6.1 It has become clear to the Committee that how a disease control program is delivered is almost as important as what control strategies are adopted. This was indicated by a wealth of evidence provided by those most directly affected by the Victorian OJD Control Program. It was also supported by experiences in NSW and other parts of the world.
6.2 Eradication programs are generally difficult and likely to cause some stress and hardship. However, a more sensitive approach to delivery of the Program could have resulted in less distress to farmers and staff of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment.1 The short time that the Department was given to initiate the Program and stretched resources made better implementation difficult. None the less, the Committee found the lack of regard given on occasion to the distress and hardship caused by the Program to be unacceptable.
6.3 Chapter 3 listed factors that are commonly associated with successful animal health programs. Those that relate to program delivery are summarised in Table 6.1. The Committee has concluded that the control of a contagious disease cannot and need not await a perfect delivery program any more than it can wait for perfect knowledge, but there need to be processes for review incorporated into the ongoing program. Consequently, program review needs to be taken into account in program delivery.
6.4 Communication is sometimes equated with providing information. This is one aspect of communication, but it involves education and consultation as well.2 Most of all, effective communication is a two-way process.3
|
Aspect of the program |
Aspect of delivery |
Consultation with affected people |
Mechanisms that allow those affected to have ownership of the program, particularly consultation during planning and ongoing communication. |
Providing information and technical support |
Provision of information, education and technical support that can minimise harm and give confidence in information provided. |
Financial issues |
Minimisation of negative economic impacts and efforts to reverse financial harm. |
Social issues |
Efforts to avoid, minimise or reverse negative social impacts. |
Accountability |
Mechanisms that ensure confidence in, and ownership of, the implementation of the program |
Adequacy of resources |
Resources sufficient to undertake high-quality delivery of the program. |
6.5 Several witnesses spoke of the importance of involving those who are directly affected in the process of making decisions about the program.4 This relates to decisions at the broad policy level and at the individual property or local area level.
6.6 Past experience with other control programs in Australia supports this view. Though there was some opposition to the bovine brucellosis and tuberculosis eradication campaign at a fairly late stage in the program, the effort put into achieving agreement between property owners and managers and the campaign team was seen as playing a large part in the success of the campaign.5
6.7 There are now many other examples to show the importance of stakeholders' having ownership of a program. This is at the heart of the successful Landcare movement. This grew out of a group of farmers in the Warrenbayne Boho districts near Benalla joining together to combat tree decline and salinity.6 The recent NSW footrot eradication program is showing evidence of succeeding, in contrast to an earlier top-down program that was not containing the disease. A key part of its success was its ownership by industry, commencing when "graziers with strong enough conviction to having footrot free sheep started to drive groups and lay the foundations for the building blocks of area eradication".7
6.8 As the Committee indicated earlier, farmers in the Ensay district discussed the problems that OJD was causing them with authorities and the industry peak body before the decision was made to embark on the Victorian OJD Control Program.8 The same opportunity does not appear to have been available to other affected producers. Evidence presented to the Committee suggests that those who were consulted directly and played a part in the decision to destock support the Program, at least for their district. Among those who were not consulted there is widespread and strong opposition to the Program.
6.9 Those most directly involved in making the decision to embark on the strategy of eradication with compensation (the Pastoral Group of the Victorian Farmers Federation, the Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee and senior staff of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment) claim to have consulted with `industry'. According to Mr Paul Black, of the Sheep and Goats Compensation Advisory Committee, the Committee chose eradication of OJD as the goal of the OJD Control Plan because "it was driven by industry, encompassing the woolgrowers and every offshoot of the sheep and lamb industry...".9However, many of those who gave evidence to the Committee deny that this was the case, or even that their views, if made known, were taken into account.10
6.10 Neither the Australian Sheep Veterinary Society nor the Australian Veterinary Association, Victorian Division, was involved in providing advice on the surveillance, management or eradication of OJD prior to the Victorian OJD Control Program being put in place. Members of these groups expressed "considerable anger over the development of the policy and failure to include veterinarians with expertise on the sheep industry in the policy development".11 The declining of an invitation by the Chief Veterinary Officer to meet with a large number of the State's sheep veterinarians in February 1997 did not help.
6.11 Consultation appears to have been minimal with the Livestock Saleyards Association of Victoria even up until the present: the Association "has been extremely concerned about the lack of contact that has been made with our member saleyards on strategies that are needed to help us assist industry to prevent the spread of ovine Johne's disease".12
6.12 Even those organisations represented on the Advisory Committee that put together the original Victorian OJD Control Program appear to have not been involved to a great extent: "We were approached around December [1996]. I do not think we were given a lot of time to promote anything. At that time of the year the agents are very busy." One livestock agent, Mr N. Guthridge, considered that the Victorian Stock Agents' Association was not given adequate time to inform its membership of the impending decision to implement a policy of eradication, let alone respond to it. According to Mr Guthridge, the Victorian OJD Control Program was:
no `industry decision' ... the decision to run down the eradication path was arrived at by a mere handful of people in the space of a few days ... My main concern is that the speed with which this committee formulated this fund did not allow stock agents sufficient time for a sensible or thorough discussion on an issue as vital as OJD.13With respect to individual farmers, one from Buchan presented a view that echoed many expressed at hearings and in submissions. He said:
The manner in which the program was developed between a very limited number of affected Victorian sheep farmers and officers of the DNRE without wide - indeed almost without any - consultation with potentially affected farmers was, at best, inappropriate. In my view, OJD in Victoria is more an administrative disease, a disease of government, than a stock disease.14One farmer, in describing a public meeting held by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment in late 1996 in the Hamilton area, said that the Departmental staff were "unwilling to consider other possibilities or ideas [other than eradication by destocking]".15 The meeting was this farmer's first introduction to OJD.
6.13 The decision by government to rely on the Pastoral Group of the Victorian Farmers Federation to represent sheep farmers in Victoria has come under criticism. As Mrs J. Hall told the Committee, the Victorian Farmers Federation can only represent its members.16 This membership is approximately 8,000, including all types of grazing enterprises.17 There are an estimated 13,682 sheep farmers in Victoria.18 This suggests that only around half of sheep farmers are members of the Federation and so could be represented by the Pastoral Group.
