|
|
|
|
Alert Digest No. 2
of 1999 1.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Jan Wade MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 1.2 The Bill amends the Coroners Act 1985 (the Act). The main purposes of the Bill are to:- invest the State Coroner with the jurisdiction to re-open inquests in certain limited circumstances; repeal the provisions in the Act relating to the holding of inquests with juries; confer on coroners a power to award costs; and amend the objects and functions of the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine. 1.3 Clause 2 sections 1, 2 and 3 come into operation on Royal Assent and the remaining provisions come into operation on 1 July 1999. Clause 4 inserts new definitions for legal practitioner, public statutory authority, tissue, person held in custody and reportable deaths. Clause 5 [see 1.4 below] Clause 6 amends section 15 to remove the obligation on a coroner to investigate or hold an inquest into a death occurring in another State or Territory if an investigation or inquest is held in that State or Territory. Where a death occurs overseas, the amendment gives the coroner a discretion to investigate or hold an inquest into such a death. Clause 7 amends section 17 of the Act and removes the obligation on coroners to hold inquests in certain circumstances into deaths of persons ordinarily resident in Victoria occurring in another State or Territory or overseas. A coroner may still do so, or may be directed by the Attorney-General to do so. Clause 8 repeals provisions of the Act that refer to coroners inquests held before a jury.
Clause 9 amends sections 18 and 35 of the Act and extends the time within which a coroner may respond to a request to hold an inquest from seven days to a reasonable time. If the coroner does not respond within three months of the request an application may be made to the Supreme Court for an order that an inquest be held. Clause 10 repeals section 19(1)(e) of the Act and makes it discretionary to name a person who contributed to a death. The provision to be repealed requires the coroner to identify any person contributing to the cause of death of a person. A coroner investigating a death is still obliged to find, if possible, how death occurred and the cause of death.
Clause 11 amends sections 21(2) and 38(2) to enable the coroner to make recommendations to any Minister or public authority on any matter connected with a death or fire which the coroner has investigated. The current provision only allows the coroner to report such death or fire to the Attorney-General. Clause 12 inserts new sections 49 and 50 in the Act permitting coroners a limited power to award costs against a person or their legal representative if the person or legal representative has unreasonably delayed an inquest. Clause 14 inserts new sections 59A and 59B allowing the State Coroner to re-open an inquest and to order that certain inquiry findings are void. This may occur where there is an error in the record of the finding or because of new facts or evidence. If the State Coroner refuses, a person may apply to the Supreme Court to obtain such an order. Clause 15 [ see 1.4 below] Clause 16 inserts a new section 64(2)(i) into the Act providing the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicines (VIFM) the power for the storage of human tissue taken in accordance with the Human Tissue Act 1982 from deceased persons. Clause 17 validates past action taken by VIFM under section 64(2)(i), as though that section had been in force when the action was taken. Clause 18 deals with transitional matters and provides that the amended sections 17, 18, 19 and 35 of the Act only apply to deaths or fires occurring after the commencement of the amendments made by this Bill. 1.4 Alteration or variation of section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (section 4D(i) and (ii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968) Clause 5 amends section 5 of the Act and provides that the provisions of the Coroners Act 1985 apply to a re-opened or a new inquest in cases where the original inquest was held or completed by a coroner under the Coroners Act 1958. Clause 15 inserts a new section 62A into the Act and declares that it is the intention of section 5 to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Section 85 Statement It is the intention of Clause 5 of this Bill to alter or vary Section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. I therefore make the following statement under Section 85(5) of the Constitution Act 1975 to set out the reasons for altering or varying that section. Clause 14 of this Bill is included to satisfy the requirements of Section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 in respect of the changes to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court effected by Clause 5. Clause 5 of the Bill amends Section 5 of the Coroners Act 1985. Under the proposed Section 5(2) persons will no longer have the right to apply under the Coroners Act 1958 for an order to have a new inquest held into a death or fire reported to a Coroner under that Act. Instead they will be required to apply under Section 59 of the current Coroners Act. To facilitate this new procedure, the proposed Section 5(3) invests the Supreme Court with the jurisdiction to hear such applications under Section 59 of the current Coroners Act. Under that section, the Supreme Court may order a new inquest or that an inquest be re-opened. Any new inquest or re-opened inquest would be conducted in accordance with the current Coroners Act. These amendments will allow a Coroner investigating a death to avoid having to conduct an inquest under the old Act, under which the procedure is lengthy and complex. The benefits of being able to hold an inquest under the new Act are that the inquest can be conducted under the simpler and quicker procedures provided for in the new Act. This justifies indirectly removing the Supreme Courts jurisdiction to order new inquests under the Coroners Act 1958 in respect of deaths and fires reported under that Act. The Bill will enhance the role of the State Coroner in preventing avoidable deaths and also improve the operation of the coronial system in Victoria.
The Committee makes no further comment. Education Acts (Amendment) Bill 2.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Phil Gude MP with the Honourable Jan Wade MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 2.2 The Bill amends the Education Act 1958 and the Teaching Service Act 1981. The main purposes of the Bill are:- to make further provision for the registration of schools; to widen the application of section 84 of the Education Act 1958 to ministerial Orders made under section 15T of that Act; and to make further provision for appointments to vacant offices in the teaching service. 2.3 Clause 2 the provisions in the Bill commence operation on Royal Assent. Amendments to the Education Act 1958 (the Act) (clauses 3 to 6) Clause 3 provides new definitions in the Act for Melbourne Statistical Division and Urban Centre. Clause 4 amends section 42 of the Act to state the areas in which primary schools may be registered provided they have more than 10 pupils. Clause 5 amends section 43(1A) of the Act to state the areas in which primary schools with less than 10 pupils may remain registered if the Registered Schools Board is satisfied the low enrolment is due to special circumstances of a temporary nature. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- The Registered Schools Board operates under the Education Act 1958 and is responsible for registering non-government schools and teachers in those schools. The Board comprises representatives from the Association of Independent Schools, the Catholic Education Commission and the Department of Education. The Act provides that primary schools in what can generally be called urban areas, need a minimum of 20 pupils to be registered. Primary schools in what can generally be called rural areas, only need 11 pupils to be registered. The rural area is referred to in section 42(3)(C) of the Education Act 1958 as meaning a shire other than a shire listed in schedule five to the Public Service Act 1974. Once a school is registered, then section 43(1A) of the act provides that a primary school in a rural area with an enrolment of less than 10 may remain registered if the Registered Schools Board is satisfied the low enrolment is due to special circumstances of a temporary nature. These provisions create an exception for primary schools to be registered with only 11 pupils, instead of the normal 20 pupils, if the school is situated in what is generally called a rural area. Amendments to the Teaching Services Act 1981(the Act) (clauses 7 to 13) Clause 7 inserts a new definition for efficiency in section 2 of the Act. Clause 9 inserts a new section 4B in the Act to provide that relative efficiency is the criterion to apply when selecting persons for appointment to offices in the Teaching Service. Clause 11 substitutes a new section 9(1) and 9(2) in the Act to provide that relative efficiency is the criterion to apply when selecting persons for appointment to temporary positions in the Teaching Service. The effect of the amendment is to repeal the provisions giving existing officers an advantage in applying for appointment to an office in the teaching service. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Section 5 of the Teaching Service Act 1981 deals with the first appointment of a person to an office in the teaching service, and authorises the Secretary to the Department of Education to invite applications for appointment to offices in the teaching service. However, before the Secretary can appoint a person to an office in the teaching service, section 6(1) of the Act requires the Secretary to be satisfied that there is no available officer in the teaching service who is capable of filling a vacant office as a person who is not a member of the teaching service. The requirements of section 6(1) give existing officers an advantage over persons seeking to join the teaching service, and it is an advantage that is contrary to concepts of fair competition. Consistent with section 7(A) of the Public Sector Management and Employment Act 1998, which provides that agency heads must establish employment processes that will ensure that employment decisions are based on merit, the Bill repeals the provisions which give existing officers an advantage and provides that all appointments to positions in the teaching service are to be made on the grounds of relative efficiency. The Committee makes no further comment. 3.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Jan Wade MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 3.2 The Bill re-enacts with amendments, laws relating to trading practices and makes new provisions concerning deceptive, misleading or unconscionable trading practices. The Bill repeals the Consumer Affairs Act 1972, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs Act 1973, the Fair Trading Act 1985 and the Market Court Act 1978. The Bill promotes and encourages fair trading practices and a competitive and fair market; regulates trade practices; provides for the safety of goods and services supplied in trade and commerce; regulates off-business-premises sales and lay-by-sales; provides for codes of practice; and establishes the Office of the Director of Fair Trading. The Committee notes the background to the Bill in the Attorney-Generals Second Reading Speech:- General Background The Fair Trading Bill before the House is the result of the Governments commitment to review the legislative framework relating to fair trading and consumer affairs and to enhance the concept of fair trading in an efficient, competitive and informed market place where there is an equitable balance between the rights of consumers and traders. Bill is a Consolidation The Fair Trading Bill represents a significant consolidation of the three core Fair Trading Acts, the Fair Trading Act 1985, the Consumer Affairs Act 1972 and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs Act 1973. In addition, it repeals the Market Court Act 1978. The three existing core Fair Trading Acts are archaic, similar in content and function and needed to be updated to improve their relevance in todays marketplace. Coverage of the Fair Trading Bill The reason for the introduction of the existing Fair Trading Act 1985 in Victoria was pursuant to an agreement between all States to extend the coverage of laws prohibiting a wide range of deceptive or misleading practices based on relevant provisions of the Commonwealths Trade Practices Act to non-corporate traders (i.e individuals and partnerships) trading in Victoria over which the Trade Practices Act has no jurisdiction. Both the Fair Trading Act 1985 and the Trade Practices Act have coverage over corporate traders trading within Victorian and Victorian based corporate traders trading outside Victoria. The new Fair Trading Bill continues this coverage. In pursuit of uniform fair trading legislation across Australia, drafting of provisions in the Fair Trading Bill has been modelled where possible on the relevant provisions of the Trade Practices Act. New Areas of Regulation for Victoria The Fair Trading Bill introduces regulation for the first time in Victoria in a number of areas such as:
Modifications of Existing Provisions The Bill modifies existing provisions of the core Fair Trading Acts, such as the:
Conjoint Bill Another Bill is to be introduced into the House entitled the Fair Trading (Inspectors Powers and Other Amendments) Bill which contains transitional provisions and consequential amendments to other acts required as a result of this Bill, as well as standardised inspectors powers to be inserted into other acts across the Fair Trading portfolio. 3.3 Clause 2 Part 1 commences operation on Royal Assent. The remaining provisions commence on a day or days to be proclaimed, but not later than by 1 February 2000. Clause 5 the Act binds the Crown. Clause 5 sets out the circumstances under the Act in which a representation about a future matter is deemed to be misleading. Clause 6 gives the Act extraterritorial effect. The Act covers circumstances where the conduct occurs outside Victoria but involves a body corporate whose principal place of business is in Victoria or conduct by a person ordinarily resident in Victoria. Part 2 Unfair Practices Clauses 7 to 32 deal with various forms of misleading and deceptive conduct. In particular clauses 7 and 8 provide that a person must not in trade or commerce engage in unconscionable conduct and 8(2) provides a guide as to the criteria used in assessing whether conduct is unconscionable; clause 13 deals with misleading conduct in relation to an offer of employment; clause 14 deals with false testimonials; clause 17 bait advertising; clause 22 deals with pyramid selling; and clauses 23 to 27 relate to the provision of unsolicited goods and services. Part 3 Safety and Information Requirements Clauses 33 to 58 deal with aspects of the supply of goods and services which do not comply with safety standards, and include matters such as:- prescribed safety standards; ban orders; voluntary recall of goods; compulsory recall of goods; repair and replacement of goods recalled; loss and injury or damage arising out of supply of dangerous goods; and services and warning notices to the public in respect to dangerous goods and services. Clause 57 allows the VCAT to review a decision to make an interim or permanent ban order or issue a compulsory recall order. Part 4 Off-Business-Premises Sales Clause 59 lists the circumstances where the division does not apply, including where the goods or services are valued below $50, the sale of a motor car, a major domestic building contract, to a purchaser who is a body corporate, a contract for the sale of land. Clause 60 defines a contact sales agreement as one occurring off-business-premises such as in a private residence, not being the business premises of the supplier or the workplace of the purchaser. Clauses 61 to 68 deal with compliance requirements related to contact sales. Clause 68 defines a non-contact sales agreement being sales made otherwise than in the presence of both the supplier and purchaser. Clauses 69 to 75 deal with the compliance requirements of non-contact sales. Clause 76 deals with the duty of a potential supplier to immediately leave the premises when requested to do so by an occupier or person who has the authority of the occupier. Clause 77 a supplier must produce evidence of identity on first entering into negotiations and then at any time after that on request by the person with whom negotiations are being conducted (Penalty: $12,000/120 p.u. fine ($24,000/ 240 p.u.fine for a body corporate). The identification must show the persons name, the business name and either the business or residential address of the person Clause 78 a supplier must cease negotiations on the telephone if and when requested by the prospective purchaser and refrain from further contact with that purchaser for 30 days thereafter (Penalty: $6,000/ 60 p.u. fine ($12,000/120 p.u.fine for a body corporate). Clause 79 prohibits the sale by the supplier, of a purchasers trade-in during the cooling-off period. Clause 81 prohibits a contract varying, limiting, excluding or restricting a purchasers rights during a cooling-off period. Clause 82 a supplier or purchaser may apply to any court or the Tribunal for a determination of any amount payable upon cancellation of an agreement under the Part. Part 5 Lay-By Sales Clauses 83 to 93 deal with compliance requirements for lay-by contracts and supplier and purchaser remedies on cancellation of such contracts. Part 6 Codes of Practice Clause 94 allows for the preparation by the Director of Fair Trading, with the approval of the Minister or as the Minister directs, codes of fair trading between a particular class of suppliers and any purchasers or between a particular class of persons and a particular class of purchasers or in relation to the supply of a particular kind of goods and services. Clause 95 where suppliers of goods or services have agreed to abide by a code of practice the Director may submit the code and any recommendations to the Minister for consideration. Clause 96 the Minister may recommend that regulations be made prescribing codes of practice. Clause 97 a person must comply with a prescribed code of practice (Penalty: $2,000/ 20 p.u. fine). Part 7 Administration Clauses 98 to 100 establish the Director of Fair Trading (the Director), staff of the Office and the Directors functions and powers. Clause 101 allows the Director in the administration of the Act to delegate any power or function other than the power of delegation to any person employed under Part 3 of the Public Sector Management and Employment Act 1998 (being any employee of the public sector).
Part 8 Powers of the Director to deal with disputes Clauses 103 to 106 deal with making complaints and the powers of the Director to refer the complaint to conciliation and to institute or defend proceedings on behalf of other persons. Where the Director takes such a course the Director may settle the proceedings and take steps to enforce any judgment obtained on behalf of that other person. Part 9 Functions of Tribunal Clauses 107 and 108 defines a fair trading dispute for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal) and empowers the Tribunal to hear and determine disputes. Clause 110 provides that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal arises only on the application of a party to the dispute or the Director on behalf of a party. Clause 111 provides that where the Tribunal has jurisdiction and a proceeding is first commenced in the Tribunal and is not struck out or withdrawn the matter is not justiciable by a Court. [3.4 provides details in respect to a section 85 Constitution Act 1975 statement]. Clause 112 where a proceedings is commenced in a court the court may stay the proceeding if the dispute is more appropriately dealt with by the Tribunal. The court must consider factors such as costs and the duration of the proceedings and any material advantage or disadvantage that may be gained or suffered by a party if the proceedings are determined by the Tribunal. [3.4 provides details in respect to a section 85 Constitution Act 1975 statement]. Clause 113 the tribunal may hear and determine a dispute notwithstanding any pending or outstanding criminal proceedings, sentence, disciplinary action or charges. Part 10 Inspection Powers Clause 114 provides for the appointment of inspectors;. clause 115 inspectors are to be issued with identity cards; and clause 116 must produce the identity card before exercising powers under this Part or produce it at any time on request during the exercise of powers under this Part. Clause 117 an inspector may, on reasonable grounds, apply to the Magistrates Court for an order requiring any person to answer orally, or in writing, any questions put by an inspector in relation to an alleged contravention, or to supply orally or in writing information required by an inspector in relation to an alleged contravention or, to produce a specified document or documents of a specified class required by the inspector in relation to the alleged contravention. Inspectors must comply with certain requirements in relation to the execution of an order made under this section. Clause 118 allows the Director or an inspector with the consent of the Director, to require a publisher to provide published information in any format in which the publisher retains it, such as computer records. Clause 119 deals with entry by an inspector with the consent of the occupier of the premises. Inspectors have powers to search, seize, examine and inspect anything found at the premises and make copies of extracts and documents found on the premises. Clause 120 an inspector may enter and inspect any part of a premises, which at the time of the entry, is open to the public and may purchase anything on such a premises. Clause 121 deals with emergency entry and search at any time whether the owner or occupier is present or not, in circumstances where the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that there is evidence on the premises of dangerous goods being supplied to members of the public in contravention of a ban order. In such circumstances an inspector may seize goods, secure goods against interference, require the occupier to remove the goods, examine and take samples of the goods and make copies or take extracts of documents on the premises and may prohibit the goods from being removed from the premises for up to 3 days. Clause 122 deals with applications for search warrants on oath to a Magistrates Court. Clause 123 and 124 makes provision for the standard requirements in executing search warrants such as announcement (if practicable) before entry and details of the warrant to be given to the occupier. Clause 125 allows an inspector executing a search warrant, to seize or take samples of things not described in the search warrant, if the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that the thing or sample is of a kind that could have been included in a search warrant, and that the seizure or sample will afford evidence of a contravention of any Act specified in Schedule 1 or where the inspector believes that it is necessary to seize that thing to prevent its concealment, loss or destruction or its use in the contravention of this Act or of a Schedule 1 Act. Clause 126 allows an inspector executing a warrant to place an embargo on the removal of goods that cannot be readily removed. It is an offence to move, transfer deal with or dispose of embargoed goods. An embargo notice affixed to the goods under this section is not limited to a three (3) day time limit, as is the case in clause 121 (emergency entry). Clauses 128 and 129 an inspector may only retain seized documents or things for three months but may apply to the Magistrates Court for an extension of time. Clause 130 if an inspector intends taking a sample the inspector must advise the person in possession of the sample the reason why a sample is being taken. The inspector must give a part of that sample to that person. Clause 131 to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to determine compliance with the Act or the regulations an inspector may require a person to assist with inquiries by answering questions either orally or in writing, producing documents and giving any other reasonable assistance to the inspector. Clause 132 it is an offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement under this Part (Penalty: $6,000/ 60 p.u. fine). Clause 133 deals with the protection against self-incrimination, and provides:-
Clauses 134 to 136 respectively create offences to give false or misleading information, hinder or obstruct inspectors and to impersonate an inspector (Penalty: $6,000/60 p.u. fine). Clause 141 creates an offence for an inspector to directly or indirectly give information to any other person, obtained in carrying out functions under the Act, otherwise than as permitted by the Act, for example, an order of a court or tribunal or with the consent of the person to whom the information relates. Part 11 Enforcement and Remedies Clause 142 provides that a prosecution for an offence under the Act may be commenced not more than 3 years after the commission of the offence. Clauses 143, 144 and 145 deal with offences by bodies corporate, the imputation of state of mind of bodies corporate and liability of bodies corporate or employers for the acts of others. Clauses 146 to 154 deal with remedies available under the Act including:- the giving of undertakings in respect to contraventions under this Act or any of the Schedule 1 Acts; injunctions and interim injunctions restraining a person from engaging in certain conduct. Both types of injunction may be applied for ex parte. The court has power to make orders requiring the publication of correcting advertising, and orders prohibiting certain payments of money or the transfer of property. Clause 155 deals with defences including reasonable mistake of fact, reasonable reliance on information supplied by another, the taking of reasonable precautions and the exercise of due diligence by the defendant. Clause 156 provides that in proceedings under the Act, evidence of certain matters, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is evidence or proof of certain other matters. Clause 158 lists the type of orders that may be made where a court or the Tribunal finds that there has been a contravention of the Act. Orders may include, compensation, voiding contracts or certain provisions in contracts, varying contracts, payment of damages, orders to repair or to supply services under the contract. Clause 159 provides that an action for damages may be commenced within six (6) years of the accrual of the cause of action (it is 3 years for a criminal prosecution). Clause 160 allows for an award of compensation, as part of the courts civil jurisdiction, in addition to other penalties under the Act for humiliation or distress caused by the conduct constituting the offence. Part 12 Miscellaneous Clause 161 provides that at the request of the prospective purchaser, the supplier must give the purchaser a document containing certain particulars describing the goods and/or services in readily understandable English language. Clause 162 requires that a person who repairs or removes certain parts from goods must offer to return those parts to the owner and must return them if asked to do so by the owner within a reasonable time after returning the goods to the owner. Clause 165 allows the Governor-in-Council to make regulations for the purposes of the Act including a fine of up to $2,000/20 p.u. for a contravention of the regulations.
