to an express contrary intention,[120] the term ‘heir’ is considered to be the same as statutory next-of-kin for the purposes of identifying inheritors in cases of intestacy.[121] In Victoria , the equivalent provision in the Administration and Probate Act (Vic) 1958[122] makes no reference to the term ‘heir’. This is possibly because the term ‘heir’ has now lost all relevance in Victoria .[123]
However, the Committee acknowledges that provisions relating to old ways of defining inheritors may need to be retained for the purposes of the preservation of particular titles to real property.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information through public hearings as to whether it is necessary to retain Part V of the Property Law Act 1958. |
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The Committee received a number of submissions concerning Acts that did not contain discriminatory provisions, but which may have a discriminatory impact on some groups because of the way in which they operate in practice. For example, people with particular types of disabilities and indigenous peoples suffer systemic disadvantage in a range of areas including economic, social and health. Therefore laws criminalising drinking in public places or the use of drugs are likely to impact more on these groups than other groups.
Where this is the case, the Committee has attempted to examine how these laws impact on particular groups, in order to determine whether amending the law could address the problem and, if so, whether it is reasonable to amend the law in light of the purpose of the law. In some instances the Committee recognises the discriminatory impact, but considers that this impact cannot be adequately addressed through law reform. Rather, the Committee considers broader social and other reforms may be appropriate to ameliorate the discriminatory impact.
The submissions in this section have been further categorised according to the type of recommendation made.
Category:
2.1 provisions identified in submissions that have a discriminatory impact and which the Committee considers may reasonably be amended
2.2 provisions identified in submissions that have a discriminatory impact, but which the Committee considers do not require amendment
2.3 submissions in relation to provisions in Acts that appear to have a discriminatory impact, but in relation to which the Committee has refrained from making substantive recommendations in this report. This is because
a) the submissions are in relation to Acts which are currently being reviewed by another body. The Committee has decided that, as the Terms of Reference for the review of these Acts by the other bodies are broader than the scope of the current Inquiry, it will not duplicate the review process.
As a result, the Committee has recommended that the discriminatory provisions be retained pending the outcome of the other review, or
b) the submissions are in relation to Acts about which the Committee considers it did not have enough information to make a substantive recommendation. The recommendation in relation to these submissions is that further information be sought at the public hearings.
The Committee received a submission asserting that the public drunkenness offences in the Summary Offences Act 1966[124] indirectly discriminate against people on the grounds of mental illness, as public drunkenness is often closely bound to mental illness and homelessness. They argued that such offences should be abolished.[125] The Committee received a separate submission contending that the public drunkenness provisions of the Summary Offences Act 1966 may indirectly discriminate against Indigenous Australians.[126] The submission argued that public order laws, and the manner in which they are enforced, lead to indirect discrimination against Indigenous Australians. It was submitted that Aboriginal people are more likely to be poor, more likely to congregate in public places due to lack of alternatives and therefore are more likely to be over-policed.
The Committee notes that, in 2001, the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee reported on its review of the Summary Offences Act 1966.[127] The Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee also conducted a report into public drunkenness and issued its final report in June 2001.[128] Both Committees recommended decriminalisation of public drunkenness offences, by repealing ss 13, 14 and 16 of the Summary Offences Act 1966 and the enactment of new laws that would enable intoxicated persons to be detained on a civil rather than criminal basis. Both committees also proposed that such legislation should form only one part of a wider program to manage intoxicated people and that programs such as ‘sobering up centres’ to detain and treat people found intoxicated in public places should be established before any move to decriminalise public drunkenness took effect.
The Committee supports such reforms.
Interim recommendation That sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Summary Offences Act 1966 be retained until a new regime for management of public drunkenness has been enacted, at which point the sections should be repealed. |
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The Committee received submissions arguing that the ways in which infringement penalties are enforced through the Procedure for Enforcement of Infringement Penalties (PERIN) system under Schedule 7 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (‘Act’) indirectly discriminates against people with a mental impairment[129] and Indigenous Australians.[130] The submissions noted the over-representation of people with mental illness and Indigenous Australians, respectively among those incurring large numbers of fines for petty infringements. The submissions identify low socio-economic backgrounds and homelessness as the reasons for the over representation.
The submission in relation Indigenous Australians contends that the infringements system contributes to the over representation of indigenous people in prison as a result of inability to pay fines.
