5.1 The Victorian OJD Control Program was initiated in December 1996, a year after the discovery of an outbreak of OJD in the State and more than a year before the National OJD Program got underway. Johne's Disease was declared a notifiable disease under Victorian legislation in the mid-1920s.1The Livestock Diseases Control Act, Regulations and Procedures
5.2 The way in which government agencies are required to manage OJD and other livestock diseases is determined by the Livestock Diseases Control Act 1994 and regulations made under the Act. The Manual of Procedures for Animal Health and Welfare Programs provides information and guidelines for Victorian animal health and welfare staff in relation to diseases declared under the Act.2Under the Act, a disease means:
a) any contagious or infectious disease, or any condition to which any livestock is subject, that the Governor-in-Council declares from time to time to be a disease; or
b) an exotic disease.
5.3 Exotic diseases include foot-and-mouth diseases and rabies.3 Essentially, they are serious contagious disease not found in Australia but which could find their way here.
5.4 Non-exotic livestock diseases defined under the Act include such contagious diseases as anthrax, ovine footrot, ovine and bovine brucellosis, tuberculosis, Johne's disease and rabbit calicivirus disease.4 They also include parasitic diseases such as ovine lice and cattle tick. They do not include many stock diseases, for example tetanus, botulism and mastitis. Though other diseases may be important to animal production, the provisions of this Act do not apply to them.
5.5 All diseases that are declared under the Act are what are commonly termed `notifiable diseases'. That is, there is a requirement under the Act that:5If a person knows or has reason to suspect that a disease is present in livestock, livestock products or hives -
(a) owned by that person or in the possession, control or charge of that person; or
(b) on land owned and occupied by that person; or
(c) dealt with by that person as a veterinary practitioner, [etc.]
the person must notify an inspector.
5.6 Being a `notifiable disease' does not mean that any particular action regarding the disease follows. The subsequent action is determined by regulations under the Act. The listing of the disease means, in the first instance, that government agencies are in a position to keep track of the disease and, in the second instance, introduces regulations to control the disease if there appears to be a need to do so. For a number of listed diseases, notification leads to no control action - rabbit calicivirus disease, for example. The primary focus of the listing in such cases is keeping track of the disease.
5.7 Only for a relatively small number of listed diseases (for example footrot and OJD) have control programs been developed. Procedures for the delivery of these programs by staff of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment are outlined in the periodically updated Manual of Procedures for Animal Health and Welfare Programs.6 This Manual of Procedures is updated as new policies are developed.
5.8 In delivering a control program, Departmental staff are also constrained by secrecy obligations under the Act. These obligations prevent staff from divulging any information gained during their employment concerning producers or properties with whom staff have worked.7 The Committee received evidence that staff did not always meet this requirement and conversely that this requirement can work against the affected property owners - these aspects are further discussed in Chapter 11.
5.9 Victoria has successfully undertaken a number of livestock disease control and eradication programs. Examples cited by Dr B. Kefford, Executive Director Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, include contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (eradicated in 1973), bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis (eradicated in 1997 and 1998 respectively), three fowl plague outbreaks and (in 1997) anthrax in the Goulburn Valley.8 However, Dr Kefford acknowledged, in his evidence to the Committee, that OJD has been different and more difficult to manage than other diseases.9All of these previous control and eradication programs attracted State Government funding as well as funding from the Commonwealth Government and industry.
5.10 The Victorian approach to managing OJD involved active intervention, that is, it was a control program. The control approach was essentially one of eradication by destocking, with an allied compensation package. There are, however, other aspects of the program. These included testing flocks, tracing infection and quarantine of infected or suspect flocks.10 For convenience, the Committee will refer to the full program that was in place between December 1996 and November 1999 as the `Victorian OJD Control Program'.
5.11 Two factors that were reported as making control of OJD in Victoria particularly difficult were the absence of any national program when a program of control was being developed and initiated and limited knowledge available on OJD in Victoria at that time.11 The latter related particularly to the extent of OJD in Victoria and the time lag between infection of a flock and manifestation of disease symptoms.
5.12 The Committee has summarised the evidence it received in relation to the development and operation of the Victorian OJD Control Program in an attempt to: clarify what at first sight appears to be conflicting statements about the program and to determine if there are lessons to be learnt for the future.
5.13 The Committee was provided with a short background paper prepared by the Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Millar, on the history of the Victorian OJD Control Program.12 A summary of the development of the Program, as presented by that paper supplemented by material provided by other witnesses, is contained in the next section.
5.14 As was outlined in Chapter 4, it was clear that OJD was known to occur in Australia and moreover known to be spreading by way of introducing infected sheep onto properties. So what was happening to control the spread of OJD into Victoria prior to December 1995? The answer, it seems, is not very much.
5.15 Owners of known infected flocks in New South Wales were required to sign agreements `not to trade' from 1981, when OJD was first identified in that State, until 1996 - when a `formal quarantine situation' was put in place and the full regulatory provisions of the NSW Stock Disease Act 1923 brought into play.13
5.16 The sheep industry, through the Victorian Farmers Federation Pastoral Group, was concerned about the high risk of Johne's Disease to the Victorian sheep flock and in December 1984 requested the State Government to implement suitable measures to prevent the introduction of OJD into Victoria.14 "In July 1993 the Pastoral Group called for improved tests to be developed to identify Johne's disease in all species affected to enable eradication programs to be developed". 15 And in October 1995, the Pastoral Group again "requested the State Government to design and implement protocols for sheep entering Victoria from interstate to decrease the risk of spread of OJD into Victoria."16 And what happened in response to all of these requests? The answer again, it seems, is not very much.
5.17 Producers have given evidence that they were unaware of OJD and had not received any advice or information from the Department of Natural Resources and Environment and its predecessors about OJD, including the risks of bringing stock into the State from OJD-affected areas. Indeed the Committee was given anecdotal evidence of a producer who was given no information about the distribution of OJD and subsequently found he had purchased sheep from an OJD-infected area.
5.18 At the Public Hearings, the Committee asked the Department of Natural Resources and Environment whether, given that OJD has been in New Zealand and in New South Wales for many years, the Department had a contingency plan in place before December 1995. The Department's reply, by Dr Galvin and Mr Bailey, is indirect, but in effect they knew about the disease, its diagnosis and characteristics but had not implemented any option prior to December 1995.17The Committee was not able to obtain any evidence that advice of how to prevent infection of OJD had been given to Victorian farmers in the form of pamphlets or brochures prior to the December 1995 outbreak.
It is of concern that the Department responsible for animal health programs had no effective strategies in place to prevent an infectious livestock disease known to occur in areas from which animals were being brought into Victoria. An absence of any evidence of even generally available information materials on the disease and risk-management techniques is inexplicable and, in the Committee's opinion, unacceptable.
5.19 Many of the submissions to the Inquiry referred to the haste with which the Victorian OJD Control Program was introduced and the inadequacy of knowledge on which to base a program at that time.18
5.20 In fact, there was a period of approximately twelve months between the first identification of OJD in the Ensay district of East Gippsland, in December 1995, and the initiation of the Victorian OJD Control Program.
5.21 Immediately after OJD was identified in Victoria, the Department of Natural Resources and Environment appeared to put into train a work program that was in accordance with the requirements and provisions of the Victorian Livestock Diseases Control Act 1994. Its actions included:
a) defining the extent of infected flocks by trace-back and trace-forward from infected properties and investigation of neighbours and other `high risk' properties;
b) limiting further spread of the disease from the infected flocks;
c) providing advice about the disease, its recognition and control, to affected farmers and the Victorian sheep industry; and
d) developing and supporting voluntary market-assurance processes (vendor declaration or, ultimately, a market-assurance program) to promote the sale of low-risk sheep in Victoria and nationally.19Was the Distribution of OJD Investigated Prior to Commencing the OJD Control Program?
