Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations CommitteeAlert Digest No 5 of 2008Tuesday, 6 May 2008[Back to Table of Contents]Cancer Amendment (HPV) Bill 2008Introduced:
16 April 2008 PurposeThis Bill amends the Cancer Act 1958 (the ‘Act’) by extending the definition of ‘cancer test’ in section 59(1) to include a test for a precursor to cancer. The amendment will enable reports of tests for precursors to cancer, such as the human papilloma virus, to be forwarded to an organisation that maintains a prescribed register. The Committee notes these extracts from the Second Reading Speech – The Bill seeks to amend the Cancer Act 1958 to enable the Victorian cervical cytology register to lawfully collect and record women's test results for human papilloma virus, commonly known as HPV. … Whilst the Act currently enables results of tests for cancer to be forwarded to a prescribed register such as the Victorian cervical cytology register, the definition of 'cancer test' does not extend to tests for 'precursors to cancer', such as HPV. This Bill will broaden the definition of 'cancer test' to enable tests for precursors to cancer to be reported to and recorded by a prescribed register. … This Bill will provide a legislative framework for reporting and recording test results of precursors to cancer other than HPV. However, it will only support the capture of information about other precursors to cancer where a prescribed register is established to record this information. This will avoid the unnecessary capture of test results that do not serve to improve health outcomes for Victorians. The proposed amendment maintains current provisions in the Act which require that people are informed of their right to object to their test results being recorded, to opt off the register, or not have their information reported to the register in the first instance. The amendment appropriately balances healthcare considerations with patient privacy. Content and Committee comment[Clauses] [2]. The provisions in the Bill will come into operation on the day after Royal Assent. [3 and 4]. Respectively amends the definition of ‘cancer test’ in section 59(1) and amends section 62 in respect to registers of results from cancer tests to include a test for a precursor to cancer. [5]. Provides that this amending Act is repealed on the first anniversary of its commencement. Charter ReportRight to life – Privacy – Register of results of tests for precursors to cancer Charter s. 9 gives everyone ‘the right to life’. Charter s. 13(a) provides that everyone has the right ‘not to have his or her privacy unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with’. The Committee notes that clause 3, amending s. 59(1) of the Cancer Act 1958, expands the definition of ‘cancer test’ to include tests to determine whether a person is suffering from a precursor to cancer. The Committee also notes that existing s. 62 permits practitioners who perform a cancer test or persons in charge of places where such tests are performed to forward the results for inclusion in a register (to be used to follow-up test results and for research into cancer.) The Committee considers that clause 3 engages the Charter rights of people who are tested not to have their privacy unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with. The Committee further notes that existing ss. 62(3) & (4) require that people who are tested must be informed of their right to object. If they object, their information must not be forwarded. The Committee additionally notes that the Bill does not extend the mandatory cancer reporting requirement in existing s.60 to include people suffering from precursors to cancer. The Statement of Compatibility remarks: The proposed amendments are considered to be reasonable from a privacy perspective because they appropriately balance healthcare considerations with patient privacy…. I consider that the Bill promotes the right to life because the amendments will facilitate best practice screening and treatment of women who have a higher cervical cancer risk associated with the human papilloma virus. The Committee considers that clause 3 is compatible with the Charter’s right to privacy and also promotes the Charter’s right to life. The Committee makes no further comment. |
Rights and freedoms – Presumption of innocence – Reverse onus to prove evidentiary facts – Offender must not fail, without reasonable excuse to attend a medical examination The Committee notes that an evidential onus on an offender to prove ‘reasonable excuse’ raises the rights and freedoms issue of the ‘presumption of innocence’. The Committee notes that by reason of section 30 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 the evidential burden would be on the offender to point to or present sufficient evidence to raise the reasonable possibility of the existence of a reasonable excuse and it would then fall to the prosecution to rebut the existence of that excuse beyond reasonable doubt. The Committee observes that such reverse onus provisions in proposed legislation may be justified in circumstances where a defence is solely or peculiarly within the knowledge of the offender. |
[17]. Inserts new Division 4A in Part 2 (new sections 25A to 25N) to provide for IESO.
New section 25A provides that the Secretary can apply for an IESO in respect of an offender who is the subject of an application for an extended supervision order or of an application for a renewal of an extended supervision order.
New section 25C the court must ensure that a person subject to an IESO application must have a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation.
New section 25D sets out the circumstances in which a court may make an IESO. The Secretary must have applied for an ESO or for the renewal of an ESO. The court must be satisfied, amongst other things that the order is justified and it is in the public interest to make the order.
New sections 25G and 25M provide that an interim extended supervision order can be made or renewed for a period of up to 4 months, and cannot exceed a period of 4 months unless the court making or extending the order considers that exceptional circumstances exist.