The Committee notes that once a person fails to pay an infringement fine after the issuing of a courtesy letter, the infringement is registered at the PERIN court. If the person still fails to pay, a warrant is issued which allows a Sheriff to seize property to sell to pay for the outstanding fine. If the person does not have enough property to cover the amount of the fine, the person will have to perform community service as ordered by the court. If they are unwilling to perform community service, they are taken before a magistrate who decides on a sentence, unless the person has a mental disorder, intellectual impairment, brain injury, dementia, or is experiencing other exceptional circumstances .
The PERIN system is automated, so that once the infringement is registered a warrant is automatically issued. However, section 10A of Schedule 7 of the Act which was added in 2000, provides that a registrar may revoke an enforcement order on his or her own initiative, or refer the matter for hearing by a magistrate of the PERIN court.
In addition to revocation by a registrar or by a magistrate, since 2002, the Magistrate’s Court has run a diversion program called the Enforcement Review Program (ERP) that aims to assist the court by identifying people with PERIN orders with a severe physical or intellectual disability, or those with a diagnosed mental illness. The ERP refers the PERIN orders of eligible persons to the Registrar to be revoked and refers the matters to a magistrate’s court Special Circumstances List for more appropriate disposition.[131]
The Committee notes that the ERP currently covers people with a diagnosed mental illness, but does not cover Indigenous Australians. However, the Department of Justice’s Annual Report for 2003–04 refers to an initiative looking at broadening the (ERP) to cover people experiencing homelessness and drug addiction. The Report states that ‘the project is also taking a whole-of-government, whole-of-community approach to determine how the infringement notices system could operate more effectively, consistently and fairly across the community’.[132] The Department of Justice’s submission to the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee’s Inquiry into Warrants has further information on the review program.[133] It explains that the purpose of the review of the ERP is to ‘establish common principles to guide infringement policy, ensure the protection of the disadvantaged (primarily by ensuring alternatives to their entering the infringements system in the first place), improve infringement processes, expand the system where appropriate and establish overarching legislation (such as an Infringements Act).’[134]
The Committee considers that there are important policy reasons supporting the retention of an infringements regime.
The Committee considers that the consideration being given to the broadening and improvement of the ERP is likely to address the issues raised in the submissions.
Interim recommendation That Schedule 7 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 be retained. |
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The Police Regulations 2003 (‘Regulations’) are made pursuant to the Police Regulation Act 1958.[135] The objective of these Regulations is to provide for the employment of members of the police force, protective services officers and police reservists, and to provide for the operation of the Police Appeals Board.[136]
The Committee received a submission arguing that the regulation providing that a member of the police force is liable to immediate transfer to any part of the State[137] may discriminate against people with an impairment, or because of marital status, parental status or status as a carer.[138] The submission explains that this provision is often relied upon by the police force to compulsorily transfer newly confirmed recruits to ‘difficult-to-fill’ positions usually in remote rural areas.
The Committee recognises that it may be more difficult for a person with a particular type of disability or people with caring responsibilities to move to remote areas than people who are not in such positions. However, the Committee considers that the policy reason behind this regulation is to ensure that the police force is adequately staffed, and thus considers it reasonable in the circumstances.
Interim recommendation That Regulation 21(1) of the Police Regulations 2003 be retained. |
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The Committee received a submission that argued that the operation of the Bail Act 1977 (‘Act’)[139] may lead to discrimination against indigenous peoples.[140] The provisions of the Act outline factors to be assessed in considerating of whether there is an ‘unacceptable risk’ that the accused would not show up at court, would commit an offence while on bail, endanger the safety or welfare of members of the public, interfere with witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice. Where a judge or magistrate considers there is an ‘unacceptable risk’, they may refuse bail.[141]
It was submitted that the Act[142] allows for very broad discretion and that this fact is likely to disadvantage people who do not have legal representation. It was submitted that a lack of legal representation combined with the over-representation of indigenous people charged with lower-order offences in the criminal justice system may lead to discrimination against indigenous peoples.
The Committee acknowledges the over-representation of indigenous peoples in the criminal justice system.
The Committee notes that the VLRC has received terms of reference from the Attorney-General to review the Bail Act 1977.[143] The terms of reference include a review of the way in which the current bail system operates in practice to ensure that it is consistent with the overall objectives of the criminal justice system, including the presumption that a person accused of an offence should normally be granted bail, except in circumstances specified in the Act.[144] In conducting the review, the Commission is asked to have regard to the fact of over representation of indigenous peoples on remand and the needs of marginalised and disadvantaged groups, including Indigenous Australians and the impact of the bail system on people in those groups.