6.14 Witnesses at the Melbourne Hearing of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Reference Committee on the Incidence of Ovine Johne's Disease in the Australian Sheep Flock (21 July 2000) considered that any farmer who, sometimes for strongly held convictions, was not a member of the Victorian Farmers Federation, was disenfranchised by the consultation process.19 Certainly it appears that few people other than farmers (such as private veterinarians, stock agents or shearers) were given much opportunity to have input into decisions about the Victorian OJD Program prior to its commencement.20The Committee received evidence that a number of members of the Victorian Farmers Federation consider that even they were unrepresented in consultations. The Benalla, Ararat, Buchan/Gelantipy and Strathbogie branches of the Victorian Farmers Federation and the Hamilton Victorian Farmers Federation Pastoral District Council indicated to the Committee that they had opposed the eradication strategy and made this opposition known to the Group.21
6.15 According to the Federation's Pastoral Group, resolutions passed at branch meetings are discussed at district council level and when passed as resolutions there, are brought to the central council to be debated. As a result, some of these branch resolutions may not have reached the central council.22The Future
6.16 Several witnesses have called for an independent steering or advisory committee to formulate OJD policy and strategies.23 These witnesses emphasise the need for this committee to be truly representative of, and in touch with, sheep farmers, and also to include people with expertise in the science of OJD, farm management and animal health.
6.17 A diversity of other approaches also exists to ensure that those likely to be affected by any disease control program are fully consulted and their views incorporated into any future program. Processes used during the current Inquiry are examples. So also is the ballot recently undertaken to obtain the opinions of dairy farmers with regard to deregulation of the dairy industry.
6.18 It is evident to the Committee that the time and resources required to ensure effective consultation, both before a program is initiated and during the program, could be significant, but are worth the commitment involved.
Finding 6.1
Inadequate consultation in relation to the Victorian OJD Program has been responsible for some of the dissatisfaction with the Program. Poor timing and lack of consultation with those directly affected have compounded this problem.
6.19 Some aspects of the delivery of the Victorian OJD Control Program relate to technical information - particularly the availability and quality of information about technical aspects of OJD and its control. The way people learn about the OJD status of their flocks is also a most sensitive matter.
6.20 Witnesses indicated that there can be a need for some forms of technical assistance other than information and confidence in quality control in connection with diagnosis of infection.
6.21 One Gippsland farmer highlighted the need of farmers for good information on OJD and advice on "real farm management to control and contain the disease".24 The Department of Natural Resources and Environment admitted that a better Victorian OJD Control Program:
Would have stakeholders better informed to ensure they understand the complexity, constraints and characteristics of the disease and the program.25The Committee notes, however, that education goes beyond providing technical information. It includes ensuring that the information is understood and that skills are developed to meet the purpose of the education program - in this case managing OJD or excluding it from a property. For management of an animal disease there is a need to educate not only farmers, but also the responsible animal health workers, stock agents and operators of saleyards. This task requires trained personnel. Evidence provided by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment indicates that its staff made considerable effort to provide technical information.26 However, additional staff resources were not provided for this purpose and those who undertook this task did not have training in communication.27 The Departmental staff concerned appeared disappointed with the success of their efforts. 28It also appears that Departmental staff have not always been able to meet the needs of farmers for technical information. For example, according to one farmer, staff of the Department could not advise them on the risk posed by hay made on contaminated properties.29 Another farming family described being first advised that they could cut and sell hay during the period of destocking, then were advised, after they had made it, that the hay could not be sold where it might be fed to sheep.30
6.22 Dr Prowse considers that while the risk is low, it is unwise to graze young cattle on contaminated pastures during the decontamination period of an eradication program. This is because, if transmission of OJD through cattle is possible, it will be young animals that are responsible.31 The Manual of Procedures for Animal Health and Welfare Programs, Victoria does not preclude the grazing of young cattle during decontamination periods. Farmers were advised that running cattle was a suitable farming activity, but there is no evidence that they have been advised about the age of cattle that they should use. This has led to some anxiety among farmers.32The Department of Natural Resources and Environment, NSW Agriculture and other groups, as well as the rural press, have published a considerable amount of information on OJD.33 The latter is not always accurate or comprehensive. For material to be effective it must be accurate and also reach those who need it and be in a form that is suitable for them. The numerous complaints that the Committee heard about inadequate information indicate that this aspect of program delivery was less than adequately addressed. Moreover, the Committee received in-camera evidence that pressure was brought to bear on journalists covering OJD stories to ensure that such articles were always favourable to the Victorian OJD Control Program as supported by the Victorian Farmers Federation and State Government.
6.23 The Committee notes that the Department is now considering the option of appointing specialist communication staff to its Animal Health section.34 This seems to the Committee to be an appropriate, if somewhat belated, move.
Finding 6.2
Communication is critical at all stages in an animal disease program and could have been improved in this instance. Good information and education programs are an important part of program delivery. They deserve adequate resources, including suitably trained personnel.
6.24 In a disease control program it is inevitable that farmers must be informed about the disease status of their flocks and how this will affect them. Many witnesses indicated that the way in which this was done influenced their response to the control Program.35 Some farmers felt that some Departmental staff behaved towards them in an overbearing and arrogant manner, showing a lack of regard for the hardship and distress caused by the actions imposed on them by government policy.36 According to one farmer, what farmers need is "good [veterinary] support - not threats". 37
6.25 Carelessness in providing information was also criticised. Some farmers described hearing of results first through neighbours rather than Departmental staff:
I think it was absolutely shocking that the department did not notify me before letting people know down country. It was talked about in a shearing shed at smoko [before I was officially informed] ... it seems they are terribly slack about it.38One stud breeder has told the Committee of being required, after a positive diagnosis in his flocks, to inform clients and neighbours of the diagnosis. This was very distressing for the breeder concerned.39
6.26 Other farmers complained of delays in being given results and of inconsistent advice on the outcome of tests.40 Another said that he was never given written confirmation of a positive test.41
6.27 Another farmer was told that an autopsy had showed a positive blood test result on one of her sheep to be a false positive. 42 After this result:
A letter was forwarded some weeks later from NRE advising that the farm was under quarantine [and] would remain that way for a period of several years, although a telephone call to the vet lab disputed that fact and advised that the farm was not under quarantine. 43This confusion in information clearly caused the farmer considerable distress. Her submission indicates that both positive and negative diagnosis, and the implications that flow from them, need to be conveyed to farmers accurately and promptly and in a sensitive manner. In her words:
The initial shock of being advised that your life is to undergo a massive turnaround and that you will cease doing what has occupied you for a majority of the 50 plus years needs to be carried out with sensitivity. I'm not advocating for expensive ongoing services just the courtesy the situation demands.44The distress of learning that their flocks were infected was compounded for several farmers by their being given very little time to destock their properties.45 As noted in the previous chapter, these farmers were notified on 23 or 24 December 1996 that they were required to sign by 30 December an agreement to destock.46 Destocking was required early in January 1997. The second letter, dated 2 January 1997, required signed agreements to be received by 6 January 1997. The commencement of the Program over Christmas and New Year period meant that producers were having to make decisions at a time when it was very difficult to obtain professional advice on what was a momentous decision. In the words of producers from the Western District: "The program was so badly timed it was difficult to contact our stock agent and accountant to get any advice.47... The timing of the decision was rather strange; government departments had gone on Christmas and New Year holidays, there were difficulties getting legal advice and so on."48 Even in later years of the Program, the Committee understands that producers often had very short periods of time to make the decision to destock.