New section 25H provides that sections 15 (conditions of an ESO), 16 (instructions and directions in relation to an ESO), 16A (person on a victim register may make a submission) and 16B (how victim submissions are dealt with by the Adult Parole Board) apply to an IESO.
Rights and freedoms Separation of powers – Judicial powers – Board may give a direction to offender to reside in premises that are situated on land that is within the perimeter of a prison – Whether direction punitive or preventative and rehabilitative – Whether cruel and unusual punishment The Committee observes that all of the provisions of sections 15 and 16 (and others) are to apply to the proposed IESO’s. The Committee notes the provisions raise many human rights issues that are identified in the Statement of Compatibility. The Committee observes that it reported on the Act, when it was introduced in February 2005. The Committee also reported on an amending Act in October 2006 when amendments were made to the Act with the insertion of new section 16(3A) (see below) giving the Adult Parole Board a discretion to require that an offender (as part of the conditions of an ESO) live in premises that are situated on land within the perimeter of a prison but that does not form part of the prison. In that report the Committee considered whether such a law could be regarded as punitive and therefore a form of additional punishment to a judicially determined sentence. If such a law could be characterised as punitive it may be offend the principal of the separation of powers allowing sentences to be imposed other than by judicial merits adjudication. The provisions may also be repugnant to the exercise of judicial power by non-judicial bodies within the meaning of Chapter III of the Commonwealth constitution. The Committee further observes that if the requirement to reside within the perimeter of a prison constitutes a form of unusual punishment it may be characterised as an undue trespass to rights and freedoms. The question for Parliament to consider is whether the laws are properly characterised as punitive or preventative and rehabilitative. (The Committee further considers this question in its Charter Report below). Rights and freedoms – Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment - Compulsory medical treatment of offender The Committee observes that section 16(3)(d) relating to treatment or rehabilitation programs will now apply to the new IESO scheme proposed by the Bill. The Committee observes that the question whether non-consensual medical treatment constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment is discussed in the Statement of Compatibility. (Refer also to the Charter Report below). Natural justice – Offender may be excluded from or absent at hearing of application for orders The Committee notes that the insertion of a new Division 4A will be subject to the provisions of the existing Division 5 of Part 2 of the Act including section 29 that provides that in certain circumstances the hearing of an application for an ESO (and as proposed by the Bill, an IESO) may be held in the absence of the offender. In brief the reasons why the offender may not be present at the hearing include exclusion of the offender on ground of misbehaviour or absence for illness or other reason. On grounds other than exclusion for misbehaviour the hearing may only proceed if doing so will not prejudice the offender and it is in the interests of justice to do so. The Committee considers that these provisions do not unduly abridge the right to a fair hearing (trial) (see also the Charter Report below). Retrospective application of laws – scheme to apply to new categories of past offences – Whether scheme is punitive or protective and rehabilitative The Committee observes that amendments to the Act expand the ‘relevant offences’ to which the monitoring and reporting obligations under the Act will now apply to offences committed against adult victims. As the Statement of Compatibility observes ‘the application of clause 24 therefore has a ‘retrospective’ impact to the extent that at the time the relevant offence was committed, the offender would not have been eligible for the scheme’. The Committee observes that if the scheme is properly to be characterised as punitive in nature rather than protective and rehabilitative then the laws may be repugnant to the notion that legislation should not impose a retrospective higher penalty to the punishment prevailing at the time the offence was committed. (The Committee considers this question in its Charter Report below). |
Note 1: The provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the SSOMA are –
15. Conditions of extended supervision order
(3) The conditions of an extended supervision order are that during the period of the order the offender must —
(a) not commit, whether in or outside Victoria, another relevant offence or an offence that, if committed in Victoria, would be a relevant offence;
(b) attend at any place as directed by the Secretary or the Adult Parole Board for the purpose of supervision, assessment or monitoring;
(c) report to, and receive visits from, the Secretary or any person nominated by the Secretary for the purposes of this paragraph;
(d) notify the Secretary of any change of name or employment at least 2 clear working days before the change;
(e) not move to a new address without the prior written consent of the Secretary;
(f) not leave Victoria except with the permission of the Secretary granted either generally or in relation to the particular case;
(g) obey all lawful instructions and directions of the Secretary given under section 16(1);
(h) obey all lawful instructions and directions of the Adult Parole Board given under section 16(2).
16. Instructions and directions in relation to extended supervision order
(1) For the purposes of section 15(3)(g) the Secretary may give to an offender who is subject to an extended supervision order any instruction or direction that the Secretary considers necessary to ensure the effective and efficient implementation and administration of the conditions of the order.
(2) For the purposes of section 15(3)(h) the Adult Parole Board may give to an offender who is subject to an extended supervision order any instruction or direction that the Board considers necessary to achieve the purposes of the conditions of the order set out in section 15(2).