In light of the specificity of the VLRC’s review on this issue, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That section 4(3) of the Bail Act 1977 be retained, pending review by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. |
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The purpose of the Coroner’s Act 1985 (‘Act’) is, among other things, to establish the office of the State Coroner and require the reporting of certain deaths.[145]
The Committee received a submission that argued that the Act discriminates against members of the Indigenous community in that it excludes people, other than ‘senior next of kin’, from objecting to an autopsy. ‘Senior next of kin’ is defined in the Act to mean the domestic partner, son or daughter, parent, brother or sister, or a personal representative of the deceased.[146] It was argued that the Act should be amended to allow Aboriginal elders and respected persons to object to the performance of an autopsy, in recognition of the relevance of cultural objections to autopsy.[147]
The Committee notes that the relevant Acts in Tasmania , ACT, Northern Territory and Queensland recognise indigenous familial relationships within their definitions of ‘senior next of kin’ for the purposes of objecting to autopsy.[148] The NSW Act allows people other than the senior next of kin to object to an autopsy.[149]
The Committee notes that allowing objection to autopsy does not necessarily mean that an autopsy will not be carried out. If the coroner decides that an autopsy should be carried out, the ‘senior next of kin’ can make an application to the Supreme Court for an order preventing the autopsy. The Supreme Court may make an order preventing the autopsy if it is satisfied that it is desirable in the circumstances.[150] However, the Supreme Court may not make such an order, in which case, the autopsy will be conducted.
The Committee notes that the VLRC is currently conducting an inquiry into the Coroners Act 1985 and that similar questions have been identified in the discussion paper.[151] In light of the specificity of the VLRC’s review in relation to this issue, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That section 29(3) of the Coroners Act 1985 be retained, pending review by the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee. |
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The Committee received a submission that argued that the provisions relating to the swearing of oaths in ss 100 and 101 of the Evidence Act 1958 (the ‘Act’) discriminate against people other than Christians.[152]
The submission suggested that the Act be amended to provide for a standard affirmation or solemn promise to be administered to all persons, regardless of their religious beliefs.
The Committee notes that the Act also allows the oath to be administered in a manner appropriate to the religious beliefs of the person swearing it. The source of law for such alternative forms of oath appears as: ‘Any oath may be administered in any manner which is now lawful’.[153] However, the Committee notes that not all religions approve of oath taking, and attempts to translate the oath in some cultures is inappropriate.[154]
The Committee notes the issue of oaths and affirmations was reviewed by the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee in 2002.[155] The Law Reform Committee noted that ‘t he risk of the witness’s choice of oath or affirmation being viewed with unjustified suspicion by the court has long been one of the central objections to retaining a religious oath’.[156] The Committee notes that, after reviewing the options for reform, the Law Reform Committee’s preferred option was to keep both the religious oath and the affirmation, but to remove the precedence of the religious oath to ensure the religious oath and the affirmation are equal.[157] This is the model used in the Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995,[158] the NSW Evidence Act 1995, the Tasmanian Evidence Act 2001 and the South Australian Evidence Act 1929.[159]
The Law Reform Committee also recommended that the Act be amended to remove the requirement to swear on a religious text, as is provided in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).[160] The Committee notes that this reform was also recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission in a review of the Evidence Act 1929 (Cth) conducted in 1985.[161]
The Committee notes that the VLRC is currently conducting an inquiry into the Act, and similar questions have been identified in the discussion paper.[162] The Committee also notes that the VLRC inquiry follows on from a review of the Act by the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee in 1996, with a view to considering whether the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), as a model for uniform legislation, was appropriate for enactment in Victoria.[163] The Committee notes that the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee recommended that Part IV of the Act, which includes ss 100 and 101, be retained and moved to another Act where appropriate.[164] However, the Committee notes that the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee’s Inquiry focused on ‘a consideration of the suitability for adoption in Victoria of the Evidence Act1995 (Cth), rather than independent consideration of the Evidence Act1958 (Vic)’.[165] The Committee therefore considers that any consequent recommendation for amendment is not at cross-purposes with the 1996 inquiry recommendation in relation to Part IV of the Act.
In light of the specificity of the VLRC’s review in relation to this issue, the Committee will refrain from making a substantive recommendation in this report.