6.28 In addition, hasty destocking resulted in loss of income - stock had to be sold at `fire sale' prices, and in the early phase of the Program sheep were not permitted to be shorn and lambs were not permitted to be kept until fat enough for sale. A number of farmers reported having to shoot several hundred sheep that were not ready for sale, including new-born lambs.
6.29 Clearly the task that staff were required to do was very difficult, particularly in the first year when there was pressure on them to ensure that destocking was undertaken in time to incorporate the first summer into the decontamination period. At the same time, not all farmers were critical of Departmental staff. A number of farmers praised staff for their consideration and support. A share farmer from Yea "found that all the staff I had discussions with about dealing with ovine Johne's disease seemed open and honest with their information about how it would affect us".49 A farmer from Woodside relayed to the Committee his neighbour's view that: the Departmental staff who handled their case were totally sympathetic to their farm and family".50 A farmer from Yea who had been through the destocking process said: "I cannot fault the department people, because any time we wanted to know things we would ring them. However, we did not go in with a hostile attitude."51In response to a question at the Melbourne Hearing as to whether the Departmental staff that are given the responsibility for visiting each newly identified infected farm had been appropriately trained in stress debriefing, the Animal Health Operations Manager replied that they hadn't; that they were not counsellors. He added that suggestions that farmers contact trained professional rural counsellors were not always well received.52 The Committee notes that veterinary staff were required to deliver the news, but many farmers did not only require veterinary advice, they needed support and good counsel.
Finding 6.3
Farmers have not always been given the results of testing in a sensitive manner. Breaking such news will always be difficult and requires considerable skill. Staff delivering the Program did not have formal training in the required skills.
6.30 Loss of `blood lines' and the valuable genetic resource in stud flocks has been identified as an important loss to farmers faced with destocking.53 Trading restrictions imposed by quarantine also deny these resources to the wider industry, even where animals are not slaughtered. The loss results in both financial cost and distress where `blood lines' have been the product of years, or even generations, of work.
6.31 The time lines imposed on destocking often meant that the affected farmers did not have an opportunity to adjust their business.
6.32 The Committee describes options to preserve the genetic resource in Chapter 8. Ways to deliver these options to affected producers have not yet been developed. It is evident to the Committee that this is an important issue, particularly for stud producers.
6.33 Many witnesses spoke of their difficulty in obtaining `clean' (uninfected) stock.54 This was a matter of particular concern for those restocking after destocking to eradicate OJD.
6.34 The Market Assurance Program, which the Committee described in Chapter 4, is the main mechanism that is available at present to provide `clean' stock. Financial assistance for testing is also provided by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment.
6.35 Mr B. Starritt, a stud breeder, has suggested an expansion of the Market Assurance Program to include additional categories.55 The new categories would rate `non-assessed' as the lowest (highest risk) category and flocks with varying levels of disease prevalence would be placed in other categories. Both regulatory control and incentives would be used to ensure extensive participation in the Program. Trading would be permitted to flocks in equal or lower categories.
6.36 Mr Starritt considers that the scheme would remove the `stigma' of infection. Many witnesses spoke to the Committee about the problems associated with the `stigma' attached to districts in which OJD has been found. However, as `stigma' has to do with perceptions and emotional reactions as much as with objective facts, further investigations would be needed to determine how changed regulations would affect the stigma attached to OJD.
6.37 The difficulties Mr Starritt sees with his proposed scheme arise mainly from the problem of accurate diagnosis. The Committee also sees this as a very great problem. Furthermore, trading of sheep from flocks with any identified level of infection would seem to have little to offer Victoria, where few such flocks occur. Testing all flocks in a State with a low incidence of OJD would not necessarily be a cost-effective way to identify clean `flocks'.
6.38 In light of the importance that the Committee has identified for consultation and education, it would seem desirable that any proposal to introduce new restrictions should be discussed with the producers most affected, particularly stud and store-stock breeders.
Finding 6.4
Farmers need assistance in retaining `blood lines' and to find `clean' sheep for restocking. They are not confident that these needs can be met adequately at present.
6.39 Considerable concern has been expressed to the Committee about the diagnostic procedures used to identify OJD-infected flocks. This relates not only to the overall accuracy of the tests, but to quality control and accountability for testing procedures. The Committee received strong evidence to suggest that these aspects of diagnosis have at times been less than adequate. 56
6.40 The reliability of diagnosis depends on accurate and consistent sampling and testing procedures and reliable methods for identifying the sample being tested. The Committee was made aware of concerns about procedures at each level.
6.41 In 1999 a case reported to the Committee raised serious concerns about quality control in laboratory diagnosis. The same microscope slide of a sample of sheep's intestine was examined at both the Victorian State Laboratory and the NSW Agriculture laboratory in NSW.57 The Victorian laboratory concluded that a bacterium in the tissue indicated that the sheep had OJD. The NSW laboratory considered that the bacterium indicated presence of contamination and concluded that there was no evidence of OJD infection. On the basis of this contested diagnosis, the property was maintained under quarantine.
6.42 Prowse also concludes that: "there appears to be a lack of consistency in how testing [for OJD] is performed".58Concerns about quality control in laboratories may now have been addressed - see Chapter 8. However, quality control for OJD testing appears only recently to have been developed. Time will be needed to determine whether it is in fact adequate.