(3) Without limiting subsection (2), instructions or directions given by the Adult Parole Board may include instructions or directions as to—
(a) where the offender may reside;
(b) times at which the offender must be at home;
(c) places or areas that the offender must not visit or may only visit at specified times;
(d) treatment or rehabilitation programs or activities that the offender must attend and participate in;
(e) the types of employment in which the offender must not engage;
(f) community activities in which the offender must not engage;
(g) persons or classes of person with whom the offender must not have contact;
(h) forms of monitoring (including electronic monitoring) of compliance with the extended supervision order to which the offender must submit;
(i) personal examinations by a medical expert for which the offender must attend for the purpose of the Board being given a report by the expert to assist it in determining the need for, or form of, any instruction or direction under this section.
(3A) Without limiting subsection (2) or (3)(a), an instruction or direction given by the Adult Parole Board under subsection (2) as to where an offender may reside may require the offender to reside at premises that are situated on land that is within the perimeter of a prison (whether within or outside any walls erected on prison land) but does not form part of the prison.
Note 2: Cruel and unusual punishment – Other than the provisions of section 10(b) of the Charter (cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment) by force of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 there are incorporated in Victorian statute law certain enactments of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Unless Victorian law provides otherwise or is inconsistent with the Imperial Act these enactments apply in Victoria to the extent that they may provide interpretive guidance to Victorian statute law, namely –
10. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
[1688] I William and Mary Sess II (Bill of Rights) c.II
New section 25M sets out the circumstances in which the Secretary may request an extension of an IESO.
[20]. Substitutes a new section 39 to extend the powers of the Court of Appeal on an appeal against an ESO so that the court can make an order quashing the relevant decision and remit the matter back to the court that made the original order in accordance with any directions made by the Court of Appeal.
[21]. Inserts new section 39A to give the Court of Appeal the power to make an IESO.
[23]. Inserts a new section 51 being the transitional provisions for the amendments made to the Act by the Bill.
The provisions in clause 17 relating to an IESO will apply on and after the date of commencement whether an application for, or a renewal, or a review of an ESO has been made before, on or after that date of commencement.
The amendments to the Schedule made by clause 24 which extend relevant offences to include adult victims, will apply from the day after Royal Assent.
[24]. Makes a number of amendments to the Schedule to extend the offences in that Schedule to include certain offences against adult victims.
The clause also inserts a new item 19 into the Schedule being the offence against section 60AB of the Crimes Act 1958 (sexual servitude) and new item 20A being the offence against section 60AD of the Crimes Act 1958 (deceptive recruiting for commercial services).
[28]. Makes an amendment to the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Refer to note 3 under clause 2 above).
[29]. Provides for the automatic repeal of this amending Act on 1 August 2009.
Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – Non-consensual medical treatment – Movement – Privacy – Religion and belief – Expression – Association – Liberty – Extensions to extended supervision order scheme – Adult Parole Board may give an offender any directions it considers necessary to ensure that the community is adequately protected by monitoring the offender – Where discretion to limit many human rights exempted from natural justice, statutory review procedures and human rights obligations – Whether reasonable limit
Charter s. 7(2) provides that human rights may be ‘subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. Charter s.32(1) requires that Victorian legislation be ‘interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights’ ‘so far as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose’. Charter s. 38(1) provides that ‘it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right or, in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right.’
The Committee notes that existing ss.15 & 16 of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 either require or permit people who are the subject of extended supervision orders to comply with a large number of conditions, including being required to:
obey all lawful instructions and directions of the Secretary to the Department of Justice ‘that the Secretary considers necessary to ensure the effective and efficient implementation and administration of the conditions of the order’ (ss. 15(3)(g) & 16(1))
obey all lawful instructions and directions of the Adult Parole Board ‘that the Board considers necessary to achieve the purposes’ of ensuring ‘that the community is adequately protected by monitoring the offender’ and promoting ‘the rehabilitation, and the care and treatment, of the offender’ (ss. 15(2), 15(3)(h) & 16(2))
The Committee also notes that clause 17, inserting a new section 25H into the Act, provides that ss. 15 & 16 apply with respect to interim extended supervision orders. The Committee further notes that clause 24, amending the Schedule to the Act, provides that various sex offenders whose victims were adults and offenders convicted of sexual servitude or deceptive recruiting for commercial sexual services are eligible for extended supervision orders and, hence, may become subject to ss. 15 & 16.
The Committee considers that clauses 17 and 24 may limit the following Charter rights of offenders who may now be subject to an interim or standard extended supervision order:
Charter s. 10(c): prohibition on non-consensual medical treatment: see s. 16(3)(d), permitting the Adult Parole Board to make directions as to ‘treatment programs or activities that the offender must attend and participate in’.