Interim recommendation That sections 100 and 101 of the Evidence Act 1958 be retained, pending review by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. |
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The Committee received a submission asserting that the offence of begging[166] indirectly discriminates against people on the grounds of mental illness, as begging is often closely bound with mental illness and homelessness. The submission argued that such offences should be abolished.[167] The Committee notes its report on the Vagrancy Act 1966 (the ‘Act’), recommending the Act be repealed in its entirety, as many of the offences had been subsumed by other Acts.[168]
The Committee noted that at the time there had been relatively little research conducted into the issue of begging in Victoria, and recommended that further research be conducted before a just and comprehensive solution to the problem of begging can be formulated that deals with the complex relationship between begging and homelessness, drug and alcohol dependence, long-term unemployment, gambling, crime and psychiatric and physical disability.[169]
The Committee notes that Homeless Person’s Legal Clinic has recently completed detailed research into the policy options for effectively reducing begging in Melbourne .[170] The research provides clear evidence of the link between begging and mental illness.[171] The report also notes the reigniting of interest in the issue of begging in Melbourne in early 2005 and the Government’s apparent response to that interest.[172] The report notes that –
On 17 February 2005, seemingly responding to public pressure, the Victorian Government announced that it had no intention of decriminalising begging but would instead re-enact it as a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment in the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) following the repeal of the Vagrancy Act.[173]
The Committee also notes that Crime Prevention Victoria has canvassed the option of ‘dispersal legislation’ to enable police to direct people engaged in anti-social behaviour (including begging) to ‘move on’.[174]
The Committee considers that, given a number of policy and law reform options are currently being considered in relation to the issue of begging, it will refrain from making a substantive recommendation on this submission in this report.
Interim recommendation That section 6(1)(d) of the Vagrancy Act 1966 be retained, pending the outcome of further policy and law-reform developments on the issue. |
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The Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (‘Act’) regulates the legal relationship between tenants and landlords by setting out their rights and duties and providing a mechanism for resolving disputes between these parties through the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.[175] The Act’s coverage does not extend to ‘health and residential services’.[176] This means that special accommodation services for people with physical, mental or intellectual disabilities, as well as some other groups, are not covered by the Act. In some of these types of accommodation, including community residential units, residents pay rent and, apart from the support they receive, reside under the same conditions as any other tenant. The Committee notes that there are approximately 4,400 people with a disability living in community residential units.[177] The Committee notes that people with a disability who live in private rental accommodation or public housing have their rights protected by the Residential Tenancies Act 1997.
The Committee received submissions[178] arguing that excluding certain types of accommodation, for example, community residential units or community care units, discriminates against people with a disability since people living in such accommodation have no clear mechanism by which they can pursue their tenancy rights.
The Committee notes a recent review undertaken by the Department of Human Services recommended that the current legislation be amended to bring health and community residential units within the protection of the Act.[179] However, the Committee also considers that there may be unintended and arguably onerous burdens that could flow from such a legislative change. Such consequences may include burdens placed on care provided and a restriction on services and access to services for people with a disability and high care needs.
The Committee will therefore seek further evidence at public hearings.