Clauses 166 to 169 repeal the Acts mentioned in the long title of the Bill (shown at 3.3 above). Clause 170 provide for savings and transitional provisions in the form of Schedule 3 to the Act. 3.4 Alteration or variation of section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (section 4D(i) and (ii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968) Clause 164 of the Bill provides that it the intention of sections 111 and 112 (clauses 111 and 112 of the Bill) to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. Clause 111 provides that where the Tribunal has jurisdiction and a proceeding is first commenced in the Tribunal and is not struck out or withdrawn the matter is not justiciable by a Court. Clause 112 provides that where a proceedings is commenced in a court the court may stay the proceeding if the dispute is more appropriately dealt with by the Tribunal. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Section 85 Statement Clause 164 of the Bill states that it is the intention of clauses 111 and 112 to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. I therefore make the following statement under sub-section 85(5) of the Constitution Act 1975 of the reasons for altering or varying that section. Clause 111 provides that if proceedings regarding a fair trading dispute or other matter under the Fair Trading Act over which the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction, are commenced first in the tribunal and are not struck out or withdrawn, the dispute is not justiciable by a court. Clause 112 provides that if proceedings regarding a fair trading dispute are first commenced in a court, the court must stay the proceedings if they could be more appropriately dealt with by the Tribunal, including if a party could obtain a material advantage in the Tribunal (for example, if it would be cheaper or quicker), provided that it is not outweighed by any material disadvantage suffered by another party if the dispute goes to the Tribunal. Where the court stays proceedings, a party may apply to the Tribunal for an order in relation to the proceedings, whereupon the Tribunal must notify the court, which must dismiss the proceedings (except where the Tribunal has exercised its power to refer the matter to the court). The reasons for the variation to section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 are to allow the parties to a fair trading dispute a choice of forums in which to litigate and to ensure that a party wishing to take advantage of the benefits offered by the Tribunal is not unfairly frustrated by another party commencing proceedings in a court merely as a tactical manoeuvre to put pressure on the other side to settle disadvantageously or to abandon the proceedings.
3.5 Schedule 1 List of other Fair Trading Act related Acts
The Committee makes no further comment. Government Superannuation Bill 4.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Alan Stockdale MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 4.2 The Bill establishes the Government Superannuation Office (the GSO) and facilitates the transfer of the Victorian Superannuation Fund to Commonwealth supervision. The Bill repeals the Public Sector Superannuation (Administration) Act 1993 and makes consequential amendments to other Acts. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- The purpose of the Bill is to establish a new State entity, the Government Superannuation Office, to act as trustee and administrator for the unfunded closed defined schemes of the State Superannuation Fund and to enable the Victorian Superannuation Board to make a valid election for the Victorian Superannuation Fund to become regulated under Commonwealth supervision. There are no changes to existing rights and entitlements of State Superannuation Fund members. There are no changes to the existing rights and entitlements of Victorian Superannuation Fund members. 4.3 Clause 2 provides that sections 30 and 48 come into operation on Royal Assent. The remaining provisions come into operation on 1 July 1999. Clause 5 the GSO is established as a body corporate. Clauses 6 to 27 deal with the administration of the office, board of directors, meetings, staff, functions and other like matters. Clause 28 provides that on the commencement of the Act the GSO assumes all of the powers, duties, obligations and rights of the Victorian Superannuation Board in respect of the State Superannuation Fund and the MTA Superannuation Fund. Clause 29 provides for the transfer of staff to the GSO and that staff of the former Victorian Superannuation Board are to be employed under the Act on terms and conditions no less favourable than immediately before the commencement of the Act. Clause 30 provides for the transfer of designated staff from the Victorian Superannuation Board to VicSuper Pty Ltd, the new trustee of the Victorian Superannuation Fund. Such staff will be offered employment from VicSuper Pty Ltd and to elect in writing, within 14 days of receipt of the offer, to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the person must resign as a member of staff of the Victorian Superannuation Board, but retains entitlement to all accrued long service leave, annual or sick leave. If the offer is rejected, the persons employment may be terminated by the Chief Executive Officer of the Office. Clauses 33 to 41 provide for the transfer of administration and staff from declared public sector superannuation funds to the GSO. Staff are to be employed on terms no less favourable than prior to the transfer and are entitled to all accrued benefits arising from prior employment. The Committee makes no further comment. Legal Practice (Practising Certificates) Bill 5.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Jan Wade MLA with the Honourable Phil Gude MLA. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 5.2 The Bill amends the Legal Practice Act 1996 by altering the practising certificate year from the calendar year to the financial year and introduces other measures. 5.3 Clause 2 saving Part 2, the provisions in the Bill commence operation on Royal Assent. Part 2 commences on 15 August 1999. Clause 4 provides a new definition for practising certificate year. Clause 5 practising certificates will run for the financial year from 1 July in each year to the following 30 June, instead of for the calendar year. Initially the new provisions will commence on 1 January 2000 and end on 30 June 2001, a period of 18 months, being the transition period. Following this transition period certificates will be issued for the financial year. The Bill also allows for the appointment of additional deputy registrars (clause 17) and provides that practitioners specify on their practising certificate application forms, which roll they wish to entered on for the purpose of Legal Practice Board elections (clause 14). Voting in such elections remains voluntary. The Committee makes no further comment. Office of the Regulator-General (Amendment) Bill 6.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Alan Stockdale MLA with the Honourable Phil Gude MLA. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 6.2 The Bill amends the Office of the Regulator-General Act 1994 (the Act) to provide for certain procedural matters relating to appeal panels. 6.3 Clause 2 provides that the provisions in the Bill commence operation on Royal Assent. Clause 4 substitutes a new section 37(2) and provides that the grounds for appeal are:- (a) there has been bias; or (b) the determination is based wholly or partly on an error of fact in a material respect. By comparison the existing provision in part (b) is "the facts on which the determination is based have been misinterpreted." Clause 7 inserts a new section 38A, 38B and 38C into the Act dealing respectively with:- split decisions of an appeal panel; disclosure of certain interests by appeal panel members; and the process to be followed should a panel member become unavailable during the appeal process. Clause 9 provides for transitional arrangements for appeals commenced before these amendments take effect. The provisions of the Act in existence prior to the amendments made by the Bill continue to apply to those appeals. Clause 10 makes consequential amendments to the Gas Industry Act 1994 and the Gas Pipelines Access (Victoria) Act 1998. Clause 11 provides for miscellaneous statute law revision amendments. The Committee makes no further comment. 7.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Jan Wade MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 7.2 The Bill amends the Sentencing Act 1991 (the Act) so as to:- enable the Magistrates Court to defer the sentencing of certain offenders; and make further provision with respect to the conditions and enable the variation of a combined custody and treatment order; allow conditions to be imposed under an intensive correction order for a period shorter than the duration of the order; and enable medical reports to be attached to victim impact statements. The Bill also makes amendments to the Children and Young Persons Act 1989 so as to widen the sentencing options available on dealing with a breach of the conditions of a temporary leave permit. 7.3 Clause 2 sections 1, 2, 16, and 17 come into operation on Royal Assent. The remaining provisions commence on proclamation, but not later than by 1 January 2000. Clauses 4 and 9 respectively insert new sections 7(2) and 83A into the Act and deal with the deferral of sentencing for young offenders aged between 17 and 25. Sentencing may be deferred for up to 6 months to enable the offender to deal with the contributing factors to their offending behaviour. This sentencing disposition is only available to the court if the offender consents to a deferral order being made. The offenders release on deferral may be conditional or unconditional. On the return date the court may have regard to the offenders behaviour during the deferral period for the purpose of sentencing. The offender may be brought back to court for sentencing if during the deferral period the offender re-offends or breaches a condition. The amendment will not effect the operation of any requirement imposed on a Magistrates Court under the Act or any other Act to impose a disqualification, cancellation or suspension, or make any other order in respect of an offence, for example in respect to a drivers licence or permit. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Deferred Sentencing Deferred sentencing has been available as a sentencing tool in the Childrens Court since 1991, and is used to capitalise on the high motivation of young offenders when they are found guilty of a crime by providing an incentive for them to change their behaviour. This Bill will extend the availability of deferred sentencing into the Magistrates Court for cases involving offenders up to 25 years of age. Deferred sentencing provides offenders with an opportunity to take responsibility and deal with factors contributing to their criminal behaviour. They are given an opportunity to address the problems in their lives and demonstrate to the court that they are taking their own rehabilitation seriously. Once an offender is found guilty of a crime, their sentencing may be deferred for up to 6 months, on the understanding that the offender is to return to court at a later date having made good on a promise to, for instance, enrol and attend a course, work in the family business, live at home, or undertake counselling or drug treatment. When the offender returns to court for sentencing, the court can take their behaviour during the deferral period into account in determining whether a lesser penalty is warranted, or whether treatment or other conditions should be attached to a sentence to provide ongoing management of the offenders specific needs. The Government has extended deferred sentencing from children to young adult offenders in recognition that offenders who are most likely to benefit from early intervention and rehabilitation, and who are willing to take responsibility for changing their behaviour, should be given the opportunity to have their commitment to change considered by the court in sentencing. Clause 5 makes a number of amendments to the provisions in the Act relating to Combined custody and treatment orders. A new section 18R(1)(ab) is inserted providing that while serving a sentence in custody the offender must undergo treatment for alcohol or drug addiction as directed by a prescribed person or a member of a prescribed class of persons under the regulations. An amendment to section 18S(1)(a) will ensure that the court can direct an offender to submit to testing for alcohol or drug use whilst in custody and not, as currently, whilst they are serving part of the sentence in the community. Amendments to section 18W relating to breach of a combined custody and treatment order will mean that an offender breaching such an order will be required to serve out the whole of the sentence in custody, unless a court is of the view that it would be unjust to do so due to exceptional circumstances arising since the order was originally made.