Charter s. 12: right to move freely within Victoria: see s. 15(3)(b), which requires the offender to ‘attend at any place as directed by the Secretary or the Adult Parole Board for the purpose of supervision, assessment or monitoring’; and ss. 16(3)(b) & (c), which permit the Adult Parole Board to make directions as to ‘times at which the offender must be at home’; and ‘places or areas that the offender must not visit’.
Charter s. 12: right to enter or leave Victoria: see s. 15(3)(f), which provides that the offender must ‘not leave Victoria except with the permission of the Secretary’.
Charter s. 12: right to choose where to live: see s. 15(3)(e), which provides that the offender must ‘not move to a new address without the prior written consent of the Secretary’ and ss. 16(3)(a), (b) & (c), which permit the Adult Parole Board to make directions as to ‘where the offender may reside’.
Charter s. 13(a): right not to be subject to certain interferences with privacy: see ss. 16(3)(h) & (i), which permit the Adult Parole Board to make directions as to ‘forms of monitoring (including electronic monitoring) of compliance’ and ‘personal examinations by a medical expert for which the offender must attend’.
Charter s. 14(2): right to demonstrate his or her religion or belief as part of a community: see s. 16(f), which permits the Adult Parole Board to make directions as to ‘community activities in which the offender must not engage’.
Charter s. 15(2): right to freedom of expression: see Fletcher v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2006] VSC 354, where the Adult Parole Board imposed a condition barring an offender from using or accessing the internet.
Charter s. 16(2): right to freedom of association with others: see s. 16(3)(h), which permits the Adult Parole Board to make directions as to ‘persons or classes of persons with whom the offender must not have contact’.
Charter s. 21(1): right to liberty: see all of ss. 15 & 16.
The Statement of Compatibility argues that clauses 17 and 24 do not infringe the rights to privacy and liberty (as the intrusions and deprivations are not arbitrary) and are compatible with the remaining rights because of the operation of Charter s.7(2). The Statement of Compatibility also argues that the clauses promote the Charter rights of potential victims of eligible offenders to equality, life, privacy, liberty and security.
Whilst the Committee considers that the purposes in s.15(2) of the Act and the Charter rights of potential victims are compelling reasons to limit eligible offenders’ rights in accordance with the Charter’s limitation provisions, the Committee is concerned that the discretion given to the Adult Parole Board as to whether those rights will be limited in particular cases is extremely broad.
The Statement of Compatibility remarks:
Whilst these rights may be limited in individual cases, it is necessary to have a broad power to impose such restrictions, tailored to the individual circumstances, in order to protect the community.
The extent of this limitation would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the specific instructions and directions given by the APB in relation to the personal circumstances of the offender. However, it is fair to presume that the limitation that may occur in respect of this right would be reasonable, vis-à-vis s7 of the Charter, given that in order to be lawful the limitation would need to be for an important and legitimate purpose (i.e. those set out in s15(2) of the SSOMA) and any derogation from these purposes would render the decision ultra vires. It is also worthwhile noting that the breadth of the discretionary powers… is necessary in order to tailor instructions to particular offenders; and the individual risks they represent. Bearing in mind that these are discretionary powers, it is important to recognise that the limitation of the right will be curtailed by principles of administrative law. That is, any decision that was in fact disproportionate to an offenders individual risks could be challenged on the grounds that it was either incompatible with human rights (see s32 of the Charter); or unreasonable (broad ultra vires) or an abuse of discretionary power.
The Committee observes that the two purposes in s.15(2) are conflicting, so that the capacity for either of them to limit the Adult Parole Board’s authority is limited. The Committee also observes that the interpretation rule in Charter s.32 is limited by the requirements that any new interpretation be both ‘possible’ and ‘consistent with the purposes’ of the statute. The Committee further observes that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under the common law to overturn a decision of the Adult Parole Board under s. 16(2) is ‘limited’, ‘supervisory’, ‘is not concerned with the merits of the decision under review’ and ‘is not concerned with whether the decision was fair or correct’: Fletcher v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2006] VSC 354, [36]-[37].
The Committee additionally observes that the Adult Parole Board is:
not bound by the rules of natural justice (s.69, Corrections Act 1986)
not subject to statutory appeal to the Court of Appeal (s. 36(1), defining ‘relevant decision’, in Part 3 of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005)
not subject to review by VCAT (s.3 defining ‘tribunal’, Administrative Law Act 1978)
not subject to ombudsman inquiries (including human rights inquiries) (s.13(3)(aa), Ombudsman Act 1973)
not currently a public authority under the Charter (s.4(a), Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (Public Authorities)(Interim) Regulations 2007).
The latter means that the Adult Parole Board is not currently required to act compatibly with Charter rights or to consider relevant Charter rights when making its decisions.
The Committee will seek further information from the Minister as follows:
1. Why are the Adult Parole Board’s decisions under s. 16(2) not subject to the rules of natural justice or to any statutory review or inquiries?