Interim recommendation That the Committee seek further information through public hearings concerning the operation of section 23 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 that excludes health and residential services. |
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Scrutiny
of Acts and Regulations Committee
©
Parliament of Victoria
Footnotes |
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The Committee notes that it has further refined the scope of the Inquiry since the Progress Report published in December 2004, and that therefore some submissions included in that report have been excluded in this report. See Chapter 1 for further explanation of this process. |
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Children and Young Persons (Age Jurisdiction) Act 2004; Energy Legislation (Amendment) Act 2004. |
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Courts Legislation (Judicial Pensions) Bill 2005; Long Service Leave (Amendment) Bill 2005. |
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Adoption Act 1984, ss 11(1)(a) and (c). |
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Adoption Act 1984, s 11(1A)(c). |
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 26. |
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The relevant parts of s 69 of the EOA read: 69. Things done with statutory authority (1) A person may discriminate if the discrimination is necessary to comply with, or is authorised by, a provision of— (a) an Act, other than this Act; (b) an enactment, other than an enactment under this Act. (2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), it is not necessary that the provision refer to discrimination, as long as it authorises or necessitates the relevant conduct that would otherwise constitute discrimination. |
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The relevant part of s 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 reads: In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or subordinate instrument— (a) a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or subordinate instrument (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or subordinate instrument) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. |
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Section 4A. |
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Submission 412. |
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Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Review of Anzac Day Laws, October 2002. |
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Section 1. |
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Births Deaths and Marriages Registration (Amendment) Act 2004. |
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Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2004, Part 4A. |
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1. The Victorian Law Reform Commission is to enquire and report on the desirability and feasibility of changes to the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 and the Adoption Act 1984 to expand eligibility criteria in respect of all or any forms of assisted reproduction and adoption; and make the recommendations for any consequential amendments which should be made to the: Status of Children Act 1974 and any other relevant Victorian legislation. 2. In making its enquiry and report, the Commission should take into account, to the extent it decides is necessary or desirable: (i) social, ethical and legal issues related to assisted reproduction and adoption, with particular regard to the rights and best interests of children; (ii) the public interest and the interests of, parents, single people and people in same-sex relationships, infertile people and donors of gametes; (iii) the nature of, and issues raised by arrangements and agreements relating to methods of conception other than sexual intercourse and other assisted reproduction in places licensed under the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (‘the Act’); (iv) the penalties applicable to persons, including medical and other personnel, involved in the provision of assisted reproduction (whether through a licensed clinic or otherwise); and (v) the laws relating to eligibility criteria for assisted reproduction and adoption and other related matters which apply in other states or countries and any evidence on the impact of such laws on the rights and best interests of children and the interests of parents, single people, people in same sex relationships, infertile people and donors of gametes. 3. In addition, the Commission should consider whether changes should be made to the Act to reflect rapidly changing technology in the area of assisted reproduction. 4. The Commission is also requested to consider the meaning and efficacy of ss 8, 20 and 59 in relation to altruistic surrogacy, and clarification of the legal status of any child born of such an arrangement. |
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EOA, s 4. |
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Submission 394. |
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Submission 211. |
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See: Sexual Reassignment Act1988 (SA) , Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (NT) , Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT) , Gender Reassignment Act 2000 (WA ), Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) . |
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Section 5. |
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Submissions 394 and 412. |
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Section 1. |
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Submission 370. |
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For example, by reason of their profession. |
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Schedule 2 of the Juries Act 2000 identifies persons who are ineligible to serve as jurors. |
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Submission 370. |
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Victorian Parliament, Law Reform Committee, Jury Duty in Victoria, Final Report, Volume 1, December 1996, Recommendation 33, See: http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/default.htm. |
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Ibid, 3.132–3.140. |
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See: http://www.courts.vic.gov.au/CA256EBD007FC352/page/Jury+Service-Selection?OpenDocument&1=50-Jury+ |
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These Regulations are provided for under s 158 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004. |
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Regulation 104. |
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Regulation 226. |
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Submission 401. |
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Submission 370. |
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Section 28LB. |
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Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Act (Insurance Reform) Act 2003. |
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Premier Steve Bracks, ‘Second Reading Speech’, Hansard, 21 May 2003 , p. 1781. |
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The thresholds under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 for physical injuries is 10 per cent (s 98C (2)(a)) and 30 per cent (s 98C (3)(a))for psychiatric injuries . |
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Section 47 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 sets out the calculations based on percentage of impairment. No distinction is made between physical and psychiatric impairment. |
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These were introduced through the Workers Compensation Legislation (Further Amendments) Act 2001 (NSW). See: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/643feaa31cf01297ca256f64000688e6/$FILE/Information%20Sheet%20on%20 |
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These laws are being reviewed by the NSW Parliament General Standing Committee No. 1. For the terms of reference and timetable of this Inquiry, see: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/Committee.nsf/0/643FEAA31CF01297CA256F64000688E6 . |