Clause 6 inserts a new section 18VA into the Act to allow for variations or cancellations to be made in a combined custody and treatment order, for example where there are materially changed circumstances or where the offender is no longer willing to comply with the order. The extent to which the offender has complied with the order will be taken into account in the re-sentencing of the offender. Clause 7 makes amendments to the intensive correction orders provisions in the Act and allow for some of the conditions attached to such orders to be shortened so that they will not necessarily need to run for the full length of the order. The amendment also clarifies that a breach of a core condition of an intensive correction order may be committed within or outside Victoria. Clause 8 amends provisions related to community based orders and clarifies the core condition of the order is the non-commission of further offending in or outside Victoria. Clause 10 inserts a new section 86(6A) into section 86 of the Act, providing that the court has power to appoint a litigation guardian in respect of compensation applications brought under section 86 of the Act by children or other persons under a disability. It also enables the court to administer compensation monies awarded to children and persons under a disability. Clause 11 amends section 86(9) of the Act allowing a court considering an application for compensation under the section, to have regard to any victim impact statement, including any medical report attached to such a statement which had been made available to the court at the time of sentencing. Clause 12 allows a court a discretion in special circumstances to make a costs order in respect to compensation applications made under section 86. Clause 13 inserts a new section 95BA into the Act and allows medical reports to be attached to victim impact statements. Clause 14 amends section 95B(2) and allows the court to have supervisory powers over the content of a report and the procedure to be employed in presenting the contents as evidence in court. In respect to clauses 11 to 13 the Committee notes the comments made in the Attorney-Generals Second Reading Speech:- Victim Impact Statements and Compensation Applications In 1994, this Government introduced legislation that gave a voice to victims of crime by enabling victim impact statements to be submitted to the court for consideration in passing sentence. Victim impact statements are now widely accepted as a useful and informative mechanism by which the court can better understand how victims have been affected by the crime. This Bill will make it clear that victims can also provide the court with medical and psychological reports, which can be attached to their victim impact statements. Victim impact statements are sometimes used by victims to support their applications for compensation for pain and suffering. While courts have the ability to take various documents into account when considering compensation applications, there has been some uncertainty about the admissibility of victim impact statements in this context. This Bill will clarify that victim impact statements can be relied upon by victims when they seek compensation from offenders for pain and suffering. Where compensation is sought in respect of harm or loss suffered by a victim who is a child or by a victim under a disability, this Bill will ensure that the court has the capacity to appoint a litigation guardian to make the application on their behalf. This will ensure that these victims will be able to take advantage of the compensation provisions of the act through the representation of a guardian whose interests do not conflict with their own. Finally, the Bill will clarify that all Victorian courts have the power to award costs to a party involved in an application for compensation for pain and suffering. While the Magistrates Court currently has a wide power to award costs in respect of any proceedings under section 131 of the Magistrates Court Act, this Bill puts it beyond doubt that the higher courts can also award costs in respect of the compensation applications. While the presumption will be maintained that each party should bear their own costs in these cases, there may be circumstances when costs should be awarded against a part, such as in the case of a convicted offender unreasonably contesting the victims application. Clause 17 amends section 256(10) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1989 and provides for an alternative penalty of detention in a youth training centre to the existing imprisonment penalty. The amendment will apply only to offences committed after the amendment commences operation. The Committee makes no further comment. Superannuation Acts (Further Amendment) Bill 8.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Alan Stockdale MLA with the Honourable Phil Gude MLA. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 8.2 The Bill makes miscellaneous amendments to specified Superannuation Acts, including amendments to ensure compliance with the latest Commonwealth preservation standards to apply from 1 July 1999. The new standards require all growth to a superannuation benefit from that date, whether through contributions, earnings or accruals, to be preserved until the minimum preservation age is reached, or upon prior death, disability or early release due to severe financial hardship or on compassionate grounds. The preservation age is 55 years of age for persons born before July 1960, increasing by one year up to 60 years of age for persons born after 30 June 1964. The new preservation standards will apply to all Victorian public sector superannuation schemes through the current legislative mechanism of raising a Order in Council to specify the preservation standards to apply from 1 July 1999. The Bill also amends the Magistrates Court Act 1989 in relation to the pension entitlements of the Chief Magistrate. The Bill amends the:-
8.3 Clause 2 saving Part 3, the provisions in the Bill come into operation on Royal Assent. Part 3 is deemed to have come into operation on 7 May 1996. Clauses 5 and 6 make amendments to the Magistrate Court Act 1989 to provide that the Chief Magistrate is to receive pension entitlements equivalent to those of a County Court judge. The amendment is retrospective to 7 May 1996 coinciding with the date the present Chief Magistrate took office. The Committee notes the comments of the Attorney-General in the Second Reading Speech:- The Bill amends the Magistrates Court Act 1989 to provide that the Chief Magistrate is to receive pension entitlements equivalent to those of a County Court judge. Such an arrangement is consistent with the leadership and managerial tasks required of the office and reflects the recommendation of the Judicial Remuneration Tribunal that the Chief Magistrate is to be remunerated on the same level as an ordinary member of the next highest court. Such a nexus exists between the Chief Judge of the County Court who is remunerated at the same level as a judge of the Supreme Court.
The Committee makes no further comment. 9.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Jan Wade MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 9.2 The Bill regulates the installation; use and maintenance of audio, optical and tracking surveillance devices; restricts the communication and publication of records of private conversations and activities obtained through the use of surveillance devices; establishes procedures for law enforcement officers to obtain warrants or emergency authorisation for the installation and use of surveillance devices; creates offences relating to the improper installation or use of surveillance devices; and imposes requirements for the secure storage and destruction of records obtained by law enforcement officers through the use of surveillance devices. The Bill repeals the Listening Devices Act 1969. The Committee believes that this is an important Bill concerning rights and freedoms and reproduces the Attorney-Generals Second Reading Speech:- The Listening Devices Act 1969 provides significant protection to private conversations from eavesdropping. It prohibits anyone who is not a party to a conversation from listening to or recording that conversation. The Act also prohibits the communication or publication of records or reports of private conversations, except in limited circumstances. Since the Listening Devices Act was passed, the use of video cameras has become very widespread. The fact that the Listening Devices Act only regulates listening devices and not optical surveillance devices produces an anomaly. Currently, private conversations may not be recorded and communicated by others, but private activities may be. At present, there is no limitation on the use of video cameras or tracking devices. A video camera may be used to video a private activity, which may then be published and communicated freely, as long as the sound is turned off. For example, a retailer may install a video camera in a change room to watch and record the activities of customers without legal sanction. That video material may then be published freely by the retailer. This sort of activity will no longer be allowed under this Bill. In an era of increasingly sophisticated technology, it is necessary to enact this Bill to protect individuals privacy. This Bill will bring the regulation of optical surveillance devices into line with the regulation of listening devices. Just as the Listening Devices Act regulated listening devices in 1969, the time has come to regulate other surveillance devices in the same way. The use of listening devices has been regulated in Victoria since 1969. The Bill takes the basic model for the regulation of listening devices in the Listening Devices Act 1969 and applies it to a broader range of surveillance devices. The Bill establishes a general prohibition on:
The Bill also prohibits the use of data surveillance devices by the police without a warrant or without the consent of the person in control of the data. The Bill provides penalties of up to two years imprisonment or a maximum fine of $24,000 or both for breaches of these prohibitions. The Bill also restricts the publication or communication of records or reports of private conversations and activities gained using surveillance devices. This includes publication or communication by participants without the consent of all the parties to the conversation or activity. The Listening Devices Act restricts the circumstances in which recordings of private conversations may be published to others, protecting the privacy of private conversations. The Bill will extend this protection to video recordings of private activities. The Bill provides substantial penalties for breaches of this prohibition. While the Bill extends the protection of privacy afforded to private conversations to private activity, law enforcement officers have been given the power to use surveillance devices to fight serious crime. In these circumstances, the Bill also ensures stringent safeguards to protect individual privacy. This Bill achieves an appropriate balance, and provides stringent safeguards for the protection of privacy. The Bill prohibits the use of surveillance devices to intrude on individuals privacy except in exceptional circumstances. Surveillance devices may be used by law enforcement officers for investigating suspected serious criminal activity. Surveillance devices are most useful in fighting organised crime. In many major drug cases surveillance devices provide key evidence in prosecutions. Crime that is difficult to uncover, such as organised child pornography rings, can be exposed using surveillance devices. A law enforcement officer may only apply for a warrant to use a surveillance device if the applicant suspects or believes that an offence has been, is being, is about to be or is likely to be committed, and the use of the device is necessary to investigate the offence or to gather evidence of the offence. Before a court may issue a warrant, it must balance the nature and gravity of the offence with the extent to which the privacy of a person is likely to be effected. When law enforcement officers wish to:
they may only do so pursuant to a warrant issued by the Supreme Court or an emergency authorisation under the Bill. This is an important measure to ensure the accountability of law enforcement officers proposing to use of surveillance devices and to ensure that surveillance devices are used appropriately. A warrant to track a person or object may be issued by the Magistrates Court, as tracking devices are less intrusive than other types of surveillance devices. These requirements will ensure the protection of privacy by requiring that warrants allowing the use of surveillance devices are only issued when an appropriate balance is determined by the courts between the benefits of using the device and the potential invasion of privacy. There are a number of stringent safeguards in the Bill to protect peoples privacy. Once a surveillance device has been used pursuant to a warrant, the user must report back to court on the use of the surveillance device, adding a further measure of accountability. Any evidence gathered using surveillance devices must be destroyed if it is not needed to investigate or prosecute an offence. The responsible Minister must report annually to parliament on the use of surveillance devices pursuant to the Bill. In certain limited circumstances, for instance during a kidnapping or a siege, the police force or the National Crime Authority may issue its own officers with an emergency authorisation to use a surveillance device. This may only be done where an imminent threat of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property exists, or a serious drug offence is being committed. A police officer who receives an emergency authorisation must report to court within seventy-two hours of being granted the emergency authorisation. This will ensure that there is appropriate independent supervision of the use of these powers. Finally, the Bill compels law enforcement bodies to destroy potentially sensitive information gained using surveillance devices when the information is not needed. It is an offence not to destroy surveillance evidence when required to do so under the Act. The Bill provides stringent safeguards to protect individuals privacy ensuring that Victoria is a safe place to live. The Bill will extend the protection of private conversations currently offered by the Listening Devices Act and will protect private activities from intrusion. 