6.43 Identification of animals slaughtered for diagnostic testing, from farm to final result, is an essential part of accurate diagnosis. The "chain of evidence" that is supposed to ensure this identification appears to have failed, at least on one occasion.59
6.44 Two farmers from Euroa provided written evidence to the Committee of how eight of their rams had been taken to an abattoir to be slaughtered prior to autopsy of their intestines.60 At the abattoir nine sets of intestines were grouped together as coming from the Richardson farm. When the mistake was discovered one was discarded, but it was not definite that the last one retained was in fact from their farm. One only of the sets of intestines was diagnosed as infected. There was an inevitable doubt that the ram concerned came from their flock, but the flock was still diagnosed as infected and has, as a result, been slaughtered.
6.45 There is some anecdotal evidence of substitution of animals on properties in NSW between positive blood tests and autopsy.61 Without a rigorous method of sheep identification such substitution could occur elsewhere.
Finding 6.5
Quality control for diagnosis of OJD appears to have been a matter for legitimate concern. Grounds for these concerns may have been addressed in new protocols, but farmers still need to be given evidence of this. They need have confidence that the new quality-control procedures are consistently and regularly applied.
6.46 According to Lehane, author of Beating the Odds in a Big Country, an essential factor in the success of the eradication of bovine brucellosis and tuberculosis in Australia was targeted financial assistance and compensation for slaughtered stock.62
6.47 Several witnesses stated that a financial package that provides incentives to control OJD is an essential part of an effective containment or eradication program. It is the essential factor missing from the NSW Program and should not be neglected in Victoria.63The Victorian Farmers Federation64and many individual witnesses have called for reinstatement of compensation for farmers who choose to destock.65 Ongoing testing without such compensation is, they believe, placing sheep producers in a situation of unacceptable financial risk, removing the option of property eradication, and `driving OJD underground'. Without compensation, if testing is undertaken and OJD is diagnosed, the property will be quarantined immediately and the owner will not have the option of financial help to clear the property of the disease.66Costs Not Met by Compensation
6.48 Witnesses to the Inquiry have identified many costs caused by OJD-related regulations. These extend well beyond those addressed by compensation for animals slaughtered.67 They include losses resulting from quarantine and surveillance, and costs of testing to enter the Market Assurance Program. As well as predictable costs, there can be a considerable increase in financial risk and difficulties with cash flow. These witnesses consider that appropriate support or compensation should be made to cover these costs too.
6.49 The stigma attached to districts in which OJD has been found, particularly the Tambo Valley, have led to loss of store-sheep sales.68 This has affected owners of uninfected flocks as well as infected ones.69 One witness pointed out that the presence of OJD in a district would have had an adverse impact on sale of breeding animals even if there were no eradication program.70 However, it appears to the Committee that this difficulty has been most acute in the region where OJD was first identified in Victoria. It may have resulted from a fear of becoming involved with a harsh eradication program rather than a fear of OJD itself.
6.50 Slaughter of sheep has also caused loss of income and financial hardship for people other than farmers. Shearing, other rural employment and small business activity have decreased markedly in some districts where wool production is a major part of the local economy.71 Mr S. Beechy of the Australian Workers' Union told the Committee that, as a result of the contraction of sheep production in parts of Gippsland, some rural workers have "had to travel many hundreds of kilometres from their families to search for work." Others have had no income at all. Mr Beechy considers that rural workers should have an opportunity to put a case for lost-income compensation. No provision was made to deal with these financial impacts on many individuals in the Victorian OJD Control Program.
6.51 Alternative ways of providing financial support for OJD-affected farmers have been suggested. These include low-interest loans, either to help the farmers get back into sheep production or to move into an alternative enterprise.72The Bairnsdale Branch of the Victorian Farmers Federation suggested an alternative approach for farmers who choose to destock and later return to sheep production. It proposed support for farmers during destocking, then provision of funds at the time of restocking.73 This approach would assist with cash-flow problems where there are inadequate options for alternative enterprises and fluctuations in the price of stock between destocking and restocking.
6.52 Other options that have been suggested and could be evaluated include:
a) insurance for producers entering the Market Assurance Program;
b) assistance with the assessed costs of ensuring containment of infection, or support in kind;
c) compensation in terms of the fair market value of stock; and
d) subsidies for testing.
6.53 Where payment of an application for compensation is queried, the Sheep and Goat Compensatory Advisory Committee is requested by the Department to determine whether the application meets the prescribed requirements. There is no appeals process, nor mechanism to argue a special case. As noted in the previous chapter, an appeals process has been subject to discussion, but negotiations were suspended on the calling of the State election in 1999 and have not resumed.
6.54 Several witnesses have expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of an appeals mechanism or with the mechanism that has been proposed74
6.55 Many farmers highlighted the need for help in working out how to manage with OJD.75 According to Mr David Webb Ware, whose property the Committee inspected, good advice is a major factor in dealing successfully with OJD at both the financial and social levels.76 Farmers also need time to plan. This was sometimes refused.
6.56 During its study tour of NSW the Committee was provided with information on developments in NSW Agriculture's approach to OJD.77 A major focus is on providing appropriate, timely and personalised farm-management and financial counselling. The Department works closely with Rural Lands Protection Board staff, who are usually well known and trusted by farmers. Account is taken of the emotional impact of a positive diagnosis on a farmer. The offer of advice is made early but not pressed until the farmer has had time to adjust to the changed circumstances. Information is provided on the disease and then experienced animal health and extension advisers work with the farmer to assess the farm and develop a Property Disease Reduction Plan. The Plan is tailored to the circumstances of the farm. Its aim is to contain OJD while providing the farmer with an income and a way forward. The farmer owns the plan. Agency staff provide information and facilitate the planning process.
6.57 There was no indication in the evidence provided to the Committee of a similar integrated approach to providing information to, and support for, OJD-affected farmers in Victoria. Some farmers have obtained valuable support, for example, through financial counselling services provided by the Rural Counselling Service (a free and confidential service), a number of private consultants and Melbourne University's Mackinnon Project.78 However, the Rural Counselling Service is already heavily committed and not in a position to increase its services substantially, while the costs of private consultants could be outside the means of farmers with flocks affected by OJD. Furthermore, counselling is only provided when sought by farmers - the service is not proactive as in NSW.
6.58 Not all affected producers are willing to seek advice from rural counsellors.79 At the same time, some farmers may not want counsellors to approach them, particularly if these people are not known. The NSW experience has been that, when assistance is offered at the same time as farmers are told about the diagnosis and its implications, and when known and trusted people are used, there is a good chance that the support will be accepted and helpful.80Workshops
6.59 Workshops provide a forum where farmers can obtain information and ideas, analyse their own situation and plan to improve it, and obtain the encouragement of others in similar circumstances.