5.22 Many submissions have stated that a fundamental flaw of the Victorian OJD Control Program was a lack of knowledge of the distribution of the disease. It is clear from the evidence presented to the Committee that there was a lack of such knowledge - a situation admitted by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment in the evidence they gave at Public Hearing.20 Indeed, the Committee notes that complete information of the distribution of the disease is still not known - see also Chapter 7.
5.23 On identifying an outbreak of OJD in Victoria, the Department of Natural Resources and Environment commenced what the Committee now understands is a normal response to the identification of a new infectious disease - see Chapter 3 - a program of trace-forward and trace-back testing. At the time the only available test for identifying infection, other than by identification of gross clinical signs or by post mortem, was a blood test. By the end of 1996, 3,478 sheep on approximately 180 properties had been blood tested and, on the basis of these tests, 207 sheep tested by slaughter and histological (microscopic) inspection.21
5.24 According to Dr John Galvin, Manager Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, there was also regular contact with NSW at this time and the advice they "consistently got back from New South Wales was that on the information it had from its affected properties there were very few if any traces that were coming into Victoria''.22 "Knowing that there was a problem in New South Wales", the Department also set up some initial abattoir monitoring - "Interestingly, we were particularly focussing on a couple of abattoirs in Gippsland, and we found one positive, which led back to a property on which we had already found the disease through tracing from the Tambo Valley".23By the time the Victorian OJD Control Program commenced, some 33 infected properties had been identified.24 These properties were not restricted to the Ensay district and the Tambo Valley, but included properties elsewhere in the State - including at least one that the Committee understands did not have a link to the Gippsland flocks.
5.25 While there were no obvious signs of a major outbreak (of clinical disease symptoms) elsewhere in Victoria at this time, this did not mean there were not other areas of Victoria with lesser levels of infection. The fact that the Department specifically sought funding from industry - see the next section - for eradication of flocks outside of the initially identified 33 flocks may indicate that other areas of infection in Victoria were anticipated.
5.26 The Committee received evidence from many groups and individuals that the Department "must have known" that there was a risk of infection being introduced from trade with infected flocks outside Victoria. Given that sheep were being imported from known areas of infection in New South Wales and Flinders Island, although not necessarily from infected flocks in these areas, the Committee considers it likely that Departmental veterinarian staff could have concluded that there was a potential for OJD infection to be found elsewhere in Victoria if not in 1995, at least in the next few years.
A significant level of testing was undertaken between the identification of a node of OJD infection in Victoria and the commencement of a control program 12 months later. The Department did not have, and did not attempt to obtain, a Statewide distribution of infection before commencing the control program. In the Committee's view, the Department should have, and probably did, know that further nodes of infection were likely.
5.27 During the period between December 1995 and December 1996 there appear to have been many discussions between staff of the Department and the Victorian Farmers Federation Pastoral Group about how to respond to the outbreak. There were also discussions between both of these groups and the affected farmers in the Ensay district about what these farmers could do to cope with the disease. By October 1996, according to Dr J. Bailey, Director Quality Assurance, Department of Natural Resources and Environment , a number of producers in this district who had experienced unsustainable losses and the distressing spectacle of sick and dying sheep were "pushing very hard for assistance to destock".25Such affected farmers actively lobbied for support from the Victorian Farmers Federation Pastoral Group and the Department of Natural Resources and Environment. Once they had been diagnosed with OJD they couldn't sell the sheep and it appears that they believed that they had an obligation to their fellow farmers to destock: "Anybody who has knowingly got the disease on their property and is prepared to continue to run the stock is doing so unethically and not in consideration of their fellow farmers."26
5.28 The push for financial assistance was confirmed by evidence given by one of the owners of the first farms identified with OJD:
On several occasions from as far back as 1984 right up until just prior to us getting the disease, the Victorian Farmers Federation had requested of the relevant government department, `What about the risk of OJD?', and on each occasion the department responded, `It won't be a problem in Victoria'. That is one of the reasons why I strongly believe the government has a responsibility to cover the costs for the people in the eradication program.27It seems that the eradication of OJD from affected flocks and properties and more particularly compensation of affected farmers was also supported by the Victorian Farmers Federation Pastoral Group - see comments above - as well as the Department of Natural Resources and Environment . Although the then Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Turner, stated in evidence given to the Committee that the Department did not have a preferred option,28the Minister recalled in evidence presented to the Committee on 25 September 2000, "The advice I got from the vets was that we should do something on the program. We should go through a process to try to eradicate those flocks that were infected".
5.29 The Committee has had access to correspondence between the Department and the Pastoral Group. The main issue raised in this correspondence, certainly towards the end of 1996, was not whether should there be an eradication program or not, but rather who should pay compensation for the destocked sheep. As was outlined in Chapter 4, New South Wales was still preparing a co-ordinated strategy for managing OJD in that State and consultations on developing a national position were becoming protracted and, according to a Departmental briefing note of 10 October 1996, it was "likely to be some time before a national consensus of the sheep and wool industries is obtained". As it turned out, a national program was not adopted until 1998.
5.30 On 11 October 1996 Minister McNamara, who was the then Minister for Agriculture,29wrote to the then President of the Pastoral Group, suggesting three options for "controlling or eradicating" OJD - these being control (in effect quarantine with flocks only sold to slaughter), eradication (with or without compensation) and removal of all controls (accept that Johne's disease will become endemic). The letter concludes:
In the interests of those farmers, who have had the misfortune to have had this terrible disease develop in their flocks, they need assurances that the sheep industry is serious about assisting them in eradicating the disease. If there is to be no eradication program, the sheep industry needs to clearly indicate this so that all controls on infected flocks can be removed and those producers allowed to get back to normal operations again.
5.31 In response, the then President of the Victorian Farmers Federation - Pastoral Group, wrote back on 18 October 1996 stating, among other things, that "while ... [the Pastoral Council] is totally supportive of a national approach to the control and possible eradication of ovine Johne's disease, we again contend that in our belief Victoria has a unique window of opportunity to act to clean up this insidious disease prior to any further spread to other flocks". It also sought "urgent financial grants/assistance so as to enable an immediate slaughter out of these infected stock". In a second letter, dated 30 October 1996, after a Pastoral Council meeting, the president reiterated the Council's "support for a national approach to the control and eradication of ovine Johne's disease", confirmed its rejection of any new taxes to fund animal health, stated that the Pastoral Council "is acutely aware of the seriousness of this problem and the unique window of opportunity we consider we have prior to this summer to tackle the problem". The letter also refers to perceptions of a link between Johne's disease and a human medical condition (a point also raised in the Minister's letter) and seeks:
a one off government grant and other assistance measures so as to move immediately to destock these infected properties ... [and avoid] delaying the program another twelve months, thus providing more opportunity for the further spread of ovine Johne's disease.
5.32 By early November, the Minister had replied that he was "still of the view that the Government should only make a one-off grant available to provide compensation payments to the [then] 19 affected farmers as outlined in your letter, if there was to be a commitment by the sheep industry to address this issue on a long term basis." The Minister, in his letter, went on to say, "there will be no expectation on the Government to continue the program in the event that industry cannot agree on a national or State program providing industry funds for compensation".