9.3 Clause 2 Part 1 (sections 1 to 5) commence on Royal Assent. The remaining provisions commence on proclamation but not later than by 1 January 2000. Clause 3 Definitions important words defined in the Act are:- chief law enforcement officer, law enforcement officer, senior law enforcement officer, private activity, private conversation and serious drug offence. Private activity means an activity carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that the parties to it desire it to be observed only by themselves but does not include:- (a) an activity carried on outside a building; or (b) an activity carried on in any circumstances in which the parties to it ought reasonably to expect that it may be observed by someone else. Private conversation means a conversation carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that the parties to it desire it to be heard only by themselves, but does not include:- a conversation made in the circumstances in which the parties to it ought reasonably to expect that it may be overheard by someone else. Clause 4 Act binds the Crown provides that the Act binds the Crown. Clause 5 Act not to apply to certain Commonwealth agents states the Act does not apply to certain Commonwealth agents such as the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the National Crime Authority, the Minister administering the Migration Act and Australian Customs. Clause 6 Regulation of installation, use and maintenance of listening devices creates an offence of knowingly installing using or maintaining an unauthorised listening device to overhear, record, monitor or listen to a private conversation without the consent of each party to the conversation. Exceptions to the general prohibition are:- (a) where a law enforcement officer has a warrant or emergency authorisation to install, use or maintain the device; or (b)where such devices are used or maintained in accordance with a Commonwealth law (Penalty: 2 years imprisonment/$24,000/ 240 p.u. fine, or both ($100,000-200,000/ 1000-2000 p.u. fine for a body corporate). Clause 7 Regulation of installation, use and maintenance of optical surveillance devices creates an offence of installing, maintaining or using an unauthorised optical surveillance device to observe a private activity to which the person is not a party, without the express or implied consent of each party to the activity. Major exceptions are the same as in clause 6 (Penalty: as in 6 above). Further exclusions are permitted where the occupier of premises authorises law enforcement officers to use these devices for the protection of the lawful interests of the occupier or another person. Records obtained in such circumstances are subject to the same controls as records obtained using a surveillance device under a warrant. Clause 8 Regulation of installation, use and maintenance of tracking devices creates an offence to use, maintain or install an unauthorised tracking device to determine the location of a person or an object without that persons consent or the consent of the owner of the object as the case requires (Penalty: as in 6 above). The same exceptions apply as in clause 6 above. Clause 9 Regulation of installation, use and maintenance of data surveillance devices by law enforcement officers regulates the use of data surveillance devices to record or monitor the input of information into, or the output of information from, a computer by law enforcement officers without the express or implied consent of the person on whose behalf that information is being input or output (Penalty: 1 year imprisonment/ $12,000/ 120 p.u. fine, or both). The same exceptions apply as in clause 6 above. Clause 10 Authority for assistance and for others to use surveillance devices provides that if a law enforcement officer is authorised by the Act to install, use, maintain or retrieve a surveillance device that authorisation extends to any person who provides assistance or technical expertise to the authorised officer. Clause 11 Prohibition on communication and publication of private conversations or activities the clause creates an offence to knowingly communicate or publish a record or report of a private conversation or private activity that has been made as a direct or indirect result of the use of a surveillance or tracking device (Penalty: 2 years imprisonment/ $24,000 /240 p.u. fine). Exceptions to the prohibition against communication include:- consent of the other party; where the communication is in the public interest or for the protection of the lawful interests of the person making the communication; in the course of legal proceedings or disciplinary proceedings; where the communication is made by a law enforcement officer in certain specified circumstances; or where authorised by a law of the Commonwealth. Public interest may include permission for such records to be broadcast on television programs such as Australias Most Wanted. Clause 12 Communication and publication of information from the use of a data surveillance device deals with the prohibition on communication by a law enforcement officer of, data from a computer obtained in the course of data surveillance (Penalty: 1 year imprisonment/ $12,000 /120 p.u. fine). Exceptions to the prohibition are similar to those found in clause 11 and include:- consent, legal proceedings, in the course of investigating or prosecuting an offence and a law of the Commonwealth. Unlike section 11 above, there is no legislative exception for public interest or the protection of lawful interests. Clause 13 Warrants deals with the type of warrants that may be issued, including a composite warrant for different types of surveillance devices. Clause 14 Which court may issue warrants the Supreme Court may issue any warrant and the Magistrates Court a tracking device warrant. Clause 15 Application for a warrant sets out the grounds for an application for a warrant including, that an offence has been or is likely to be committed, that the use of the device is necessary for the purpose of the investigation of the offence. The application must be supported by an affidavit setting out the
grounds on which the warrant is sought. An application may be made prior to the
preparation of an affidavit in urgent cases. In that event the sworn affidavit must be
transmitted to the court the following day. Applications are heard in closed court. It is
an offence to publish a report containing information of an application for a warrant
(Penalty: Clause 16 Telephone warrants provides that in urgent cases a law enforcement officer may apply for a warrant by telephone, fax or other form of communication. In such circumstances if an affidavit is available, sworn or unsworn, it must be faxed to the court that is to determine the application. Clause 17 Issue of warrant sets out the criteria used by a court to determine whether to issue a warrant including:- the gravity of the alleged offence; the extent of the intrusion on a persons privacy; any alternative means of obtaining the evidence; the evidentiary value of the material sought to be obtained; and any previous warrant sought or issued in connection with that alleged offence. A warrant issued must specify the alleged offence in respect of which the warrant is issued and must specify the name of any person whose private conversations or activity may be listened to or observed, or whose location is sought to be determined, or whom the information collected relates to. The warrant must name any law enforcement officer who may use the device under the warrant. A warrant is in force for 90 days other than where no affidavit is included under section 15(4) (prior to the preparation of an affidavit) and under section 16 (telephone warrant), in which case the warrant is issued initially for 3 days. The warrant must specify the premises upon which the device is to be installed or the place at which it is to be used, the conditions of entry allowed to be used and state the time in which the person must report to the court under section 20 (see below). More than one warrant may be issued in respect to the one alleged offence. The clause also deals with retrieval warrants and creates special conditions for the issuance of a telephone warrant. Clause 18 What a warrant authorises deals with authorisation to take certain ancillary actions such as the installation and retrieval of devices, connection of a device to electricity, entering or crossing land, entering by force on the premises or premises adjoining the target property, the temporary removal of vehicles and other objects.
Clause 19 Revocation of warrant A court issuing a warrant may revoke it at any time before the expiration of its term of validity. Clause 20 Report to court A person to whom a warrant is issued must report to the issuing court within the time specified in the warrant. The report must contain certain information and specify whether the warrant was used; the period of its use, name any person if known, observed, listened to or tracked; name the premises where a device was installed or was used; give details of the type of installation; give details of the general use to which the information obtained was or is to be used; and give details of any previous use of devices under a warrant or emergency authorisation in connection with an offence in respect of which the warrant was issued. In the case of a retrieval warrant the report must give details of any premises entered under the warrant and state whether the device was retrieved under the warrant. Clause 21 Application for assistance order If a person applying for a warrant believes that it is necessary to obtain the assistance of any other person (individual or corporate) for the effective execution of the warrant they may apply to the Supreme Court for an assistance order. The application is to be made in the same manner and at the same time as an application for a warrant or may be made subsequently to it. Notice of an application for an assistance order is not required to be given to any person. For example an application may be made for assistance by a third person to connect a device to electricity. Clause 22 Assistance order Deals with applications under section 21 and provides the criteria for granting such an application where reasonable grounds are made out to a court, including:- the costs or difficulty of compliance with such an order and the gravity of the alleged offence for which the warrant is issued. An assistance order is in force for the duration of the relevant warrant and its conditions of issue must be endorsed on that warrant. Clause 22(3) the court is given discretion to make an order subject to any conditions it thinks fit. Clause 23 Failure to comply with assistance order The section creates an offence to knowingly contravene the assistance order (Penalty: 2 years imprisonment/ $24,000 /240 p.u. fine, or both). After careful consideration in respect to clauses 21 to 23 relating to applications for assistance orders the Committee resolved to express its concerns as follows.
Clause 24 Existence and operation of assistance order not to be disclosed - creates an offence for the unlawful disclosure by a person subject to an assistance order of the existence of such an order to any person except a disclosure: (a) to a person authorised to use the device; (b) to another person for the purpose of ensuring that the order is complied with; (c) to a legal practitioner acting for the person, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation in relation to the order; or (d) in the course of legal or disciplinary proceedings (Penalty: 2 years imprisonment /$24,000 fine (240 p.u.), or both).
Clause 25 Application for emergency
authorisations provides that in limited circumstances a law enforcement
officer may use a device in the same manner as if a warrant had been issued by a court,
provided a senior law enforcement officer, as defined in clause 3, authorises such use, in
circumstances where there is:- (a) an imminent threat of serious violence to a person or
substantial damage to property; Clause 26 Emergency authorisations provides that an emergency authorisation may authorise the person to whom it is given to do anything that may be done under a warrant. Clause 27 Form and duration of emergency authorisation emergency authority remains in force for 3 days or such shorter period as is specified. Clause 28 Report to court where an emergency authority is issued the person given the authority must furnish the Supreme Court a report as referred to in section 20(2) within 3 days after the authorisation is given (Penalty: 1 year imprisonment/ $12,000 fine, or both). Clause 29 Information to be brought before court the Supreme Court may require that evidence obtained under an emergency application be brought before it within 3 days of making such a direction. Such evidence may be kept in the custody of the court and the court may order its destruction or return. Clause 30 Court may direct use of surveillance device to cease where emergency authorisation has been granted the Supreme Court may by order direct that the use of a device cease immediately. Clause 31 Unlawful interference with surveillance device - a person must not knowingly interfere with, damage, remove or retrieve a surveillance device that has been lawfully installed by a law enforcement officer (Penalty: 2 years imprisonment/ $24,000 /240 p.u. fine, or both (a body corporate - $100,000 - $200,000 /1000-2000 p.u. fine).
Clause 32 Offences by persons involved in management of bodies corporate provides that officers of a corporation who are concerned in, or takes part in the management of the body corporate are deemed guilty of offences committed by the corporation and that a person may be proceeded against whether or not the corporation has been proceeded against for, or found guilty of, that offence. Clause 33 Search warrant makes provision for the issue of search warrants in circumstances where police suspect, on reasonable grounds, that there is or may be, in the next 72 hours, evidence of illegal surveillance devices on the premises. The usual conditions of issue, forms and procedure of warrants are provided pursuant to the Magistrates Court Act 1989. Clause 34 Announcement before entry makes standard provision for announcement prior to the execution of a warrant, and exceptions to the necessity for prior announcement. Clause 35 Copy of the warrant to be given to occupier or person searched a copy of the search warrant issued under section 33 must be given to the person being searched and/or to the occupier or a person representing the occupier of the premises being searched. Clause 36 Dealing with records obtained by use of surveillance devices provides that each chief law enforcement officer, as defined in section 3, must:- (a) keep records about information obtained using surveillance devices in a secure place that is not accessible to persons not eligible to deal with those records or reports; (b) destroy or cause to be destroyed records and reports if satisfied that they will not be required for an investigation, prosecution, application or proceedings. Penalty: $12,000 /120 p.u. fine. Clause 37 Annual reports provides that the Chief Commissioner of Police, the chairperson of the National Crime Authority and the Secretary to the Department of Natural Resources and Environment, must submit annual reports containing certain information relating to warrants issued pursuant to the Act, as soon as practicable after the end of a calendar year. The Minister must cause each report to be laid before each House of the Parliament within 12 sitting days of that House after it is received by the Minister. Clause 38 repeals the Listening Devices Act 1989. Clause 39(1) provides for transitional arrangements such as warrants still outstanding pursuant to the Act to be repealed. Clause 39(2) provides that:- A warrant or emergency authorisation may be issued or given under Part 4 in relation to an offence that was committed before the commencement of this section. Clause 40 makes consequential amendments to the Evidence Act 1958 by substituting the name of the new Act for the name of the Act to be repealed. The Committee makes no further comment. Tattersall Consultation (Amendment) Bill 10.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Alan Stockdale MLA with the Honourable Phil Gude MLA. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 10.2 The Bill amends the Tattersall Consultation Act 1958 (the Act) and makes provisions for lotteries and games where no ticket is issued to subscribers. 10.3 Clause 2 the Bill comes into operation on Royal Assent. Clause 6 inserts a new section 6AA into the Act and imposes a ten cent levy on each subscription to a consultation or soccer football pool where no ticket is issued (i.e. lottery products sold over the telephone) and for the payment of the levy by the promoter to the Treasurer for payment into the Consolidated Fund. Clause 7 inserts a new section 13 into the Act validating the past collection of such levies prior to these amendments coming into effect.
