FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Report on
3.0 This chapter explains the processes of international treaty negotiations, and considers ways in which the States can involve themselves in these processes. Although Australian States do not have the international status necessary to enter legally binding treaties, they can nevertheless benefit from participation in international affairs.
3.1 The process of Australia entering binding international agreements can be broken down into three stages: negotiation, signature, and ratification. To properly consider the possibilities for an enhanced role for the States in this process, it is necessary first to clarify what each of these stages entails.
3.2 The negotiation of a treaty is a process whereby the governments of different countries reach a formal agreement that they will behave in certain ways. It is an essentially international process. There are a number of ways the process can begin. The United Nations, or one of its organs, might propose to its members that they create a treaty to deal with a matter of general international concern. Two countries, acting through normal diplomatic channels, might decide to enter a mutual pact of some sort. A group of neighbouring countries might decide to establish a regional agreement. Whenever countries interact, through diplomacy, international forums, international trade or any other means, there is the potential for the establishment of formal agreements.
3.3 As treaty-making is a Commonwealth function, it is the Commonwealth Government which leads Australian treaty negotiations.
3.4 Treaty negotiations may last for months or even years. At the end of the negotiations, those countries which still wish to enter the agreement will agree upon a text.1 It is then the practice for a representative of each government (typically, the foreign minister or head of government) to sign the treaty.
3.5 A signed treaty is not binding at international law. However, the signatories to a treaty do have an international obligation: they must not act in such a way as to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.2
3.6 Ratification is the process whereby a country indicates that it accepts a treaty as binding on it at international law.3 In Australia, ratification is a purely executive act. In other countries, ratification can require parliamentary approval of the text that the government has negotiated.4 Depending on the legal and political situation in a country, weeks, months or years may elapse between signature and ratification. Sometimes countries sign treaties that they never ratify. In such a case, the country is not bound by the treaty at international law, and has no rights under it. Upon ratifying a treaty, a country is bound by the treaty at international law.
3.7 Depending on the sort of treaty being negotiated and agreed to, the terminology used to describe the stages of signature and ratification can vary. In the case of a multi-lateral treaty (a treaty with many countries party to it), the stages are called signature and ratification, as explained above. In the case of a bilateral treaty (a treaty between just two countries), it is less common to talk of ratification. After signing, an intention to be bound by a treaty is signalled by an exchange of notes between the two countries. Sometimes, the parties to a bilateral treaty wish it to enter into effect immediately upon signing. In such a case, the treaty first will be initialled. Such initialling of a treaty has the same force as signing a multi-lateral treaty. Signing an initialled treaty then has the force of ratification.
3.8 It is also possible for a country to accede to a multi-lateral treaty which it did not negotiate and which therefore it has not signed. Accession has the same force as ratification.
Finding 8:
If the States wish to influence the text of treaties, particularly multi-lateral treaties, they must intervene prior to signature. Although a treaty is not binding until it has been ratified, the likelihood of changes in a treaty text between signature and ratification, particularly in the case of a multi-lateral treaty, is low.
3.9 As was noted above (paragraph 3.3) and in Chapter One (paragraph 1.6), it is the Commonwealth Government which has responsibility for Australia's treaty negotiations. In appropriate cases, however, Australia's delegation to a treaty negotiation may include members of State departments or concerned agencies, as well as their Commonwealth counterparts. As an example of this, Victoria has attended negotiations in Geneva relating to the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.5
3.10 According to Mr Bill Campbell, himself a member of Australia's delegation, the Solicitor-General of Western Australia played a valuable role in the negotiation of a maritime delimitation agreement with Indonesia.6
3.11 In 1996, Queensland represented the States at international treaty negotiations on several occasions,7 including the European Union Mutual Recognition Agreement negotiations.8 It hopes to continue playing this role as long as the Commonwealth and the other State Governments agree to it doing so, in cases where it has the appropriate expertise. To ensure that the rest of Australia's governments agree to its presence at international treaty negotiations, Queensland has a standing requirement that any line agency wishing to attend an international treaty negotiation work through the Department of Premier and Cabinet. 9
3.12 The Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties (the COAG-endorsed protocols for State involvement in Australia's treaty processes)10 make it clear that the role of State officials in such cases is not to represent Australia, but to keep the States informed on treaty matters, and to put State views to the Commonwealth.11 It is ultimately the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade who determine delegation composition and negotiation positions.