6.60 The Farm$mart program, run by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment offers training in farm business management in a group environment. It helps farmers to assess their lives and objectives for the future and plan for achievable options.81 Under the recently initiated support program for OJD-affected farmers, access to a Farm$mart course is provided free of charge.82Cootamundra Livestock Officer, Ms S. Maguire, outlined the objectives of Business Skills Workshops that are being run for OJD-affected producers in NSW. These are "designed to be flexible and driven by producers in response to their needs." 83 They focus on assisting farmers to better manage their businesses and new challenges produced by OJD. The Victorian OJD Action Group has run similar workshops in Victoria.84Finding 6.6
OJD control regulations can cause a number of types of financial hardship that are not necessarily addressed by a simple compensation formula. There are some additional tools that can be used to mitigate this hardship.
Finding 6.7
Counselling support can help farmers to cope with the impacts of restrictions imposed by OJD. While it appears that different types of support are required at different times, the Committee believes it important that counselling support be offered soon after the farmer and his or her family receives a positive diagnosis of OJD or is placed under surveillance. Such support needs to be provided by people who are known and respected. Support could be offered on an individual or group basis and at times both approaches may be useful.
6.61 One farmer told the Committee of the stress caused by the lack of anyone to talk to when his flock was diagnosed with OJD. According to this farmer, "lack of communication caused unnecessary stress that could be avoided".85
6.62 Many witnesses to the Inquiry have advocated effective social support for those affected by OJD.86
6.63 The NSW Ovine Johne's Disease Advisory Committee is:
Strongly of the view that social support issues are frequently neglected in the development of rural industry strategies ... In times of crisis, such as that posed by OJD, the need for improved access to support services and networks becomes acute.87 The Committee received evidence that the same need exists in Victoria.88The Advisory Committee was referring particularly to farmers, but the impacts of OJD on the wider rural society have also been described by several witnesses.89 There appear to be deficiencies in the services to rural communities in Victoria as well as NSW. 90Social support services are provided in Victoria's rural areas by a number of groups. Provision of information on these is being co-ordinated by Community Connections, an agency engaged early in 2000 by the Office of Rural Communities to provide support for OJD-affected farmers in Victoria.91 Details of this arrangement were outlined in Chapter 5.
6.64 There has not yet been sufficient time to assess how well this new initiative is working. However, early responses by the farming community have led the Shire of East Gippsland to conclude that the support program is not well structured to meet the needs of the target group.92 The Shire believes that a more proactive response is needed.
6.65 The Committee also notes that services provided by support agencies are constrained by confidentiality obligations imposed on staff of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment. Because the Department cannot reveal names of affected farmers, social support is only offered when requested. The contract under which Community Connections is working also ensures that initial contact is made by telephone. This may sometimes have advantages but is not always an ideal way to initiate support.
6.66 Other support programs available include those offered by the OJD Action Group and the Victorian Farmers Federation.
6.67 The OJD Action Group, a self-help group of affected farmers, was formed in August 1997.93 The need for the affected farmers to form such a group was the result of "the isolation of OJD affected farmers, the extreme lack of knowledge of the causes and control of OJD, the almost universal ignorance of the Victorian Sheep Industry about OJD; and the failure to undertake any genuine technical, economic and social assessment of the impact of this eradication program."94
6.68 Major objectives of the group are:
a) to provide a support base for affected farmers;
b) to acquire and distribute information about all aspects of OJD;
c) to liaise with DNRE regarding the implementation of the eradication program;
d) to seek Government and Industry recognition of their plight and an equal and fair voice in the consideration of OJD management in Victoria; and
e) to represent and protect the interests of their members.95Until the Community Connections program was set up, the Group saw themselves as "the only support facility offered to OJD affected families". 96 As one representative of the organisation put it: "I believe the existing organisations that we would have looked to, and did initially, to provide that support and representative role felt it was not within their agenda or it did not have a sufficiently high priority. Certainly it did not exist to the degree that after the initial destocking it was basically through the individual efforts of farmers finding each other ... and deciding that they have to have some sort of group to not only share their experiences and represent their views, but, to be honest, to take comfort and support from each other in their experiences".97
6.69 Support has been provided to its members by way of seminars, workshops, newsletters and telephone. They do not have trained counselling staff, but callers are directed to other sources of professional help if required. The Chairman of the group and his wife appear to face the brunt of calls:
They would ring the media to get our telephone number because Frank had gone public to say we had OJD. They would ask, `What do I do now? I think I am going crazy, I - not the sheep - `have tested positive to OJD.' People are extremely emotional about how they have been treated ...98
6.70 In 1999, the Victorian Farmers Federation Pastoral Group responded to requests by its members by calling on them to offer social support services to affected producers in addition to the financial counselling services being offered. In January 2000 the Pastoral Group "funded a short-term OJD Support Officer to talk to affected farmers about their experiences in a confidential manner and to assist in linking them with professional services made available by Government."99 The Support Officer contacted more than seventy farmers.
6.71 The NSW approach, where social and financial support are offered together soon after farmers learn of infection in their flocks, seems to the Committee to have much merit. It would be important, however, that those who make this early contact are suitably equipped for the task. The Committee does not consider that it is appropriate for animal health staff, untrained in such work, to be expected to shoulder this task on top of their other duties.
6.72 Ms S. Maguire, NSW Livestock Officer, described another NSW group initiative.100This was the Goulburn Women's Information Day. The day was aimed at helping rural women to cope with the changes wrought by OJD. An important aspect of this day was that it was free. Women present said that they would not have been able to attend had there been a charge, a point that illustrated the interconnectedness between the financial and social issues associated with OJD and the need to address the two together
6.73 The NSW Ovine Johne's Disease Advisory Committee also identified a need to:
a) improve provision and accessibility of social support services to rural and regional communities affected by OJD;
b) increase awareness, participation and responsiveness on the part of public and community sector organisations serving communities affected by OJD; and
c) improve understanding of the social support needs of rural and regional communities affected by OJD.101Evidence provided to the Committee and discussed in more detail in Chapter 10 indicated that Victorian farmers and communities face the same needs and that there is room to improve available services to meet these needs.102Group Development and Action
6.74 The Shire Council of East Gippsland, in its submission, recommended that assistance should be given to OJD-affected farmers - both those directly affected and those under surveillance - to form small local groups. The Council proposed that each group should be facilitated to determine the best way to manage OJD in its particular area and to implement agreed strategies.103Ms S. Maguire considers that the development of neighbourhood groups of affected producers can serve the dual roles of social and management support. 104
6.75 There is good precedent for group action to deal with rural issues. Both the Victorian and NSW programs for eradication of virulent footrot have been based on co-operation between neighbours and progressive eradication from local districts.105 Co-operation between neighbours might assist farmers to manage OJD and progressively rid districts of the infection. It would be particularly useful if farmers co-operated in excluding infection from properties that have been decontaminated or were never infected.