The Committee makes no further comment. Transport Accident (Further Amendment) Bill 11.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Alan Stockdale MLA with the Honourable Phil Gude MLA. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 11.2 The Bill amends the Transport Accident Act 1986 (the Act) and provides that the Transport Accident Commission (TAC) is liable to pay the reasonable costs of housekeeping, child-care, services of a domestic nature and nursing and attendance services. The cost of these services is currently restricted to payment at a maximum rate equivalent to average weekly earnings for Victoria. The amendment will bring these costs into line with all other medical and like services for which compensation is payable by the TAC under section 60 of the Act. A reasonable rate for housekeeping and other services provided to Transport Accident claimants will be determined through competitive tender. The amendment will allow the providers of housekeeping and other domestic services to obtain a reasonable market rate for the services they provide. 11.3 Clause 2 the Act comes into operation on Royal Assent. Clause 3 amends section 60(1) of the Act by inserting new sub-sections (b) and (c) to make the amendments described in 11.2 above. The Committee makes no further comment. Transport Acts (Further Amendment) Bill 12.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Robin Cooper MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 12.2 The Bill amends the Public Transport Act 1995 (the Act) by extending the transitional period allowed before bus operators are required to obtain accreditation; to exempt private bus services in certain circumstances from the requirement to be accredited; and to provide for a prescribed fee for the temporary accreditation of a person to operate a road transport passenger service. The Bill also amends the Transport Act 1983 to repeal the provisions governing the licensing of passenger ferries. 12.3 Clause 2 saving sections 8 and 9, the provisions of the Bill come into operation on Royal Assent. Sections 8 and 9 commence on proclamation, but not later than by 1 July 2000. Clause 5 inserts a new section 10(1C) into the Act enabling regulations to be made to set a fee for the issue of a temporary accreditation to operate a road transport passenger service and to make payment of the fee a condition of accreditation. The Committee makes no further comment. 13.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Pat McNamara MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 13.2 The Bill amends the Water Act 1989, the Water Industry Act 1994 and the Metropolitan Board of Works Act 1958. 13.3 Clause 2 saving sections 6(6), 8 and 10, the provisions in the Bill come into operation on Royal Assent. Section 6(6) comes into operation on the first anniversary of the day on which the Bill receives Royal Assent. Sections 8 and 10 are deemed to have commenced operation on 25 March 1999. 13.4 Water Act 1989 (the Act) Alteration or variation of section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (section 4D(i) and (ii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968) Clause 4 inserts new subsections (1A), (1B) and (1C) in section 222 of the Water Act 1989 and enables a water Authority (listed in Schedule 12), to reduce the supply of water in an irrigation district on account of contamination of water in the supply system. The Authority is free from liability for making such reductions in water supply, provided the contamination was not caused by the intentional or negligent conduct of the Authority. Clause 5 inserts a new section 323A into the Act declaring that it is the intention of section 222(1C) to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Clause 5 inserts a new section 323A in the Water Act 1989 which states that it is the intention of section 222(1C) to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. Section 222(1C), which is inserted by clause 4(2), protects an authority from liability for restricting water supply where there is contamination in the water supply system and the contamination was not caused by intentional or negligent conduct of the authority. I therefore make the following statement under section 85(5) of the Constitution Act 1975 to set out the reasons for altering or varying that section. Section 141(4) of the Water Act 1989 already precludes liability when an authority restricts supply because of a shortage of water or for any other unavoidable cause. The new provision simply extends the circumstances in which supplies can be restricted, and to be consistent a similar liability arrangement should apply. However, the authority will not be protected from liability if the contamination in the water supply system was caused through its own fault.
Clause 4 (3) repeals paragraph (a) of section 222(2) of the Act which restricted the sale or supply of water rights unless all domestic and stock users have been fully supplied. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- At present the Water Act 1989 requires that, in times of severe drought, water rights in irrigation districts be not supplied at all until stock and domestic rights have been fully supplied. The stakeholders consultative forum reporting on entitlements to Victorias portion of the river Murray has advised that these rights should be able to be restricted equally. This is achieved by clause 4(3). Clause 6 clarifies water rights in the Mildura irrigation area. The clause amends various provisions in Schedule 6 of the Water Act 1989, in particular the insertion of new clause 4A to 4F in that Schedule. New clause 4A extinguishes any easements or other interests securing a water right in the area conferred by an earlier indenture or earlier legislation, insofar as any still exist. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Water rights in the First Mildura Irrigation Trusts District have had a distinct legal status, deriving from an 1887 indenture between the Chaffey Brothers and Queen Victoria. This stipulated that once the Chaffeys had developed irrigation works for some land, and were thus granted freehold, they could sell it to growers, but must secure A sufficient water right, to run with the land as a perpetual easement. During the process of defining entitlements to Victorias Murray water, expert legal advice was obtained which showed that these easements were always subject to quite low limits, set by legislation from 1895 onwards. The Water Act 1989 sought to replace such easements with ordinary water rights. It said irrigators in the Trusts district are entitled to 6.113 megalitres per hectare, which can be increased by the Governor-in-Council. Some parties continue to contend that the old easements still exist, and that they provide rights to whatever amounts of water the crops require. This would mean that if growers changed from vines to a higher-water-using crop like citrus, their rights would become greater, which would clearly be incompatible with the cap on diversions. The Bill will put this matter beyond doubt, and remove any possibility that at some time in the future people could claim an increased entitlement, at the expense of all other right-holders. In the absence of any legislative clarification of this issue, it has not been possible to allow trust growers entitlements to be traded. Clause 6 of the Bill confirms that the only water rights attached to holdings in the trusts district will be those listed in a register kept by the trust. The trust is required to determine, within twelve months, the volume of rights attached to each holding. For land which has been irrigated, the trusts determination must be based on 9.144 megalitres per hectare, though there is scope to allocate a higher amount where high-use crops have been grown. Water rights may also be allocated to land which has not been irrigated, if rates are being paid for it. These allocations are consistent with those in neighbouring districts, and in accord with agreements reached during the process of developing shares in Victorias river Murray resources. Once the water rights on each holding have been determined, they will become fully tradeable. The influence of the Chaffeys indenture extends beyond the trusts district. There is currently a situation just outside the district where a handful of private diverters have a right to unlimited water at no charge. Clause 6 provides for such diverters to be given a licence by the Minister for at least 9.144 megalitres per hectare of land being irrigated, whereupon their traditional right will be superseded. It has become clear that the uncertainties surrounding the Chaffeys indenture have been inhibiting development in the Mildura area. There has been insufficient scope and incentive to put water resources to their best use. Local irrigation community leaders now see there are significant advantages in being able to trade water. This bill will assist in realizing the full irrigation potential of the district.
13.5 Water Industry Act 1994 (the Act) Alteration or variation of section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (section 4D(i) and (ii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968) Clause 8 amends section 74A of the Act by inserting new sub-sections (5) to (8) requiring all actions (other than personal injury claims) brought under section 74 of the Act after 25 March 1999 to be heard by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Actions under section 74 relate to damage caused by a flow of water from the works of a licensed business such as flooding from a burst pipe. Clause 10 substitutes a new section 183A declaring that it is the intention of the new sections 74A(5) and 74A(6) to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Clause 10 inserts a new section 183A in the Water Industry Act 1994 which states that it is the intention of section 74A(5) (as substituted by clause 8) and 74A(6) (as inserted by clause 8) to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975. Section 74A(5) gives the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) exclusive jurisdiction in certain proceedings under section 74 of the Water Industry Act 1994 and section 74A(6) requires the Supreme Court to strike out uncompleted proceedings over which VCAT is given exclusive jurisdiction. I therefore make the following statement under section 85(5) of the Constitution Act 1975 to set out the reasons for altering or varying that section. The practice of entrusting water disputes to tribunals is long standing. The tribunal system offers a specialist and cost-effective mechanism for dealing with flooding and like disputes. Prior to 1995 all property claims relating to flooding from a Water Authoritys works were dealt with by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Claims against water authorities outside Melbourne continue to be heard by VCAT. Conferring exclusive jurisdiction on VCAT to deal with section 74 claims will bring about consistency in the treatment of similar cases across the state. It will also ensure that related claims arising from one incident are dealt with in the one forum. The Bill has been drafted so as to encourage all litigants now contemplating proceedings to direct them to VCAT. The bill provides that all proceedings instituted on or after todays date are to be brought in the tribunal. If proceedings are brought in the courts the litigant faces the prospect of the proceedings being struck out if they have not been determined before the Act receives Royal Assent.
13.6 Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works Act 1958 (the Act) Clauses 12 and 13 amends the Act by updating the list of waterways under Melbourne Waters management and control for waterway management and drainage purposes and validates waterway management activities carried out by Melbourne Water on waterways within the metropolis but not previously formally placed under its management.
The Committee makes no further comment. Year 2000 Information Disclosure Bill 14.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 24 March 1999 by the Honourable Alan Stockdale MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 25 March 1999. 14.2 The purpose of the Bill is to encourage the voluntary disclosure and exchange of information about year 2000 computer problems and remediation efforts, compliance and for other purposes. The Bill provides limited liability protection for voluntary Year 2000 disclosure statements made between 27 February 1999 and 30 June 2001. 14.3 Clause 2 saving Part 6, the Act is deemed to have commenced on 27 February 1999. Part 6 commences on Royal Assent. Part 6 deals with the regulation making powers and with the section 85 Constitution Act 1975 provision discussed below at 14.4.
Clause 3 provides for various definitions used in the Act. Clause 4 states that the Act binds the Crown. Clause 8 provides that no civil action lies against a person making a Year 2000 disclosure statement and such a statement is not evidence against a person in a civil action to which a person is a party. Clause 9 provides for exceptions to the protection provided in clause 8 including:-
Clause 10(1) provides that in order to gain the protection of clause 8, the person making the Year 2000 disclosure statement must, in the course of the civil action, provide the other party with an explanatory statement which sets out the belief that the statement was made bona fide and not made recklessly. Clause 10(2) provides that the statement is not evidence in the civil proceedings otherwise than the determination of whether sub-section (1) has been complied with. Clause 10(3) allows the person bringing the action to waive the requirement in clause 10(1). Clause 11 sets out how the knowledge requirements contained in section 9 may be imputed in relation to corporations and persons other than corporations. Clause 13 provides a legislative exemption for certain conduct under the Act that may otherwise be prohibited by section 45 of the Competition Code. The section operates in conjunction with section 17 of the Commonwealth Act, which authorises the same exempted conduct for the purposes of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Clause 15 allows regulations to be made to give effect to the purposes of the Act.