5.33 The veiled threat to discontinue the program was pivotal from the Federation's perspective: "The prospect of the abolition of controls for OJD by the State Government in Victoria, and the subsequent potential for the disease to spread unchecked through the State's sheep flock, impressed upon industry the urgent need to progress consideration of a program".30 The Pastoral Group then contacted "all VFF Pastoral District Councils on the support for the implementation of a stamp duty on ovine sales to fund an OJD compensation fund in Victoria." This proposal was then taken to a special meeting of the Federation's Pastoral Group, which approved the proposal on 10 December 1996.31
5.34 Dr Millar, in his briefing paper, added that:
The most significant decision was a decision by the VFF Pastoral Council to agree to the provision of industry funding to support eradication of the disease, through a stamp duty on sheep sales, similar to the stamp-duty scheme that had operated for the cattle industry for decades.32
5.35 This decision led, in December 1996, in Dr Millar's words, to:
The Victorian sheep industry reaching agreement with the Victorian Government for a major control program to commence, which had as its key objective, the eradication of OJD infection from affected properties and the prevention of the spread of infection to unaffected flocks.33The importance of destocking being accompanied by compensation was reiterated by the Hon. Pat McNamara in evidence he provided to the Committee:
It is hard to require farmers to quarantine their properties and offer them no financial incentive to get out of it ... I find it hard to say, "We will provide no compensation, but we still quarantine your property". You can do that. ... I felt that was being particularly harsh, but it is still what is happening in New South Wales and South Australia.
5.36 Staff of the then Department of Natural Environment and Conservation explained to the Committee that a sense of urgency arose as summer approached.34 To include the summer of 1996-67 in the decontamination period, destocking was required to be completed by 31 January 1997.35
5.37 On the 23-24 December 1996 an initial offer was made to all 33 known affected producers for compensation to destock their properties.36 These were mainly in East Gippsland but also included a small number elsewhere in Victoria that had been identified during the trace-forward operations undertaken during 1996. At this stage the offer was based on the premise that the program would only proceed if all affected producers were prepared to accept the offer. The form had to be signed and returned to Melbourne by 31 December 1996.
5.38 The level of compensation was determined by an "industry-based committee, being the forerunner of the Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee".37 The initial offer was refused. A higher offer of compensation was then made and the 33 producers signed agreements to destock in January 1997. The Victorian OJD Control Program was underway.
5.39 Towards the end of 1996, an ad hoc body was assembled by the then Minister for Agriculture called the Interim Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee. As agreed with the Victorian Farmers Federation, it had representation from:
a) Victorian Stud Sheep Breeders Association;
b) Sheepmeats Committee, Pastoral Group, Victorian Farmers Federation;
c) Wool Committee, Pastoral Group, Victorian Farmers Federation;
d) Quarantine and Animal Health Committee, Victorian Farmers Federation;
e) Victorian Stock Agents Association;
f) National Meat Association, Victorian Division; and the
g) Department of Natural Resources and Environment.
5.40 This interim Advisory Committee considered a draft control plan on 16 December 1997. By the end of a five hour meeting, a compensation and eradication plan had been approved.38
5.41 The interim Advisory Committee's plan, "An Industry Program to Achieve Eradication of Ovine Johne's Disease (OJD) from Affected Victorian Sheep Flocks" formed the basis for its second and "final offer to owners".39 The purpose for the program of controlling OJD was stated as "to eradicate it from the State sheep ... through a compulsory slaughter scheme for affected flocks". It required that all sheep, goats, deer and alpaca on properties that have had contact with infected sheep to be slaughtered and various levels of compensation offered per head of stock (according to whether a ewe, ram, lamb or wether) but not for "consequential loss nor replacement values". It also required that "All sheep including rams, must be removed from the properties in this summer period [ending 1 March, or by the 31 January to avoid missing an extra summer credit]".
5.42 The plan stated, "The Government is providing the first $1,000,000 to compensate owners for affected flocks." And, "The sheep industry will provide the funds to compensate the owners of flocks on further properties where infection is detected. The scheme to collect stamp duty and provide compensation would be along the lines of the cattle compensation scheme".
5.43 The letter outlining the program was dated 2 January 1997 and required signed agreements to be received by 6 January 1997. As noted above, this was the second letter to infected farmers - the first having been sent a couple of weeks earlier, on Christmas Eve. The commencement of the program over the Christmas and New Year period meant that producers were forced to make decisions at a time when it was very difficult to obtain professional advice on what was a momentous decision - whether or not to sign the destocking agreement. Such issues are further explored in Chapter 6.
The development of a control program that involved the use of eradication of OJD on known infected sheep properties by destocking with compensation appears reasonable, given the available information at the time, the support of the major relevant industry peak body and a funding source. The Committee, however, considers it totally unacceptable for access to such compensation to have been subject to a decision having to be made in less than one week of receiving a proposal, at a time when access to legal, financial and stock agent advice was difficult and with total destocking required in as little as four weeks.
5.44 According to Dr Millar, under the Victorian OJD Control Program a producer with an infected flock had two clear options:
a) to undertake a program to eliminate the infection from the property (by destocking), with financial assistance by way of compensation for sheep sent to slaughter; or
b) to manage the flock under strict quarantine and isolation from neighbouring flocks.40This view was reiterated by Mr Bailey, Manager Quality Assurance, while giving evidence on behalf of the Department: in answer to the question "Is it your understanding that in the period December 1996 to January 1997 this was actually a voluntary program, that people could choose whether or not to destock?" said "Yes, and that is why we asked people to sign an agreement to destock".41 Likewise Mr Black, Chairman of the Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, in response to the questions about whether destocking was compulsory or not, consistently replied that it was not compulsory.42
5.45 However, according to the East Gippsland Shire, most farmers identified as having OJD on their properties in the early stages of the Victorian OJD Control Program believed that they were offered no alternative to destocking.43 From evidence presented to the Committee, it is clear that this belief was shared by affected farmers in other parts of the State.44A pro forma letter under the letterhead of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment , dated 2 January 1997, was supplied to the Committee. This was used by the Interim Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee in making the offer of compensation to owners of OJD-affected flocks at that time. The letter describes the purpose of the Victorian OJD Control Program as being "to eradicate it from the State sheep flock and this can only be achieved through a compulsory slaughter scheme for affected flocks."
5.46 According to Dr Kefford, farmers were ordered to destock after they had already agreed to do so.45 He stated that the reason for this was to ensure that they were not liable for taxation on the compensation money. This, in Dr Kefford's opinion, may have given rise to the feeling that the scheme was operating in a compulsory fashion. Others, however, have stated that the taxation issue did not arise until some months later.46Several witnesses to the Inquiry seemed to be in no doubt that destocking, in their experience, was compulsory. For example, a producer from eastern Victoria said in his evidence to the Committee that his property was "compulsorily destocked in December 1996 in the first instance, when 2000 or so sheep were destocked, with 10 days notice. These included spring lambs and merino replacement ewes".47 A producer from the western part of the State had almost identical experience.48Indeed, the Committee was given to understand that the way in which the alternatives to destocking were presented to farmers during the first year of the Victorian OJD Control Program left them with no alternatives at all.