2. Why is the Adult Parole Board exempted from the obligation to act compatibly with human rights and to consider relevant human rights when making decisions under s. 16(2)? Will the exemption in the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (Public Authorities) (Interim) Regulations 2007 be renewed in 2009?
Pending the Minister’s response, the Committee refers to Parliament for its consideration the question of whether or not clauses 17 and 24, by expanding the operation of the Adult Parole Board’s discretion under s. 16(2) to restrict many Charter rights of offenders who are the subject of extended supervision orders, without that discretion being subject to natural justice, statutory review or the Charter’s human rights obligations, are reasonable limits on those Charter rights under Charter s. 7(2).
Retrospective criminal laws – Right not to be tried or punished more than once – Retrospective extension of extended supervision order scheme – Whether extended supervision order is punishment or penalty – Whether reasonable limit
Charter s. 7(2) provides that human rights may be ‘subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. Charter s. 26 provides that a person ‘must not be tried or punished more than once for an offence in respect of which he or she has already been finally convicted’. Charter s.27(2) bars the imposition of a ‘penalty for a criminal offence that is greater than the penalty that applied to the offence when it was committed’.
The Committee notes that clause 23, inserting a new section 51(8) into the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005, provides that the amendments made by clause 24 ‘apply on and after the commencement of clause 23 whether a person was sentenced in respect of a relevant offence before, on or after that commencement’. The Committee also notes that clause 24 extends the definition of ‘relevant offences’ for the purposes of extended supervision orders to include offenders whose victims are adults and offenders who commit the offences of sexual servitude and deceptive recruiting for commercial sexual services. The Committee further notes that clause 23 prevents the application of s. 114 of the Sentencing Act 1991, which would otherwise ensure that any amendment that increased a penalty did not apply retrospectively.
The Committee observes that the effect of clause 23 is that some finally convicted offenders will now be potentially subject to extended supervision orders, even though they were not subject to them when they were convicted. The Committee also observes that the effect of clause 23 is that some offenders who committed offences at a time when those offences were not relevant offences for the purposes of extended supervision orders may in the future be subject to extended supervision orders in respect of those offences. The Committee considers that, to the extent that an extended supervision order is a punishment or a penalty, clause 23 may limit the Charter rights of such offenders against double jeopardy and retrospective increases in penalties.
The Statement of Compatibility argues that extended supervision orders are neither punishments nor penalties as the purposes of extended supervision orders ‘do not include punishment’ and:
The authority to impose an ESO is not drawn from what was done in the sentencing of the offender; rather the Act simply takes as the factum of the application for an ESO the status of the offender as a person who is serving a custodial sentence…
The Committee observes that the meaning of ‘punishment’ and ‘penalty’ in the Charter is not determined by any Victorian law. The Statement of Compatibility argues that its view that extended supervision orders are not punishments or penalties is supported by judgments of the High Court interpreting Chapter 3 of the Commonwealth Constitution. However, the Committee observes that the High Court’s judgments concerned the separation of powers and are ‘not concerned with wider issues’, including ‘substantial questions of civil liberty’: Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) [2004] HCA 46, [3] (per Gleeson CJ).
The Statement of Compatibility remarks:
The approach of the High Court is consistent with the approach of Courts in a number of other jurisdictions under human rights legislation where protective measures are imposed upon persons who have been convicted of certain offences, including sex offenders.
The Committee observes that decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the United Kingdom courts that held that somewhat similar schemes were not punishments turned on a finding that the relevant proceedings for imposing the supervision orders were civil, rather than criminal, proceedings. However, s. 26 of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 expressly provides that proceedings for an extended supervision order are ‘criminal in nature’.
The Committee also observes that New Zealand’s Attorney-General reported to that nation’s Parliament that a bill to enact an extended supervision scheme that was very similar to Victoria’s ‘should be viewed as “punishment” for the purposes of’ the double jeopardy provision of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Parole (Extended Supervision) and Sentencing Amendment Bill but c.f. the report of the New Zealand Parliament’s Justice and Electoral Committee, noting that ‘[i]t is possible to consider retrospective application of the extended supervision regime not to be “punishment”.)
The Committee further observes that New Zealand’s Court of Appeal recently held that the same legislation, now enacted as Part 1A of the Parole Act 2002 (NZ), ‘amounts to punishment’ for the purposes of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’s provisions on retroactive penalties and double jeopardy: Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2006] NZCA 262, [49]. At para [47] of that judgment, the Court of Appeal listed fourteen characteristics of the New Zealand extended supervision order regime that supported its conclusion. The Committee observes that the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 matches eleven of those fourteen characteristics and that the three differences are arguably minor. In particular, whereas the New Zealand Act permits an offender to be placed in home detention, the Victorian Act permits an offender to be told where to reside (including living within the perimeter of a prison) and when to be at home.