6.76 The key to the success of the footrot program, according to staff of NSW Agriculture, was for farmer groups to be the driving force behind district eradication.106 NSW Agriculture found that its past top-down approach to footrot control had not contained the disease. Lessons had to be learnt about sociology and group dynamics. The network of Rural Lands Protection Boards, which have been in place across NSW for more than 100 years, provided a framework for the NSW program.
6.77 Victoria has a long experience of farmers working together to achieve group objectives. The Landcare movement, mentioned earlier, started from a grass-roots initiative in Victoria more than two decades ago. Representatives of Bestwool 2010 and others have suggested that existing groups might be used as a framework for groups aimed at control, and possible regional eradication, of OJD.107 Group action against OJD could be based on neighbours or on trading groups such as stud societies.
Finding 6.8
The social hardship caused by the Victorian OJD Program was not addressed by the Program. There is a need for a commitment to social support that is adequate, appropriate and goes beyond what is available at the present time.
The OJD Action Group provided an appreciated support service to affected producers - and its consistent lobbying gave the affected farmers an effective voice.
6.78 A number of farmers have complained of the arbitrary way in which Departmental staff were able to impose restrictions and directions on them. Some of these directions can only be seen by the Committee as thoroughly unreasonable, in particular the short time, described above, for farmers to sign contracts and destock.
6.79 There was a strong view expressed by some witnesses that Departmental staff cannot be held accountable for their decisions and that they have imposed requirements on farms and farmers without any consultation or negotiation.
6.80 One witness described the way "DNRE staff are acting as policemen and enforcers of regulations."108 Another referred to the "attitude of the DNRE to my fellow farmers and the way they were treating them with a jackboot approach".109Others expressed dissatisfaction that there was no opportunity to verify testing results. As one farmer said of the test results:
Three sheep came up [positive]. I cannot argue because they did not show me the sheep dead when they autopsied them. I just had to go on what I was told by the chief veterinary officer.
6.81 Producers have indicated that they consider there is a need for access to independent review of Departmental decisions.110 According to Mr L. Hiscock, there should also have been earlier review of how the whole program was being implemented:
There has been widespread testing and harassment of some districts and no testing at all in other districts ... One of the worst aspects of the program is that no review has taken place since its start in 1996. The program has run unchecked, with no meaningful steps taken to address the serious social harms [caused by the Program].111With Respect to Diagnoses
6.82 Concern has been expressed about a lack of opportunity to verify the test results provided by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment.112According to Dr Kefford:
In relation to independent review of tests, where owners or private veterinarians request verification of results, this may be done at an approved laboratory subject to the approval of NRE's Chief Veterinary Officer or Manager Animal Health Operations.
6.83 It is clear from the evidence that many of those affected are not aware of this option. In a matter of such seriousness as positive identification of OJD, the Committee cannot see why any approval should be required for a producer to obtain verification of results. In fact it would seem more appropriate that owners of flocks diagnosed as OJD positive should always have the right to some form of independent verification of the diagnosis and that they should be told of this right. If the nature and reliability of the tests has been well explained and the flock owner must bear at least a proportion of the cost of additional testing, it is not likely that verification would be sought lightly.
6.84 In summary:
a) evidence of past problems, lack of opportunity to verify results and failure to explain the tests adequately have led to a loss of confidence among some farmers in the system of diagnosis; and
b) greater efforts to provide accountability, explain the quality assurance systems and the basis of diagnosis may overcome this lack of confidence.
Finding 6.9
There is a perception among people affected by OJD that Departmental staff can impose restrictions on them without any provision for negotiation or appeal. There also appears to be no opportunity for farmers to seek verification of tests.
6.85 A Gifford sheep farmer described the "inconsistencies of the whole OJD debacle" in her submission to the Inquiry.113 She referred particularly to differences in the number of sheep tested for the same sized flocks. When the Committee asked staff of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment why such inconsistencies occurred, it was explained that different numbers were appropriate if the `tail' of the flock was tested compared with the whole flock.114 At least part of the difficulty for farmers appears to have been the lack of information provided to them on the reasons for variations in the delivery of the Program.
6.86 Dr J. Galvin, Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, also explained that some of the variations in delivery of the Victorian OJD Control Program resulted from efforts to tailor the Program to the circumstances of individual properties.115 The Committee has outlined some of the different sampling requirements to ensure statistical validity of blood testing in Chapter 5 and recognises that balancing flexibility with consistency in delivery of a program is difficult.
6.87 However, on some issues no flexibility is offered at all. A farmer of Barooma (near Sale) told the Committee:
We were tested because a neighbour had an infected flock. One wether tested positive. We asked to test our ewes, and after over 800 were tested, all were negative. The vet said we were very unlucky, that it was suspected that a flash flood had brought affected faeces on to our property and the wether could well be the only infected sheep on the property. We pleaded strongly to keep our ewes and have them tested constantly, and if any sign of infection appeared we would have them destroyed. That was denied and 14,000 visibly healthy sheep were slaughtered.116 The Committee identified, in preceding chapters, variations in options and circumstances of different properties. Differences in economic circumstances are considered in Chapter 10. There is certainly a good case to be made for taking these circumstances into account when planning the control of OJD on any particular property or in a district. At the same time, farmers need to know where they stand if they are to plan and manage their properties. Ways to deal with the problem of balancing flexibility and consistency are needed.
6.88 The Committee expects that approaches will include clear guidelines and processes, which indicate how individual farm circumstances are to be addressed.
Finding 6.10
Providing an OJD control program that is both flexible and consistent is difficult. Mechanisms to achieve both attributes need to be developed.
6.89 The Committee drew attention, at the beginning of this chapter, to the importance of adequate resources to run a disease control program.