5.47 The Committee has already pointed out that, under the program developed by the Interim Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, the potential liability of farmers for spread of OJD from their properties was made clear. The Committee is aware that many producers considered that highlighting their legal liability to neighbours if they did not destock was unreasonable and threatening. This is, in fact, a common law liability - where an onus of proof has been established.49 However, the Committee's document goes on to say:
Producers who choose not to destock their properties under the above program must accept full responsibility for the legal ramifications associated with this decision. This includes accepting any financial responsibilities for the spread of OJD to another flock and indemnifying the Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee against the payment of compensation where the disease spreads from their property. Under this option, infected flocks will remain under full quarantine restrictions, and owners will be required to practise appropriate disease control procedures to minimise the risk of disease spread. Compensation will not be paid for sheep or goats under this option.50Destocking will be enforced where owners of infected flocks do not practise sound disease control procedures and expose other flocks to infection, or refuse to cooperate under either of the above options.51That is, in addition to having a liability for losses suffered by others from any proven spread of the disease, the agreement required the producer to also indemnify the Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee against paying compensation to other affected flocks. In the Committee's opinion, this exposed the producer to a considerably increased liability of possibly $100,000 for each abutting property, to cover compensation for destocking their animals. (While producers weren't offered an option of being placed under formal quarantine, other than by way of implied threat, the Committee notes that the producer may in fact have been better off being put under formal quarantine order.)52Moreover, if the decision to destock wasn't made in the very tight and, in the Committee's view, arbitrary timelines, any future access to compensation could be forfeited. Material supplied by a farmer in the Western District illustrates this point. The farmer, who was affected by the first year's program, provided the Committee with comments recorded by his lawyers at a meeting between Dr Turner, the then Chief Veterinary Officer, the farmer and his lawyers on 6 January 1997:
Should ... [the farmers name has been deleted by the Committee to protect his identity] refuse to enter into the voluntary agreement the Department could quarantine his farm to stop the further spread of the disease. A quarantine order is under section 11 of the Act ... The Department could then make an order for destruction and/or disposal under sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Should it be necessary to make such an order compensation may not be payable ... The offer has to be accepted today, or at the very least tomorrow morning.
5.48 It is not difficult to see that the voluntary "option" to not destock was offered in a manner that made it the only possible option for a farmer to choose.
5.49 Once the first summer's program had passed, the Department's aggressive and inflexible attitude appeared to be wavering. A graphic indication of this is provided by evidence given in media extracts provided to the Committee:53Stock and Land of 5 June [1997] states: Andrew Turner maintained this week that it was compulsory to destroy infected animals. In the same article Paddy O'Sullivan is quoted as saying: The intent of the scheme has never been to tell farmers what to do with their own animals. Ross Davies, advisor to Pat McNamara states: It is not compulsory to destroy sheep infected with OJD. ... a press release of 6 June [1997] from the pastoral group ... states: The Pastoral Group today reinforced its support for the compulsory eradication ... In the Stock and Land of 12 June Andrew Turner: ... confirms that destocking is voluntary.
5.50 On 14 May 1997 the Minister for Agriculture, the Hon. Pat McNamara, is quoted as saying that destocking was voluntary.54 He reiterated this view in evidence he gave to the Committee on 25 September 2000: "My view to the department and to the VFF always through the process was that it was going to be a voluntary program, but we were certainly encouraging people to go down the course and take the option of compensation." He went on, however, to say, "Certainly people within the department advised affected farmers of the options and I think, quite fairly, pointed out to them the liability if they had neighbours affected."
5.51 By the end of June 1997 the now statutory Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee had adopted a "Strategic Plan for the Control for Ovine Johne's Disease in Victoria". Its goal: "To progressively eliminate ovine Johne's disease infection in Victoria through the eradication of OJD on known infected sheep properties ..." It does, however, include a provision for "producers who choose not to destock their property." Several farmers have chosen this option. The Committee notes that the section in the Manual of Procedures on delivery of the Victorian OJD Control Program (as at February 1998) includes draft letters and contracts covering both eradication and quarantine options for use by field staff when dealing with affected producers in relation to test results and contracts. The Committee notes that the contract for "Control of Johne's Disease in Sheep" contains the words:
The objective of this agreement is for the parties [the Department and the owners of the property] to cooperate in a program to prevent the spread of ovine Johne's disease from this property, prior to the establishment of a program to eradicate this disease from the property.55A later section in this document indicates that eradication will be by destocking, that is:
The Department of Natural Resources and Environment agrees to undertake an investigation of the flock and property with a view to developing a program of eradication of ovine Johne's disease from the property. (This program will be based on destocking the property of sheep and goats and possibly deer or camilids for a continuous period which includes two summers, and will be the subject of further written agreement with the owner.)56
5.52 The Committee takes this pro forma contract as indicating that, by this date, producers had a clear choice to enter into quarantine rather than destocking, at least in the short term. However, the only way out of quarantine remained, and apparently still remains, eradication by destocking.
The Committee finds that for all intents and purposes, destocking was compulsory for affected farmers in the first year of the Victorian OJD Control Program. Changes to the Program in mid-1997 made an option of quarantine without eradication more accessible, but still offered this in a manner that, in the Committee's opinion, offered little real choice to farmers.
5.53 The Committee has received evidence that, before the Victorian OJD Control Program was initiated, affected producers in the Ensay district were involved in discussing their predicament with staff of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment and the Pastoral Group of the Victorian Farmers Federation.57Later consultation, though possibly well intentioned, was undertaken hastily and did not provide a voice for all those who would be affected by the Victorian OJD Control Program. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 6.
5.54 The Committee heard evidence of rumours to the effect that the Government had done a deal with the Victorian Farmers Federation by way of providing $1million to the OJD Control Program in return for the Federation not complaining about the Government's policy of closing regional veterinary laboratories and privatising the laboratory services.
5.55 An example of such evidence came from a wool-grower from Buchan: "the government did not want the Victorian Farmers Federation to protest against the closing of the veterinary labs. Industry rumours at the time were that a deal had been done between the Victorian Farmers Federation and the government".58 And from a Glenrowan producer: "A fortnight ago I spoke to a chap who was at the first OJD meeting in Pat McNamara's office in Benalla. It was at the time when they were closing the regional vet labs - to give them some employment".59
5.56 Dr Picken, of the Australian Veterinary Association, gave evidence that it was "well known in the profession that, presumably on Christmas Eve in 1996 when discussions occurred at VFF House between representatives of the department and the VFF - and read into it whatever you like - the government was concerned over the closure of the state labs, which was another issue that we had raised with the government, the minister in particular. Clearly the government, perhaps rightly or wrongly, in hindsight obviously wrongly, thought that if a deal could be done with the VFF, the VFF would go quietly about the state labs. We had already been pretty vocal about the state labs".
5.57 The notion of some kind of `deal' was rejected by the Department60and representatives of the Victorian Farmers Federation: " there was no deal done at all".61 In response to a question about whether the $1 million seed funding was allocated on the understanding that the Federation would go quiet on the closure of the government vet labs, Mr Pat McNamara, the former Minister, replied: "No, that is just bull dust. The closure - it was not the closure of the veterinary labs - the contracting out of the veterinary service occurred probably two years prior to that."62There does appear to be a link between the veterinary laboratories and the OJD $1 million. The Committee has a copy of correspondence from the then President of the Pastoral Group of the Victorian Farmers Federation to the Minister, dated 30 October 1996, in which he states: "Minister we appreciate your immediate offer to make finance available from the savings accruing from the veterinary laboratory tender."
5.58 The following outline of procedures is summarised from the Department of Natural Resources and Environment Manual of Procedures. This document is continually updated, with the section dealing with Johne's Disease in sheep last updated in February 1998. It is, in turn, based on the national Standard Definitions and Rules.
5.59 According to the Department of Natural Resources and Environment Manual of Procedures, the long-term objective of the Victorian OJD Control Program is: "to progressively eliminate sources of OJD infection in Victoria through the eradication of OJD on known infected sheep properties" and "to ensure a market assurance process is available to the industry in Victoria, and thereby, to minimise the impact of OJD on the Victorian sheep industry".
5.60 The details of the Victorian OJD Control Program are spelt out in a document "developed by the Sheep and Goat Advisory Committee" titled: A Strategic Plan for the Control of Ovine Johne's Disease in Victoria.