The Committee therefore considers that clause 23 may limit the Charter rights of some past offenders not to be subject to double jeopardy or retrospective increases in penalty. The Committee observes that the question of whether or not clause 23 is compatible with human rights may therefore depend on whether or not that clause satisfies the test for reasonable limits on rights set out in Charter s. 7(2). The Committee also observes that the Statement of Compatibility does not address this question.
The Committee further observes that the New Zealand Attorney-General’s view (in the report mentioned above) is that the New Zealand extended supervision order regime ‘is not capable of justification under’ New Zealand’s equivalent to Charter s.7(2). She remarked that individuals who have already been sentenced:
may well have made decisions about how to plead to charges they faced on the basis that the only punishment they were thereby liable to was a term of imprisonment (of possibly relatively short duration – a significant factor if the defendant had been remanded in custody pending trial.)
The Committee additionally observes that the New Zealand courts are yet to determine whether or not the New Zealand extended supervision regime is compatible with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
The Committee refers to Parliament for its consideration the questions of –
• whether or not extended supervision orders are penalties or punishments; and
• if they are, whether or not clause 23’s retrospective application of the extended supervision order scheme to past offenders who committed sexual crimes against adults and to past offenders who committed the crimes of sexual servitude and deceptive recruiting for commercial sexual services is a reasonable limit on those offenders’ Charter rights against double jeopardy and retrospective penalties.
Fair hearing – Reasonable limits on rights – Criminal justice procedures – Privacy – Liberty – Presumption of innocence
Charter s. 7(2) provides that human rights may be ‘subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.
The Committee notes that the Bill amends various Acts that regulate criminal justice procedures. The Committee observes that such regulation inevitably engages a variety of human rights, but that reasonable provisions will typically satisfy Charter s. 7(2), as well as internal limits on particular rights.
The Statement of Compatibility identifies several provisions of the Bill that are said to engage the following Charter rights:
Privacy (Charter s.13(a)): provisions for victims to be notified about interim extended supervision orders and extending the current victim notification scheme (clause 6(a), amending ss. 30A of the Corrections Act 1996; clause 24, amending the schedule to the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005); provisions for the subjects of interim extended supervision orders to be monitored at community corrections centres, including taking photographs (clause 6(e), amending s. 104E of the Corrections Act 1996); provisions for a medical expert to seek an assessment of an eligible offender from an additional medical expert, for the offender to be directed to comply and for additional assessments to be made (clause 15, inserting a new 7B into the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005); and provisions extending the operation of existing provisions requiring offenders to report to, receive visits from and notify the Secretary of the Department of Justice of any change of name or employment; and to be directed to undergo monitoring and personal examinations (clauses 15 and 24, inserting new section 25H into and amending the schedule to the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005.).
Liberty (Charter s.21(1)): a provision that does not specify a time limit for interim extended supervision orders imposed by the Court of Appeal when remitting a matter to a lower court (clause 21, inserting a new section 39A(3) into the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005).
Fair hearing (Charter s. 24(1)): a provision allowing an offender to be excluded from the courtroom during interim extended supervision order hearings (clause 17, inserting a new Division 4A into Part 2 of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005).
Presumption of innocence (Charter s.25(1)): a provision placing an evidentiary onus on offenders charged with disobeying a direction to attend a medical examination to point to evidence establishing a reasonable excuse (clauses 14 & 15, amending s. 7A(3) and inserting a new section 7B(4) into the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005).
The Statement of Compatibility contends that these provisions do not infringe the above rights.
Having considered the above Charter rights and provisions, the Committee is satisfied that the measures so engaged do not warrant any special mention or adverse comment in respect to possible incompatibility with human rights.
Statement of Compatibility – References to court decisions – Further explanation where arguable that a right is limited
The Committee recalls its Practice Note No. 2, which states:
The Committee has determined that it will characterise a Statement of Compatibility as a form of explanatory memoranda equivalent in status to an explanatory memorandum accompanying a Bill.
The Committee considers that the provision to Parliament of reasonable explanatory material is critical to the Parliament’s exercise of legislative power in an informed manner.
The Committee notes that the Statement of Compatibility, when addressing the question of whether or not an extended supervision order is a penalty, stated that a view that orders are not punishments or penalties:
is consistent with the approach of Courts in a number of other jurisdictions under human rights legislation where protective measures are imposed upon persons who have been convicted of certain offences, including sex offences.
The Committee observes that the recent unanimous decision of five judges of New Zealand’s Court of Appeal in Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2006] NZCA 262 held that a very similar regime for extended supervision orders was a punishment for the purposes of very similar human rights provisions.