6.90 As noted in Chapter 5, there was no increase in financial or staff resources provided to deal with the outbreak of OJD in Victoria. Staff responsibilities were also extended during this time to provide education and information on OJD. Moreover, the Committee understands that at the time of the first summer of the Victorian OJD Control Program, from 26 January to 26 March 1997, the Department's Animal Health group was fully committed to the control of a major anthrax outbreak in the Goulburn Valley.
6.91 No specialist staff trained in communication were appointed117and arrangements for social counselling were not provided until the Program had been in operation for three years.
6.92 The Committee also heard that requests for more-extensive testing of flocks identified as infected were not met because of limited resources. Such additional testing would have been desirable to provide research data on the extent and speed of infection in flocks and, perhaps more importantly, provided the affected farmer with a greater sense that his flock was indeed infected, rather than just one or two animals. Examples of such concerns came from farmers in Yarram, Omeo and Buchan.118Finding 6.11
Given the large number of infected flocks across the State and the ongoing nature of control, the resources for the Victorian OJD Control Program appear to have been less than required for good delivery of the Program. The total resources and specialist staff are considered to not be sufficient to meet the needs of consultation, communication and both financial and social support of those affected by the Program.
6.93 As noted in Chapter 5, the Sheep and Goat Compensation Fund is currently carrying a debt of $15.9 million, serviced by an annual revenue of $1.282 million.
6.94 The Committee asked a number of key industry groups about this debt and the level of debt that they believed that the industry could or should carry. The responses were far from definitive. For example, the Chairman of the Sheep and Goat Advisory Committee, the body that is responsible for administering the debt, stated: " I do not think that is our decision. We negotiate the funds, but in consultation with government and industry. I do not think a figure has ever been put on it."119
6.95 This is an issue of concern not only to the Committee but also to the current Minister for Agriculture. When briefing the Committee on the Inquiry Terms of Reference at the commencement of the Inquiry, Minister Hamilton said: "When Labor came to Government ... Treasurer's advances were up to about $8 million dollars and approaching $11 million. Treasurer's advances are not money for jam. They are in fact loans to statutory organisations which incur interest and have to be paid back."120
6.96 Many witnesses also described to the Committee other aspects of the Victorian OJD Control Program that have led to the present situation where there is division in the community concerning both the appropriateness of the Program and the best way forward. These aspects include the initial and later decision-making processes, differences between affected producers in their experience of the disease, uncertainties surrounding the adequacies of the science and technology employed and a failure to address the social dimension of the Program. Indeed, evidence presented to the Committee suggests that how the Program was delivered has been at least as much of an issue as what was delivered. More-detailed assessment of the financial and social impacts of the program is provided in Chapters 10 and 11.
6.97 Evidence provided to the Committee indicates a two opposing attitudes to the Victorian OJD Control Program. Some people support the strategy of eradication with compensation, even if they are less than happy with some aspects of how the Program was delivered. Others are opposed to the eradication strategy and, in some cases, other aspects of the Program as well. These attitudes have changed over time.121According to Mr P. Jennings, Rural Counsellor for the Gippsland Rural Financial Counselling Service, at the time that the eradication and compensation scheme in Victoria was announced there was broad acceptance of it.122 The scheme had been called for by a group of farmers who were badly affected by the disease and felt that they had little choice but to destock.123 The Victorian Farmers Federation took up the cause and lobbied the Government. However, in Mr Jennings words, "when flocks of apparently healthy sheep started to produce positive diagnosis we started to experience a new phenomenon. The control measures became a greater problem for individuals than the disease."
6.98 Some farmers with flocks identified late in the Program still supported eradication by destocking,124but many others did not. Mr Jennings considers that for some time there was a failure to recognise this changing circumstance.
6.99 In other words, a program and mode of delivery were continued past a time when they had wide acceptance among the people who had to take primary responsibility for making sure the Victorian OJD Control Program worked - the affected farmers. As the Committee identified when examining the broad principles of livestock disease control (Chapter 3), it is difficult for a control program to succeed unless it has the support of these people. The challenge now is to find strategies to control OJD and methods of delivery that will engage the support of a farming community that is divided in its attitudes towards both the disease and the control methods.
1 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
2 Schnurrenberger, Sharman and Wise (1987), p. 91.
3 Schnurrenberger et al. (1987), p. 16.
4 For example, Harrison, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 013.
5 Lehane (1996).
6 Youl, Y. (2000), Landcare Australia, personal communication, November 1999.
7 Walker (1997), p. 115.
8 Bray, W. S. (2000), President , Pastoral Group, Victorian Farmers Federation, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
9 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
10 For example Wood, I. (2000), OJD Action Committee, Written Submissions, OJD 106.
11 Larsen, J. W. A. (2000),The Mackinnon Project, University of Melbourne, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
12 White, F. J. (2000), Executive Officer, Livestock Saleyards Association of Victoria, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
13 Gutheridge, N. J. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 075.
14 Bolitho, W. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 18 May 2000.
15 Calvert, D. K. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 108.
16 Hall, J. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 10 July 2000.
17 Bray, W. S. (2000), President, Pastoral Group, Victorian Farmers Federation, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
18 Australian Bureau of Statistics (1998-99), p. 13.
19 Clark, A. and I. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, Inquiry into the Incidence of Ovine Johne's Disease in the Australian Sheep Flock, Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Reference Committee, 21 July 2000.
20 Picken, K. J. (2000), Executive Officer, Australian Veterinary Association, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
21 Lyons, J. (2000), Vice-President, Hamilton Victorian Farmers Federation District Council, Written Submissions, OJD 111, Shea, D. (2000), Secretary, Ararat Branch, Victorian Farmers Federation, Minutes of Evidence, 21 June 2000, Strathbogie Tehan, J. (2000), Strathbogie Branch, Victorian Farmers Federation, Written Submissions, OJD 043, Livingston, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 005.
22 Bray, W. S. (2000), President, Pastoral Group, Victorian Farmers Federation, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
23 For example, Wood, I. (2000), OJD Action Committee, Written Submissions, OJD 106; and also Livingston, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 005.
24 Livingston, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 005.
25 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
26 Hides, S. (2000), Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
27 Hides, S. (2000), Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000; and also Kefford, K. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, correspondence, VT/001/0001, received 22 September 2000.
28 Hides, S. (2000), Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
29 Anders, W. and V. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 067.
30 Richardson, J. and J. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 102.
31 Prowse, S. (2000), Program Manager, Infectious Diseases and Food Safety, Animal Health Laboratories, CSIRO, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
32 For example, evidence presented by Vallance, J. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 4 June 2000.
33 For example, Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1997) and NSW Agriculture (1997c).
34 Millar, H. (2000), Acting Chief Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, personal communication, 6 September 2000.