5.61 According to this document the strategic objectives of the Program are to:
a) define the extent of flock infection and detect and control spread where this has occurred;
b) progressively reduce the reservoir of OJD-infected animals and infected properties in Victoria;
c) ensure a source of low-risk replacement sheep for producers generally, and for producers restocking their properties following a property eradication scheme;
d) promote the use of voluntary vendor declarations which are meaningful and based on veterinary assessment of flocks or, preferably, the Market Assurance Program;
e) ensure the availability to all sectors of the sheep industry of accurate and sound advice on the disease, controlling its spread, the Victorian Control Program, and the Australian Sheep Johne's Disease Market Assurance Program; and
f) meet the criteria for declaring Victoria a Protected Zone for OJD, in accordance with the national Standard Definitions and Rules, at the earliest possible date.
5.62 The document then goes on to detail an array of strategies to achieve these objectives and details the manner in which it is proposed to implement these strategies.
5.63 The Committee was bemused that in response to questions about some of the objectives of the Plan relating to defining the extent of flock infection across the State, the representatives of the Sheep and Goat Advisory Committee could not answer and stated that: "All we do is advise the Minister on compensation matters." Moreover, they stated that they didn't have any input into the original documents (for the 1996-97 summer program), nor did they send them. 63The relevant document clearly indicates that it was prepared and sent out by the Advisory Committee. It seems to the Committee, in hindsight, that the representatives of the Advisory Committee are quibbling over semantics - on the basis that the statutory Advisory Committee was not formally constituted until May 1997. The Committee notes, however, that the interim Advisory Committee has the same bodies represented on it as the statutory Advisory Committee and, moreover, the actual membership of the two bodies is very similar - with Mr Black, the current Chairman, a member of the interim Advisory Committee as well as the statutory Advisory Committee.
5.64 As soon as a flock is confirmed as being infected, the Senior Veterinary Officer together with the District Veterinary Officer or Animal Health Officer is required to visit the property and require the owner to sign an agreement which effectively quarantines the farm and commits the farmer to work towards eradication. "If an owner refuses to sign this agreement, a [formal] Quarantine Notice is to be served prohibiting the entry and exit of all sheep, goats, deer and camelids without the permission of an Inspector."
5.65 The agreement `de facto quarantine' or the `formal' quarantine remains in place until the property is destocked and decontaminated.
5.66 The District Veterinary Officer is then required to inventory the stock on the property and investigate the likely source of infection, the prevalence of the disease, the opportunity for spread, past sheep movements and the layout of the farm, including potentially contaminated permanently wet and shaded areas.
5.67 The District Veterinary Officer, in consultation with the owner, prepares a `Property Disease Eradication Program', which is based on the property investigation and "must ensure that high risk stock ... [i.e. all sheep in mobs where there is clinical evidence of OJD and sheep on infected properties which cannot be satisfactorily separated from neighbouring flocks by an adequate barrier] are to be removed as soon as possible (within 8 weeks of diagnosis of OJD) and that all other susceptible species [i.e. sheep, goats, and deer other than fallow deer] are removed from the property according to an agreed program by 15 December in that year." Fallow deer and camilids are assessed on a case-by-case basis.
5.68 There is some discretion for the Senior Veterinary Officer to permit limited grazing of new sheep on destocked properties for short periods and for the sale of hay. Embryo transfer is permitted subject to "special embryo washing and processing procedures ... [to] prevent transmission of Johne's disease by embryo transfer."
5.69 Once a Property Disease Eradication Program is in place, a second agreement is required to be signed between the owner and the Department. This second agreement has to include a destocking time frame. If an owner wishes to opt out of the destocking program "they must accept full responsibility for the legal ramifications associated with this decision" and "the infected flocks will remain under full quarantine restrictions, and owners will be required to practise appropriate disease control procedures to minimise the risk of disease spread" - they need to sign an agreement accepting liability for disease spread or be subject to a formal quarantine notice.
5.70 The current provisions of the Manual of Procedures, as updated at February 1998, provides for the consideration of requests to extend the destocking period to finish prime lambs or shearing.
5.71 Once an infection is confirmed on a property, trace-back (to identify the source of the infection) and trace-forward (to identify the likely spread of the infection) information is collected. Traced properties, including neighbours of an infected property, are investigated with a view to:
a) "provide advice to the owners about OJD in sheep;
b) undertaking an investigation of the introduced animals and/or flock to detect evidence of OJD infection; and
c) placing an `Order to Isolate' on the traced sheep to restrict their contact with other flocks, and to prevent disposal of the traced sheep prior to the completion of diagnostic evaluation".
5.72 The current Manual of Procedures requirements, as updated at February 1998, require any property identified from a trace forward from infected flocks to be subject to, in summary:
a) slaughter of all sheep with post mortem and histopathology; or
b) blood testing of a `statistically valid' number of sheep and definitive testing of positives; or
c) three annual visits with targeted blood tests and post mortems.64Targeted blood testing involves collecting blood samples "from up to 50 carefully selected sheep, being the poorest of the mob and over 2 years of age. Sheep returning positive results ... must be slaughtered and subjected to appropriate histopathological examination." The number of sheep required to meet the `statistically valid' criteria is defined in the rules and guidelines of the Market Assurance Program, but the Committee understands typically involves testing 500 sheep from a larger flock.
5.73 Properties which have received mobs from infected flocks remain `under surveillance' until it has been demonstrated that the introduced sheep are uninfected, annual testing results prove negative over at least three years, or the flock is shown to be infected. No sheep from flocks classified as `under surveillance' should be certified for interstate movement, although there is some provision for discretion.
5.74 All "owners should be advised in writing of the results of all investigations as soon as possible" and the pro forma letters in the Manual of Procedures include clear statements about the nature of the testing: "as a screening procedure ... [it] cannot give absolute assurance that the flock is not infected at this time" and "no evidence of ovine Johne's disease has been detected as a result of investigations .... [but] it is important to stress the need to be vigilant for any signs of this disease in your flock or any sheep purchased in the future."
5.75 Purchases of sheep, particularly those buying breeding or store stock, are advised to seek a `Vendor Declaration' from the seller. The Victorian standard vendor declaration is identical to that used by NSW and based on the same process of stock assessment. The declarations are backed by the provision of the Stock (Sellers Liability and Declarations) Act 1993, which provides penalties for false declarations.
5.76 In accordance with provisions of the Sale of Land Act 1962, vendors of land that is subject to a written agreement or formal quarantine order must provide a statement to this effect to prospective purchasers.
5.77 As was outlined in Chapter 4, the Market Assurance Program is a voluntary national program. A flock with one or more negative tests is classified as `Monitored Negative' (MN) - the higher the MN status, i.e. MN1, MN2, MN3, the lower the risk. It has been available since 1997.
5.78 Compensation payments are available to "owners of infected properties who have entered into an Agreement to destock their properties according to an agreed eradication program. The per head rates range from $27 per wether to $180 for (a defined number of) rams.
5.79 In addition, if the destocked sheep are sold to slaughter, the slaughter value is retained by the owner.
5.80 The actual level of compensation paid for sheep slaughtered for OJD eradication is based on the advice of the Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee - a statutory committee under the Livestock Diseases (Control) Act 1984, consisting of representatives from the Victorian Stud Sheep Breeders Association, the Sheepmeats and Wool Committees of the VFF Pastoral Group, the VFF Quarantine and Animal Health Committee, the Victorian Stock Agents Association, the Victorian Division of the National Meat Association and the Department of Natural Resources and Environment
5.81 Since at least February 1998, owners of properties that have been destocked and completed the required decontamination period of two summers are encouraged by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment to purchase sheep for restocking by "requiring a written declaration from the vendor that JD is not known or suspected in their flock ... a vendor declaration based on some testing of the flock by an approved veterinarian is recommended." In its standard correspondence to producers, the Department also makes reference to the Market Assurance Program.65At December 1999 there were 115 flocks in Victoria that had tested to MN1 market assurance status, four that had MN2 status, with none at that date having reached MN3 status.66 This is 17 per cent of the total of 685 flocks tested Australia-wide under the Market Assurance Program to the end of 1999. The Committee heard evidence that some farmers were actively seeking such flocks, albeit that the desired level of genetic development may not be available.