3.13 As well as State representatives, it is possible for representatives of industry groups or concerned non-government organisations to participate in treaty negotiations.12 As with State representatives, such participation is subject to the approval of the Commonwealth. The role of such participants is to observe and advise the Commonwealth negotiators.13
3.14 In some cases, individuals and organisations have more actively involved themselves in the treaty negotiation process. Professor Marcia Langton, of the Northern Territory University, briefed the Committee on the extent to which Aborigines have been able to involve themselves directly in treaty negotiations affecting their interests:
Mr Gerald Ashman - What global consultation occurred with the development of international treaties? Were they really just controlled out of Canberra or did indigenous people get to get involved within the development and the negotiation process of the treaty?
Professor Marcia Langton - If you take the ILO Convention formerly Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, of 1989, and Convention 109 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, adopted earlier. But there was a very thorough consultation with indigenous people not just Australians but all over the world. Indigenous people have a very great say in the wording of that Convention. Even though they were disappointed with the outcome they had every opportunity in the UN system and its parallel bodies for having an input into it as much as any nation State would or any member State would. Likewise, with the developing draft Declaration on Indigenous People. An enormous consultation process.
Mr Gerald Ashman - Is that consultation occurring at the UN or is it actually occurring at a domestic level?
Professor Marcia Langton - Well, I think that every Aboriginal person if they read Aboriginal newsletters has had an opportunity to read summaries of the draft declaration as it was developed and as it now stands. My estimate would be that hundreds of Aboriginal people have gone to the United Nations working group on indigenous populations since the early eighties to observe the process and to have an input. Including ordinary people such as widows of people who have died in custody. Aboriginal organisations have made a point of sending victims and family members of these human rights abuses so that they can see that there is some kind of process in place. The Government annually calls a meeting of those people choosing to attend the United Nations as a preparatory meeting. There have also been training courses for Aboriginal people in human rights and advocacy from the University of New South Wales. Some of which have been held in the Northern Territory.
Mr Gerald Ashman - We want to talk to you about some of the trade treaties and some other treaties not related to indigenous people. We really have come to the view that there is not an adequate level of consultation with the States and with the broader community. Frequently they do not find out that there is a treaty in the negotiation stage until it has actually been initialled by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In many respects what you are saying to us in this case is quite refreshing.
Professor Marcia Langton - I think Aboriginal people force the issue on that. I do not think that the Governments willingly permitted consultation of this kind. When I first went to the UN they were so worried about what I was going to say that they brought three High Commissioners in from different European places who were furious about the waste of their time. That was in 1982 or 1983.14
Mr Gerald Ashman - We have become aware of the number of treaties that the Commonwealth negotiated which are not foreign affairs and defence. Treaties where you would expect to have a level of confidentiality in the development of the treaty. They have effectively been developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and initialled and at the point the States become aware that a treaty is actually under negotiation. One of the concerns that has been expressed to us in a number of the States is that at that point there is little likelihood of the treaty terms being varied. Nor up to the point has there really been an assessment of the cost of implementing the treaty by the States. There are a significant number of treaties that are signed nationally where the States have the responsibility for the delivery of the treaty conditions. The Commonwealth has in fact not funded the States in the delivery of those treaties. Hence, the questions earlier on in relation to the consultative process. Part of that really has to be how you address the funding of the outcomes.
Professor Marcia Langton - This is my point about a very underdeveloped system of treaty implementation in Australia. You have Federal Governments involved in a global community and responsible to trade treaties, environment treaties and so. But in the States historically in Australia, particularly in the last three decades, have made a conservative reading of this global phenomenon of multinational treaty making or transnational treaty making. The conservative reading of that process is misinformed. The understandings are very partial. They are read through a haze of State rights ideology and so they're unprepared to set up the mechanisms and also they don't know how these systems work in the United Nations. They might say that it is difficult or impossible to have treaty wording changed. But that is not in fact the case. You see, so few Australians know how these international bodies work. Interestingly, say on the Aboriginal side we have had a lot of success in changing the words of the ILO Convention, developing the Declaration of Indigenous Rights. Because we send teams of people every year and have made a huge effort in the last twenty years to find out how the process works.15
The Department of Foreign Affairs panicked about us going to the United Nations and no they did not consult us. We went quite independently of them. But now they do consult. . .
[E]ach year the Department of Foreign Affairs organises a meeting of Aboriginal delegates who are going to discuss the issues which are going to be raised and all of the negotiations take place in the UN meeting wherever that might be held. . .