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Sections 11(1)(a) and (c). |
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Section 11(1)(b). |
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Section 11(3). |
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Submissions 305, 394 and 412. |
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Section 11. |
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See footnote 25 for the terms of reference of this inquiry. |
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Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology & Adoption: Consultation Paper, 20 January 2004 , Question 41, p. xxviii. |
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Section 15(1) allows the birth to be registered by one parent if the Registrar is satisfied that it is not practicable to obtain the signatures of both parents on the birth registration statement. |
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This has been confirmed as the practice of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registry. Discussion with the Acting Manager, Policy and Legislation, Births, Deaths and Marriages Registry, 19 May 2005. |
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Submission 394. |
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See Victorian Law Reform Commission, ‘Assisted Reproductive Technology & Adoption: Consultation Paper’, 20 January 2004, 5.5–5.8. |
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See footnote 25 for the terms of reference of this inquiry. |
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Victorian Law Reform Commission, ‘ Assisted Reproductive Technology & Adoption: Consultation Paper’, p. xix. |
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Section 27. |
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Refer also to discussion under the Crimes Act 1958. |
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Submission 364. |
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Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Laws of Evidence , referred 22 November 2004. The terms of reference of the Inquiry may be accessed at: http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256A25002C7735/All/CE68BBABABC16988CA256F570077F41F?OpenDocument& |
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Phone conversation with VLRC, 25 May 2005. |
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Section 28(1). |
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Submission 364. |
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Section 28. |
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Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Review of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) and Review of the Role and Appointment of Public Notaries, October 1996. |
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Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Laws of Evidence , referred 22 November 2004. |
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Section 127. |
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Section 1. |
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Submissions 75, 394 and 399. |
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Section 8(1). |
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Ss. 8(2) and (3). |
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Submission 346 is an example of such a view. |
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(2000) 117 ALR 320. |
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See footnote 25 for the terms of reference of this inquiry. |
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Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproduction and Adoption Paper One: Access , 11 May 2005 , 2.24. |
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Submissions 410, 412 and 398. Submission 410 also made a further point concerning the provision of WorkCover payments to injured workers. It argued that the Accident Compensation (Occupational Health & Safety) Act1996 provides that payments should cease at the age of 65, or the normal retiring age of the worker’s occupation, and as such is discriminatory. |
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This entitlement was extended from 52 weeks to 104 weeks in 2004 through the Accident Compensation Legislation (Amendment) Act 2004. |
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Section 5. |
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The Committee notes, that although the Hansard record refers to ‘63 years of age’, the definition of ‘retirement age’ in s 5 refers to 65 years of age. |
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Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 18 November 2004 , p. 1730. |
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On the commencement of the EOA. |
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Attorney-General’s Justice Statement, 2004, 3.1.01, p. 24. |
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Submission 412. |
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The Committee notes that the provisions proscribing sexual offences against children (ss 45–49) provide a defense to certain crimes if the act was committed by the child’s married spouse. However, these provisions were not identified in the submission. |
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Section 44. |
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Section 51. |
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Section 52. |
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‘De facto spouse’ is defined in s 35(1) as a person who is living with a person of the opposite sex as though they were married although they are not. |
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Section 44(2). |
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‘Residential facility’ is defined by s 50 of the Crimes Act 1958 as meaning ‘an approved mental health service defined by section 3 of Mental Health Act 1986 or premises operated by any person or body (government or non-government) for the purpose of providing residential services to intellectually disabled people’. |
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The submission refers to ss 337, 338 and 339. |
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Sections 337, 338 and 339(2). |
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Section 339(1). |
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Subsections 400(3)–(6). |
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Submission 394 and 412. |
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Subsection 400(3) also enables the court to exempt a parent or child of the accused from giving evidence for the prosecution in certain circumstances. |
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Section 401(4). |
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Section 84. |
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Section 3 defining the term ‘child’. |
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Section 19(1). |
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Submission 161. |
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Protecting children: ten priorities for children’s wellbeing and safety in Victoria – technical options paper, August 2004, see: http://hnb.dhs.vic.gov.au/commcare/ccdnav.nsf/fid/-95C11ECF83AD6050CA256F080010CFDA/$file/pc_tech_options.pdf . |
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Section 119(5). |
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Section 120. |
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Section 123. |
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Sections 119(5) and 123(2)(a). |
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Submission 394 and 412. |
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Liquor Control Reform (Underage Drinking and Enhanced Enforcement) Act 2004, s 9. |
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Correspondence from the Minister for Consumer Affairs, 17 May 2005. |
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Sections 241–246. |
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Submission 394. |
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Section 33(2). |