5.82 Another strategy being used to locate low-risk replacement flocks is to source sheep from areas where no OJD is known, in conjunction with Vendor Declarations.
5.83 As at April 2000, 88 of the then 175 producers who had or were destocking were eligible to restock.67 The Committee has unsuccessfully attempted to identify exactly how many have restocked. From the evidence received during the Inquiry, many have done so, at least to some extent. Some farmers have converted to cattle enterprises and some have taken advantage of the Rural Finance Corporation's land aggregation program to leave farming altogether. The Corporation has been undertaking improvements on these properties and assessing them before they are offered for market. Some environmentally sensitive areas will not be sold but retained under State ownership.68The difficulty of obtaining `clean' replacement sheep of suitable quality was, however, a common concern raised with the Committee. For example, Ms H. Martin, Director, East Gippsland Shire, indicated to the Committee that some East Gippsland farmers, having completed the decontamination period after destocking, are restocking with sheep.69 There is reasonable expectation for these farmers that they can return to viable sheep production. However, Ms Martin said that "there are constant fears of reinfection and the whole cycle starting again." These issues are further discussed in Chapter 6.
Obtaining low-risk, and ideally OJD-free replacement sheep of equivalent genetic development to destocked sheep remains a major issue facing the Victorian OJD Control Program.
5.84 By December 1999, 2,535 flock investigations had been undertaken by the Department in 1,287 `high risk' flocks with 175 infected properties detected.70 This involved conducting 173,000 blood tests and 3,685 post-mortem investigations. For blood tests, the number of positive tests as a proportion of tests undertaken has shown a general tendency to fall since mid-1998. For post mortem tests, approximately 10 per cent gave a positive indication of OJD in 1997. This fell to 6-7 per cent then climbed again to 10 per cent in late 1999, when a node of infection was discovered in the Yea district. In other words, the general trend has been downward in the number of positive test results for a given amount of testing. This trend, according to Prowse, is usually an indication that the prevalence of a disease is declining.71
5.85 Surveillance was initiated in a number of abattoirs in Victoria by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment in early 1998, as a means of identifying the location of infection and, equally important, areas free of infection. 72 After the initial trials, surveillance was continued in the central Victoria abattoir and recommenced in May 2000 in another abattoir in western Victoria. Abattoirs that slaughter a significant number of aged sheep are targeted.
5.86 In the 12 months to 30 June 2000, 1870 lines had been inspected, comprising over 140,000 sheep, with one OJD-positive sheep detected. A further 180,000 sheep had been tested by the end of September 2000, with a further two infected lines detected. An additional two infected lines of Victorian sheep also have been reported from the NSW abattoir surveillance program - these two lines came from farms known to the Department as OJD-infected farms that were destocking.73The Department is planning to commence surveillance operations in two more abattoirs, one in the north of the State, the other in the west, in the near future, with the feasibility of operating in Melbourne abattoirs also being investigated. The Department has stated that given that around 2.8 million sheep are currently slaughtered in Victoria each year, the existing and planning surveillance program should cover over 70 per cent of adult sheep slaughtered. 74The Committee was told, during its Public Hearing on 7 August 2000, that there have now been 188 infected flocks identified and 169 have destocked or are in the process of destocking - that is, there are currently nineteen flocks in Victoria known to contain infected sheep.75 Over 660 flocks have been cleared from suspicion and can now trade normally.
Since the commencement of the Victorian OJD Control Program just under four years ago, the level of testing has significantly increased the level of knowledge on the distribution of OJD. With the associated effective quarantine of properties and destocking of known infected flocks, the Committee concludes that the Program has limited the potential spread of OJD that would otherwise have occurred.
An increase in abattoir surveillance will improve the knowledge of the distribution and prevalence of OJD in Victoria.
5.87 Much of the criticism that the Committee heard concerning the Victorian OJD Control Program related to the delivery of the Program.76 This will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, but a summary of concerns is given below.
5.88 According to the submission made by the East Gippsland Shire and producers from other parts of Victoria, major criticisms of the Victorian OJD Control Program include:
a) farmers being forced to make rapid decisions about destocking and to carry them out in a very short time. As a result, some experienced financial losses as they did not have time to shear, obtained poor prices from abattoirs or had to kill new-born lambs;
b) at the same time as farmers had haste imposed on them, there were delays in notifying them of the outcomes of tests;.there was also occasion for some farmers to doubt the results of tests;
c) no meaningful social support was provided to affected families or communities; and
d) information flow was inadequate, often contradictory and changed over time. 77The Shire noted that not all the Ensay farmers in the first group to destock felt that the first point applied to their experience.
5.89 It became evident to the Committee, through submissions, evidence provided at Public Hearings and its field inspections, that much of the financial difficulty, distress and social problems that have been attributed to the Victorian OJD Control Program had their roots in how the Program was delivered. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
5.90 The Committee was told that the Victorian Government provided the initial $1 million grant for compensation under the destocking programs, conditional on industry funding further compensation.78Apart from an initial grant of $1 million from the Government, funds are to be provided by industry. So far this has led to an industry debt of approximately $15.9 million to be repaid to the Government from funds collected through a stamp duty on sheep sales.79The Hon. Pat McNamara recalled: "The department found the $1 million and then obviously as flocks were identified and compensation had to be paid, if we had to draw on additional funds we estimated that there would probably be a payout at a higher level for the first two or three years - higher than the actual levy coming in - and we got the advance from Treasury. I cannot give the Committee the exact figure, but I think we had in the vicinity of about $3 million to draw on to fund the scheme so we could meet the compensation claims as they came through ... we said, `We will provide $1 million in seed funding to get the thing rolling'. I went back to cabinet and got a Treasury advance to fund the initial compensation. .... I think that climbed up to about $1 million or $2 million a year or it might be a bit above that now. ... The estimates we made at the time were that that would be sufficient to fund the program in the longer term."
5.91 The Chairman of the Sheep and Goat Advisory Committee, Mr Black, noted that "The borrowings from Treasury by the fund have been amortised over 10 years" and went on to say: "Such disease compensation schemes will always incur the major cost early in the life of the scheme, and collections over the life of the scheme." Difficulties in managing the fund were stated to be: "the unexpected average size of the flock, the disappointing initial revenue flow, and the number of flocks detected ... [with] the number of flocks as the third thing."80Mr Black also provided the Committee with details of the current position of the fund: "The compensation to date amounts to $16.029 million. The borrowings from the government are $15.9 million. We have a running balance of $3.2 million, which is to come off. We have current known liabilities to the Sheep and Goat Compensation Fund of $1.8 million. We have the non-destocked flock detected after 8 November of about 50 000 sheep ... The stamp duty collected for the year 1999-2000 is $1.282 million".81Mr Black was less forthcoming on predicting how long the current debt would take to pay off, stating that he believed that industry "would be pleased if the government would extend the time period that they have to pay back" but also went on to say that he also believed that "if an increase in the levy were proposed, it would be accepted [by industry]".82
5.92 According to Mr R. Roberts of the Sheep and Goat Advisory Committee, compensation has so far been paid on 428,000 sheep.83 If one assumes an average flock size of 3,000 sheep, this equates to a mean average of about $110,000 compensation per property.