The Declaration on Indigenous Rights has not been ratified. It is still in the development stages. But you will find if you talk to ATSIC that indigenous people have gone to international meetings involving the development of treaties numbers of times and involving numbers of treaties or conventions and that this is now a standard practice for ATSIC to notify peak Aboriginal bodies that there are negotiations on particular treaties going on. It is up to the Aboriginal bodies to get involved. By in large, it is a very positive response. So for instance, you have a very high standard of development by Aboriginal people of practical projects such as indigenous protection area projects which has been recently funded by Environment Australia. These are practical expressions of the standards of rights for all species in the Biodiversity Convention and so on. And in the IUCN documents on indigenous protected areas. I think it is true to say that Aboriginal people because they are willing to participate in these processes and see some net benefit from participation are actually much more active in this area than say a regular Australian businessman or than a State politician would be. I think that in Australia there is great deal of suspicion of these international development but they have been tremendously beneficial to Aboriginal people in raising the standards of debate from a welfarist discourse. From an Aborigines as wards of the State kind of discourse to Aborigines as people who have human rights, a rights based discourse.16
3.15 The Committee believes that, if the States are to increase their role in the treaty negotiation process, then they will have to increase their level of engagement with international affairs.17 The minimum requirement for the States is to be aware of what treaties are being negotiated, and of their potential ramifications on State activity.
3.16 However, it is possible for the States to go much further than this. As globalisation continues, the pressure on regions within a nation to find their own place in the world economy is increasing.18 This makes necessary a willingness to consider, and to integrate with, the regional economies of neighbouring countries. In Australia, it is State and Territory Governments who have the role of representing the regions; it is they who are best placed to judge regional needs and economic opportunities.19 It is therefore appropriate that they play an active role in establishing good relationships with neighbouring regions.
3.17 One way to pursue this goal of international integration is for States and Territories to enter into agreements with foreign governments.
3.18 As was observed in Chapter One (paragraph 1.11), Australian States have no power to enter treaties which are binding at international law. Although the distinction between a treaty, and a mere political agreement, is an important one in the theory of international law, the Committee heard evidence suggesting that this does not undermine the value of such political agreements:
The CHAIRMAN - Is there a legal difference? If there is, what is the legal difference between a memorandum between, say, Darwin - or the Northern Territory Government - which might be dealing with Indonesia on trade or some other two-way matter, and another treaty between two nations?
Ms WALKER - It is a bit of a difficult question to answer. A distinction is drawn, and it may be that a memorandum of agreement, for example, is ultimately not enforceable as a matter of international law. An example is that Australia itself will enter into a memorandum of agreement rather than a treaty in dealing with Taiwan because of the particular sensitivity with China. The question arises about the status of that. It is accepted that a memorandum of agreement is something less than a treaty and therefore may not be as enforceable as a treaty is at the international level. It is difficult to be absolutely certain about how such an arrangement would be treated.
Ms BURKE - What is the policing agent, and what are the ramifications of disobeying a treaty under international law?
Ms WALKER - There is no policing agent as such. The consequences really depend on the nature of the treaty. For example, if a state breaches the United Nations charter by invading another state - it is probably not something of immediate concern to Australia - or something that serious, there is, in effect, a policing reaction, as there was when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and there can also be use of force. Continuous breaches of human rights will often result in economic sanctions. For example, in the South African experience with apartheid, international community sanctions were part of that.
Perhaps economic sanctions are the next step from the use of force, but they are for very serious breaches. Other than that, for a developing country there is the threat of withdrawal of aid - again, that does not really apply to Australia. With respect to controversial areas of human rights and the environment, no-one will enforce them unless we participate in something extraordinarily serious. At the international level we rely on embarrassment and the need for Australia to retain good relations with other countries. Because we want to encourage Indonesia and other countries to obey human rights laws, we feel it is incumbent on us to have a good human rights record.
The situation is slightly different in international trade because the World Trade Organisation has some ability to interfere with respect to domestic issues and to allow countries to impose trade burdens and so on - for example, if we were to breach our GATT obligations. However, that is a special case and it would be just on a country-to-country basis.
I have been talking about multi-lateral treaties. With respect to bilateral treaties, we again have the mechanism of embarrassment and also the withdrawal of diplomatic relations. Again, that is done for fairly serious matters; it is not something a country would do lightly. Enforcement really varies according to the nature of the treaty and the seriousness of the breach. We certainly do not have a police force that is going to come into Australia and act, unless we take aggressive action first.20
The main mechanism of treaty enforcement is political pressure and the desire to maintain friendly international relations, and these factors apply just as strongly to non-legal political arrangements between a State and another country.