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Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 33. |
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Section 56. |
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Email correspondence with Legal Officer for the Uniform Succession Law project, NSW Law Reform Commission, 5 May 2005 . |
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Sections 13, 14 and 16. |
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Submission 370. |
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Submission 391. |
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Victorian Parliament Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Review of Redundant and Unclear Legislation, Inquiry into the Summary Offences Act 1966, November 2001, accessed at: http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/sarc/Summary%20Offences/soafintoc.htm. |
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Victorian Parliament Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee, Inquiry into Public Drunkenness, Final Report, June 2001. |
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Submission 370. |
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Submission 391. |
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Magistrate’s Court of Victoria, Annual Report 2003–04, p. 49. |
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Department of Justice, Annual Report 2003–04, p. 48. |
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Department of Justice, Submission to the Law Reform Committee’s Inquiry into Warrants Powers and Procedures, 31 December 2004 accessed at: http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/lawreform/Warrant/Submissions/Submissions%20in%20PDF%20format/38%20 |
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Department of Justice, Submission to the Law Reform Committee’s Inquiry into Warrants Powers and Procedures, 31 December 2004 , p. 6. |
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The Regulations are made under sections 118, 118K, 120 and 130 of the Police Regulation Act 1958. |
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Regulation 1. |
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Regulation 21(1). |
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Submission 56. |
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Section 4(3). |
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Submission 364. |
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Section 4(2)(d)(i). |
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Section 4(3). |
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For the terms of reference of the VLRC Inquiry see: http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256A25002C7735/All/B5C69AF21DF55C03CA256F570077F483?OpenDocument&1=30- |
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The circumstances are contained in s 4. |
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Section 1. |
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Section 29(5). |
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Submission 391. |
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Coroners Act 1995 (Tas), s 3: Definition of senior next of kin, Coroners Act 1997 (ACT), s 3: Definition of ‘immediate family member’, Coroners Act 1993 (NT), s 3: Definition of senior next of kin, Coroners Act 2003 (Qld), schedule 2: Definition of ‘ATSI family member’. |
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Coroners Act 1980 (NSW), s 48B. |
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Coroners Act 1985, s 29(4). |
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Victorian Parliament, Law Reform Committee, Coroner Act 1985: Discussion Paper, April 2005, Question 37(c). |
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Submission 394. |
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Section 100(4). |
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Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into Oaths and Affirmations with Reference to the Multicultural Community, Final Report, October 2002, pp. 79-83. |
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Ibid. |
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ibid, p. 205. |
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ibid, p. 228. |
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Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 23. |
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Parliamentary Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into Oaths and Affirmations with Reference to the Multicultural Community, Final Report, October 2002, p. 58. |
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Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Section 24(1). See also Victorian Parliament, Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into Oaths and Affirmations with Reference to the Multicultural Community, Final Report, October 2002, Recommendation 19, 230. |
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Parliamentary Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into Oaths and Affirmations with Reference to the Multicultural Community,Final Report, October 2002. |
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The terms of reference of the VLRC inquiry can be found at: http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256A25002C7735/All/CE68BBABABC16988CA256F570077F41F? |
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For the terms of reference of the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee Inquiry, see: http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/sarc/Evidence%20Report/evidence_act.htm. |
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Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Review of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) and Review of the Role and Appointment of Public Notaries, October 1996, Recommendation 2(l). |
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Ibid, Introduction. |
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Section 6(1)(d). |
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Submission 370. |
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Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Review of Redundant and Unclear Legislation,Inquiry into the Vagrancy Act 1966, Final Report, September 2002. The report can be accessed at http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/sarc/Vagrancy/Final_report.htm. |
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Ibid., pp. 14–16. |
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Public Interest Law Clearinghouse Homeless Person’s Legal Clinic, We Want Change: Joining up Public Policy and Management to Respond to Begging in Melbourne, April 2005. This document is due to be released publicly in June 2005. A copy was advanced to the Committee by the author. |
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Ibid., p. 5; ‘71 per cent of people who beg have a mental illness, including 12 per cent who have an intellectual disability and 12 per cent who have a physical disability’. |
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Ibid., p. 11. |
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Ibid. citing Farrah Tomazin and Jewel Topsfield, ‘Doyle Wants Beggars Off Streets in Time for Games’ The Age (Melbourne) 17 February 2005. |
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Crime Prevention Victoria, Inner City Entertainment Precincts Taskforce A Good Night for All, p. 41. |
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Residential Tenancies Act 1997, s 1. |
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Section 23 excludes ‘health or residential services’ as defined under s 3 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997. |
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Department of Human Services, Annual Report 2002–2003, Melbourne , p. 84. |
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Submissions 370 and 404, |
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Review of Disability Legislation: Report of Recommendations, October 2004. See: http://hnb.dhs.vic.gov.au/ds/disabilityimages.nsf/Downloads/review_of_disability_legislation/$File/review_of_disability_legislation.pdf. |
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