14.4 Alteration or variation of section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (section 4D(i) and (ii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968) Clause 14 states that it is the intention of Part 3 (clauses 8 to 11) to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 to the extent necessary to prevent the Supreme Court from entertaining an action under those provisions. The Committee notes the comments in the Second Reading Speech:- Clause 14 alters or varies section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 to the extent necessary to prevent the Supreme Court from entertaining an action in the circumstances set out in Part 3 of the Bill. Part 3 of the Bill sets out the circumstances in which a person will be protected from civil liability in connection with the making of a Year 2000 disclosure statement. The reason for these limitations of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is to provide certainty to those organisations wishing to disclose Year 2000 readiness statements, which subscribe to the criteria outlined, to clients and the public set out in the Bill. This Bill seeks a balance in reducing barriers to disclosure of information on the one hand, and encouraging responsibility and virtuous conduct amongst those sharing information on the other. Finding such a balance will help accelerate the rate of Y2K readiness and underscore Victorias reputation as a leader in tackling the Y2K issue.
The Committee makes no further comment. Ministerial CorrespondenceMagistrates Court (Amendment) Bill 15.1 The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 28 October 1998 by the Honourable Jan Wade MP with the Honourable Phil Gude MP. The Second Reading Speech was delivered on 29 October 1998. 15.2 The Committee reported on the Bill in Alert Digest No. 1 of 1999 at page 3. The Committee expressed concern in seven separate amendments sought to be introduced by the Bill, and wrote to the Attorney-General on 24 March 1999 in the following terms:- 1. Clause 4 substitutes a new schedule 5 into the Act . Clause 13 of the new schedule deals with applications for leave to cross-examine witnesses. The Committee made the following comments in the Digest:- The new procedure requires the applicant to specify the scope and purpose of the proposed cross-examination before being granted leave to cross-examine. Cross-examination is not to be permitted unless the applicant can show that the evidence sought to be adduced by the proposed questioning has substantial relevance to the facts in issue. The relevance test may prove to be difficult to satisfy, however it remains to be seen what standard of specificity will be required by the bench in the notice for leave to cross-examine. The Committee is of the view that the committal proceeding is meant to determine what is of relevance for the purposes of a trial and that to make an application seeking leave to cross-examine on the foundation of questioning that is relevant would appear to presuppose that what is relevant is already known by the defendant/applicant. The purpose of cross-examination at committal has always been understood as one properly involving a forensic search to determine what is relevant as opposed to a broadly based fishing expedition or a rehearsal of testimony. The Committee is concerned that the new provisions may impair the right of a defendant to know, at an early stage of a criminal proceeding, the full extent of the case against him/her and therefore effect the defence opportunity to fully meet that case at trial. In some cases it may also impair the prosecution in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of charges brought, and therefore its ability to effectively prosecute those charges or in appropriate circumstances to withdraw some or all of the charges. The new cross-examination application procedure is silent as to cross-examination going only to issues of credit. The Committee believes that evidence on issues of credit allow both the defence and the prosecution sides to consider, in an informed way, the strengths and weaknesses of the case and may lead to an early determination of the proceedings by way of a plea or the withdrawal of some or all of the charges. 2. Clause 5 inserts a new section 56A in the Act dealing with an application to the Court by the informant for the compulsory attendance and examination of witnesses or the production of documents or things or both without notice to the defendant. The Committee made the following comments in the Digest:- The Committee notes that the amendment establishes a new witness examination procedure in criminal proceedings and that this procedure does not allow the evidence of a witness to be tested by cross-examination by any person who stands at risk of having an adverse finding being made against them as a consequence of that evidence. This may have the potential of infringing or diminishing existing rights. The Committee will write to the Attorney-General seeking her comments related to the Committees concerns on this amendment. The Committee assumes that witnesses examined under the new section 56A procedure will be entitled to legal representation during any such examination. The Committee will write to the Attorney-General to clarify that this is so and also to confirm by whom the costs of such legal representation are to be paid. 3. Part 3 deals with appeals to the County Court. The Committee prefaced its comments on this amendment with the following heading and remarks :- Alteration or variation of section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (section 4D(b)(iii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968) Pursuant to section 4D(b)(iii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968 the Committee is entrusted with the responsibility to consider any Bill introduced into a House of the Parliament and to report to the Parliament where a Bill does not repeal, alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975, but where an issue is raised as to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and to the full implication of that issue. Clause 9(1) inserts a new section 86(1AA) into the Act having the effect that a County Court judge is no longer obliged to warn the appellant that a more severe sentence may be imposed on the appeal. Such warning will now be given to a defendant prior to lodging an appeal. The proposed new sub-section (1AA) provides: Despite any rule of law or practice to the contrary, the County Court is not required, on the hearing of an appeal under section 83, to warn the appellant before making a sentencing order of the possibility of a sentencing order being made, or of its intention to make a sentencing order, that is more severe than that made by the Magistrates Court. The Committee made the following comments in the Digest:- The Committee believes that a failure to warn an appellant that he/she stands at risk of having a more severe sentence imposed on appeal diminishes a common law right of procedural fairness and natural justice propounded by the Victorian Supreme Court in Brand v Parson[1994] 1 VR 252 and by the High Court in Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 and the Privy Council in Mahon v Air New Zealand Airlines [1984] AC 809. The Committee further believes that there may be constitutional difficulties in applying the amendment in cases where the County Court exercises Federal jurisdiction. See Chu Kheng Lim v Minister of Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1. The Committee notes the High Court decisions in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 51; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister of Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1; Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; and Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 concerning constitutional law and the vesting of Federal judicial power in State Courts. The Committee believes that a question bearing on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be raised by this amendment. The Committee reports its concerns pursuant to section 4D(b)(iii) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 1968 that there may be implications concerning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. However the Committee feels constrained in offering an authoritative legal comment concerning the possibility of an issue of constitutional validity arising from the amendment. The Committee will write to the Attorney-General requesting her clarification on the Committees concerns on this amendment. 4. Clauses 9(2) and (3) repeals section 86(3)(a) of the Act and inserts sections 86(3A) to (3C) providing the court power to hear and determine an appeal where the appellant fails to appear on the appeal. The court may also strike out the appeal or adjourn the proceedings. New section 86(3B) allows the court, in circumstances where the appellant failed to appear on the appeal, to rely on any statements, exhibits or documents which the informant served on the appellant prior to the Magistrates Court hearing or may rely on oral evidence given on oath by or on behalf of the respondent. The Committee made the following comments in the Digest:- The Committee notes section 86 of the Magistrates Court Act 1989 invests in the County Court the same powers as the Magistrates Court could have exercised in the proceeding had the proceeding been commenced in the Magistrates Court by a charge filed in that court. The Committee believes that the amendment to section 86 proposed to be made by clause 9(3) will impair a defendants right not to have a criminal matter adjudged on the merits and criminal sanctions imposed without the necessity of being present at the proceeding in which this takes place. The Committee notes that the sanction applied in the Magistrates Court for failure to attend a summons on an indictable offence is the issuance of a warrant to arrest. The Committee will write to the Attorney-General seeking her comment on the Committees concerns in relation to this amendment. 5. Clause 11 inserts new section 88AA into the Act allowing the County Court wide discretion to order an appellant to pay all or part of the respondents costs of an appeal where the Court is satisfied that the appeal was brought vexatiously or frivolously or in abuse of process. The Committee made the following comments in the Digest:- The Committee believes that the amendment may deter some meritorious appeals being brought by appellants and that the amendment may impact more heavily on financially disadvantaged appellants who do not qualify for legal aid. 6. Clause 14 deals with the abandonment of appeals and inserts new sub-clauses (2A), (2B) and (2C) into clause 6 of Schedule 6. The effect of the amendments are that once 30 days have elapsed from the making of the sentencing order by the Magistrates Court an appeal may only be abandoned with the leave of the County Court, before that time the appeal may be abandoned by filing a notice of abandonment. The Court may only give leave if it is in the interests of justice to do so because of the existence of exceptional circumstances. The Committee made the following comments in the Digest:- The Committee believes that the amendment may impair an appellants right of appeal, and may force appellants to abandon appeals at an earlier stage in order to avoid the risk of a more severe sentence being imposed at appeal. The Committee is mindful that in many instances a grant of legal aid may only be given very near to the date of the appeal hearing. In such cases the amendment may impact adversely on persons reliant on legal assistance and who, without such assistance are not in a position to assess, in an informed manner, the merits of their case and therefore the likelihood of success of their case on appeal. 7. Clause 18 amends section 18 of the Sentencing Act 1991 by inserting new sub-sections (1A) and (1B) the effect of which will allow the Court of Appeal discretion, on dismissing an appeal under Part VI of the Crimes Act 1958 to disallow up to 3 months of a period of imprisonment or detention already served under the sentence between the time of giving of the notice of appeal or the application for leave to appeal and the determination of the appeal. The Committee made the following comment in the Digest:- The Committee believes the amendment may impinge on the right of access to justice by some prisoners and may act as a deterrent to the bringing of meritorious appeals by some prisoners. The Committee is specially concerned that the impact of the amendment may fall more heavily on unrepresented appellants. 15.3 Attorney-Generals response Thank you for your letter of 24 March 1999 referring me to the Committees concerns with certain provisions of the Magistrates Court (Amendment) Bill. You have sought my comments in relation to each of the areas raised. Committal Proceedings I would like to note that the amendments to committal proceedings were developed relying on the expert input of a Committee established to consider the need for reforms and the appropriateness of various reform models. Committee members included judges and magistrates, the Victorian DPP and his Chief Crown Prosecutor, the Commonwealth Deputy DPP, the Managing Director of VLA, several representatives of the Criminal Bar Association and Bar Council and the Law Institute. I believe that the amendments in the Bill will improve the effectiveness of committal hearings and will encourage the parties to come together with a view to resolving the issues in dispute. I consider that the reforms appropriately acknowledge that properly justified and controlled cross-examination of witnesses can benefit both prosecution and defence. 1. Clause 4 As the Committee is aware, despite the courts having stated on many occasions that committals are neither intended to be a fishing expedition nor a rehearsal proceeding for defence counsel to practice cross-examination on witnesses, abusive questioning of this kind is difficult for Magistrates to prevent under the present scheme. This difficulty in preventing irrelevant cross-examination at large arises because the defendant is under no obligation to disclose the issues in dispute. The new provisions address this problem by allowing cross-examination of witnesses only with leave of the court. Leave will only be granted where the Magistrate is satisfied that the evidence sought to be adduced by the proposed questioning has substantial relevance to the facts in issue. The Committee is concerned that the relevance test proposed by the legislation may presuppose that what is relevant is already known by the applicant. The Committee is also concerned that the provisions may impair the right of defendants to fully know the case against them, and may hinder the Crown in assessing the merits of the case for trial. I have considered the issues raised by the Committee, however, I am satisfied that the proposed amendments will not have the effects apprehended by the Committee. It should be remembered that the Bill places an increased onus of full and early disclosure on the prosecution by requiring a greater range of material to be discovered to the defendant than is currently the case. A defendant will have this material when framing his or her application for leave to cross-examine and will be aware of which areas are disputed. I note that the substantial relevance test already applies where the defendant seeks leave to cross-examine sexual assault complainants and has been applied for some years without difficulty. The Committee does not refer to the matters which the magistrate must take into account when considering whether to grant leave to cross-examine. The criteria would appear to address the types of concerns raised by the Committee. Magistrates are specifically directed to have regard to:
The Committee correctly notes that the legislation is silent about cross-examination on credit issues. Feedback from the courts indicates that this is precisely the area where the greatest abuses occur resulting in long, repetitive and ultimately irrelevant cross-examination. Nevertheless, it is conceded that there will be cases where cross-examination on credit issues will be of vital importance. I consider that the legislation will allow leave to be granted for such cross-examination in appropriate cases. The package of committal amendments will also enhance the courts ability to control the course of proceedings before it in a fair and flexible manner. These amendments do not go as far as amendments in new South Wales and South Australia which have drastically curtailed oral committals. 2. Clause 5 The Committee has raised concerns about the compulsory examination procedure found in the new section 56A. This new provision is designed to apply in circumstances where a witness is reluctant to make a statement, streamlining the procedures which currently apply in such cases. It is based on similar provisions in the equivalent West Australian and UK legislation. The compulsory examination procedure allows the court, on the application of the informant at any time before the committal mention date, to make an order requiring a person to attend court to be questioned by or on behalf of the informant or produce a document. The procedure is conducted in open court, however, the defendant is neither a party to the application, nor may the defendant cross-examine a witness attending the court under such an order. It is an investigative procedure that allows evidence to be taken from someone that the informant suspects has relevant information, but who refuses to cooperate with investigators. The evidence of a witness given under the procedure is taken on oath and recorded. The defendant will receive a copy of the transcript of the evidence whenever the procedure is used. If the prosecution wishes to rely on the evidence, then a transcript of it must be included in the hand-up brief. If the prosecution decides not to use the evidence, it must nevertheless disclose the evidence to the defendant and provide the defendant with the transcript (see clause 6 of the Bill). I believe that the effect of section 56A has been misunderstood. The provision is necessary to address an increasing incidence of witnesses refusing to assist investigators in white collar prosecutions, particularly in corporations and tax fraud cases. The refusals are typically based on a desire not to assist for commercial as well as personal reasons and on fear of being sued for breaching confidentiality (as opposed to breaching a recognised privilege). It should be noted that the current provisions do include a general power in the court to dispense with evidence-in-chief by statement, and thus allow a witness who has refused to make a statement to be summonsed to give full oral evidence. Such witnesses are already subject to the contempt of court provisions in the Magistrates Court Act. However, some magistrates have taken the view that once this procedure is used for one witness, it must be used for all, which leads to a cumbersome, full oral committal hearing. Further, both prosecution and defence are given no notice of the evidence that the witness will give in advance. The section 56A procedure allows such evidence to be taken in open court prior to the committal which minimises disruption to the court during the subsequent committal proceedings and gives both sides notice of the witness evidence-in-chief prior to the committal. I further note that once the evidence is included in the hand-up brief, the defendant will be entitled to seek leave to cross-examine in the usual way. The Committee has queried the entitlement to legal representation during any such examination. I note that the court has a discretion to allow counsel to appear for a witness or interested party where the witness is in need of particular protection or wishes to rely upon a particular privilege or immunity or the interested party seeks to protect the interest. The principles of natural justice and procedural fairness will guide the court in exercising the discretion whether or not to allow legal representation. Appeal Provisions I would like to note at the outset that the amendments relating to County Court appeals were developed in consultation with the County Court and that the amending provisions are fully supported by the Chief Judge. 3. Part 3 The Committee has expressed concern about the amendment contained in section 86(1AA) stating that a County Court judge is not required to warn an appellant that a more severe sentence may be imposed on the appeal. The Committee considers that the provision diminishes the common law right of procedural fairness and natural justice. I note however that the amendments take account of procedural fairness by requiring notice of the courts ability to increase a sentence to be provided to the proposed appellant at the time the appeal is lodged. Further, section 86AA is not mandatory in its terms: a County Court judge hearing an appeal may still choose to warn an appellant about a prospective sentence increase if in the circumstances of the case it is appropriate to do so. The Committee suggests that there may be constitutional difficulties in applying the amendment in cases where the County Court exercises federal jurisdiction. The Committees concerns on this aspect have been referred to the Solicitor General for consideration, who has indicated that in his opinion, the provisions raise no difficulties in relation to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The Committee also notes that a question bearing on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be raised by this amendment. The Solicitor General has considered this aspect of the Committees comments and has indicated that in his opinion, the provisions do not affect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. I note further that the amendments do not remove an appellants ability to seek judicial review by the Supreme Court. 4. Clauses 9(2) and (3) These provisions enable a County Court judge to hear and determine an appeal where the appellant fails to appear on the appeal. The judge may also strike out the appeal or adjourn the proceedings. The Committee has expressed concern that clause 9(3) will impair a defendants right not to have a criminal matter adjudged on the merits and criminal sanctions imposed in his or her absence. The thrust of this package of amendments is to ensure that appeals to the County Court operate as true hearings de novo and that prospective appellants consider the merits of their appeal before proceeding. The Bill tightens the procedures for abandoning appeals (discussed below) to achieve these policy objectives. In my view, the ability to hear an appeal ex parte is equally necessary to avoid the situation where appellants informally abandon by simply failing to appear. As you will appreciate, abandoning appeals in this manner is particularly disruptive to court lists and wasteful of court and prosecution resources. While the County Court will be able to determine an appeal ex parte, it should be stressed that the clause also contemplates the Court striking out the appeal or adjourning the proceedings. The Committee refers to the sanction available in the Magistrates Court for failing to appear on an indictable offence. The magistrate may issue a warrant to arrest the defendant. The Committee does not however refer to the procedures that apply where the failure to appear relates to a summary offence, which is the model for the above clause. Under section 41(2) and (3), the Magistrates Court may proceed to hear and determine summary offences ex parte. I believe that the analogous procedure for County Court appeals, be they in relation to summary or indictable offences, is entirely appropriate. Many appeals to the County Court will in fact relate to summary offences. Where indictable offences are concerned, I note that the defendant would have elected to have had the charge dealt with summarily in the first instance, and has therefore chosen to opt in to the practice and procedure of the Magistrates Court. Finally, the Committee does not discuss clause 12 of the Bill, which inserts a new section 89A into the Magistrates Court Act 1989 providing a safeguard to an appellant who has had his or her appeal determined ex parte by allowing for a re-hearing procedure. The appellant may, within 30 days of receiving written notification of the outcome of the appeal, apply for a re-hearing of the appeal. The Court may only grant the application if satisfied that the failure to appear was not due to fault or neglect on the part of the appellant. Sub sections (2) and (3) of 89A contemplate applications for a re-hearing outside the 30 day period in exceptional circumstances and where the respondents case would not be materially prejudiced by the delay. These latter requirements reflect the existing criteria for applications out of time found in clause 1(3) of Schedule 6. 5. Clause 11 The Committee has expressed concern about the new section 88AA which empowers a County Court judge to order costs if satisfied that the appeal was brought vexatiously or frivolously or in abuse of process. The Committee believes that the amendment may deter some meritorious appeals being brought and that the amendment may impact more heavily on financially disadvantaged appellants who do not qualify for legal aid. I am concerned that the criticism of this costs power is quite misconceived as it seems to proceed on the basis that the mere fact of a failed appeal will give rise to the jurisdiction to consider making a costs order. Far from allowing a wide discretion to order costs, the provision explicitly spells out narrow criteria which a County Court judge must be satisfied of before the ability to consider making a costs order arises. Even if an appeal were to fall within the criteria listed in the section, the judge could still in his or her discretion decide not to award costs if the circumstances of the case warranted this. I would expect costs orders under this provision to be made only rarely and am confident that the power will operate to deter those who seek to abuse the appeal system rather than discouraging meritorious appeals. 6. Clause 14 The Committee has raised concerns about the provisions of the Bill relating to abandonments of appeals. Whilst the Committees concerns have been noted, I believe that the Bill fairly balances the need for measures to deter worthless appeals that have no prospect of success with the fundamental right to challenge court decisions by appealing against them. Those with valid appeal grounds will not be forced to abandon their appeal early to avoid the risk of a higher sentence being imposed. Rather, the amendment addresses abuses such as judge shopping or appeals that are solely brought in an attempt to buy time for the defendant. The provisions allow for a cooling off period of up to 30 days during which time the appeal may be abandoned as of right to cover the situation where an appeal is lodged in the heat of the moment, or where subsequent legal advice is received to suggest that the appeal will fail. Where a person has lodged their appeal notice towards the end of the 30 days, they will not have as long a time within which to re-consider and perhaps abandon. However, in such cases that person will have had more time to seek legal advice or assistance prior to lodging the appeal. The Committee has referred to a difficulty which may arise where a grant of legal assistance is given near to the date of the appeal hearing, presumably after the 30 day period has expired. However, Victoria Legal Aid has indicated that it should be able to finalise applications for assistance in sufficient time to enable an appellant who has been refused assistance to abandon the appeal, so long as defendants are reasonably prompt in making their applications. I have instructed my Department to consider administrative and other ways to encourage defendants to apply for legal assistance promptly. For example, Magistrates Court documentation may need to clearly explain the time frame for abandoning appeals as of right and reinforce the importance of lodging an early application for assistance. It may also be appropriate for Magistrates to convey this information direct to persons in their court. 7. Clause 18 Clause 18 of the Bill provides the Court of Appeal with a discretion to order that time spent in custody (up to a maximum of three months) between lodging an application for leave to appeal against sentence and its dismissal not count as time served. The provision is targeted at deterring frivolous appeals that waste court resources and delay the determination of legitimate appeals. The Committee believes that this amendment may impinge upon the right of access to justice by some prisoners and may operate to deter meritorious appeals. The Committee has raised a particular concern that the impact of the amendment may fall more heavily on unrepresented appellants. I note that the power conferred upon the Court of Appeal is discretionary and I reaffirm my confidence in the ability of that court to use the power wisely. I would in fact expect that orders under the provision would only be made rarely and that the Court is competent to take into account matters such as lack of representation if this was a pertinent factor in a given case. I further advise the Committee that this provision has been amended in the House to address criticism that it was drafted too widely. The House amendments: confine the operation of the provision to applications for leave to appeal against sentence only; clarify the circumstances in which the discretion arises by expressly providing that jurisdiction to exercise the power will only arise where the Court of Appeal is satisfied that the application for leave to appeal is frivolous, vexatious or brought without there being any reasonably arguable grounds. I trust that my response clarifies the legislative amendments and addresses the concerns expressed by the Committee.
Committee Room
|