3.19 However, the dominant position of the Commonwealth in conducting Australia's foreign affairs means that States will not be able to reach international arrangements which are in conflict with any of Australia's international legal obligations or international political commitments. Also, the external affairs power means that the Commonwealth can legislate to curtail any international activity by a State of which it does not approve.21
3.20 Any activity by the States in this area must therefore be undertaken with the support and co-operation of the Commonwealth. While this limits the freedom of the States and Territories, it also produces benefits. International activity by the States will require a large deal of interaction and co-operation with the Commonwealth. This will give the States a greater involvement with and understanding of Australia's international affairs. In turn, this will increase the opportunities for the States to influence the Commonwealth on treaty matters more generally.
3.21 A scenario of the sort just outlined is currently being played out in the Northern Territory. The proximity of the Northern Territory to Asia, and the consequent need for the development of commercial links with that part of the world, have led to the Territory developing a number of international arrangements which have been described as unique in Australia.22
3.22 The centrepiece of these arrangements is the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Northern Territory of Australia on Economic Development Co-operation (MOU). The MOU was signed by Chief Minister Marshall Perron and the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas on January 21st 1992.
3.23 The MOU reflects the Territory's geographic and historical links to Indonesia; the Parties to it
acknowledge the strong cultural and social ties established between the Eastern Part of Indonesia and the Northern Territory of Australia.23
3.24 Mr Richard Matthews, of the Northern Territory Department for Asian Relations, Trade and Industry, in a paper presented to the Australian National University's North Australian Research Unit's conference on Northern Territory Relations with Eastern Indonesia: Benefits and Future Directions, emphasises this point:
supporting [the MOU] was the theory of sub-regional economic growth areas which was blossoming in the Indonesian bureaucracy, which argued that instruments were needed to overcome the problems caused by international boundaries which cut across traditional, pre-colonial trading patterns.24
3.25 The MOU has as its focus to
support and encourage continued Economic Development Co-operation between the Eastern Part of Indonesia and the Northern Territory of Australia.25
3.26 The MOU creates a six-member Joint Policy Committee (JPC), with three appointments by each Government, to develop strategies to and support plans which further the aims of the MOU. The MOU provides that
In development of these strategies and plans, both Parties recognise the importance of strong involvement from their respective private sectors and endorse and support private enterprise initiatives which will lead to the fulfilment of common economic development objectives.
3.27 The Northern Territory Government has fostered a broad awareness of the MOU and its importance. This awareness is obvious at various levels of government, and in the private sector.
3.28 The MOU is very important to the Territory. It has led to significant commercial and other benefits. The Territory is a major exporter of food and mineral products into the ASEAN region.26
3.29 Dr Christine Fletcher, of the North Australia Research Unit of the Australian National University, told the Committee:
The Territory feels it is significant because it is up here. The Territory is so close to Asia.27
3.30 Mr Lyal Macintosh, Chief Executive of the Northern Territory Department of Asian Relations, Trade and Industry, said
If we look back to the days of self-government twenty years ago. The Government of the Northern Territory had a dilemma. Whilst they were proud to have self-government - the fact was that we were a long way from Canberra. Therefore, they felt that the financial support that we received and also a lot of other support might be under threat. If we had a future it had to be with the north.28
3.31 As well as contributing to a sense of regional identity, the MOU has a positive outcome in terms of relations between governments. Dr Fletcher said
they are highly symbolic. They do provide a framework for developing governmental relationships between parties. That is the important part.29
3.32 The President of the Northern Territory Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr Peter Carew, said
The major MOU that the Northern Territory Government has entered into is with the Republic of Indonesia. I think that happened back in 1992. I think from a government to government point of view it has been excellent.30
3.33 The same view was expressed in a briefing to the Committee by the Department of Asian Relations, Trade and Industry:
Can I just say that I think that the level of trust that has developed between ourselves and each of the key people in the region is phenomenal. They really do treat us as if we are one of them.31
3.34 Good government to government relations have facilitated commercial relationships between Territorian and Indonesian businesses. Indonesia appreciates a formal relationship between governments as a sign of commitment to mutual economic endeavour. Informal comments to the Committee from representatives of the Indonesian Government suggested that a very high value is placed by Indonesia on instruments such as the MOU. Businesses which cannot demonstrate their good standing with their own government have difficulty succeeding in the Indonesian market.