35 For example, Tobin, R. and F. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 063.
36 For example, Blennerhassett, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 001, Killeen, P. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 024 and Bowman, H. E. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 18 May 2000.
37 Livingston, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 005.
38 Ahsam, A (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000.
39 Ahsam, B. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000.
40 Webb, M. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 052.
41 Murphy, R. (2000), Minutes of Evidence,18 May 2000.
42 Webb, M. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 052.
43 Webb, M. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 052.
44 Webb, M. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 052.
45 For example, Murphy, R. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 007, Bowman, H. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 032 and Tobin, R. and F. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 063.
46 Tobin, R. and F. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 063.
47 Anders, W.G. (2000); Minutes of Evidence, 221 June 2000.
48 Tobin, C. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 21 June 2000.
49 Oliver, A. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 13 June 2000.
50 MacLennan, G. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 18 May 2000.
51 Sievers, J. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 14 June 2000.
52 Galvin, J. W. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
53 The Committee discusses this issue in more detail in Chapter 10.
54 For example, Ahsam, B. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000; and also Hiscock L. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000 and Oliver, G. (2000), National President Pole Dorset Association, Minutes of Evidence, 10 July 2000.
55 Starritt, B. (2000), stud breeder, personal communication, 16 September 2000.
56 Ahsam, B., Written Submissions, OJD 004; and also Clark, A. and I. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 040 and Richardson, J. and J. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 102.
57 Clark, A. and I. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 040. Copies of the reports were submitted to the Melbourne hearing of the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Joint Investigatory Committee on 21 July 2000.
58 Prowse (2000), p. 18.
59 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, correspondence, VT/001/0001, received 22 September 2000.
60 Richardson, J. and J. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 102.
61 Whittington, R. (2000), NSW Agriculture, personal communication, 8 June 2000.
62 Lehane (1996).
63 For example, McNamara, P. (2000), former Minister of Agriculture, personal communication, 25 September 2000; and also Denholmn, L. (2000), NSW Agriculture, personal communication, 8 June 2000.
64 Victorian Farmers Federation (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 084.
65 For example, Beechey, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 011 and Shea, R. A. and M. M. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 082.
66 McNamara, P. (2000), former Minister of Agriculture, personal communication, 25 September 2000.
67 These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.
68 Johnston, T. (2000), Written Submissions, 17 May 2000.
69 Foster, P. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000.
70 Newcomen, B. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000.
71 Lloyd, C. R. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000; and also Killeen, P. J. (2000), Area Wool Manager, Westfarmers Dalgety, Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000 and Beechey, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 011.
72 Mactier, J. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 020; and also Vickers, B. (2000), farmer, Carcoar, NSW, personal communication, 3 July 2000.
73 Fechner, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 028.
74 For example, Lade, A. (2000), merino stud breeder, personal communication, 13 June 2000 and Tobin, F. (2000), Secretary, OJD Action Group, personal communication, 20 June 2000.
75 For example, Harrison, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 013.
76 Webb Ware, D. (2000), personal communication, 13 June 2000.
77 Evers, M. (2000), OJD Policy Development Officer, NSW Agriculture, personal communication, 3 July 2000.
78 Marriott, J. (2000), Rural Financial Consultant, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000; and also McPhan, B. (2000), Rural Counselling Service, personal communication, 17 May 2000 and Webb Ware, J. (2000), personal communication, 13 June 2000.
79 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
80 Evers, M. OJD Policy Development Officer, NSW Agriculture, personal communication, 3 July 2000.
81 Moloney, J. P. (2000), Office of Rural Communities, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
82 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (2000).
83 Maguire (1999).
84 Tobin, F. (2000), Secretary, OJD Action Group, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
85 Harrison, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 013.
86 For example, McLennan, F. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 019 and Shea, D. (2000), Ararat Branch, Victorian Farmers Federation, Written Submissions, OJD 029.
87 NSW Ovine Johne's Disease Advisory Committee (2000), p. B 28.
88 Hall, J. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 10 July 2000; and also Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, briefing, 17 July 2000.
89 For example, Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, briefing, 17 July 2000; and personal communication, 11 July 2000; and also Beechey, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 011.
90 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, briefing, 17 July 2000; and personal communication, 11 July 2000; and also Beechey, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 011.
91 Moloney,J. P. (2000), Office of Rural Communities, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
92 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, Written Submissions, OJD 006.
93 Wood, I. (2000), Chairman OJD Action Group, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
94 Victorian OJD Action Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 106.
95 Victorian OJD Action Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 106.
96 Victorian OJD Action Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 106.
97 Wood, I. (2000) Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
98 Tobin, R. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 21 June 2000.
99 Victorian Farmers Federation (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 084.
100 Maguire (1999).
101 NSW Ovine Johne's Disease Advisory Committee (2000), p. B 29.
102 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, briefing, 17 July 2000; and personal communication, 11 July 2000; and also Beechey, S. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 011.
103 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, Written Submissions, OJD 006.
104 Maguire (1999).
105 Walker (1997); and also Millar, H. (2000), Acting Chief Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, personal communication, 6 September 2000 and Newcomen, B. and E. (2000), personal communication, 17 May 2000.
106 Walker (1997).
107 Bush, C. (2000), BESTWOOL 2010, Written Submissions, OJD 065; and also Newcomen, B. and E. (2000), personal communication, 17 May 2000.
108 Lobb, D. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 14 June 2000.
109 Gooding, P. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 18 May 2000.
110 For example, Blennerhassett, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 001 and Wood, I. (2000), OJD Action Committee, Written Submissions, OJD 106.
111 Hiscock L. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000.
112 Ahsam, B., Written Submissions, OJD 004.
113 Best, D. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 017.
114 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
115 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
116 Mactier, W. J. (2000), Munites of Evidence, 18 May 2000.
117 Hides, S. (2000), Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
118 Best, D. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 017; and also Ahsam, B., Written Submissions, OJD 004 and Murphy, R. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 007.
119 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
120 Hamilton, K. G. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 5 April 2000.
121 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
122 Jennings, P. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 012.
123 Jennings, P. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 012; and also Newcomen, E. and D. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 058.
124 For example, Shea, R. A. and M. M. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 082; and Sievers, J. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 14 June 2000.