Whilst the Committee acknowledges that Statements of Compatibility are not intended to be read by lawyers and that views can reasonably differ on the interpretation and significance of relevant legal authorities, the Committee feels that, where a general claim is made about the approach of ‘Courts in a number of other jurisdictions under human rights legislation’ to a particular question, the Statement should also draw Parliament’s attention to any recent decision of a senior court in a significant comparative jurisdiction concerning similar legislation that is contrary to the approach described. The Committee therefore considers that the Statement should have addressed the Belcher decision in its discussion of the compatibility of the bill with Charter ss. 26 and 27(2).
The Committee also notes that the Statement, having concluding that extended supervision orders are not punishments or penalties, did not address whether or not, in the event that Parliament considered that the orders were punishments or penalties, penalties, their retrospective application to certain past offenders was a reasonable limit on the Charter rights of those offenders against double jeopardy and retrospective penalties. The Committee observes that, for Parliament to make an assessment of whether or not a provision is compatible with human rights, it is important that the Statement of Compatibility explain whether or how a provision that arguably limits a right is a reasonable limit under Charter s. 7(2).
The Committee recalls its Alert Digest No. 15 of 2007 where, in response to Ministerial correspondence arguing that a traffic offence hearing was not a ‘criminal proceeding’ for the purposes of Charter s. 25(2), the Committee stated:
The Committee considers that, where a provision of a Bill engages or infringes Charter s.25(2) with respect to a matter that even arguably fits the definition of a criminal offence, the Statement of Compatibility should address whether and, if so, how that provision is compatible with Charter ss. 24 and 25(2).
The Committee is of the opinion that a similar approach should be taken to the words ‘punishment’ and ‘penalty’ in Charter ss. 26 and 27.
The Committee therefore considers that, where a provision engages or infringes Charter ss. 26 and 27 with respect to a matter that even arguably fits the definition of a ‘punishment’ or a ‘penalty’, the Statement should address whether and, if so, how that provision would satisfy the test in Charter s.7(2).
The Committee will write to the Minister expressing its concerns about these aspects of the Statement of Compatibility.
The Committee makes no further comment.
Introduced: 15 April 2008
Second Reading Speech: 17 April 2008
House: Legislative Assembly
Member introducing Bill: Hon. John Brumby MLA
Portfolio responsibility: Premier
The Bill repeals specified redundant and spent Acts and amends the Road Safety Act 1986 to re-enact certain transitional application provisions currently provided for in an Act to be repealed by the Bill.
[Clauses]
[2]. The provisions in the Bill come into operation on the day after Royal Assent.
[3]. Provides for the Acts listed in Schedule 1 to be repealed.
[4]. Provides for the Road Safety Act 1986 to be amended as set out in Schedule 2 to re-enact transitional provisions found in a 1991 amending Act which is to be repealed by this statute law revision bill.
[5]. Provides for the automatic repeal of this amending Act on the first anniversary of the day on which it receives the Royal Assent.
The Committee notes that this Bill has been referred to it on 17 April 2008 for further inquiry, consideration and report. The Committee intends to table its report on 26 May 2008.
The Committee makes no further comment.
Introduced: 15 April 2008
Second Reading Speech: 17 April 2008
House: Legislative Assembly
Member introducing Bill: Hon. Rob Hulls MLA
Portfolio responsibility: Minister for Industrial Relations
The Bill amends the Public Sector Employment (Award Entitlements) Act 2006 to repeal provisions relating to the Victorian public sector fairness test for workplace agreements. The Bill also repeals redundant provisions and spent provisions that made consequential amendments to the Workplace Rights Advocate Act 2005 and the Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996.
[Clauses]
[2]. The provisions in the Bill come into operation on the day after Royal Assent.
[10]. Provides for the automatic repeal of this amending Act on the first anniversary of the day on which it receives Royal Assent.
The Committee makes no further comment.
Introduced: 8 April 2008
Second Reading Speech: 10 April 2008
House: Legislative Assembly
Member introducing Bill: Hon. Rob Hulls MLA
Private Bill
The Bill amends The Uniting Church in Australia Act 1977 (the ‘Act’) to update the definition of Synod, to provide for procedural matters relating to The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Victoria), to make certain other consequential and minor amendments to improve the operation of the Act and to make consequential amendments to 2 other Acts.
[Clauses]
[2]. Other than section 4 the provisions will commence on the day after Royal Assent. Section 4 will commence on 21 September 2008.
[4]. Amends section 12 of the Act to increase from 5 to 7 the number of members of the Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Victoria) that are to be appointed by the Synod.
[9]. Provides for the automatic repeal of this Act on 21 September 2009.
The Committee makes no further comment.
Introduced: 16 April 2008
Second Reading Speech: 16 April 2008
House: Legislative Council
Member introducing Bill: Hon. Peter Hall MLC
Portfolio responsibility: Minister for Environment and Climate Change
Private Members Bill
The purpose of the Bill is to promote a reduction in the use of potable water by establishing the Victorian Water Substitution Target scheme (the ‘VWST’ scheme) which provides for the creation and acquisition of water substitution certificates; and requires the surrender of water substitution certificates.