3.35 Peter Carew, President of the Northern Territory Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told the Committee:
No one in Indonesia does any business unless the Government says you can do that. The Government really is the marketing body and the driving force behind industry. Because you have to have a licence for everything etc. That is the way it is done. From our point of view, we can go over and try to set up a deal. They will say "What is your backing?" We need government backing.32
3.36 On the back of the MOU, the Northern Territory Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Northern Territory Exporters Council have made agreements of co-operation with several of their sister bodies in Eastern Indonesia.33
3.37 The Territory's growing links with Indonesia have also led
to the Northern Territory Government becoming involved in strategic planning in
Indonesia's Eastern Provinces.34
This is a consequence of the Territory taking part in the development of a
sub-regional grouping under the auspices of ASEAN: Brunei/Indonesia/Malaysia/
Philippines-East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA).35
BIMP-EAGA is a forum for deepening economic co-operation between various
sub-national regions of those four ASEAN countries.36
The Northern Territory has built up its participation on the back of bilateral
agreements developed with the four member nations, and now takes part in
high-level regional meetings:
[I]t has taken us three years of lobbying with BIMP-EAGA senior officials which we were never allowed to attend. For the first time in Sabah this year we were invited to meet with the senior officials, the top guys, out of this region.37
The Senior Officials Meeting determines the agenda for the Ministerial Meeting, which is the peak body co-ordinating BIMP-EAGA.38
3.38 The Territory has at all stages of these developments worked closely with the Commonwealth Government, particularly the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT):
Mr Nathan Sammy - I think the interesting thing about these Memoranda is that we kept DFAT fully informed every step of the way. We were told very early in the piece we were not allowed to undertake a treaty of any sort. We could not call it an agreement. So we had to use Memorandum of Understanding - which was a non-legal status agreement. Interestingly enough I think it amazed DFAT that we were able to get these arrangements in place very quickly with the endorsement of the highest level of government.39
Mr Lyal Macintosh - All the Memoranda are sent to the Federal Government before that is signed. So they knew exactly what the wording is.40
[T]hey have got to have a tick by Foreign Affairs. . .41
Mr Neil Almond - [I]t has really been a terrific partnership where they [the Commonwealth Government] have been happy obviously for us to go in and form the relationship. They have used us quite frequently to provide them with some advice and some guidance and some direction on how we read what is happening in the region.42
3.39 Being a sub-national entity actually gives the Territory certain advantages in reaching commerce-oriented agreements with foreign governments:
Mr Nathan Sammy - That is what these memoranda have done. We use the same draft for each of the member countries. So they could see we weren't playing games and the memorandum were designed specifically around business outcomes. No politics at all.43
Mr Neil Almond - I guess just to follow on what Nathan has said. Being a State or Territory Government gives you a huge advantage because you don't carry the baggage of foreign affairs policy and defence policy, immigration policy. So if you are a little bit smart you can go into these places and be very very honest with them. Because they don't have anything to fear from you. You are not able to go back home and maybe change your foreign affairs policy. Now I can remember sitting in Canberra talking to a Department Secretary about BIMP-EAGA and what we want to do. His greatest concern was what impact it would [have] on Australia's relationship into ASEAN. I think that one of their difficulties is that they are not able to go into a region and just look at the business outcomes. They have a whole range of other things that they need to consider and it has really been a terrific partnership where they have been happy obviously for us to go in and form the relationship.44
3.40 The close relationships built up between the Territory Government and both the Indonesian and Commonwealth Governments led to the Northern Territory Minister for Asian Relations, Trade and Industry, Mr Eric Poole, being the first representative of a State or Territory Government to participate in the biannual Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum.45 At that forum the Australia-Indonesia Development Area agreement was announced.46 This agreement has as its objective the development of closer economic relations between Australia and a number of Indonesian Provinces,47 and the Northern Territory will play a major role in its implementation.48 Dr Christine Fletcher described this as "the MOU in action".49
Finding 9:
The Northern Territory has taken a pro-active role in developing ties with the East ASEAN region. It has done so on its own initiative, with the co-operation of the Commonwealth. The Territory's achievement shows that, by involving themselves directly in international relations, the States and Territories can increase their ability to work effectively with the Commonwealth. By developing Memoranda of Understanding with other countries, the States and Territories can play a significant role in driving the treaties agenda and influencing treaty outcomes. For the Territory, this has also led to economic benefits which are likely to increase in tandem with its regional integration.