5.93 The stamp duty is collected by the State Revenue Office, through agents, under the Stamps Act 1958. The revenue is paid into the Sheep and Goat Compensation Fund, which is administered by the Animal Health Operations Group of the DNRE at no cost to the Fund.
5.94 In addition to the Government's initial $1 million grant, the DNRE provided testing free of charge for sheep being purchased for restocking (up to 500 tests per flock). Its staff were required to undertake the substantial testing of suspect flocks to determine which flocks were infected (as indicated by the statistics previously outlined), develop the property-based eradication plans and provide information, advice and support for farmers on OJD, alternative enterprises and other difficulties (such as worms and footrot) that could become issues during restocking.84
5.95 The DNRE has estimated that its expenditure on OJD between late 1995 and June 2000 has been $3.5 million.85 This has been the cost of staff time, testing and surveillance. Research undertaken by the Department has cost a further $805,000.
5.96 The numbers of animal health staff employed for all animal health work in the State over the last decade is shown in Table 5.1.86
|
Date |
Head office |
Field staff |
||
|
Veterinarians |
Animal health officers |
Veterinarians |
Animal health officers |
|
|
June 1992 |
5 |
2 |
17 |
36.5 |
|
September 1995 |
6 |
2 |
21 |
34 |
|
September 2000 |
5.5 |
2 |
21 |
34 |
Source: Dr. B. Kefford (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, correspondence, VT/001/0001, dated 22 September 2000.
5.97 In addition, there have been approximately fourteen agricultural extension officers employed under a range of Departmental meat and wool programs during the period. The duties of these officers include running of Farm$mart seminars, now being promoted to OJD-affected farmers.87The Committee notes that the DNRE was required to meet the demands of the Victorian OJD Control Program without any additional resources.88 Indeed, its resources were, in effect, reduced as it was required to fund the initial $1 million committed by the Government for compensation.
The Victorian OJD Control Program, other than the mainly industry-funded compensation funding, was undertaken using existing Departmental funds and staffing. The Committee considers it commendable that the Departmental staff were able to undertake the level of investigations and testing achieved without any extra resources being applied.
At current rates of income and debt, the Sheep and Goat Compensation Fund appears unlikely to become self funding by the end of 10 years of operation.
5.98 According to Dr S. Hides, Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment , the animal health staff of the Department made considerable effort to explain OJD and the Victorian OJD Control Program to the farming community and the community in general.89 According to Dr Hides:
Very early in the program many OJD information sessions were initiated and provided by DNRE for the farming community at many locations. 90We [animal health staff] took any opportunity that was presented to us to explain the program and to provide some factual information about it because a lot of information was proliferating in the media at the time that was often difficult to reconcile with reality or with the facts.
5.99 Locations where these information sessions were provided included Ensay, Omeo, Benambra, Bairnsdale, Buchan, Woodside, Gifford West, Rosedale, Meeniyan, Boort, Woodhouse, Hamilton, Harrow, Koonongwotong, Motson, Willaura, Kyneton, Redesdale, Heathcote, Sutton Grange, Mia Mia, Elmore and Yea.91 Dr Hide told the Committee that more than one information session was offered at each location and some sessions were offered well beforeOJD was located in the district.
5.100 The Pastoral Branch of the Victorian Farmers Federation concluded, however, that the level of information provided to producers over the lifetime of the Victorian OJD Control Program was inadequate and varied between regions.92Financial and Social Support
5.101 Efforts to provide support for affected farmers have developed as the Victorian OJD Control Program progressed. Support was made available from:
a) The Rural Finance Corporation - including assistance towards the cost of preparing farm business management plans, and a concessional loan scheme for farmers who have destocked - see below;
b) Centrelink - including a farm family restart scheme, restart income support and grants, retirement assistance;
c) Rural Financial Counselling Program - a government-funded network of free, independent and confidential service to farmers and allied businesses; and the
d) Department of Natural Resources and Environment - farm$mart program.
5.102 The use and effectiveness of these programs are discussed in Chapter 11. Other support programs available include those offered by the community and industry groups as outlined in Chapter 6, respectively, the OJD Action Group and the Victorian Farmers Federation and the Office of Rural Affairs.
5.103 The Office of Rural Affairs (now the Office of Rural Communities) was established in 1986 with a broad charter of acting as a conduit between rural communities and government to influence government policy. It also has a role in establishing government programs and undertaking research and hosting forums and networks of rural people.
5.104 Evidence presented to the Committee by representatives of the Office of Community Affairs stated that "a key role of the Office of Rural Affairs has been to play a positive role in working with farming and rural communities in the change management process in order to minimise pain whilst promoting the adjustment necessary to adapt to a changing rural environment."93
5.105 When the Office became aware of the social and economic impact of OJD, it distributed information to the OJD Action Group, rural counsellors and animal health staff about support services available for families. These include the rural counsellors, the Rural Finance Corporation and Centrelink services. According to Mr J. Moloney from the Office of Rural Communities, it was not until July/August 1999 that discussions took place about developing a specific support service for those affected by OJD.94
5.106 The Office, through the DNRE, put out a tender for the provision of advice and counselling services for Victorian farm families affected by OJD in January 2000. The tender required an established infrastructure and registered counsellors. The actual nature of response was not specified in the contract but the tenderers were required to submit details of how they intended to respond to `critical incidents' - by way of a step-by-step process including timelines, communication methodology, debriefing arrangements and follow-up actions.95
5.107 Community Connections (Victoria) Ltd was the successful tenderer and commenced the service in February 2000. The objective was to provide a family counselling service as well as where requested to provide referrals to other agencies. It operates through a central phone number where a trained receptionist finds out "which shire or municipality the individual is from and then they will get permission for someone to contact the person". A local service provider on contract with Community Connections is then contacted and he or she makes contact with the caller "within 48 hours of the original phone call".96 The local agency would then make direct contact with the farming family and arrange an initial home visit. As at 20 June 2000, the service had been used by 21 people. 97OJD Loan Scheme
5.108 In addition to making existing government financial advisory services available, the Victorian Government has created a special loan scheme for affected farmers whose properties have been destocked. The Ovine Johne's Disease (OJD) Scheme is a concessional loan scheme. These loans are in addition to any compensation that may have been received as a result of destocking. "The purpose of the scheme is to provide funds for living expenses during the destocked period to avoid the erosion of compensation funds to enable maximum funds to be available for restocking in the future".98 As the Committee understands it, these funds would then be repaid once the farm income was re-established following restocking.
The Committee is disappointed that the Office of Rural Affairs, the agency with a specific charter to provide advice to government on rural needs and assisting farmers, did not begin to become involved in the OJD issue until over three years after the first OJD outbreak in Victoria. Its involvement appears too little, too late.
5.109 On 8 November 1999, the Government placed a moratorium on destocking with compensation, pending the outcome of the current Inquiry.99 This moratorium is subject to honouring commitments made prior to that date. Other aspects of the Victorian OJD Control Program continue - specifically tracing, testing for infection and restrictions on trading (quarantine and surveillance) to prevent spread of the disease.