[Clauses]
[2]. The Act will commence on proclamation but not later than by 1 January 2010.
Note: Extract from the Second reading Speech – The intention would be that the scheme commence as soon as possible following the making of regulations under the Bill.
[6]. Provides that the Essential Services Commission (ESC) is responsible for the general administration, enforcement, monitoring and auditing of the provisions of the Act.
[39 to 42]. Provides a power of entry to premises either by consent or by means of a monitoring warrant.
[45 and 46]. Privilege against self-incrimination preserved but not in respect to requirement to produce documents – An authorised officer may require information and a person must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to answer a question or produce a document required under section 45.
It is a reasonable excuse for an individual to refuse or fail to answer a question or produce a document under section 45 if the answering of the question or the production of the document would tend to incriminate the person however it is not a reasonable excuse for an individual to refuse or fail to produce a document that the person is required to keep by this Act, if the production of the document would tend to incriminate the person.
[50]. Makes provision for monitoring warrants according to the rules applying to warrants under the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989.
[51]. An affected person in relation to a reviewable decision may request that the ESC reconsider the decision including a decision to refuse an application for accreditation or to suspend a person's accreditation.
[55 and 56]. The ESC may obtain information and documents and may by notice require a person to appear before the ESC to give information or provide a document. A person must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a notice given to the person under section 55.
[57]. Protection against self-incrimination - It is a reasonable excuse for an individual to refuse or fail to give information or evidence or produce a document under section 55 if the giving of the information or evidence or the production of the document would tend to incriminate the person.
[60 and 61]. Provides for offences relating to the disclosure of confidential or commercially-sensitive information obtained during the exercise of a power or the performance of a function under, or in connection with, this Act offences other than in prescribed circumstances.
[70 and 71]. Provides for regulations to be made for the purposes of the Act and for the review of the Act by 31 December 2012.
[72 and 73]. Make consequential amendments to the Essential Services Commission Act 2001.
[74]. Repeals Part 9 (sections 72 to 74 – consequential amendments) on 1 January 2011.
Reasonable limits – Water substitution certificate scheme – Movement – Privacy – Property
Charter s.7(2) provides that human rights may be ‘subject to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’
The Committee notes that the Bill relates to the regulation of trading (specifically water substitution certificate trading) and the enforcement of that regulation. The Committee observes that such legislation inevitably engages a variety of human rights, but that reasonable provisions will typically satisfy Charter s7(2), as well as internal limits on particular rights.
The Statement of Compatibility identifies several provisions that are said to engage the following Charter rights:
Movement: (Charter s12): a provision requiring individuals whom the ESC believes has information relevant to the operation of the Bill to appear before the Commission (clause 55(2)(c)
Privacy (Charter s13(a)): provisions
requiring applicants for accreditation to disclose information considered necessary for the purposes of the Victorian Water Substitution Target scheme to the ESC (clause 8)
requiring the disclosure of information in certificates, notices and registers pursuant to the scheme (clauses 19, 35 , 52, 53 & 54)
requiring authorised officers to carry an identity card (clause 37)
providing for search of premises for items relating to certificates or scheme acquisitions pursuant to the occupier’s consent or a monitoring warrant issued by a magistrate (clauses 39 to 43)
requiring persons at a premises entered pursuant to the occupier’s consent or a monitoring warrant to disclose information and documents relating to certificates or scheme acquisitions to an authorised officer (clauses 44 & 45).
requiring persons who the ESC believes have information or documents relevant to the operation of the Bill to give that information and produce those documents (clause 55)
The Statement of Compatibility also characterises the latter provisions as engaging the right to freedom of expression.
Property (Charter s20): Provisions for the surrender of water substitution target certificates if an offence under the Bill is committed (clause 35); the provision of documents to authorised officers who enter premises pursuant to the occupier’s consent or a monitoring warrant (clauses 44 & 45); and the copying and retention of documents supplied to the Essential Services Commission pursuant to its examination powers under clause 55 (clauses 58 & 59)
In each instance the Statement of Compatibility contends that the respective rights are not infringed.
The Committee observes that the provisions of the Bill are similar to the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Bill 2007, considered by the Committee in its Alert Digest No. 15 of 2007. In its report on that Bill, the Committee sought further information from the Minister concerning that Bill’s equivalent to clause 55, including itsbreadth and the use of coercive powers and criminal sanctions on people who aren’t involved in the trading scheme. The Minister’s response to the Committee’s questions is set out in Alert Digest No. 1 of 2008.
Having considered the above Charter rights and provisions, the Committee is satisfied that the all of the measures so engaged do not warrant any special mention or adverse comment in respect to possible incompatibility with human rights.
The Committee makes no further comment.
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