1Once negotiations have been completed and a text has been agreed upon, changes are unlikely: Annemarie Devereux, "Treaties Process - One Year in Operation", paper delivered to the ANZIL Conference, June 1st 1997 (proceedings forthcoming).
2Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 18.
3Ibid, art 14.
4See Appendix 3 for a discussion of treaty making and implementation in three other federations.
5Minutes of Evidence, FSRC, p 329 (per Ms F Hanlon); Ms F Hanlon, Reply to request for information, p 4.
6Minutes of Evidence, FSRC, June 30th 1997, p 612 (per Mr W Campbell).
7Mr P Ellis, Reply to request for information, p 2.
8Ms F Hanlon, Reply to request for information, pp 4-5.
9Mr P Ellis, Reply to request for information, p 3.
10Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties, Attachment C to Council of Australian Governments, Communique, June 14th 1996; available on the World Wide Web at http://www.nla.gov.au/pmc/treaties.html. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
11Ibid, para 6.1.
12Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia and International Treaty Making Information Kit, 1997, p 11; available on the World Wide Web at http://www.austlii.edu.au/dfat/infokit.html; Anne Twomey, "International Law and the Executive" in Brian Opeskin and Donald Rothwell, International Law and Australian Federalism, Melbourne University Press, forthcoming, p 81.
13Department of Foreign Affairs, above n 12, p 11.
14Minutes of Evidence, FSRC, August 22nd 1997, p 812 (per Professor M Langton).
15Ibid, p 815.
16Ibid, pp 818-9.
17See also Chapter 4, paragraph 4.40.
18Minutes of Evidence, FSRC, April 15th 1997, p 383 (per Professor M Considine).
19Ibid, p 387.
20Minutes of Evidence, FSRC, June 30th 1997, pp 588-9 (per Ms K Walker).
21Minutes of Evidence, FSRC, April 7th 1997, p 336 (per Mr A Thomas).
22Memoranda of Understanding have been entered into by other Australian States (for example, the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Victoria in co-operation in the fields of academia, applied research, industry, investment and trade, signed in Melbourne on May 25th 1995), but do not seem to have the same profile as that of the Northern Territory with Indonesia.
23Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Northern Territory of Australia on Economic Development Co-operation.
24Richard Matthews, "Overview of the MOUs: Benefits and Future Directions", paper delivered to the Australian National University's North Australian Research Unit's conference on Northern Territory Relations with Eastern Indonesia: Benefits and Future Directions, March 13th 1997.
25Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Northern Territory of Australia on Economic Development Co-operation.
26For a summary of the Territory's trade and commerce with the ASEAN countries, see North Australian Research Unit of the Australian National University, Submission to the Inquiry by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade into ASEAN.
27Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 775 (per Dr C Fletcher).
28Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 797 (per Mr L Macintosh).
29Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 775 (per Dr C Fletcher).
30Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 787 (per Mr P Carew).
31Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 804 (per Mr N Almond).
32Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 790 (per Mr P Carew).
33For example, the Dili Accord between KADINDA I Timor Timur, the Northern Territory Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Northern Territory Exporters Council, and the Agreement of Joint Co-operation between Asosiasi Rekanan dan Distributor Indonesia Propinsi NTT and Northern Territory Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
34Geoff Forrester, "The Northern Territory and its Role in the Region" in Christine Fletcher and Cliff Walsh (eds), Budgeting for Statehood in the Northern Territory, North Australian Research Unit, Darwin, 1997, p 118-9.
35Forrester, above n 35, p 119.
36Ir Hartarto, "BIMP-EAGA and the Northern Territory", Territory Business Magazine, 3rd Quarter 1996; available on the World Wide Web at http://www.nt.gov.au/darti/tbm/tbm3q96/editorial.html.
37Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 805 (per Mr N Sammy).
38Hartato, above n 37.
39Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 800 (per Mr N Sammy).
40Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 805 (per Mr L Macintosh).
41Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 808 (per Mr L Macintosh).
42Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 805 (per Mr N Almond).
43Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 805 (per Mr N Sammy).
44Minutes of evidence, FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 805 (per Mr N Almond).
45Forrester, above n 35, p 119.
46Ibid.
47Joint Press Statement by the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Production and Distribution, Dr Hartato, and the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, Launch of the Australia-Indonesia Development Area, April 24th 1997.
48Forrester,
above n 35, p 119. 49" href="#fnB49"49Minutes of evidence,
FSRC, August 21st 1997, p 777 (per Dr C Fletcher).
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