5.110 Since 8 November 1999, compensation has been paid to owners of eight properties that had already entered into contractual arrangements.100With key parts of the Victorian OJD Control Program being suspended, the Committee has been presented with evidence concerning several effects of this moratorium. These include:
a) lobbying by some farmers with flocks found to be infected after the moratorium was announced, for access to financial assistance to destock;101concern among farmers that testing is continuing without the availability of compensation; 102
b) economic difficulties experienced by farmers with properties under quarantine where, because of the loss of potential income from compensation, their property values have fallen, while there are additional expenses associated with implementing quarantine requirements;103refusal by some producers to allow `suspect' flocks to be tested while there is uncertainty over future availability of compensation.104Appeals Processes
5.111 Extensive negotiations on an appeals process occurred between the Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, the OJD Action Group, the Victorian Farmers Federation Pastoral Group and other interested groups prior to August 1999. However, agreement was not reached before the State election was called in Victoria in that year and negotiations were suspended.105 Renewed negotiations with respect to this process have now been put on hold, pending the outcome of this Inquiry.
1 Johne's Disease was declared a notifiable disease in the mid-1920s, following the first identification of the disease (in cattle) in Victoria. The bovine and ovine strains of the disease are not separately scheduled.
2 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1995).
3 Exotic diseases are those that the Governor-in-Council declare to be an exotic disease.
4 Livestock Diseases Control Act 1994, and subsequent amendments.
5 Livestock Diseases Control Act 1994 , S. 7(1)(c) amended by No. 58/1997 s. 96(Sch. item 6.1).
6 Livestock Diseases Control Act 1994, and subsequent amendments.
7 Livestock Diseases Control Act 1994 , S. 107C(2) amended by No. 83/1998 s. 12(c).
8 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director Agriculture, Written Submissions, OJD 087.
9 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director Agriculture, Written Submissions, OJD 087.
10 Millar, H. (2000), Control of Ovine Johne's Disease in Victoria, unpublished briefing paper prepared for the Natural Resources and Environment Committee, April 2000, p. 1.
11 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director Agriculture, Written Submissions, OJD 087.
12 Millar, H. (2000), p. 1.
13 Roth, I. (2000), Program Manager - Wool and Sheep Meat Services, NSW Agriculture; personal communication, 13 October 2000.
14 Victorian Farmers Federation - Pastoral Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 084.
15 Victorian Farmers Federation - Pastoral Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 084.
16 Victorian Farmers Federation - Pastoral Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 084.
17 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
18 For example, Blennerhassett, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 001, Livingston, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 005.
19 Millar, H. (2000), pp. 1-2.
20 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
21 Millar, H. (2000), p. 1.
22 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
23 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
24 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
25 Bailey, P. J. (2000), Director, Quality Assurance, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000; and also Newcomen, E. and D. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 058.
26 Newcomen, B. (2000) Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000.
27 Newcomen, E. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 17 May 2000.
28 Turner, A. J. (2000), former Chief Veterinary Officer, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
29 The Hon. Pat McNamara became Minister for Agriculture in April 1996.
30 Victorian Farmers Federation - Pastoral Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 084.
31 Victorian Farmers Federation - Pastoral Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 084.
32 Millar, H. (2000), p. 1.
33 Millar, H. (2000), p. 1.
34 Bailey, P. J., (2000), Director, Quality Assurance, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
35 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
36 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
37 Millar, H. (2000), p. 1.
38 Correspondence signed by Mr David Pollock, the Executive Director of the Victorian Stock Agents Association as quoted in Gutheridge, N. J. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 075.
39 Interim Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee (1997), Industry Program to Achieve Eradication of Ovine Johne's Disease (OJD) from Affected Victorian Sheep Flocks, letter to `owners of flocks affected with Ovine Johne's disease', 2 January 1997.
40 Millar, H. (2000), p. 2.
41 Bailey, P.J. (2000), Director Quality Assurance, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
42 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
43 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, Written Submissions, OJD 006.
44 For example, Wood, I. (2000), Chairman OJD Action Group, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
45 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
46 OJD Action Group submission addendum.
47 Wood, I. (2000), Chairman OJD Action Group, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
48 Tobin, R. and F. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 063.
49 Denholm, Ottaway, Cornish and Merton (1997); and also; Denholmn, L. (2000), NSW Agriculture, personal communication, 8 June 2000.
50 Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee (1997).
51 Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee (1997).
52 When placed under formal Quarantine Order, the affected producer's common law liability may be restricted by way of meeting any prescribed conditions of the Quarantine Order.
53 Tobin, F. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 21 June 2000.
54 Report of meeting provided by Tobin, F. (2000), Chair, OJD Action Group, 23 June 2000.
55 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1995), p. 6.5.27.
56 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1995), p. 6.5.27.
57 Bray, W. S. (2000), President , Pastoral Group, Victorian Farmers Federation, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
58 Bolitho, W. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 18 May 2000.
59 Burton, R. (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 13 June 2000.
60 Turner, A. J. (2000), former Chief Veterinary Officer, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
61 Bray, W. S. (2000), President, Pastoral Group,Victorian Farmers Federation, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
62 In evidence presented to the Committee on 25 September 2000.
63 Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee (2000), Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
64 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1995), p. 6.5.13.
65 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1995), p. 6.5.23.
66 Kennedy and Allworth (2000), p. 7.
67 Millar (2000).
68 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, personal communication, 29 September 2000
69 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, Written Submissions, OJD 006.
70 Millar, H. (2000), pp. 6-7.
71 Prowse (2000), pp. 9-10; and also Prowse, S. (2000), Program Manager, Infectious Diseases and Food Safety, Australian Animal Health Laboratories, CSIRO, Geelong, personal communication, 17 March and 12 April 2000.
72 Millar, H. (2000), pp. 6-7.
73 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, correspondence, VT/001/0001, dated 22 September 2000.
74 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, correspondence, VT/001/0001, dated 22 September 2000.
75 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
76 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, Written Submissions, OJD 006; and also Wood, I. (2000), Chairman OJD Action Group, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000; and also Kyenton Prime Livestock Producers Group (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 095.
77 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, Written Submissions, OJD 006; and also Wood, I. (2000), Chairman OJD Action Group, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
78 Galvin, J. (2000), Manager, Animal Health Operations, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
79 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
80 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
81 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
82 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
83 Roberts, R. E. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
84 Millar, H. (2000), p. 2.
85 Kefford. B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, correspondence, VT/001/0001, received 22 September 2000.
86 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, correspondence, VT/001/0001, received 22 September 2000.
87 Department of Natural Resources and Environment (2000).
88 Kefford, B. (2000), Executive Director, Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
89 Hides, S. (2000), Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
90 Hides, S. (2000), Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
91 Hides, S. (2000), Senior Veterinary Officer, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
92 Bray, W. S. (2000), President , Pastoral Group, Victorian Farmers Federation, Minutes of Evidence, 24 July 2000.
93 Moloney, J. (2000), Office of Rural Communities, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
94 Moloney, J. (2000), Office of Rural Communities, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
95 Department and Natural Resources and Environment (2000), Request for Tender For the Provision of Advice and Counselling Services for Victorian Farm Families Affected by Ovine Johne's Disease, Tender No T11599
96 O'Brien, D. (2000), Team Leader, Community Connections, Minutes of Evidence, 4 June 2000.
97 O'Brien, D. (2000), Team Leader, Community Connections, Minutes of Evidence, 4 June 2000.
98 Department of Natural Resources ad Environment (2000).
99 Millar, H. (2000), p. 9.
100 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
101 For example, Shea, R. A. and M. M. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 082; and also Millar, H. (2000), p. 10.
102 Livingston, B. (2000), Written Submissions, OJD 005.
103 Martin, H. (2000), Director, East Gippsland Shire Council, Written Submissions, OJD 006.
104 Black, R. P. R. (2000), Sheep and Goat Compensation Advisory Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 7 August 2000.
105 Tobin F. (2000), Chairman, OJD Action Group, personal communication, 20 June 2000.
